To military historian and one-time US Marine officer Allan R. Millett, the Korean War is not so much the forgotten war as the neglected war. He opens by chastising his fellow historians for their Eurocentric studies of the Cold War, noting that one devoted eight pages to the Korean War, another a page and a half, and a third skipped over the Korean conflict from 1948 to 1953. Millett, to the contrary, asserts that strategic thinkers and serving officers could learn much from the Korean War that is applicable today.

The author, a professor at the University of New Orleans, asserts: “I propose that the Korean War is an example of the one great lesson of twentieth-century warfare: that no conflict should be categorized as simply an interstate war or civil war or even a limited insurgency. While such definitions may advance statistical analysis, they are not much help for field diplomats and soldiers.” He adds: “Understanding the Korean War will provide even more relevant examples of a war that embodies almost every aspect of contemporary conflict.”

Particularly pertinent: “The Korean conflict remains a major window on the Chinese way of war.” The most appropriate way to view it, Millett writes, would be “as a Maoist people’s war, the global socialist template for wars of national liberation and postcolonial succession.” Phase One began in 1945 with the end of World War II and the division of Korea in which the Soviets took the Japanese surrender north of the 38th parallel and put Kim Il Sung in power while the US took the surrender in the south—and then went home. Phase Two started in 1948 when North Korea sent a column of 1,800 partisans into the south to take advantage of a rebellion there. But South Korea, Millett asserts, “won the unknown war before the forgotten war.”

That brought on the North Korean invasion of June 1950, which had the backing of Joseph Stalin in Moscow and Mao Zedong in Beijing. Millett labels that Phase Three of the conflict in Korea but contends that Stalin and Mao guessed wrong on the North Korean army’s ability to conquer South Korea, which led to the intervention of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Force (CPVF) in November of 1950. “That,” Millett says, “is the subject of this book,” the second in a trilogy on the Korean conflict.

The author, whose writing is a model of clarity, doesn’t say it outright but he might well have renamed the Korean War the “Sino-American War.” Note the book’s title, “The War for Korea,” not the “War in Korea” or “The
War between the Koreans.” Both the South Korean and North Korean armies turned in spotty performances, to the dismay of their respective American and Chinese allies, leaving the brunt of the battle to the two foreign armies. Mao’s motive, having come to power in Beijing just a year before, was to drive the United States off the Asian mainland. The objective of the United States was to prevent that. Today, a potential Sino-American confrontation is driven by much the same intentions.

Millett, citing Chinese and Korean as well as US sources, focuses on leaders of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) who provided the forces to the CPVF; they are the forefathers of PLA leaders today. The commander, Peng Dehuai, a veteran of the Eighth Route Army that had fought the Japanese and the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek, was among the PLA’s most respected commanders. A realist, he “knew that the Chinese People’s Volunteer Force had never faced an enemy as potent as the US Eighth Army.” Moreover, “his subordinates were the most professional senior officers of the PLA,” Millett says.

As the CPVF waited in Manchuria for orders into Korea, “they trained for an asymmetrical campaign that would turn their weaknesses into advantages.” The lack of logistics was perhaps the CPVF’s primary weakness. A Chinese division operated on 25 tons of supplies a day for a division of 10,000 soldiers; an American division required ten times that for a division of 15,000. “As planned,” Millett reports, the CPVF resupplied itself “with captured weapons, ammunition, food, and medical supplies from the rolling larder behind every American division.” Even today, when Chinese officers visit the United States, they ask how the United States provides logistics to forces in the field. American officers have said they don’t answer that question.

Throughout the war, Peng Dehuai had two tribulations that would sound familiar to American officers of that period—and later. One was Mao micromanaging from Beijing “by war on the map.” General Douglas MacArthur, until he was relieved by President Harry S. Truman in April 1951, did much the same from his headquarters in Tokyo. Peng was constantly vexed by the North Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, who refused to establish a joint headquarters or to commit forces in accord with Peng’s operational plans. Millett says: “Not the least of General [Matthew B.] Ridgway’s challenges was keeping the South Korean army in the war.” In addition, “Ridgway faced a major problem with Syngman Rhee,” the imperious South Korean president, who feared the United States would abandon Korea.

In sum, throughout Millett’s meticulously researched narrative, endnotes, bibliographic essay, and index, is evidence of first-rate scholarship. The author cautions, however, that the Korean conflict should be seen for what it was, no more, no less. “Those who claim that the war served as a surrogate World War III,” he argues, “should take another sip of soju,” the Korean wine that has been known to cause the ears of unsuspecting Westerners to emit blue flames.
by James A. Russell

Reviewed by W. Andrew Terrill, Ph.D., Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

Innovation, Transformation, and War is an important and valuable effort to move beyond the clichés and slogans of how the Iraq War was waged and to analyze how US military units reversed the disastrous 2005 situations in Anbar and Ninewa provinces. The book originated as a doctoral dissertation by a career defense professional and, therefore, examines developments in Iraq within the framework of the theoretical literature on military innovation. While such issues will be of concern to a variety of readers, the importance of this work to many national security analysts will almost certainly center on its fine-grained analysis of how a variety of US Army and Marine Corps units adapted to a complex environment in Iraq and reoriented unsuccessful tactics and approaches to those that were significantly more effective. Russell is careful not to overreach and does not maintain that tactical level innovation “won” the war or even that it was the only reason for the reduction of insurgent violence. Other factors including local and national political issues must be included in such an assessment. The rise of anti-al Qaeda citizens’ militias that later became the Awakening Councils was especially important.

While the author maintains that extensive tactical innovation was only one factor in the struggle to move effectively against the insurgency, he also states that without it the United States would have lost the war. Russell notes that innovation occurs when unit leaders believe they are being insufficiently effective using current doctrine and tactics. In Iraq, this situation was apparent by 2005, and radical innovation was required for US forces to move forward in stabilizing the country. In this type of “adapt or fail” environment, he maintains that tactical change can accumulate over time and build a momentum of its own. The author speaks of “informal doctrine” and maintains that best practices often develop from the bottom up and then are shared with other units facing similar difficulties. Russell’s analysis makes use of case studies of US Army and Marine Corps units in varying parts of Iraq including an Army Stryker-equipped brigade, distinct in its organization. The case study discussions are based on the extensive use of primary sources and contain some of the most detailed examinations of US tactical operations in Iraq that currently exists.

The author’s deep knowledge of military organizations and changing battlefield tactics are continuously put to good use throughout this study.

The narrative about how units improved their military performance over time is especially interesting. The company- and battalion-sized units in
the field are portrayed as the epicenter for such change. These units are not characterized as struggling against crushing military bureaucracies, but are instead understood as being routinely empowered by higher headquarters to develop their own approaches to accomplishing their missions and finding the right mix of kinetic and nonkinetic tools. One officer is quoted as saying, “You name it, I tried it . . . I had a lot of flexibility and I ran with it.” Such a statement helps make Russell’s point that the biggest successes often occurred by pushing responsibility down the chain of command. Throughout this study, Russell gives high marks to higher headquarters units that resisted the impulse to micromanage their subordinate units.

Some of the innovations the author discusses include vastly improved intelligence and operations interface, dramatic innovation in logistics, improved training including predeployment training and cross-training, and even a lenient attitude toward Iraqi civilian revenue generating activities including smuggling. In intelligence the “need to know” was in many cases replaced with “need to share.” This principle was especially important with local “census” information which involved detailed data on local populations. There was also an effort to take the edge off of military activities that could anger the civilian population. As time went on, for instance, units that needed to search civilian houses distributed small toys, candy, and several two pound packages of sugar as part of these duties. Russell also identifies certain technologies as “enablers” of innovation, especially for the Stryker brigades. Additionally, the author maintains that while the deployed units did not create the split in the insurgency leading to the creation of the Awakening Councils, they took extensive advantage of it. Moreover, in a particularly important set of observations, Russell discusses the role of US Special Forces in training and radically transforming a large number of units within the Iraqi Security Forces.

