Matthew Kroenig argues nuclear superiority, “a military nuclear advantage over an opponent,” matters—especially for the United States (3). Nuclear superiority requires more than the possession of a secure second-strike capability. As he explains, nuclear superiority is a situation in which a state’s expected costs in a nuclear war are lower than its adversary’s, even if the expected costs are high for both states.

Kroenig states, “A robust nuclear posture reduces a state’s expected cost of war, increasing its resolve in international political disputes, and thus providing it with a coercive advantage over states more vulnerable to a nuclear exchange” (3–4). He makes four contentions: a US posture of nuclear superiority is more likely to contribute to international stability than a position of nuclear parity; there is no observable link between the size of the US nuclear arsenal and the proliferation of nuclear weapons among other states; nuclear arms races are uncommon and have sometimes proved to be advantageous to the United States; and a robust US nuclear force is costly, but affordable. In addition, the US nuclear arsenal must support extended deterrence commitments to more than thirty other states, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. These arguments are supported by many references to the literature and original quantitative analysis.

One of Kroenig’s more interesting points is that, regardless of academic debates, actual US nuclear strategy and force structure have been based on the assumption that relative nuclear advantage matters. Forces in excess of the minimum requirements for assured destruction or assured retaliation have been deployed during and after the Cold War, partly on the assumption that a state with superior nuclear capabilities will have an advantage in a competitive brinkmanship during a nuclear crisis. But it is also true forces within American domestic politics have driven much of this nuclear buildup during and after the Cold War.

More than one US secretary of defense has found congressional interest in weapons systems as a challenge to rational defense planning. In addition, the assumption that larger nuclear forces necessarily confer advantages in coercive bargaining is contested by some of the important research literature. The historical research and quantitative analysis of Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, for example, found, “Compellent threats from nuclear states have not been more successful than threats from nonnuclear states, even after accounting for other factors that influence coercive diplomacy outcomes. Moreover, this finding is robust to a wide variety of measurements of nuclear superiority,

Another issue is whether nuclear superiority can be conceptualized as narrowly as a relative military advantage over the opponent. Qualitative issues, including the character and experience of a state’s political and military leadership, are also important in the bargaining games of nuclear deterrence and compellence. It mattered that the more experienced John F. Kennedy was in charge during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, compared to the less experienced John F. Kennedy who presided over the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. Kennedy had learned important lessons about crisis management in the intervening months including the need to test expert opinion and policy advocacy against the realities of brinkmanship and the expected costs of a nuclear war even for the winner. Studies of the Cuban missile crisis have shown US participants were less impressed by their relative nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union than they were by the absolute destruction that might be inflicted on the United States by Soviet missiles launched from Cuba—even if more destructive US responses against the Soviet Union were to follow.

In discussing these matters, it is also necessary to keep in mind the distinction between nuclear declaratory and employment policies. America’s nuclear employment policy has usually called only for capabilities in excess of deterrence, including limited nuclear options, intrawar deterrence, escalation control, and escalation dominance, as well as war termination under favorable circumstances. Accordingly, US nuclear targeting has included enemy nuclear forces, leadership and command and control systems, conventional military forces, and economic industrial recovery targets. The challenge has been matching available policy guidance, which is sometimes vague, to national strategy as understood in the defense establishment and then to specific war plans and target assignments. But the paradox was the more ambitious the plans and employment policies, the more demanding were the requirements placed upon the command and control systems—arguably more vulnerable and fragile to imminent destruction than the forces themselves.

In this regard, the author might have better served his purpose by arguing nuclear superiority should not be conflated with larger numbers of offensive weapons. True nuclear superiority would require meaningful advantages in offensive weapons together with preclusive defenses that would limit the other side’s second-strike retaliation to acceptable levels—as well as flexible and enduring command and control systems and substantial capabilities for intrawar deterrence and escalation dominance. On the other hand, a self-evident US sprint for nuclear superiority could encourage compensatory responses from Russia and China, including the possibility of a renewed arms race. There is no last move in strategy, nuclear or otherwise.

America’s nuclear policy and force structure are parts of a larger national policy and strategy matrix. In this regard, nuclear strategic planning will have to grapple with the need to preserve US military advantages in the commons of space and cyberspace—for example, future space-based weapons could be used as interceptors for boost-phase missile defenses, and left-of-launch cyberweapons have already
been employed against ballistic missile launch sites. Space enables US command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance on which both nuclear and conventional forces depend. Therefore, an integrated cross-domain strategy for deterrence and defense with nuclear and conventional weapons will require hard choices about investments.

True nuclear superiority as defined above is not “over the horizon” for American or other nuclear weapons states, and not only because of daunting technical challenges in the way. There is also humanity to consider. Even small nuclear wars are perverse contradictions of the relationship between war and politics that Clausewitz emphasized. Beyond deterrence, there is only uncertainty. Notwithstanding these caveats, this study is worthwhile for military professionals and for other students of national security policy in challenging nuclear deterrence and arms control orthodoxy. Kroenig forces us to think more clearly about how much is enough.

The West’s East: Contemporary Baltic Defense in Strategic Perspective

By Lukas Milevski

Reviewed by Mr. Ben S. Wermeling, a graduate of George Washington University’s master of arts program in security studies and a Department of Defense contractor

Even after entering the European Union and NATO, the Baltic countries have rarely been part of the West’s strategic calculus. This focus changed in 2014 due to Russian aggression in Ukraine, which Moscow attempted to justify by claiming its actions were in the interest of Ukraine’s Russian minority. Fearing similar Russian designs on their vulnerable members, analysts within the NATO defense community quickly made the study of the Baltic region and its security a top priority. Lukas Milevski notes there has not yet been a comprehensive study of Baltic defense from a strategic perspective informed by the geopolitical history of the region. His book, The West’s East, aims to provide such a study. Informed by this analysis, Milevski argues preparing to defend the Baltic states is in NATO’s best interest because assuming Russia will not attack is wishful thinking rather than strategy.

The book begins with a succinct summary of the Baltic region’s geopolitics and history. Even prior to the existence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the region was composed of small states struggling to maintain their independence from more powerful neighbors. Throughout the overview, several themes, such as the active role these countries play in securing and maintaining their independence, are emphasized. Another theme relates to the circumstances in which the Baltic states can maintain their independence. Historically, the countries could be independent if the great powers surrounding the states were weakened or disinterested.

The aftermath of World War I exemplifies these themes. The newly independent Baltic states used military force to fend off German and
Russian attempts at reconquest. The victory was possible due to the status of the regional powers. Russia was wracked by civil war, and Poland was defending itself from Russia. Meanwhile, Germany was in the process of surrendering and handling internal unrest.

Finally, Milevski emphasizes the varying strategic significance of the Baltic Sea. At times, the region was an open and transitory route for shipping valuable materials from Eastern Europe’s hinterland. But the sea could also be blockaded for economic pressure. Another feature is the contrast of sanctuary versus vulnerability. For the German navy during the World Wars, the Baltic Sea offered a sanctuary from its stronger counterparts; however, modern long-range precision weaponry turned it into a place of danger.

A set of historical analogies currently employed to understand the current situation in the Baltics is also provided. One analogy compares Russia’s foreign policy to that used by Nazi Germany to claim territories with large ethnic German populations. Another involves Russian President Vladimir Putin and the late Soviet leader Yury Andropov. Milevski argues these analogies are especially useful to policymakers unfamiliar with the region’s history. Although this is a unique approach, the necessity of such depth is unclear considering the author views analogies as having limited utility.

The book also addresses the strategic dispositions of countries in the eastern Baltic region and in NATO. In addition to Russia and the NATO countries, the book analyzes the potential role and capabilities of Sweden and Finland, which are sometimes overlooked. Of note is the consideration of the nonmilitary vulnerabilities of the Baltic states, namely, demographic decline, Russian energy reliance, propaganda, and subversion. The section on Russia begins with an examination of Russian geopolitical thought and strategic culture. Milevski writes the current tenor of geopolitical thought emphasizes Russia’s unique position as a Eurasian power, as well as themes of defense from instability and a perceived threat of Western aggression. Moscow’s attempts to sow discord among Russians living in the Baltic states are the focus of the section on Russia’s regional policy. A final section discusses Russian military reforms and recent operations in Syria and Ukraine.

With this information, the author assesses military strategy in a hypothetical war between Russia and NATO over the Baltic. Although deterrence would be preferred, it is an uncertain prospect. In the event of a conflict, Milevski believes the warfare strategy used in Ukraine, is unlikely to succeed due to less favorable circumstances in the Baltic. Moscow, therefore, will likely prefer a conventional invasion that disrupts the balance of forces in the Baltic and allows Russia to deny or hinder NATO attempts to access the region.

A strength of the book is the consideration of the political implications of such a hypothetical conflict, which could also leave NATO at a disadvantage. From this perspective, the Alliance would need to consider the risks of potentially escalatory strikes on Russian territory versus leaving it as a sanctuary. The Alliance would likely struggle to terminate a war favorably even if the Baltics were secured, as Russia may have few incentives to stop fighting.
The conclusion of the book analyzes NATO’s Baltic defense requirements through the lens of a strategic theory developed by scholar Colin S. Gray. Considerations in the event of a conflict that are briefly elaborated on include political goals, doctrine, and logistical challenges. Given Russia’s strong regional capabilities and its possibly hostile intentions, Milevski concludes it is prudent to be prepared for full-scale war. While Milevski’s observation provides a reasonable analysis and conclusion, it provides little guidance on actual requirements.

_The West’s East_ has numerous strengths. Most notable is the comprehensive nature of the research, which encompasses geopolitics, history, the status of regional militaries, and strategic analysis. Each of these perspectives offers unique insights that could have been missed if Milevski had only focused on contemporary diplomacy and military operations.

But there are several shortcomings. A geographical overview of the region is strangely placed at the very beginning of the book. The status of Belarus is given limited consideration despite its potentially important role in the region. A deeper analysis of the hypothetical war would have been useful, but perhaps is more in the realm of tactics rather than strategy. Despite these modest problems, the book is an impressive and timely strategic analysis that is recommended reading for all who are examining Baltic security issues.
Nonstate conflict dominates contemporary discourse on war and peace yet a comprehensive framework for understanding the dynamics of insurgencies, revolutions, and national movements—collectively known as rebels. Some rebellions succeed and others fail. Many factions, competing groups, and challengers seek to dominate rebel movements. In Rebel Power, Peter Krause, an assistant professor of political science at Boston College and a research affiliate in the MIT Security Studies program looks at the factors that determine who wins and loses in one form of rebellion: national movements.

Specifically, Krause assesses the organizational factors contributing to the success of national movements. To do so he employs four case studies of well-documented national movements: two that succeeded and two that have yet to achieve their full goals but have experienced partial successes. The cases examined are Israel, Palestine, Algeria, and Ireland. In Israel, the Zionist movement was successful. Conversely, the Palestinian national movement has yet to achieve its goals. The Algerian national movement dealt a death knell to Algérie Française, while the Irish nationalist movement achieved a moderate success with the establishment of the Irish Free State and the Irish Republic but has yet to achieve a united Ireland despite experiencing a limited success in the Good Friday Agreement (1988).

Krause’s scholarship is impeccable. He looks at four well-known national movements through an analysis of 40 groups in 44 campaigns over 140 years of nationalist aspirations and struggle. The result is well-documented and articulated support for his theory of rebel organizational prowess and power known as Movement Structure Theory. He relies upon a comprehensive blend of fieldwork that includes interviews with members of the nationalist movements such as Zohra Drif, the milkbar bomber from the Battle of Algiers; Irish republican Gerry Adams; Palestinian activist Leila Khaled; and Irgun member Yoske Nachmias. These interviews are augmented by studies, archival sources (both primary and secondary) and detailed modeling of the timelines of success and failure. For Krause, the success or failure of a national movement is determined by the relative power of its constituent groups. Internal balance of power rather than ideology and external factors are more likely to determine a movement’s outcomes. Four types of organizational actors are identified: hegemons, leaders, challengers, and subordinates.

The text is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1, “Power Violence, and Victory,” provides an introduction, identifies the shortfalls of competing theories, provides definitions and describes the research design. Chapter 2, “Why National Movements Compete, Fight,
and Win,” elaborates on Krause’s Movement Structure Theory, the importance of power relationships within the national movement, success, failure, and the instrumental use of violence. The roles of hegemonic groups in defining a movement’s purpose that lead to a “hegemonic movement” capable of moderating violence is crucial. Fragmented movements comprised of strong leading groups (leaders) with competitors (challengers) and subordinates (weak participants) are less likely to succeed and more likely to act as spoilers using violence to strengthen their position and to gain relative political strength.

The case studies are presented in the following four chapters. Each of these succinctly presents the timeline of organizational struggle and relative success with the respective national movements. The cases are terse and analytically sound. What they miss in color commentary and detail they more than make up for in analytical rigor. While at times dense, the ample use of tables and figures summarizing the movements’ revolutionary progress makes the argument accessible and illuminates the cases.

Chapter 3, “The Palestinian National Movement: The Sisyphean Tragedy of Fragmentation,” shows how the Palestinian Movement has been limited by internal struggles for power and domination leading to a series of failures punctuated by moderate successes when a hegemon (Fatah) dominated the movement. Chapter 4, “The Zionist Movement: Victory Hanging in the Balance,” looks at the conditions that led the Haganah to become the hegemonic ruler and control their rivals the Irgun and Stern Gang (Lehi) and consolidate power at the founding of the State of Israel.

Chapter 5, “The Algerian National Movement: The Long, Bloody March to Hegemony,” tells the story of the ultimate success of the National Liberation Front (FLN) in gaining Algeria’s independence from France. The Algerian revolution was bloody and only through brutally suppressing competing factions and conducting spoiling attacks on civilians was the FLN able to gain hegemonic status. The Battle of Algiers was won by France but the aftermath was exploited by the FLN. The hegemonic lock on power gave the FLN the stature needed to gain international support and a seat at the bargaining table with the Métropole in Evian. The rhythm of fragmentation and violent contest is described ably in the text, figures, and tables.

Chapter 6, “The Irish National Movement: Where You Stand Depends Upon Where You Sit,” looks at the Irish nationalist and republican movements and their internal competition for power. It describes the conditions where Sinn Féin held hegemonic control over the movement that led to a moderate success in the establishment of the Irish Free State. The years of fragmented intramovement competition that persisted through The Troubles were partially reversed when Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Army became hegemonic and embraced nonviolent political action.