In sum, this work is an important contribution to understanding how the situation in Iraq was pulled back from the brink of defeat by committed and innovative officers in the field. Russell’s admiration for the US Army and Marine Corps is apparent on virtually every page of this book, and he has provided a work that will clearly benefit a military readership. This work stands as an important contribution to the literature on military innovation, and an especially valuable addition to the literature on counterinsurgency.
Michael Matheny, a retired Army Colonel and Military History Ph.D. on the faculty of the Army War College, has written the first book on the American development of operational art to 1945. Operational art is the creative act of designing and combining battles to produce strategic results. It is the way commanders and staffs synchronize and sequence tactical engagements to produce strategic victory. It is campaign planning at the most basic level, but it is also something more. Matheny believes many historians unfairly criticize the US military for failing to develop a theory and educate its leaders in operational art during the interwar period. Such criticism usually emphasizes the lack of modern techniques, organization, and technology—often expressed as the lack of effective US tank corps doctrine, units, and equipment. The traditional story is that the Germans discovered the secrets of operational art in the interwar period and the Soviets made it a separate level of war and a study by itself. Matheny argues such analysis misinterprets the US experience and deemphasizes significant developments in American military thought and practice that had been evolving for decades and culminated in superb operational performance in the Second World War.

Dr. Matheny bases his assertion on a study of the senior US military school systems from their inception beginning in the 1880s. He finds that, although the term was not used, the curricula was heavy on issues of operational art. Army officers, for example, at both the staff school at Fort Leavenworth (under a variety of names) and later the Army War College studied issues like logistics, command and control arrangements, and campaign planning that are fundamental to operational art. They did so in terms of large units using consistent methods of both analyzing the issues and presenting their results. Naval officers at Newport did the same while addressing other operational issues like forward basing. The advent of the airplane added new operational issues of integration for the traditional services, and the Army Air Corps began thinking about the unique operational aspects of air power. The US military grappled with executing operational art in Europe during World War I, where it learned invaluable lessons. All the study of and education on operational art paid dividends during World War II when American commanders faced problems they had already considered and were able to craft masterful campaigns that produced decisive strategic results. The author illustrates that success with short examples of campaigns from both world wars.
Dr. Matheny tells a familiar story with a different slant. All the battles and campaigns he uses as examples have been studied in detail; historians, for example Henry Gole in *The Road to Rainbow*, have studied the interwar military education system’s impact on war planning. Matheny’s work provides new material in terms of the curricula of all the services’ education systems, but its real contribution is in the synthesis and interpretation of a mass of material at a high level in terms of operational art. This is refreshing in an era when much of military history seems to be focused on drum and trumpet history more than the major issues of winning and losing.

If *Carrying the War to the Enemy* has a shortcoming, it is a reflection of the subject matter. Any book on operational art starts at a disadvantage. War is a tightly integrated human activity. In an attempt to study and analyze it, warriors and scholars must try to tease apart that unity and talk about artificial parts like levels of war—tactical, operational, and strategic. That is a necessary and useful intellectual exercise, but looking at only part of a complex, unitary subject is always difficult if not confusing. Tactical war is definitely different than war at the strategic level, but it is not so easy to draw clear distinctions between tactical and operational war or operational and strategic. Dr. Matheny does a good job staying away from the tactical, but perhaps because he does so, he almost automatically bumps into issues of operational versus strategic art. Is the best demonstration of US World War II operational art in the Pacific the invasion of Okinawa or the island hopping campaign that led up to that operation? The answer is probably “Yes.” One can look at the island hopping as either a campaign of a theater strategy (an unfortunate doctrinal term), or one can think of Okinawa as a battle or a campaign that includes several engagements. Dr. Matheny chose one of those approaches. He is not wrong, even if the reader likes to think about it using a different mental model. Similarly, Matheny argues the US operational approach was one of concentric pressure. One might argue that was the strategic approach and operationally the US military sought maneuver. Good cases can be made for both positions.

Overall, *Carrying the War to the Enemy* is well worth the read. The integration in a single source of a coherent interpretation of the development of US operational art for all the services is a real achievement. The research is exhaustive, and the writing is direct and very readable.
Ancient Chinese Warfare is a useful book, but not one that fits the title, because it is not about ancient Chinese warfare. As you move through the lines, you will see that this study is in essence about the evolution of ancient Chinese political authority to wage war from the legendary figure of the Yellow Emperor (黄帝) to the historical founders of the Zhou Dynasty (周朝, 11th century BCE) and the governments under their reign. More importantly, this study is about the development of ancient Chinese military institutions and structures from the defensive fortifications (walls) to the emergence of standing armies, organized military training, logistics, and the production of weapons.

Ralph Sawyer deserves considerable praise for this achievement. Presumably through his years of hard work on ancient Chinese history and classics, especially his monumental introduction and translation of The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, Sawyer has built a solid foundation for the discussion of this subject matter. Indeed, Sawyer has done an excellent job in presenting the evolution of ancient Chinese political authority and military institutions with his efforts at overcoming the confusion created by the ancient Chinese classics (discrepancies in time, place, and political and military events) and insightful interpretation of the ancient artifacts and archeological findings. Sawyer’s documentation and rigor in discussion is first class.

This volume will be an important addition to the reference books on ancient Chinese political and military history. It is also useful for those who specialized in ancient Chinese political and military history. Its value, however, in the study of ancient Chinese warfare with respect to issues such as the Chinese views on the nature of war, justification for the use of force, Chinese strategies and stratagems, and the conduct of war is limited. Although many of these are the topics associated with the eras following the Zhou, namely the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods (春秋战国时期), the political and military traditions of the earlier times had considerable impact on the classical Chinese political and military thinkers such as Confucius, Lao Tzu, Sun Tzu, and many others. The significance of the political and military institutions should have been highlighted in this book.

The second half of the book is a discussion of the armaments in what the Chinese call “cold-weapon era” (冷兵器时期), prior to the invention of gunpowder and firearms). Sawyer provides an excellent documentation and examination of the weapons created and used in these ancient times. The discussion of the Shang Dynasty (商朝) martial edifice, troops, intelligence, and tactics is informative. The examination of the axes, knives, daggers, dagger-axes, swords, spears, armors, archery, chariots, horses, chariots in battle, and
logistics is valuable. However, the discussions are largely about the construction of such weapons and their characteristics. There is limited analysis of the significance of these “cold weapons” on the nature of warfare and the conduct of war (although there is discussion of the limitation of the chariots in the text). Students of war are interested in these issues because they seek to know what impact these weaponries had on later Chinese ways of thinking and conducting war. Humans do not have fangs and claws, but they have an intelligent brain and useful hands to make weapons. In so doing, humans also changed the “face of war.” For instance, with the invention of daggers, axes, and knives, warfare had become more lethal. Slings and bows allowed combatants to inflict damage to their opponents in a distance. Chariots and horses presumably made warfare mobile. Logistics supply became an important part of military conflict for defensive as well as offensive purposes. Sun Tzu’s Art of War has discussed the advantages and difficulties associated with military logistics. Attacking the opponent’s supply has been a classic tactic in warfare. All of these are important topics of ancient Chinese warfare.

A final note on the book is about the provision of Chinese characters. With today’s state-of-the-art word-processing capability, the author, or the publisher, should provide the Chinese characters for the special Chinese terms, names, places, and concepts in the text. When the Chinese characters are provided, it does not matter whether the author uses pinyin or the Wade-Giles spelling. There is no confusion in Chinese. It is correspondingly easier for the readers to understand and to find them in the original Chinese classics. Unfortunately, there are no Chinese characters in the current text.

**Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives For War**

by Richard Ned Lebow

Reviewed by Dr. Stephen J. Blank, the Strategic Studies Institute’s expert on the Soviet bloc and the post-Soviet world

The question Lebow poses in his title is perhaps the oldest and most vexing question in the history of both international relations and its study. Perhaps this is why there have been so many continuing answers from philosophy, biology, anthropology, economics, history, and other disciplines that still strive to resolve this question. And because there are so many vintners tilling this vineyard it probably takes an intrepid man and scholar to enter into this issue and say something original. But Lebow proves that he is well equipped to do this.

Anyone writing such a book does so because he or she is obviously dissatisfied with the answers and thinking that now attaches itself to this question. Indeed, for example, a fair amount of social science literature, or perhaps more precisely literature aspiring to call itself scientific, has announced that war is
a form of bargaining. While there may be something to this kind of bloodless analysis, a subject so lethal and terrifying as the reasons for war cries out for something which accounts for the role of the passions and for thinking that goes awry in our lives. Lebow clearly is dissatisfied with answers that exclude critical elements of the human psyche (whether individually or collectively in the form of nations) in accounting for the origins of war. And as often has been the case in intellectual history fruitful innovations in thought arise from a return to the classical wellsprings of wisdom that we find in the classics.

That is what Lebow has done. He analyzes war initiation in terms of the motives and relative power of states. He finds that earlier and often well accepted or conventional explanations for war are unsatisfying. Analyses in terms of security, material, or economic interest prove to be of declining relevance in accounting for the motives for war initiation. He also believes the nexus between war and standing, or perhaps prestige, is also declining and as the Anglo-American war in Iraq suggests it is no longer necessary to initiate wars to gain what the author calls standing in world politics. Likewise, wars of revenge, initiated to recover lost territory, are also declining in frequency. He analyzes the motives for the initiation of war in terms of classically derived attributes, i.e., from Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy of what they called appetite, spirit, fear, and reason.

This does not mean that material capabilities or ideas are simply discounted as motives for war. Indeed, Lebow finds that they are both omnipresent and interdependent. But he also finds that war as a popular instrument for the achievement of wealth, standing, or rational political purposes is declining. And certainly the romantic aura of war that lasted into the twentieth century is no longer present, especially in the West. Thus, wars have come to be seen as excessively costly and destructive, and as being fundamentally antithetical to any concept of rational statecraft.

Using these aforementioned classical concepts as the basis for analysis allows Lebow to account for not only the destructiveness of past wars but also the presence of wars today, which he sees as being the outcome of what he calls a perfect storm. This storm is the interaction of these classical factors with the possibly unique elements of American wealth, political culture (i.e., material and cultural factors), the continuation of the subculture of the southern concept of honor, along with a powerful defense industrial complex. The concluding observations may possibly vitiate the power of the earlier analyses, but the title promises an account of why nations have fought and will fight in the future and as Plato wrote “only the dead have seen the end of war.” And it is true that the United States since 1990 has been engaged in many protracted wars, a factor that must be accounted for in any analysis of the phenomenon of war.

In sum, this book is well worth reading and thinking about. Many will find the author’s arguments uncomfortable. But that is to Lebow’s credit. War and its initiation is not a subject about which we should become comfortable. Even when necessary, it is a scourge and if we understand how and why wars have happened, occur now, and may still occur in the future we might actually
Hearts Touched by Fire: The Best of Battles and Leaders of the Civil War
Edited by Harold Holzer

Reviewed by COL (Ret.) Cole C. Kingseed, former professor of history at the US Military Academy, writer and consultant

Originally conceived in 1883 by the editors of The Century magazine, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War appeared four years later and contained first-hand accounts from senior officers from both sides, documenting the significant battles and events of this nation’s bloodiest conflict. Now, to coincide with the sesquicentennial of the war, editor Harold Holzer has compiled a new collection of the best writing from the original four-volume series with the stated purpose of creating an accurate account of the conflict. Assisting Holzer are some of the most renowned contemporary historians, including Pulitzer Prize winner James McPherson, James Robertson, Stephen Sears, Craig Symonds and Joan Waugh, each of whom provides a contextual introduction of a specific year of the Civil War.

Holzer brings impressive credentials to Hearts Touched by Fire. He is one of the country’s leading authorities on the political culture of the Civil War era. Holzer is also a frequent guest on television programs such as The Today Show, Charlie Rose, Fox News, and the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer. In addition, he has authored, coauthored, and edited thirty-six books, including The Confederate Image (1987), The Union Image (1990), Eyewitness to War: The Civil War (1996), and In Lincoln’s Hand (2009). Most recently, Holzer was awarded the National Humanities Medal and he currently serves as the senior vice president for external affairs at the Metropolitan Museum of Art.

The original articles that appeared in Battles and Leaders were written by Union and Confederate generals who had commanded the engagements two decades earlier—or, if he were not living, “the person most entitled to speak for him or in his place.” Consequently, a number of senior commanders immediately signed on to contribute to the project. Ulysses S. Grant, initially dismissive of the project, changed his mind when his personal economic fortunes precipitously declined. At Grant’s urging, so did Generals William T. Sherman and Admiral David Dixon Porter, quickly followed by Confederate Generals Joseph E. Johnston and James Longstreet and a host of subordinate commanders. What Holzer hopes to accomplish in Hearts Touched by Fire is “a new cycle of public attention, with the best of Battles and Leaders again at its very core.”

What makes this particular volume particularly informative are the introductions provided by current historians that place the contemporary essays into perspective. Craig Symonds examines the initial ten months of the
American Civil War—from Lincoln’s inauguration in March to the beginning of the first wartime winter—a period of experimentation and adjustment for both combatants. The contemporary account of Sergeant James Chester, who worked tirelessly to prepare Fort Sumter for defense, reveals that, stunning as it was, the subsequent first shot was hardly a surprise to the garrison. Symonds notes that two essays on the First Battle of Bull Run are especially intriguing, more for what they reveal about the internal bickering in the upper echelons of Confederate leadership than the details of the engagement itself. Confederate Generals P.G.T. Beauregard and Joseph E. Johnston both sought to claim credit for the ensuing Confederate victory to the discredit of the other. Apparently, the road to Southern victory in the war’s first major battle was not wide enough for two senior generals to walk abreast.

Of 1862, Stephen Sears writes that the year ended as it began, with the Union war effort seemingly stalled on dead center. “Our military condition I am sorry to say, does not appear as yet to improve,” President Abraham Lincoln’s secretary John G. Nicolay noted to a friend. Historian James McPherson picks up the story by opining that in early 1863, “Defeatism in the North was an anguish of the spirit caused by military defeat, while Southerners were buoyed up by military success but were suffering from hyperinflation and shortages.” While Sears focuses on the contributions of the war’s commanders, McPherson delivers a narrative account of the war in its most crucial year.

Readers of Parameters will relish the revelations of some of the war’s more controversial commanders. Union Second Corps commander Major General Darius N. Couch provides insight into the divisions within the Union high command of the Army of the Potomac after the Battle of Chancellorsville, after Major General Joseph Hooker decided to abandon the field. Couch attributed the Federal defeat to Hooker’s mistaken impression that Robert E. Lee would fall back without risking battle. Finding himself mistaken, “Hooker assumed the defensive, and was outgeneraled and became demoralized by the superior tactical boldness of the enemy.”

Lee’s I Corps commander General Longstreet writes an equally provocative account of his chieftain’s restructuring of the Army of Northern Virginia following Stonewall Jackson’s demise on 10 May 1863. Longstreet views Lee’s reorganization of the Confederate army as a direct result of Lee’s desire to have a second and third corps under the command of fellow Virginians. Lee’s decision to elevate Generals Richard Ewell and Ambrose P. Hill to corps command (in Longstreet’s opinion) overlooked “the claims of other generals, most notably Longstreet protégés John Bell Hood and Lafayette McLaws, who had been active and very efficient in the service.”

Such candid assessments by Generals Couch and Longstreet suggest that a lack of harmony characterized the senior echelons in virtually every Civil War army. Many of the Confederate writers are sharply critical of Jefferson Davis’s leadership for “drift[ing], from the beginning to the end of the war” while a few Union writers remain equally condemnatory of Lincoln, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, and General-in-chief Henry Halleck. In the final
analysis, however, the sixty-two essays by the war’s most illustrious commanders, coupled with five year-by-year introductions by America’s most esteemed historians, make *Hearts Touched by Fire* indispensable reading for any student of this country’s bloodiest conflict.

**In the Garden of the Beasts: Love, Terror and an American Family in Hitler’s Berlin**

by Erik Larson

Reviewed by Henry G. Gole, now writing the biography of Colonel Truman Smith, Military Attaché in Berlin, 1935-1939

Erik Larson, an experienced and highly successful writer, has done it again: *In the Garden of the Beasts* is near the top of *The New York Times* bestseller list. Briskly told in short chapters, it focuses on Ambassador William E. Dodd and his twenty-four-year-old daughter Martha in Berlin. Rich in detail reflecting extensive research, it begins with their arrival in July 1933 and ends on 30 June 1934, the Night of the Long Knives, when Hitler purged his party of insufficiently obedient elements by having Ernst Roehm and other old SA (*Sturmabteilung*, the brown-shirted Nazi paramilitary army) Kameraden murdered. While at it, he also eliminated other political enemies, among them two army generals. Appalled at the barbarism, Dodd never again spoke to Hitler and had as little contact with top Nazis as possible. He had earlier refused to attend the Party Days in Nuremberg that celebrated Hitler and the Nazis, an admirable stance. But how useful is an ambassador who refuses to speak to the government to which he is accredited?