Chapter 7, “The Politics of National Movements and the Future of Rebel Power,” provides a conclusion, summarizing each of the cases studies and associated variables. It also discusses potential gaps in the theory and provides suggestions for future research. All in all, the text is an excellent contribution to understanding the internal dynamics
of nationalist movements and their prospects for success under disparate conditions.

As the case studies make clear, the French, British, and Israeli intelligence services recognized the weaknesses deriving from internal fragmentation and sought to exploit them. When a group overcame these internal struggles and gained supremacy, they demonstrated the ability to govern and gained a seat at the bargaining table. Policymakers, senior strategic leaders, intelligence analysts, and hopefully war college students will read the lessons and apply them to their strategic intelligence assessments.

The Sword’s Other Edge: Trade-offs in the Pursuit of Military Effectiveness
Edited by Dan Reiter

Reviewed by Dr. Benjamin Jensen, associate professor at the Marine Corps University Command and Staff College and Scholar-in-Residence at the American University School of International Service

This edited volume complements the literature on military effectiveness in political science and history. The editor, Dan Reiter, has been at the forefront of debates about the attributes of effective military organizations along with Allan Stam, Risa Brooks, Elizabeth Stanley, Caitlin Talmadge, Jason Lyall, Austin Long, Jenna Jordan, and Stephen Biddle. Similarly, historians have long examined major campaigns, with a particular emphasis on the Second World War, to identify what makes effective military organizations. This question is central to the military profession and should be explored across the professional military education continuum.

The book’s major contribution involves trade-offs in its pursuit of military effectiveness that fall into three categories: political support, security threats, and warfighting. Multiple chapters explore political support as it relates to domestic politics and how gaining support for contemporary security operations comes at the expense of important constraints and restraints. Trade-offs with respect to security threats are treated broadly as seen in Rosella Cappella Zielinski’s analysis of how war financing affects public support and an array of political and economic challenges beyond the battlefield.

With respect to warfighting, chapters by Jason Lyall and Michael Horowitz explore how tactical-level necessities, from political officers motivating troops to the susceptibility of unmanned systems to hacking and spoofing, can generate suboptimal returns at the strategic level. The book also explores critical trade-offs at the level of campaign plans: how military effectiveness can create escalation traps. Caitlin Talmadge’s chapter is a particularly important reminder of the value of escalation control and how military effectiveness could lead to strategic failure and nuclear exchange.

The book points to the need for a larger research agenda on military effectiveness. Despite the wealth of literature on the subject, there are still open questions and major conceptual issues that warrant
further investigation. First, future work could explore the extent to which adaption and military innovation are hallmarks of effective organizations, and what factors produce more flexible and creative military bureaucracies. Second, future efforts could explore strategic mismatches such as the difficulty military organizations confronted when learning in Iraq and Afghanistan and the larger relationship between strategy and campaign planning.
Redefining the Modern Military: The Intersection of Profession and Ethics
Edited by Nathan K. Finney and Tyrell O. Mayfield

Nathan K. Finney and Tyrell O. Mayfield, active duty officers in the US Army and US Air Force respectively, have leveraged their network of national security authors from the Military Writers Guild and The Strategy Bridge to produce a unique assessment of contemporary Western military service as a profession. This assortment of academics and officers from four countries do not collaborate to provide a coherent or consistent evaluation of contemporary military professionalism. Rather, each provides their perspective on some aspect of the evolving and somewhat amorphous topic to provide the reader an opportunity to reflect on the condition of the profession and why that status matters.

The editors divide the collection of essays into two parts. Part 1 describes or elucidates some aspect of the military professional ethic. Pauline Shanks-Kaurin argues military professionalism is an aspirational goal whose value is more in motivating one to strive nobly than in codifying a baseline standard. Thus, a hallmark of a true professional is questioning and redefining the essence and limits of the profession. Jo Brick, a lawyer for the Australian Army, examines the centrality of trust in the military profession by drawing from her deep understanding of fiduciary law. She shows how military professionals have a special obligation to maintain the trust of society, the profession’s client. Casey J. Landru provides a concise history of the changes in the American military profession from the World War II through the post-Cold War. He demonstrates the profession must change as the society it serves and the character of war continually change. Hugh Michael “Mike” Denny Jr. argues from his combat experience that the mark of a true professional is knowing when to break the rules. While many will rightly question how much is to be learned from one engagement, Denny shows the importance of military professionals applying guided reflection as they mature into positions of greater influence in the profession.

Perhaps, the true mark of a professional is knowing how to prevent conditions in which subordinates feel compelled to be insubordinate. Tony Ingesson, a former Swedish Army officer, challenges the value of the military desiring the status of a profession. He argues military decision-making is sufficiently distinct and noble from that of standard professions and that servicemembers should embrace their distinctiveness and eschew the needless label of “professional.” Rebecca Johnson closes out part 1 by examining the relationships and obligations of the military profession, the professionals it comprises, and the society it serves. Her incorporation of the ethical responsibilities of the client towards the profession expands the understanding of the military profession in important ways.
The authors contributing to part 2 illuminate the role of education in developing and conveying the professional ethic described in part 1. William M. Beasley Jr. opens with an overview of the evolution of professional military education in the US Navy from the era of steam-powered propulsion to contemporary challenges, arguing each service is a distinct profession with distinct expert knowledge. He critiques the Navy’s prioritization of technical seamanship over the intellectual demands of maritime strategy.

Simon Anglim, from the United Kingdom, contends education steeped in history, politics, and culture is indispensable for military professionals to understand the world and its people. Such understanding develops the narrative that explains why the military is employing violence on society’s behalf. A military professional’s education must also address the ethics that govern the use of violence, the doctrine that prescribes its employment, and the methods for integrating joint and interagency partners.

Raymond A. Kimball argues from his military experience that mentoring is as essential as education in conveying the professional ethic from one generation to the next. Exploring literature of workplace mentoring, he argues military services should not force mentoring relationships but rather should invest in creating the places that draw professionals together and encourage the mentor-protégé relationships to emerge. Steven L. Foster, another US Army officer, provides a broad overview of the origins of military professionalism and a personal assessment of the current status. He concludes that despite recent emphasis, the status of the US Army as a profession is very much in question. He whimsically hopes potential changes in personnel management systems and leader development programs will change the Army’s culture and inspire a needed professional renaissance.

Holly Hughson uses her experience as a humanitarian aid worker to maintain military professionals charged with managing violence share an ethic with professionals who mitigate violence. Although shared experiences in dangerous places provide an insufficient basis for forging a shared identity, she rightly insists military professionals in the twenty-first century should anticipate the employment of their expert knowledge to be increasingly impacted by others interested in, but not experts in, that knowledge. Brian Laslie concludes part 2 by examining the development of the US Air Force’s professional identity and thus provides an interesting bookend to Beasley’s description of the US Navy’s professional military education that began part 2. Laslie describes how pilots solved the oxygen deprivation problem that grounded the F-22 fleet in 2011 and 2012, how the missile community recovered from the 2014 cheating scandal, and how the drone pilot community developed out of necessity. From these cases, Laslie claims the Air Force’s professional ethic remains rooted in the insubordination (euphemistically called pragmatic professionalism) of Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell. This culture, he argues, enables the service’s stovepiped communities to find independent solutions to independent problems without relying on the service’s cumbersome bureaucracy.

Despite the wide variance of the authors’ experiences and training, a few themes recur throughout the book. Most of the authors rely on Samuel P. Huntington’s *The Soldier and the State* (1957) as the foundation
for exploring military professionalism. Although none of the authors sought to address civil-military relations between senior generals and civilian policymakers, their collective recognition of Huntington as the touchstone of military professionalism endorses Eliot A. Cohen’s assessment of Huntington’s theory of objective civilian control as the normal model embedded in contemporary understanding of civil-military relations.

The editors emphasize the roles of Morris Janowitz and Sir John Hackett, alongside Huntington, in defining the profession. But the contributing authors pay them infrequent lip service. Throughout the book, the authors collectively emphasize developing and safeguarding trust within the profession and with the society client it serves. They advocate that to be a profession, servicemembers must develop and convey a unique body of knowledge and corresponding ethic. These reminders seem quite timely in this era of rapidly evolving and diffusing technology, polarizing social and political views, and swelling fiscal constraints.

The editors of this volume have done the profession a great service by collecting and refining the ideas in this volume. They have not sought to develop a coherent and consistent assessment of the profession and thus tell us what we should think of its status and future. Rather, they have gathered contributors who disagree with one another without trying to win a debate. Thus, each contributor has added to the conversation in a unique and helpful way and they have collectively reminded military professionals and educators of their responsibility to join them in developing and conveying the profession’s expert body of knowledge and ethic.

Policing Sex and Marriage in the American Military: The Court-Martial and the Construction of Gender and Sexual Deviance, 1950–2000

By Kellie Wilson-Bufford

Reviewed by Dr. Daniel Beaudoin, professor of conflict resolution, civil-military relations and humanitarian diplomacy, Tel Aviv University, Israel

Kellie Wilson-Bufford’s Policing Sex and Marriage in the American Military: The Court-Martial and the Construction of Gender and Sexual Deviance, 1950–2000 makes an original and incisive sociohistorical and legal contribution to the understanding of civil-military relations in the United States. Much of the academic literature in the field of military studies turns around hard questions of mission preparedness, strategy, weapon systems, training, cyberwarfare, and force protection.

Contrarily, Wilson-Bufford’s refreshing work focuses on the sociological and legal aspects of civil-military relations in the United States and exposes the inordinate degree of involvement of the military court system with the intimate private lives and the consensual sexual relations of US servicemembers. Principally, she argues, “Sex and marriage [became] extremely important areas of surveillance and control in the second half of the twentieth century” (237). So central was marriage
to the military during the Cold War that one judge advocate stated in a written opinion, “Marriage is not an exclusively personal relationship; it represents a status in which the Sovereign has an interest” (117).

The notion that sex and marriage are critical areas of societal regulation in which the sovereign has a vested interest is not novel. The French sociologist and philosopher Michel Foucault, arguably the champion of this school of thought, maintained sexuality is not only socially constructed, it must be socially regulated to maintain hierarchies of dominance. A number of social institutions were, and are, involved in this regulation. Schools, armies, families, police, prisons, and others, contribute to the discipline of the body by participating in social discourse.

In Foucault’s construction, sex cannot exist outside of an institutionally supported rational law that creates and defines it. “Sex,” writes Foucault, “is the most speculative, most ideal, and most internal element in a deployment of sexuality organized by power in its grip on bodies and their materiality, their forces, energies, sensations, and pleasures” (*Sexuality and Psychoanalysis*, 1978, 155).

One may assume Wilson-Bufford had Foucault in mind, considering she applied Foucauldian analysis to the military as a social institution. Her analysis illustrates how this surveillance, control, and social regulation in the military was rooted first and foremost in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which demanded “good order and discipline” among the troops (article 134). This included idealizing servicemen as the courageous protectors and loyal providers of the families and codified into military law a set of rules and values aimed at achieving uniformity in thought and action among members of the military community (44).

This drive for uniformity was a national as well as an international endeavor. Nationally, in the post-World War II era, US political legal and social institutions idealized nuclear families as the antidote to political sexual radicalism: “Insecurities abroad motivated many Americans at home to seek stability and happiness through marriage, parenthood, and traditional gender roles” (18). Moreover, the military’s model of heterosexual marriage, which promoted powerful masculinity, was a sacred medium through which service husbands and dependent wives transmitted cherished beliefs about morality, responsibility, and social obligation to younger generations of military children (20). Even those alien wives who married American servicemen overseas were strongly encouraged to participate in command-sponsored guidance classes, where military chaplains counseled them on Western moral values and the importance of maintaining “high standards of social conduct” in their new military communities (76).

An interesting question left unanswered in the book, and perhaps worthy of further scrutiny is to what extent does this sexual regulation impact US military mission capabilities and readiness? Furthermore, articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice have not been amended to reflect the changing ratio of sexes within the US armed forces. It would be intriguing to learn whether such social movements as Me Too will lead to societal pressure on the military to modify those articles (241).
For female servicemembers seeking justice in military courts, the implications from this study are disturbing. In numerous cases of rape and sexual assault in the 1980s and 1990s, “active-duty female victims were blamed for making themselves vulnerable to attack simply by pursuing careers in male-dominated fields” (241). This accusation is particularly concerning considering recent reports of sexual assault in the US military increased by nearly 10 percent in 2017 according to the Pentagon’s annual study. Are women to blame for stepping outside the dictated legal and normative constraints of an archaic system?

The lessons learned from Wilson-Bufford’s book are salient and pressing. The military is a microcosm of society, and it remains vital to encourage a critical discourse between the two in order to allow the military to carry out its mission without compromising the sexual and gendered rights of its members.

The Ethics of War and Peace Revisited

Edited by Daniel R. Brunstetter and Jean-Vincent Holeindre

Reviewed by Dr. C. Anthony Pfaff, Research Professor for Military Profession and Ethic at the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

Traditional just war theory (JWT) can be a clumsy tool for analyzing contemporary conflict. Its standard categories of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* govern the behavior of states and often draw a bright line between conditions of war and peace, where absent a violation of sovereignty or territory, military force is not permitted. Of course, the theory, or at least its application, has evolved. Notable in this evolution is the emphasis on addressing gross human rights violations or humanitarian crises. Scholars have also added the categories of *jus ad vim* (justice of force short of war), which governs the use of force below the threshold of violating sovereignty and territory, and *jus post bellum* (justice after war), which governs the termination of conflict.

These additions, while welcome, have proved inadequate. The rise of nonstate actors, hybrid warfare, and the proliferation of weapons of mass disruption and destruction do not so much challenge state sovereignty as much as make it increasingly irrelevant. This is the subject of *The Ethics of War and Peace Revisited*, edited by Daniel R. Brunstetter and Jean-Vincent Holeindre. This volume addresses what is probably the twenty-first century’s biggest security problem: the erosion of sovereignty. The essential premise is conflict arises where sovereignty is either contested or fragmented. Sovereignty is contested when brutal acts against a population undermine the absolute nature of sovereignty as a state’s right. It is fragmented when states cannot control all the territory and permit the rise of terrorist groups or other nonstate actors who project force beyond those borders. In such an environment, permission to conduct humanitarian interventions seems too anemic and the permission to conduct relentless and ongoing drone strikes against terrorists seems to be too much. What is needed is another way.