The Dodd family—four members, but wife Mattie and adult son Bill are minor figures in the book—remained in Berlin for four and a half years. Larson explains: “It is their first year that is the subject of the story to follow, for it coincided with Hitler’s ascent from chancellor to absolute tyrant.” What was it like to dine, dance, and joke with Goebbels and Goering? Larson attempted to recreate what it was like to have witnessed that year firsthand, and he has succeeded.

Dodd was not the first choice of newly inaugurated President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s to be Ambassador to Germany. In fact, Larson writes, “No one wanted the job.” When approached by Roosevelt to take up the post, Dodd asked for time to think about it. He was reluctant to accept, dubious about his own effectiveness, and, at best, willing to give Hitler and his gang benefit of the doubt. These facts had to be considered: he was not rich; he had little political influence; he was associated with deceased President Woodrow Wilson’s internationalism, anathema to isolationists; he was professor of history at the University of Chicago and designated as President of the American Historical Association; his priority was completing another volume of his *Old South*, a history, and was in his middle sixties; he was a devoted family man concerned with the futures of his adult children. On the other hand, he had access to
the President, lunched privately with him, and directly exchanged letters; he had earned his Ph.D. with a dissertation on Jefferson at Leipzig University in 1900, knew Germany, and spoke the language; and the president held open the possibility of returning in a year. It was unquestionably an honor. He accepted.

Martha is described as a spoiled thrill seeker ready to sleep with interesting or attractive men, either characteristic would do. A partial score card included Americans, Germans, at least one Frenchman, and one Russian. She wanted to believe that the Hitler movement made sense, but then a Soviet diplomat became one of the great loves of her life and she turned left. He combined The People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) business with pleasure: she was attractive, willing, and the American Ambassador’s daughter! (He was executed in Stalin’s purges in the Soviet Union in the late 1930s.) Her politics and sexual activity were too entangled to sort out. Her behavior was noted in State Department communications and in the Berlin grapevine. It is difficult to believe that Dodd was oblivious to his daughter’s escapades or that he accepted them, but it had to be one or the other. Did your reviewer mention that this is a page-turner?

Dodd, the Jeffersonian, was determined to manage his household and duties entirely on his annual salary of $17,500, not nearly sufficient for the ambassador to fulfill his representational role in a major European capital, even in 1933. He was bored at formal affairs and resented wealthy American diplomats and haughty Ivy Leaguers who dominated the State Department. They reciprocated, regarding him with contempt as a bumpkin or fuzzyheaded academic who looked for the Student Prince of 1900 in Hitler’s Germany and couldn’t find him.

As a general reader, your reviewer assigns very high marks to Larson. He makes flesh and blood protagonists of the Dodd family and breathes life into other players, thus evoking the empathy of the reader, even where available evidence requires slight embellishment, particularly in romantic scenes created from a few lines in a diary or memoir.

This historian has a pedantic “ahem.” It has to do with Hitler’s path to becoming an “absolute tyrant.” Purging the SA pleased the professional army, and both Defense Minister Blomberg and President Hindenburg congratulated Hitler for his “soldierly decision and exemplary courage.” A competitor army had been reduced in influence, if not eliminated. But an extremely important event took place a month later, after the tidy one-year period Larson chose to highlight: the death of Hindenburg on 2 August 1934. Hitler pounced, combining the offices of president and chancellor into one person, the Fuehrer; and most importantly, requiring every soldier to take a personal oath to Adolf Hitler. That is what made Hitler’s powers absolute. He cowed the German people just as he would soon cow the governments of his neighbors.
In October 2007, the US Central Command staff breathed a sigh of relief as US Africa Command was created. The vast, complex Horn of Africa (HOA) region, rife with social, economic, political, and security ills, had required the dedication of significant CENTCOM resources and attention, all amidst the prosecution of two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. HOA still receives the lion’s share of AFRICOM’s focus, mainly due to the persistent terrorist threat—the existence of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) HOA since 2002 is a testament to important US interests in the region. American military activity in the HOA region has consisted almost exclusively of engagement and security cooperation efforts, so it serves as a good case study to examine the efficacy of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) noncombat missions. CJTF HOA serves as the focus of Derek Reveron’s 2010 book, *Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military*.

Reveron provides a timely addition to the debate on the wisdom of expanding DOD’s “soft missions.” While his assertion that the larger US strategy has “shifted from containment to engagement” is arguable, the work does serve to highlight how the military has transformed to manage noncombat missions typically reserved for civilian development organizations and the State Department. Reveron sees future engagement and security cooperation success tied to DOD acceptance of defense missions linked with diplomacy and development. The author is uniquely qualified to write on this issue, with significant expertise from years of research at the Naval War College, including several well-regarded books and articles. Further, he enjoys a degree of practical experience from an extended deployment in Kabul at the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan—one of the largest security assistance efforts in NATO’s history. Reveron successfully puts security cooperation in a contemporary context that is useful to the national security professional.

Reveron argues that security and stability are fundamental prerequisites for socioeconomic development, which ultimately promotes US national security interests. By extension, America’s engagement and security cooperation can bolster partners’ military capabilities to secure the peace, ultimately preventing armed conflict. He provides a cogent argument for the strategic rationale behind engagement and security cooperation and illustrates the dramatic expansion of these missions for DOD since 9/11. The influence—vice
dominance—that America derives from the use of soft, or “smart,” power is facilitated by what Reveron calls “a reservoir from which to draw nonlethal solutions to US foreign policy problems.” Reveron further illustrates how military-to-military relations of all types contribute to the professionalization of militaries, including international military education and training, security force assistance via State Department-funded foreign military financing, and other security assistance programs implemented at American embassies. The author asserts that American efforts that support the development of foreign militaries as institutions promoting stability and human rights pay dividends in times of internal and regional tribulation. The Arab Spring provides a compelling example, when the US-trained Egyptian Army facilitated a peaceful transition of power and refused to fire on its own citizens. Egypt is of course one of the largest examples of America’s military engagement and security cooperation. What is less clear is whether smaller efforts elsewhere will be sufficient to lessen the long-term potential for conflict. This reviewer would argue that the soft power military engagement and security cooperation resources necessary to achieve US strategy goals are beyond what America can afford. As such, Washington should direct these efforts only in countries with the highest strategic relevance to vital and important US national security interests.

Any assessment of the value of engagement and security cooperation must necessarily address costs. *Exporting Security* could have devoted more attention to the potential disadvantages of military forces focusing on non-combat missions, though Reveron does explore traditional DOD resistance to security assistance missions in chapter three. While Reveron acknowledges that there are limits to what DOD can do, he does not address the more critical counterargument that these missions may not be achieving concrete results in all cases. Any argument stressing the efficacy of security cooperation and engagement must present specific evidence demonstrating the positive impact on US national security interests. Similarly, this book stops short of presenting a cost-benefit calculation in a way that reveals both real and opportunity costs in an era when budget and force reductions will require prioritization of missions. For instance, Reveron cites Somali piracy as a transnational security challenge ripe for engagement and security cooperation, yet three years of aggressive application of smart power via a multinational effort has yet to address the scourge. With the CJTF-HOA example, it seems a safe inference that the region is better off due to the security assistance that America has dedicated to partners such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, but would the region have collapsed into chaos had CJTF HOA never been established? What has nine years of effort by CJTF HOA actually cost in real dollars and lost opportunity elsewhere? In fairness to Reveron, measures of effectiveness are hard to come by, with many intangibles lacking metrics. Still, with the staggering cost of Iraq reconstruction and ongoing stabilization efforts in Afghanistan amidst DOD downsizing, there will inevitably be Congressional and DOD scrutiny on expensive missions potentially perceived as noncritical. Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn III expressed concern in June 2011 that as the US government tightens its fiscal
belt, programs critical to preventing conflict could fall victim: “Security assistance and economic development spending needed to support these initiatives funded through the State Department could suffer as government organizations reduce their spending levels.”

Reveron is right to assert that the result of this debate will have a significant effect on strategy, force structure, and doctrine for the DOD. Indeed, it already has—DOD is implementing the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan that military success alone will not guarantee positive policy outcomes. DOD transformations to meet security assistance missions are well underway, with the recent doctrinal emphasis on stability operations—as a coequal with combat operations—full spectrum operations, and “wide area security,” which includes “protracted counterinsurgency, relief and reconstruction efforts and sustained engagement focused on developing partner capacity as part of combatant command security cooperation efforts.” Force structure evolution has been slower, but the development of Army “regionally-aligned brigades,” Naval Expeditionary Combat Command’s growth, and the Marine Corps establishment of “Security Cooperation MAGTFs” are all good examples that changes are afoot. Still, tensions surrounding the requirement for the high end of conventional military capabilities have kept the debate over hard or soft military power alive. Because many of the same military skill sets support both phase zero shaping and phase four stabilization, the stigma of expensive reconstruction in the wake of current CENTCOM campaigns may leave little appetite to fund them.

Reveron’s overview of security cooperation and the many programs that support these efforts alone make the book worthwhile. Understanding the complex array of statutes and regulations, interagency relationships, funding sources and implementation requirements for successful security cooperation is important for students of strategy and policy. Yet, Reveron’s discussion would have been more complete with an overview of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s role and mention of the security assistance “bible,” the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management’s *Green Book.*

For now, the debate continues, even as DOD transforms to address irregular threats. Fiscal pressures will likely trump the dark future forecasted by such estimates as the *Joint Operations Environment* and the National Intelligence Council’s “NIC 2025,” resulting in a smaller DOD security cooperation portfolio. Even before significant force reductions, higher priority requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan leave “economy of force” theaters like the HOA with a low priority for forces optimized for security assistance, sustaining only a marginal ability to shape the regional factors that promote conflict. America’s policymakers in future years will not have the luxury of addressing most contingencies with shaping operations. Finally, because it will remain difficult, if not impossible, to predict which internal or regional concerns will threaten stability, Washington and the geographic combatant commands will inevitably miss opportunities to check emergent threats. Ultimately, questions surrounding engagement and security cooperation will likely not be focused on whether
this is an important mission for the US military, but how much America can afford to dedicate to it and where the priority efforts should be directed.

**Victorious Insurgencies: Four Rebellions That Shaped Our World**

by Anthony James Joes

Reviewed by Louis J. Nigro Jr., US Ambassador (Retired) and author of The New Diplomacy in Italy

A recent New Yorker cartoon has one front-office type telling another across his desk, “Those who fail to learn from history are entitled to repeat it.” Professor Anthony Joes’s latest book on the subject of insurgency is a superb textbook for anyone—student, teacher, or specialist—who would learn from the historical record what makes some insurgencies successful and what factors rendered the ruling regimes unable to overcome them.

Professor Joes’s credentials could hardly be better: If there were a scholarly counterpart to Standard and Poor’s, it would give him a AAA+ rating in Asymmetrical Warfare Studies. In this book, drawing on a lifetime of study and analysis of insurgencies, Joes reflects on why these four succeeded where others failed: Mao Tse-tung in China; Ho Chi Minh against the French in Vietnam; Fidel Castro in Cuba; and the mujahedeen against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

In his brief remarks addressed to US policymakers regarding future counterinsurgency operations, Joes takes the realist position that countering most future insurgencies will be seen as limited wars by state actors like the United States, but will be seen as total wars by the insurgents themselves. “This imbalance can wear down the patience of even the strongest power,” according to Joes, who finds few cases outside the “immediate Western Hemisphere” in which insurgents threaten the “truly vital” interests of the United States. Joes counsels that in responding to most future insurgent threats, US policymakers craft strategies based on “limited support to indigenous counterinsurgent forces,” by delivering technical, intelligence, and financial assistance—and especially by interdicting outside assistance to the insurgency, which is as much a diplomatic as a military task.

Joes’s thesis is that the four regimes that failed to overcome insurgencies had three things in common: they had “surprisingly serious internal political weakness”; they committed “striking military errors”; and their best efforts were undermined by “the insurgency’s external environment, especially of outside assistance to the insurgents, both direct and indirect.”

More specifically, Joes holds that all four ruling regimes were poorly served by military leadership that underestimated the insurgent enemy; policymaker offer peaceful political roads to change as alternatives to armed insurgency; could not prevent “vital outside direct assistance” to the
insurgents; and failed to commit sufficient military forces to their conflicts, because of commitments or threats or pressures elsewhere. Joes believes that the decisive factor was the fourth and final one, which would make the ruling regime’s failure an essentially military one, rooted in defeat on the battlefield.

Professor Joes’s own deeply informed narrative of the four cases, however, makes a powerful argument that the decisive factor is in fact an insurgency’s ability to exploit the possibilities of the geopolitical and diplomatic context in which it worked. Conversely, the unsuccessful counterinsurgent ruling regimes were much less agile in exploiting those international possibilities. The most important lesson of the many that Professor Joes teaches, at least for this reviewer, is that the geopolitical and diplomatic context is just as critical for wars of insurgency as for conventional interstate wars. The success of the insurgent depends greatly on the willingness of their state-actor friends and allies to provide invaluable direct support—material, technical, and financial—and to isolate the ruling regime diplomatically, which tended to delegitimize the ruling regime while empowering and legitimizing the insurgency in the international arena.

Joes shows convincingly how much Mao benefited from the Japanese assault on China, which forced Chiang Kai-Shek to fight on two fronts from 1937-45, and after 1945 from massive Soviet support, which outpaced US support to Chiang. The author demonstrates how Ho’s insurgency was especially dependent on the international context—Japanese occupation during World War II and active Japanese assistance in the waning days of the war; Nationalist Chinese occupation of northern Vietnam after the Japanese departed; and important direct support from the Chinese Communists after 1949. Meanwhile, Ho’s French opponents were isolated diplomatically; the United States favored decolonization generally and European allies like the British and the Dutch were busy liquidating their own Asian empires, while France was desperately trying to maintain its Indo-Chinese imperium.

Joes deftly describes how Castro’s ability to take Havana was dependent on Washington’s decision to withdraw its support of Batista and to pressure him to leave power, as well as by active albeit clandestine support from several Latin American and European countries. Joes notes that the mujahedeen’s victory over the Red Army was advanced by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’s diplomatic isolation in its Afghan adventure (only India outside the Soviet Bloc recognized the Kabul regime) as well as by enormous foreign diplomatic, economic, and material support from Europe, the Muslim World (especially Pakistan and Saudi Arabia), China, and, of course, the United States.

Whether one agrees completely with Professor Joes’s final conclusions or not, readers of this book will find in it the essential stories to four consequential and successful insurgencies as well as cogent analysis of the political, military and diplomatic strengths and weaknesses of the insurgents and the regimes they defeated.
Most readers view challenges of terrorism, torture, and genocide from a prevention oriented policy, operational, or legal perspective. This book offers an opportunity to look at these acts from a philosophical viewpoint. This reviewer began reading the book with doubts about its utility for his own work in genocide and mass atrocity prevention, not to mention doubts about his preparation to assess a book of philosophy. Confronting Evils is a useful text for readers possessing intellectual grit who welcome opportunities to examine and reassess the assumptions guiding their ideas and work.

The book is presented in two parts. Part I explores the concept of evil and its various forms. Part II examines terrorism, counterterrorism, torture, and genocide. The book is presented as a sequential exploration and series of arguments, but each chapter holds up well as an individual essay that can be read with limited cross-reference to the rest of the text. Readers lacking education in philosophy will find this a well written and carefully presented study that helps them overcome this obstacle (except Chapter 2, where the ideas of Immanuel Kant come heavily into play.)

Part I usefully explores the concept of evil. As Professor Card defines them, “evils are reasonably foreseeable intolerable harms produced by inexcusable wrongs.” It will be of interest to some readers that she draws on the law of war (referred to in the book as international humanitarian law or IHL) as one source of insight on the nature of evil. Part I considers not only harms to individual human beings and individuals as perpetrators, but also institutions as a source of the evils explored in the book. In what may sometimes be a stretch for readers, she also examines “ecocide” as an evil based on wrongs done to the environment.

The greatest value of Part I is that it offers readers the chance to evaluate their own frame of reference for evil as a moral issue in international relations and national security. It might be wrong to say that Part I is intellectually clarifying—the whole book requires careful, patient reading—but it will lead a willing reader to attempt an objective examination of his or her operating assumptions. The most tangible benefit for the national security oriented reader comes in Part II.

Professor Card usefully explores philosophical dimensions of terrorism, torture, and genocide in Part II. The book takes an unexpected turn with her consideration of “low profile terrorism” in Chapter 6. She argues that rape and domestic abuse meet criteria making them as much terrorism as attacks and
intimidation by terrorist organizations. This is an unusual take on the fact that we still lack a commonly agreed upon frame of reference for terrorism.

Her exploration of genocide as “social death” in Chapter 9, and genocide by forced impregnation in Chapter 10, is particularly useful for anyone concerned with prevention. Our existing definition of genocide from the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is a departure point for these chapters. She finds that treaty and frame of reference inadequate, as events taken to destroy a group culturally and socially may constitute genocide even if the group is not physically destroyed.