This book, however, does not offer a revision of the theory. Rather, it seeks to identify and then analyze the challenges this erosion of
sovereignty creates and in doing so introduce the reader to the broader discussion regarding contemporary security challenges—for example, the fact some states cannot or should not control all their territory can place incentives, if not obligations, on other states to intervene. But as the intervention in Libya clearly demonstrated, even interventions motivated by the best of intentions can lead to terrible outcomes. Since it is hard to know in advance, should they be avoided?

To answer these and other questions, the book takes on four broad themes: when to intervene, who bears the risks, how do we judge, and finally, what to do when the conflict is over. Within these themes, the book takes on a number of critical debates.

The first of these debates regards humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect. Responsibility to protect is an emerging set of norms that places an obligation on the international community, or at least those who can, to intervene in areas where state failure (intentional or unintentional) creates conditions for massive human rights violations or humanitarian crises. While certainly noble in sentiment, Aidan Hehir in his chapter notes too often such interventions, like the one in Libya, turn out badly, leaving a “humanitarian intervention hangover” that discourages future interventions. The only way to overcome that hangover, he argues, is to establish a suprastate actor who can intervene independent of other states’ interests or endorsements.

Thomas Lindemann and Alex Giacomelli, taking up Hehir’s concern about self-interested interventions, argue identity plays an arguably more important role in motivating intervention than strategic or economic interests: some states just see themselves as “hero-protectors,” though that does not mean they see every victim as worthy or able to be rescued. Nigel Biggar argues perhaps we are over thinking the problem. One can never predict all the consequences associated with interventions, so all that should be required is a just cause and the necessary means to achieve that cause.

The use of drones also figures prominently in this volume. Contributors like Kerstin Fisk and Jennifer Ramos see the increased use of such technology as a function of the precedent set by the US invasion of Iraq, which enabled preventive, open-ended, but limited use of force. As a result, a number of states are investing in the means to do so, which risks a rise in cross-border attacks by adversary states. In this regard, one of the values of this book is it takes up a range of issues, including this one, from different perspectives. In particular, Jean-Baptiste Jeangene Vilmer examines the drone debate from the French perspective, ultimately arguing to the extent drones are a better alternative to more conventional means in terms of limiting collateral harm, states should consider their use. Shannon French, Victoria Sisk, and Caroline Bass examine the problem in terms of its corrosive effect on the “warrior’s code,” arguing that as drones distance combatants from the experience of war, it also risks undermining their commitment to its rules.

Brunstetter helpfully observes part of the problem is that the erosion of sovereignty creates space where the rules we have do not seem to fit: the rules of war seem to permit too much; however, the rules of law enforcement seem to permit too little. Thus, what is needed is not a revision of JWT, but an alternative. In this regard he sees jus
ad vim not as a component of JWT but an alternative that has its own corresponding ethics of not only when force is permitted (jus ad vim), but what force is permitted (jus in vi) and what counts as a just conclusion of the conflict (jus post vim). In this vein, Frederic Ramel suggests the problem is not in the rules, but in how we think about security in the first place. Rather than the state-centric approach described by JWT and jus ad vim, he argues for a human-centric approach that orients actors away from borders and towards freedom from want and freedom from fear. If those conditions supplanted sovereignty as the things defended, we could make better sense of what counts for when to use force and how.

The book ends on this last point: what obligations do states have when the conflict is over? In this regard, Brian Orend argues while wars may be fought to punish aggression, they should end with the rehabilitation of the aggressor, a burden which falls to the victorious party. Cian O’Driscoll helpfully argues whatever those obligations are, what is missing from JWT is an account of what victory is. What sense does it make to say the United States has jus post bellum obligations in Iraq and Afghanistan if it is not at all clear the war is over? O’Driscoll does not have a firm answer but argues more work needs to be done to understand the relationship between victory and JWT.

By focusing on how the breakdown of sovereignty challenges our traditional norms of war, this volume opens up space not just to better understand the application of JWT, but also to consider alternatives. This point does not mean the book is not without its faults. The discussion on preventive war, for example, which takes place in the context of drone strikes, seems to conflate preventive war with preventive strikes. Traditionally, the former has never been permitted while the latter always has. But even where the book lacks clarity, it still frames the debate in useful ways scholars, students, and practitioners can get beyond the simple application of the “old rules” and get into the discussion of what the “new ones” should be.

Bourbon and Bullets: True Stories of Whiskey, War, and Military Service
By John C. Tramazzo, foreword by Fred Minnick

Reviewed by Dr. Paul R. Kan, professor of national security studies, US Army War College

As a former bartender turned scholar who teaches at the US Army War College and co-owns a local craft brewery, I was excited to read John Tramazzo’s Bourbon and Bullets. So I poured myself some Bulleit bourbon and opened the book.

From the early pages, I learned the founder of the Bulleit brand, Tom Bulleit, was a US Navy corpsman during the Vietnam War. This military connection is reflected in the core of the book, which seeks to understand the significance of American whiskey and its “unbreakable connection to our pursuit of happiness and the occasional call to arms” (2). Through stories of past and present American veterans with links to the uniquely American alcohol, bourbon, the book explores the
“enduring relationship between American military service and American whiskey, from the bottom shelf to the most elite heights” (11). The book is a combination of Reid Mitenbuler’s *Bourbon Empire*, which details the rise of bourbon along with the expansion of American capitalism, and Colin Spoelman and David Haskell’s *Dead Distillers*, which catalogs the individual biographies of American makers of spirits. Whiskey drinkers and bar patrons will recognize the names Maker’s Mark, Jim Beam, and Buffalo Trace but may not be aware of the links veterans have with the brands. This book fills in this gap with anecdotes, biographies, illustrations, and photographs of patriots who were also distillers.

Written with a flavor a general audience can appreciate, the approach of discussing bourbon’s history sets the book apart from other social histories that examine the important role of commodities in shaping societies. Many social histories of alcohol, in particular, are overly reductionist by arguing the market for a particular alcohol caused individuals to act in ways to protect its manufacture, distribution, and sale. These social histories reduce the outbreak of some wars to what is poured into and out of a bottle. Tramazzo mostly avoids such material determinism by having the bulk of his book discuss the warriors behind the bourbon rather than bourbon behind the wars.

But the book is unable to avoid diluting its focus in the early chapters. The first three chapters read as a hurried catalog of ways in which military members not only produced bourbon but also when and where military leaders such as General Ulysses S. Grant drank whiskey and what veterans of wars wrote about bourbon. That today’s bourbon has been “helped by strong sales among the military community” can be said about any alcohol, or practically any readily available consumer good (10). Given the sheer number of veterans in the United States, their economic power is felt broadly throughout the American economy. The book does not offer any supporting figures to demonstrate the armed forces as a community have uniquely bolstered the bourbon industry, past or present.

The strength of the book lies in the chapters profiling the veterans and their families who were part of bourbon’s history. Kentuckian George Thomas Stagg, for example, who joined the Union Army during the Civil War because of his moral opposition to slavery and used his sense of injustice after the war to break the widespread corruption between whiskey distillers and federal tax officials who were choking his bourbon company’s growth. These chapters are well-researched and include solid sourcing; the latter chapters include interviews with some of today’s veterans who are pushing the bourbon industry into the twenty-first century. Contemporary craft distillers include former US Air Force mechanic Donnis Todd who showed up unannounced at the new, and only, Texas bourbon distillery, Garrison Brothers. He proclaimed, “I’m Donnis Todd, and I want to make bourbon” (171). After working without pay and living in a condemned trailer without air conditioning or running water for months, Todd eventually became the company’s master distiller. These and other anecdotes make bourbon’s history come alive.

A more full-bodied explanation of what makes military service and bourbon an interesting connection, beyond noting the various ways they have been connected, would have added a richer dimension.
Did experiencing war change how distillers produced bourbon? What qualities of a leader in the military and on the battlefield helped these people contribute to whiskey’s history? There is some choppy writing, and the need for better copyediting is noticeable in some glaring typos. For example, there is an unfortunate typo in the last sentence of what should have been a punchy end to a paragraph about President Taft’s 1906 whiskey labeling requirements—a decision that “lices (sic) on” (17). These issues do not significantly detract from a delightful book, but like having a good bourbon served in a chipped glass, they are hard to ignore.

Any well-stocked bar would have many of the bourbons made by the veterans detailed in this book, and any well-stocked library should include this book on its shelves. After making the military-themed cocktail recipes contained in the appendix, I am keeping the book close to my bar at home.
Presidents of War: The Epic Story, from 1807 to Modern Times

By Michael Beschloss

Reviewed by Dr. John C. Binkley, professor of History and Government, University of Maryland University College

Article II, section 2 of the US Constitution states in all its simplicity that the president “shall be [the] Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.” While the language conveys a title, it tells us nothing about how the president is supposed to undertake such responsibility, especially during times of war. To help understand the gloss on this simple constitutional command, presidential historian Michael Beschloss authored Presidents of War, which explains how presidents from 1807 thru the Vietnam War attempted to undertake this most complicated of responsibilities—acting as a war president.

Beschloss’s approach is simple. Starting in 1807, with the decision by Thomas Jefferson not to engage in war over the British attack on the American frigate Chesapeake, Beschloss explores how presidents dealt with their responsibilities not only during war but also, in some cases, the more important role of a president before a war. Prior to a conflict, a president must oversee diplomacy and convince the public a military option is the best choice. This latter function becomes important when one considers it is the role of Congress to declare war, and public opinion becomes all-important in the decisional process.

Several patterns become evident from reading Presidents of War. The first is the role of public opinion in supporting the decision to go to war. In most cases, there is an incident that triggered public support. Sometimes the incident was prevocalional, such as the Mexican-American War when James K. Polk ordered the US Army into the disputed territories near the Texas and Mexican borders and then blamed Mexico for the ensuing combat. The Gulf of Tonkin incident at the outset of the Vietnam War is another example of such a prevocalional incident.

At other times, an accident supplied the trigger for war. The destruction of the USS Maine in Havana harbor became William McKinley’s casus belli for the Spanish–American War. Finally, aggressive action, either in the form of a direct military attack such as Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and North Korea’s invasion of South Korea or by provocative diplomatic action, such as the Zimmermann Telegram during World War I, was all that was needed to solidify public support. In each case, the president used the incident to gain public support for a war, which the public had little appetite for entertaining prior to the incident.

A second pattern is a constant conflict between the president and the Congress, especially during the run-up to war and could continue during the war. Abraham Lincoln was constantly fighting congressional interference during the Civil War, and Franklin D. Roosevelt had to work around Congress to provide support for Britain during the 1940–41
period. To avoid congressional conflicts, some presidents have resorted to duplicity. This approach has the appearance of “mission creep” in which the war’s original goals are substantially expanded.

Sometimes presidents have intentionally hidden an expanded goal from the public, understanding fully they would oppose this type of bait and switch. In other cases, presidents have expanded their goals as a result of wartime exigency. McKinley’s occupation of the Philippine islands is a good example of the former while Harry S. Truman’s decision to cross into North Korea is a good example of the latter. A third pattern is the difficulty presidents have in ending wars. This is especially true in the case of a declared war in which Congress has a role. James Madison, Polk, McKinley, and Woodrow Wilson all confronted congressional difficulty at the end of their wars.

Truman learned from Wilson’s failure to get Senate support for the League of Nations and involved Congress in the process of creating the United Nations. Undeclared wars raise an entirely different set of problems regarding their termination. Yet they have proliferated since World War II in an effort to avoid congressional involvement. But the War Powers Act of 1973 reflects the reality that Congress can still demand to participate in the process.

As excellent a book as this is, there is one problem which struck this reviewer—the scope of the study. Why Beschloss selected Jefferson’s decision regarding Britain as his starting point and omitted John Adams’s Quasi-War with France 1798–1800, or for that matter, George Washington’s management of the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794 is a mystery.

The omission of Adams’s conflict is particularly mystifying given the fact his involvement with the French set many precedents. At the end of the book, we confront the same problem. There is no real analysis of George H. W. Bush’s handling of the Persian Gulf War; nor is there much discussion of George W. Bush’s decisions regarding the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. While Beschloss may have felt the historical record since 2001 was still unclear, the same reasoning does not apply to the 1990 war record.

Notwithstanding this minor issue, Beschloss has authored a beautifully written book, which is deeply researched and brings a human touch to a president’s decision-making process. This book is traditional history at its best. Too often, books written about the power of a commander in chief tend to forget presidents are human beings who make mistakes. This is a book which should be read by both the general public as well the specialist in military history or civil-military relations.

**Crusader: General Donn Starry and the Army of His Times**

By Mike Guardia, foreword by Martin E. Dempsey

Reviewed by Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II, former research professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

An easy and engaging read heavily laced with extracts from General Starry’s personal papers, this book provides a combination of
biography and history. Of greatest interest to professional soldiers are Starry’s observations on the art of linking operational design with technology, doctrine, and training. The operational concepts enshrined in doctrine must flow from a thorough understanding of the qualities of the technologies available or demanded. Likewise, the soldier and leader training must mesh juniors and seniors into effective instruments for the next war. These principles must be inculcated into the thinking of senior commanders before they are translated into concepts for the effective employment of military power. The author describes Starry’s constant struggle to accomplish these aims in the face of fixed attitudes, sloppy thinking, and occasional laziness.

One of the most disturbing aspects of this story is Starry’s periodic inability to find sound, factual analysis as a basis for change because the analysis he encountered was often weak or wrong because the “facts” were not validated before changes were initiated.

Starry derived his contribution to the 1976 Active Defense doctrine—established in the US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, of that year—directly from his investigations of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the work he had performed in the Pentagon with later-Training and Doctrine Command Commander William E. DePuy. While at the Pentagon, Starry and DePuy had wrestled with not only what the Army ought to be preparing to do, but also how to go about it. Starry was tasked by Army Chief of Staff Creighton W. Abrams Jr., under whom he twice previously served, to ferret out how the Israelis were able to overcome the odds they had confronted in war, seeing it as a possible preview of a conflict between NATO and the Soviet Union.

The most important contribution Starry made to the defense of the nation and NATO, however, was in his development and carefully crafted support for AirLand Battle doctrine and the 1982 version of FM 100-5. This reviewer arrived in Europe in 1977, as Active Defense was being digested (or indigested accordingly). With what seemed to have been almost no thought given to offensive action, which was actually not the case, the document lacked emphasis and felt un-American to those of us on the ground. The lack of a deep-attack concept was not articulated at the time, as the Army was wrestling with the more normative remark that quantity had a quality all its own: the knowledge that an imbalance in forces between NATO and the Western allies, in both numbers and quality, simply invited NATO to resort to nuclear weapons early. Starry and DePuy had realized it was the best they could do with the equipment and manpower available at the time.