Unfortunately, the book is occasionally afflicted by the need to single out the United States even where the criticism does not fit. To offer several examples, Professor Card suggests that US detention raids in Iraq were “military terrorism.” Whatever their shortcomings in retrospect, this is no more persuasive than a footnote reference offering the prospect of credibility to proponents of what we might call “the United States was behind 911” school of conspiracy theory. Such passages do not enhance the credibility of the book, but there is more than enough solid material to overcome this. More relevant, by contrast, is her treatment of counterterrorism methods in Chapter 5. So, is this a worthwhile book for the military and interagency community?

This reviewer fully concurs with Professor Card’s conclusion that “The question of a genocidal trajectory becomes important politically for those who might be obligated to intervene to stop the process before it is too late. Potential interveners who look only for intent to commit mass murder will miss many attempts to destroy a people.” That perspective informs these two chapters, and they alone are worth the price of the book. This book merits the attention of anyone engaged in national security practice and education if they are willing to overlook occasional dubious and sometimes absurd references to US military history and contemporary practice, such as engaging in periodic reassessment of their intellectual frame of reference, and are willing to commit to a thought provoking but slow, demanding read.

*Morality and War: Can War Be Just in the Twenty-First Century?*

by David Fisher

Reviewed by James H. Toner, Professor Emeritus of Leadership and Ethics, US Air War College, Author of *Morals Under the Gun*

Now visiting Senior Fellow at King’s College in London, David Fisher wrote this book as his doctoral dissertation at that institution. Fisher argues cogently that “There are no moral free zones” in international relations; relying upon Aristotle and Aquinas, he says that political and military leaders must be virtuous; and, disagreeing
with such scholars as G. E. Moore and John Rawls, he contends that morality is not essentially a private matter.

Unlike Gilbert Harman or Richard Rorty, Fisher is no relativist, and unlike, say, Charles Stevenson, he is no logical positivist. In fact, Fisher sets himself the noble task of revivifying virtue ethics in the realm of just war theory. In a plea for the improved moral education of soldiers, Fisher uses as background the events in such places as Gaza, Kosovo, Basra, Osirak, Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Darfur. His comments about preemptive attacks and about torture—“morally wrong”—are also succinct and thoughtful. He makes a strong case as well for humanitarian intervention. Although he judges the second Gulf War to be unjust, he admits that, when he held a position in the United Kingdom’s Cabinet Office, he believed that Saddam retained chemical and biological weapons. The chief value of this study is that Fisher concisely examines classical just war theory in the context of recent events and concepts such as “three block war,” military operations other than war (MOOTW), and the global war on terrorism (GWOT).

Fisher coins the somewhat pretentious neologism “virtuous consequentialism,” an attempted hybrid of absolutism and utilitarianism, as a label for his approach to ethics. He explores realism from Thucydides and Thrasymachus to Morgenthau and Mearsheimer, suggesting that realism invariably and mistakenly excludes moral considerations from the art of statesmanship.

Fisher is correct that the drama of politics always unfolds on the stage of morality, but his understanding of realism is limited. Disappointingly, there is no mention in this dissertation-turned-book of such scholars as Inis Claude, Louis Halle, Kenneth Thompson, Robert Jervis, E. H. Carr, William O’Brien, or Reinhold Niebuhr, whose insights would have enriched and refined Fisher’s discussion.

Fisher quotes Michael Walzer, who told us that “War is the hardest place [to make sound ethical judgments].” Fisher is entirely correct, then, about the compelling need for sound moral education and training. One searches the pages of this book in vain, however, for suggestions about who will be such educators or what the appropriate curriculum might be. A recent commandant of the Marine Corps proposed similar moral education for Marines at the end of boot camp or for soldiers after basic training. I had the opportunity to ask him who the instructors would be. He replied that drill instructors or drill sergeants would serve as the teachers. This reviewer must respectfully, if reluctantly, disagree with the feasibility of that idea.

It is with reluctance, because Fisher’s point about the need for ethical education is correct, but, as he rather plaintively asks, how are we morally to educate young men and women who come to military service from a society in which, increasingly, there is a lack of consensus about what constitutes virtue and wise moral judgment? “A society that attaches insufficient importance to the moral education . . . of its citizens will not be able to produce and nurture the practically wise and virtuous politicians and military and civilian leaders whom we need if just decisions are to be taken on the crucial choices between peace and war.”
Although Fisher refers to the work of such philosophers as Elizabeth Anscombe, Peter Geach, and Alasdair MacIntyre, his references are perfunctory, suggesting inadequate consideration of the connection between their work and his present effort. For example, Fisher does not understand the unity of virtues—that wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance are mutually nourishing, even though he alludes to MacIntyre’s work, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* In that book, MacIntyre points out the need to understand the unity of virtue. Fisher similarly explores the idea of Double Effect, but inexpertly, and the essays in a key book such as *The Doctrine of Double Effect* (edited by P. A. Woodward), discussion of which could have enhanced Fisher’s presentation, are nowhere cited.

Fisher’s work with just war theory adds little to the foundational work of James Turner Johnson, Paul Ramsey, Father John Ford, or to the recent insights of George Weigel or Jean Bethke Elshtain. Moreover, Fisher’s “virtuous consequentialism,” which is an attempt to merge deontology (rules) and teleology (outcomes) in the service of, and regulated by, prudence is similar to what Norman L. Geisler has called “graded absolutism,” which attempts to resolve the moral problems attending the clash of absolutes. Geisler, too, is overlooked.

That, as Anscombe once wrote, there are some moral rules we can never transgress (she called these the “bedrock” of morality”), is at the heart of military ethics. When Lieutenant Calley was tried for murder after My Lai, for example, the point was made that there are some things that men of ordinary sense and understanding must grasp. One wishes Fisher had developed this theme, reminiscent of the natural moral law, more than he did.

At its conclusion, the book lapses into a quixotic appeal for a national political “Office of Moral Assessment,” whose task will be to “furnish independent ethical scrutiny” of any executive decision to go to war. Fisher seems unaware of Plato’s nocturnal council (in *The Laws*) or Jacques Maritain’s council of wise men (in *Man and the State*). Fisher fails to address by whom such councils will be chosen and to whom they will be responsible and for how long. Who will guard those who are themselves the guardians? This is an ancient question to which Fisher offers no contemporary answer.

The book has notes, a bibliography, and an index. It is peculiar, finally, that Fisher seems not to understand the subjunctive mood, and his alternating use of antecedent and pronoun (*he or him* and then *she or her*) may be chichi, but it is also distracting. Except for its study of modern cases, little in Fisher is new ground. It is, however, a useful synthesis of just war thinking and a basic introduction to virtue ethics.
Conquered into Liberty: Two Centuries of Battles Along the Great Warpath that Made the American Way of War

by Eliot A. Cohen

Reviewed by Walter Nugent, Professor Emeritus of History, University of Notre Dame, and author of Habits of Empire: A History of American Expansion

This engaging new book by Eliot A. Cohen recounts and reflects on the imperial clashes for control of eastern North America along the “Great Warpath,” the corridor between Albany and Montreal. It was the scene of numerous battles throughout the colonial period, the Revolutionary War, and the War of 1812. Cohen takes us up and down the Great Warpath with often fast-moving prose—the book is a page-turner especially when it describes battles—and its sources, both primary and secondary, omit very few items and provide a solid foundation. Though light on Canadian sources and perspectives, the author has made good use of archives particularly in London and New England.

A “Prologue” colorfully describes the Great Warpath. Ten chapters then retell key battles from 1690 to 1814 and beyond. Frequently the author points out how these battles shaped “the American way of war.” Cohen has walked (or sailed or climbed) most of the places he writes about, as did the great historian, Francis Parkman, and like Parkman, Cohen fills the mind’s eye with vivid landscape. To this reviewer, the descriptions of the battles and the analyses of strategy and tactics are the most engaging parts of the book; the “lessons” are thoughtful but sometimes arguable.

First comes a raid on Schenectady in February 1690 by about two hundred French and Indians from Montreal, “killing most of the inhabitants, carrying off others.” The raid itself occupies just a couple of pages, but it is an entrée to a lucid discussion of French, English, and Indian strategy and tactics of the late 17th and early 18th centuries. Here, Cohen draws his first lesson: “Frontenac [governor of New France] had, unwittingly, given birth to an enduring American notion about war. His Anglo-American opponents had concluded that war was not a game of political advantage and statecraft, to be suspended from time to time by diplomacy and treaties but rather, a brutal struggle, to be resolved by complete, crushing, and definitive victory.” Ulysses S. Grant probably did more than Frontenac to instill this, but it is an intriguing connection.