Previously, this reviewer participated in a wargame at the Naval War College in which Colonel Richard H. Sinnreich, then-director of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), managed the ground war. Sinnreich launched a deep attack in accord with Starry’s 1982 operational concept of how to stop the Soviets. The move caught everyone except the SAMS players unaware, leading to intense discussions. Sinnreich stood his ground arguing this was the new US Army doctrine whether anyone liked it or not.

The contrast between this and the former doctrine is perhaps best exemplified by another moment of truth in an earlier wargame played out under the Active Defense doctrine at SAMS. With a German officer
playing the role of commander in chief of the Central Army Group, the Active Defense strategy reached its limit and nuclear weapons offered the only hope, the request for release of nuclear weapons was forwarded. The acting commander in chief of the Central Army Group authorized the employment of nuclear weapons so long as at least one nuclear weapon falls on the Soviet Union. Starry had expertly described the ultimate bankruptcy of Active Defense which made the early release and targeting of forces arrayed in East Germany the final act. The wargame ceased at that point, and energetic debates followed.

By 1982, the deficiencies of 1973 were well on the way to being healed. Guardia is careful to include Starry’s evaluations of Soviet reactions thereto, which are among the most interesting passages in the book. In every major event recorded in this work, Starry follows pretty much the same process: seek the truth, understand the context, search out possible solutions, and look downrange. In analyzing performances of Starry and several senior officers for whom he developed “no regard” (a phrase of as serious condemnation as he would utter in public), the reader gains a reasonably solid picture of a man on a mission who has mastered a technique for positive, measurable progress.

I admit partiality to General Starry. But this book will easily serve as a starting point for deeper investigations, which must include the interviews contained in the US Army Heritage and Education Center.
This book assesses strategic, operational, and tactical details of the American Expeditionary Forces’s (AEF) 1918 Meuse-Argonne offensive under General John J. “Black Jack” Pershing. Chapters 1–5 provide a prewar background, the war to date, American unpreparedness, Allied planning beyond reaction to the German 1918 offensives, and the AEF’s preliminary battle at Saint-Mihiel. Chapters 6–15 follow the AEF chronologically: commencement, a slowdown in late September, and stalemate in October. Separate chapters showcase the famous “Lost Battalion,” Corporal Alvin York, and efforts to break the German’s Siegfried Line. Chapter 16 ranges from AEF expansion to French Premier Georges Clemenceau’s frustrations with Pershing, for which Supreme Allied Commander Ferdinand Foch was intermediary to temper. Chapter 17 closes the October stalemate. Chapters 18–21 dissect American operations in November: the long-awaited crossing of the Meuse, the mad dash to Sedan, and finally war’s end.

Among the book’s several themes is a familiar indictment of Woodrow Wilson’s administration. The perspective would benefit from an appreciation of the president’s challenges as articulated by Justus D. Doenecke in Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America’s Entry into World War I (2011). Another theme is Pershing’s severe shortcomings. He had fanciful tactical notions unsuitable for the Western Front and was impatient, both of which resulted in costly frontal assaults. Pershing also fostered a poor command climate that squelched subordinates’ initiative and innovation. Inadequately credited in this book is the astounding growth of an officer who had been a mere captain until 1906.

There is much tactical detail involved with dissecting how the AEF learned its trade in the most demanding, merciless form of on-the-job training, wherein battles were learning laboratories. These assessments are balanced, and the depth of research provides similar details for the enemy, specifically Bavarians, Saxons, and so forth. This comparative analysis is most effective.

Various chapters comment on military concepts, such as principles of war, the center of gravity, and decisive points as well as current Army doctrine. These references often seem contrived. They, nonetheless, provide grist for deeper thought. Although a campaign study heavy in tactical details, the book also provides numerous insights, if not lessons learned.

More specifically, aspects of the AEF experience explore organizational readiness at multiple levels and preparedness for the changing characteristics of warfare any army will face. Success often
rested upon the ability to think and to act in terms of what is now today’s Army mission command. The Meuse-Argonne campaign demanded leadership and staff skills to orchestrate combined arms operations at the multidivision and multicorps levels, whether in allied or coalition environments, and the learning curves were steep.

The AEF’s adoption of the creeping barrage on November 1–4, 1918, employed techniques that the British had matured since the disastrous first day on the Somme more than two years earlier. The book notes the importance of French assistance, especially liaison officers. Of greater importance would have been an analysis to determine the extent British and Australian planners had supplemented American staffs. Readers also miss how the AEF transitioned from positional trench warfare in 1917–18, to maneuver warfare in late 1918, to military occupation and stability operations in late 1918 into the early 1920s.

AEF General Headquarter’s mindset of “On to Sedan” set the stage for one of the greatest catastrophes of the war. General Headquarter’s favoritism for 1st Division and its commander’s decision to get to Sedan rapidly by cutting across the fronts of both 42nd and 77th Divisions on the American side of the Meuse, wrought havoc. More damning still is the description of American casualties suffered in the last five hours of war from sunrise just before 6:00 a.m. to the armistice at 11:00 a.m. on November 11.

This work performs a great service to remind current generations about what their army accomplished in record time. The integration operations and battles from the army to the company level with many, little-known individual stories is powerful. Victory rested upon soldiers and marines called to war from all walks of American society.

More contentious is the AEF’s accomplishments in perspective. The text gives fleeting rather than substantive credit to the Allies. AEF divisions were too few and too late to play a major role in stopping the five German offensives in 1918. The author notes the AEF was approximately twice the size of Allied divisions, which were reduced to nine infantry battalions. But the raw numbers of riflemen only tell part of the story. Progressive Allied organizational and procedural changes from the squad to the division and through the corps and the army made them formidable. The Canadian Corps and the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps incidentally maintained their 12-battalion divisional structure to the war’s end, the former, in particular, with a daunting artillery capability.

More problematic is the idea that French and British morale was broken, which the AEF had to save. New civilian overlords Clemenceau and British Prime Minister David Lloyd George demanded victory at less cost in lives. The French Army of 1918 was not the mutiny-stricken force of 1917 seen after the failed Robert Nivelle attacks. Similarly, the British Expeditionary Force in 1918 was not the malaise-ridden force seen after the Battle of Passchendaele. Neither force was the army of 1914. Their troops defeated all five German offensives and counterattacked. These counterattacks, the Second Battle of the Marne in July and “the black day of the German Army” at Amiens in August were one and two months before even Saint-Mihiel. But, the text makes bare mention of them even though British church bells have rung on November 21, 1917,
the day after Cambrai, and Armistice Day, since 1914. This reviewer also notes there are excessive generalizations on Allied diplomacy and postwar implementation.

The author’s penultimate chapter on recent efforts to restore memory and provide recognition is both refreshing and inspiring. The last chapter reinforces history’s value and the cost of unpreparedness. Perhaps a digression for some readers, the text also bemoans the current state of the US government.