Subsequent chapters follow this pattern—a colorful lead-in event, a description of a battle, analysis of the tactics and strategies, and lasting lessons. After the Schenectady chapter come three on engagements during the Seven Years (French and Indian) War: Montcalm’s capture of Fort William Henry at the southern tip of Lake George in 1757, meticulously described; then “The Battle on Snowshoes, 1758,” in which Robert Rogers of his eponymous Raiders...
suffered “a debacle” on the western shore of Lake George; and thirdly, the British failure in July 1758 to push the outnumbered French out of Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga), because of a superior siege defense and poor English intelligence. From this, Cohen writes, Americans formed a low opinion of British generalship (fortified by Braddock’s disaster of 1755 in the west), giving the colonials the courage to take on the British in 1775. “British condescension [toward colonial officers] and . . . British brutality” [toward American ranks] also inspired the soon-to-be rebels.

Four chapters on Revolutionary War events along the Great Warpath come next. “St. Johns, 1775” begins with Benjamin Franklin’s winter trek to Montreal in early 1776 to try to get Canada to join the American cause. Nothing doing; the Quebec Act of 1774 infuriated Protestant New England and comforted Catholic Canada, and the American invasions of summer 1775 up the Great Warpath and up the Kennebec under Benedict Arnold both failed. The long-term effect: “In years to come, Americans in many other places—from Mexico to the Philippines, Vietnam to Iraq—would behave similarly, waging wars for liberty and interest, conquering others into freedom, and as in Canada, with mixed motives and uncertain outcomes.” “Valcour Island, 1776” describes the campaign on Lake Champlain, when American forces under Benedict Arnold took heavy losses but (citing Alfred Thayer Mahan here) forestalled British capture of Ticonderoga. Cohen sees Arnold as “the most disturbing figure in American military history, perhaps because he is one of the most extraordinary.” He greatly admires Arnold’s generalship and has much empathy—not sympathy—for his defection. To Cohen, the Americans “who doffed blue for gray uniforms” in 1861 were much worse traitors. Events of 1777 are next, opening with a skirmish leading to Burgoyne’s capture of Ticonderoga in July 1777, Arnold’s halting of Barry St. Leger at Fort Stanwix, and the huge win at Saratoga, “a turning point in the Revolution” for the usual reasons. Here Cohen contrasts General Arthur St. Clair, the regular officer, with Colonel Seth Warner, the citizen soldier, followed by reflections on how the militia tradition endured “until, in the late twentieth century, the professional soldiers finally triumphed.” The fourth chapter on Revolutionary War events provides a quick tour of 1778-1783, when the Great Warpath was no longer so central. Cohen jumps ahead to the naval battle off Plattsburgh in September 1814; “decisive” because thereafter the British “gave up on the idea of seizing American territory.” The last full chapter traces American-Canadian relations and cross-border incidents up to the 1871 Treaty of Washington, some but not all of them along the Great Warpath.

A few pages of “Legacies” conclude the book, asserting that “the way of war that emerged along the Warpath shaped the manner in which America fought the conflict that brought her to global preeminence,” i.e., World War II. This is a rather large claim. Like anything else, traditions come and go, change and fade, are kept or discarded as contingencies require. Has there been an “American way of war” and do we still have it, given the ability of nineteen maniacs with cheap box cutters to destroy billion-dollar buildings and thousands of lives?
Cohen does not conclusively prove that we do, or that the Great Warpath produced it. But he provokes much thought and in the process, greatly entertains.

**The Shadow Market: How a Group of Wealthy Nations and Powerful Investors Secretly Dominate the World**

by Eric J. Weiner

Reviewed by Michael J. Fratantuono, Associate Professor, Department of International Studies, Department of Business & Management, Dickinson College

Since the mid-1990s, the global system has been characterized by rising interdependence and a reconfiguration of power among a wide range of state and nonstate actors. Many analysts have commented on these developments. In this highly-readable but somewhat foreboding account, financial journalist Eric J. Weiner contributes to that general line of discussion. He defines the shadow market as “a collection of unaffiliated, extremely wealthy nations and investors that effectively run the international economy through their prodigious holdings . . . of financial instruments, which they keep in unregulated investment vehicles such as hedge funds, private equity funds, and government-run sovereign wealth funds, as well as in vast government-owned companies.” His label suggests that shadow market transactions have been conducted absent the bright light of public scrutiny.

Mr. Weiner’s central argument is that over the past 15 years, China and the oil exporting countries have amassed stockpiles of highly-liquid financial capital, which in the current era are an increasingly important element of geopolitical power. Furthermore, those countries are learning how to transform that element of power into an effective instrument of power as they pursue their foreign policy objectives. That development does not bode well for the United States, which has structural weaknesses in its financial and external balances and is to an ever-greater degree reliant on inflows of foreign capital. Nor does it bode well for Europe, which was confronted with economic challenges even before the onset of the still ongoing Greece-centered financial crisis.

Mr. Weiner begins his discussion in startling fashion. He describes a crisis-simulation exercise conducted in Washington DC in March 2009. Players representing the United States pursued a broad range of global security objectives. Meanwhile, players representing China remained conservative and focused in their play. They inflicted damage on a vulnerable United States by releasing a relatively small portion of their holdings into the financial markets, thereby sending asset prices into a tailspin and undermining the US economy. Did such actions reduce the value of the assets still in the hands of the Chinese?
Yes, but that cost was much less than the benefits associated with successfully achieving the country’s geopolitical objectives.

The middle chapters of Mr. Weiner’s book are well-done. He relates in masterful fashion numerous detailed accounts of episodes that illustrate how economic power now permeates foreign relations. One anecdote among many suggests the tenor of things. On 20 August 2009, the Scottish government returned Mr. Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi to Libya. He had been serving a life sentence for masterminding the December 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Scottish officials cited humanitarian concerns for their decision, as Megrahi had been diagnosed with fast-acting terminal cancer. Upon his return to Libya, Megrahi was given a hero’s welcome, which was an embarrassment to the Scots. Even more damaging, subsequent news accounts suggested that Scotland’s leadership was motivated by economic more than humanitarian concerns: the release was the price for a renewed contract between oil giant British Petroleum and oil-endowed Libya.

Mr. Weiner’s book is not without some difficulties. The final chapters are not as strong as those that appear early on, as was the case for the one dealing with Norway’s state-managed Petroleum Fund. The Fund, created in 1990, is asset rich due to Norway’s territorial claims to globally important oil reserves beneath the North Sea. Mr. Weiner explains that the Fund has for two decades made investments based on principles of social responsibility, which is hardly ominous. However, he posits that in the future, Fund managers may abandon that ethical high-mindedness in pursuit of profit opportunities in the developing world. The reader may justifiably shrug: perhaps, perhaps not.

As another criticism, while Mr. Weiner does weave an array of descriptive statistics throughout his narrative, he would better serve the reader by offering a table or two of data that makes possible systematic comparisons of similar concepts. For example, he notes that the McKinsey Global Institute has estimated that in 2013, those in the shadow market will control $19 trillion of assets, and contrasts that to projected US gross domestic product of $16 trillion. The implications for his thesis are clear. Economists, however, would be quick to point out that while assets are a “stock,” which represent the cumulative effect of savings made over time, gross domestic product is a “flow,” measuring only one year of activity. To take this one step further, a visit to the McKinsey and Associates web site indicates that in 2008, the consultancy estimated that the value of US financial assets (deposits, government debt securities, private debt securities, and equity) was roughly $50 trillion and the value of global financial assets was about $178 trillion. Therefore, while the $19 trillion cited by Mr. Weiner is by no means insignificant, a comparison to asset values rather than the US Gross Domestic Product would be helpful, even if it were to slightly dull the edge of his argument.

Despite these minor complaints, Mr. Weiner’s well-researched book will be of value to students of political economy and international relations. He covers an enormous amount of ground, and does so in accessible, clear, and provocative terms. He offers a mosaic of accounts that collectively coalesce...
into a coherent proposition that will unsettle readers and sensitize them to a set of developments that do warrant further reflection and closer consideration.

The Bitter Waters of Medicine Creek
by Richard Kluger

Reviewed by Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun, Chairman, Department of Distance Education, US Army War College

Most readers of American history think of the 19th century Indian Wars taking place on either the Great Plains or deserts of the Southwest. One area that is hardly discussed is the 1855-56 Puget Sound War in the then Washington Territory of the Pacific Northwest. Although small in scope, the cause, conduct, and outcome of the war make a fascinating study. In Richard Kluger’s The Bitter Waters of Medicine Creek, the events of the conflict between members of the Nisqually tribe and the new settlers of the Washington Territory are told in a fast-paced, extensive exploration of the growing hostility involving land rights that would eventually result in fighting between the Washington militia and the Nisqually tribe led by Chief Leschi.

The Nisquallies were one of several tribes located on Puget Sound. The first white settlers, under the British Hudson Bay Company, seemed to establish amicable relations with the tribes. With the American expansion into the Pacific Northwest, however, squabbles over land rights and further political ambitions by the territorial governor, Isaac Stevens, led to the Nisqually and other tribes being forced to accept relocation to undesirable areas that made life difficult for Leschi and his people. Stevens had personal ambitions to expand his influence in these new lands. Under the Medicine Creek Treaty, Leschi’s tribe had to move to lands close to the current border of today’s Fort Lewis. The Nisqually had subsisted on salmon fishing, but the area allocated to the tribe was neither suitable for farming nor did it have access to adequate fishing. Leschi protested this treatment and the terms of the treaty. He voiced a desire to renegotiate the treaty. Wanting to avoid a conflict, the acting territorial governor, Charles Mason, ordered Leschi and his brother taken into protective custody.

The “war” resulted from the attempt to capture Leschi. Leschi was not captured and led his tribe and others against the territorial militia and a reluctant US Army. Regular Army officers openly questioned the rationale for the conflict. Stevens had goaded Major General John Wool, Department of the Pacific, to send more forces to fight the Nisqually. Wool was skeptical about the claims made by Stevens concerning the threat by Leschi. Stevens, a West Point graduate, complained vehemently to the Secretary of War Jefferson Davis. Wool reluctantly deployed forces into Washington. During the campaign, a “massacre” of white settlers occurred and a number of skirmishes resulted throughout the region. In one battle, two militiamen died, one was Abram Benton Moses
a former country sheriff, whose demise angered Stevens. Without support and
against overwhelming numbers, the Nisqually tribe finally surrendered.

After the Puget Sound War, territorial officials took Leschi into custody.
His brother was also captured, and was murdered in Steven’s office. Still fuming
over the conflict, Stevens had Leschi charged with the murder of Moses. The first
trial ended in a hung jury. Questions arose about the charges. If the Nisqually
tribe was at war, how could the government try Leschi for murder if he fought
as a combatant? The judge in the first trial had clearly instructed the jury that if
Leschi did kill Moses during a time of war, then it was not murder. This issue
divided the jury. There was also controversy regarding whether Leschi actually
killed Moses. Upset about the first trial’s results, Stevens changed venues for
the second trial. The second trial judge did not instruct the jury that parties
fighting as combatants may not be subject to a change of murder during war. A
witness also perjured himself and provided crucial evidence to convict Leschi.
Additionally, the judge at the second trial did not allow the defense lawyers to
present certain pieces of evidence that might have helped Leschi. Not all in the
Puget Sound area agreed with the court’s verdict. Several supporters of Leschi,
including a number of US Army officers, were horrified at the results and the
fact that an innocent man would die. Some tried to delay his execution through
pardon requests and various public forums, but their attempts failed and Leschi
was executed on 19 February 1858.

Kluger’s story documents a trying time in American history. The nature
of conflict, ethical decisions, and civil-military relations are all touched in his
vivid descriptions of the events of the Puget Sound War and Leschi’s conviction.
Although not strictly a military account of the conflict, it does provide insight
into a lesser-known conflict between white settlers and Native Americans. This
account will also raise questions about how to treat disputes in unfamiliar cultures.

For a fascinating read into a little known facet of Washington state and
American history, this reviewer recommends this book. Kluger uses extensive
court records and the personal accounts of witnesses to provide a comprehen-
sive review of the campaign and its aftermath for the struggle in Puget Sound.
He also devotes sufficient time to explaining current challenges facing the
Nisqually tribe. Despite living in poverty for years, the tribe has achieved some
success in economic development through casino revenues. This has provided
for improvements in health care, housing, and expansion of economic activities
designed to help future tribe members.
As recounted by former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, when asked in February 1990 who NATO’s adversary was now that the Soviet threat had gone away, President George H.W. Bush responded that “the enemy is unpredictability . . . instability.” At the time of the comment, threats or challenges like those posed by failed states, terrorists, Islamic fundamentalists, and Russian nationalists were emerging and helped to shape an unfamiliar landscape for the late 20th and early 21st century international system. The challenge for the policy and strategy maker has always been how to sort the threats, whether they be familiar or not, and develop approaches that will permit an ability to influence them to the advantage of the state. The less the policy/strategy maker knew, the harder the process became.

This superb work examines American strategic planning in a world forced to confront the massive change brought about by the events of the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 (11/9) and the tragedy of the World Trade Center attack in September 2001 (9/11), described by former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as bookends for a transitional period in world history. The intent of the editors was to assess the challenges associated with the development of national strategy in uncertain times, both good and bad as represented by the threats and opportunities related to the events surrounding these two dates.

Trying to determine how officials attempted to reconfigure American foreign policy in the wake of these events, University of Virginia professors Melvyn Leffler and Jeffrey Legro brought together a leading group of former practitioners and scholars to examine how national-level policy and strategy was developed during this period and what lessons could be identified to address future policy and strategy making in ambiguous and changing circumstances. The analysis examined the development of American policies and strategies ranging from 11/9, the disintegration of the former Soviet bloc, and long-range defense planning in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War, to the crafting of US bilateral relations with the new Russian Federation during the 1990s, and concluding with an examination of US strategic planning in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

The chapter authors with former practitioner backgrounds described their actions, motivations, challenges, and accomplishments as they sought to craft policy and strategy to guide the United States during this turbulent period. Zoellick assessed the 1989 strategic concept as one that could evolve to meet
changing circumstances, while Wolfowitz and Edelman characterized post 11/9 defense planning as responding to legislative demands for budget cuts, but one that would also reassure traditional allies and remake the force structure to shape an environment framed by uncertainty. Slocombe indicated that states had a much easier time thwarting threats than exploiting opportunities in a benign international environment. And through the lens of the drafting of the 2002 National Security Strategy in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Zelikow depicted an environment inspired by fear of more and larger terror attacks, with the belief that war was real and not distant. The result was strategic thinking determined to minimize the risk and focus on planning that would be immediate and protective in nature.

The authors coming from academia were frustrated by a perceived inability on the part of American policy and strategy makers to seize the moment during this period and create real change for the international system. Sarotte and Mueller felt that the United States missed an opportunity in the immediate aftermath of the events of 11/9 to create new international institutions that could have integrated Russia vice simply maintaining the established structures. Cummings and Westad assessed that people do not change easily, especially when something entirely unanticipated takes place; as a result, they become resistant to the potential meaning of new information and fall back on past lessons and assumptions. And Wolforth felt that reasoning style in times construed as normal may interfere with an individual’s ability to update their thinking rapidly when the conditions of a long-established equilibrium are thrown off balance. In the end, these authors questioned whether US strategy either did or could adapt to rapidly changing times.

Both benign and threatening environments come with their own sets of challenges and opportunities in time of change. The more benign environment after 11/9 allowed democratic constituencies to focus inward with parochial conditions dominating. Threats were subdued and policymakers could feel less reason to experiment; the defense establishment could be downsized but not significantly modified. The world was in a relatively peaceful place with little real reason to endorse change that might alter the international system’s status quo. After 9/11, the perceived terror threat was all encompassing—people were terrified, catalyzing a strategic response that was primarily defensive and reactive; preempt or prevent attacks as necessary. In each of the two time periods, there was clearly a reluctance to advocate for real strategic change. This does not necessarily mean that valid policies and strategies did not exist. This work makes clear that policy and strategy are more difficult to craft in periods of upheaval, when innovation and creativity come in second to the need for consistency and security. But it also leaves the national security professional with the understanding that it is not an impossible task. The work of the policy and strategy crafter got done; the issue for further consideration is did it get done, or could it have gotten done in the most effective manner possible? Read this book to decide for yourself; it’s well worth the time.