The AEF’s challenges—successfully met—inspire questions for today’s Army. Is the force ready for similar challenges and complexities in the third decade of the twenty-first century? Is the Army prepared for a return to major combat operations within the joint range of military operations? How are the current brigade combat teams and combat aviation brigades prepared to fight and win the nation’s wars in the context of multidomain operations? How are the often-ignored support brigades and the echelons above brigade and division levels postured to provide the requisite support to sustain such complex and varied operations?

Sons of Freedom: The Forgotten American Soldiers Who Defeated Germany in World War I

By Geoffrey Wawro

Reviewed by MAJ Nathan K. Finney, planner, US Army Pacific

It is often said that, despite common understanding, the decisive winner of the Second World War was the Soviet Union; its relentless pressure on the Nazi regime (and Stalin’s willingness to throw millions of Russian lives against the Eastern Front) ultimately defeated Hitler and his generals. In Sons of Freedom, Geoffrey Wawro posits a somewhat analogous claim of decisiveness about the American contribution to the First World War:

The German army, still three million strong and defending positions in France and Belgium behind the Meuse River, decided to ask for an armistice, not because it had been beaten by the British and French—who seemed incapable of beating the Germans in 1918, or arguably ever—but because it was beaten by the Americans, who broke through the eastern bastions of the Hindenburg Line, advanced on both banks of the Meuse, and surrounded the German army in France. (xxiii–xxiv)

From this strong opening statement, Wawro spends more than 600 pages backing up his thesis with research conducted in the archives of five of the six major belligerent nations of the conflict. Most impressive is the ease with which Wawro transitions from the national strategic aspects of the war to the tactical actions conducted by American soldiers, each provided with clarity and excitement that allows for an ease of intellectual consumption for the reader. While few histories of this type can be called page-turners, Wawro has achieved just that.

Sons of Freedom covers the entire relationship of the United States with World War I, from ambivalence to strict neutrality, then a reluctant associated power to a decisive fledgling force who tipped the balance.
toward the Triple Entente. In the first six chapters, Wawro ably navigates the nuances of global politics, state of the war on the European continent prior to the entry of the United States, and finally the triggers for participation and mobilization of American troops. The remaining 10 chapters zoom in on American soldiers fighting first among, then beside, and ultimately independently of their French and British counterparts. His treatment of the major battles in which the Americans participated in 1918 is an exemplar of the fusion of traditional military history, which covers tactical action by military units and the diplomatic and political impact seen by those actions.

Of particular interest to readers of *Parameters* is Wawro’s treatment of the major leaders of the war, especially the Americans. His assessment of John J. Pershing is complex, acknowledging the general’s rare experience with large troop movements from the punitive expedition into Mexico prior to his selection as the commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, as well as his unbending but paternalistic (in a positive sense) leadership skills and understanding for what was required of a new, mass American army. *Sons of Freedom* also details Pershing’s failures as a field commander, “foolishly believing that he would ‘consume’ German troops, [through frontal assaults and a near-religious belief in open warfare] when, in fact . . . they would probably consume him” (308).

Wawro is equally critical of other leaders of the American Expeditionary Forces, who like Pershing, were quick to demand initiative from their subordinate leaders, but did not recognize the bureaucracy of the Army—or the lack of training the leaders and soldiers had received prior to throwing them into combat—did not provide the experiences or background to foster leaders capable of adaptation. Indeed, most AEF leaders were unable, and in some cases unwilling, to provide the resources required to backstop the little initiative found on the Western Front, leading those who displayed such qualities to fail and to be sent packing to the depot at Blois (and such an officer’s career would have “gone Blooey”). Much of what Tom Ricks described in *The Generals* (2012) about George C. Marshall firing Army leadership who did not meet his demanding standards in World War II was likely learned firsthand as he ran American operations for the demanding Pershing decades earlier.

*Sons of Freedom* is an engaging, yet deep read of one of the major conflicts at the foundation of the US Army as a modern institution and America on the world stage. I highly recommend all Army leaders make time to read and study this comprehensive account by Wawro, as the First World War holds not only many lessons of our past but also key dynamics we will likely face again in our future.
Yesterday There Was Glory: With the 4th Division, A.E.F., in World War I

By Gerald Andrew Howell, edited by Jeffrey L. Patrick

Reviewed by Dr. Dean Nowowiejski, associate professor, Distinguished Chair for Art of War Scholars Command and General Staff College Office of the Dean of Academics

One of the trends in World War I historiography is the initial publication or republication of a variety of personal memoirs to accompany the centennial of the war. Scarlet Fields: The Combat Memoir of a World War I Medal of Honor Hero by John Lewis Barkley; Poilu: The World War I Notebooks of Corporal Louis Barthas, Barrelmaker, 1914–1918, by a French soldier; and The World War I Memoirs of Robert P. Patterson: A Captain in the Great War, by the future undersecretary of war, are among these recent additions. Now comes Gerald Andrew Howell’s memoir, Yesterday There Was Glory: With the 4th Division, A.E.F., in World War I, which adds to the story of doughboys and the 4th Infantry Division that are still on active service today.

This memoir of a private in the 39th Infantry Regiment is really the story of a soldier and the friends in his squad. How it came to print through the editorial work of Jeffrey L. Patrick, the librarian at Wilson’s Creek National Battlefield, is an interesting tale. Howell wrote this work shortly after World War II, and his perceptions are colored by the experience of a second global conflict. Howell offered the work to a variety of potential publishers, but it was never published. Patrick bought the manuscript at an auction on the internet and has done a masterful job in bringing it to life.

Patrick’s notes are carefully researched through primary source analysis in the National Archives and elsewhere. Howell’s descriptions through the course of the narrative were matched by Patrick with pertinent and captivating Signal Corps archival photographs. Patrick is obviously versed in all the latest references and the evolution of World War I historiography. And when you match this editorial work with the intriguing perspective originally offered by Howell, this book becomes a welcome addition to the common soldier’s historical account of the war.

There is much officer bashing as well as concern for food, clothes, and shelter as you might expect from Howell, a private soldier. There is also a sense of the unrelenting suffering from service in the Meuse-Argonne offensive, as Howell’s retelling is a continuous narrative of steadily impacting artillery, advances through dense woods, marching at night to avoid German observation, and the misery of hunger, cold, and filth. It reminds the reviewer of another period memoir mentioned above, No Hard Feelings by Missourian John Lewis Barkley, a Medal of Honor recipient, reprinted by the University Press of Kansas as Scarlet Fields in 2014. That work similarly captured the bravery, tenacity, endurance under raw conditions, and search for human comforts of the doughboy.

In Yesterday There Was Glory, Gerald Howell captured the good-natured banter of a World War I infantry squad throughout the war, complete with the social jibes that reflected the evolving prejudices of soldiers.
who themselves were a melting pot. Howell’s account tells the tale from mobilization to return home, with accounts of ship travel, training, rest, and combat at Château-Thierry, Saint-Mihiel, and the Meuse-Argonne.

One of the unique elements of Howell’s book is his take on the Third Army’s march into Germany at the end of the war and what it was like to occupy the land of a recent enemy. He echoes other sources on the length of the march, describing the exhaustion brought on by the hike to the Rhine. He also reinforces the idea that the doughboys quickly came to identify with the common German people as victims of war. The focus seems appropriate to the centennial of the conflict, and there is still much for the serious military professional or historian to gain through the study of individual experience.