Lieutenant General (Ret.) James Dubik has written a little book with big ideas. After an extraordinary military career, he served as the Omar N. Bradley Chair of Strategic Leadership at the US Army War College, completed a PhD in philosophy, and is now Professor of Practice in the Strategic Studies Program at Georgetown University.

*Just War Reconsidered* is an ambitious and provocative book. Dubik conducts a critical analysis of two contemporary models of civil-military relations—Peter D. Feaver’s “Principal-Agent” model presented in *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (2003) and Eliot A. Cohen’s “Unequal Dialogue” illustrated in *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (2002)—against the moral framework proposed by Michael Walzer’s *Just and Unjust Wars* (1977). Military professionals are well acquainted with the Just War terms of *jus ad bellum* (just cause for war) and *jus in bello* (just conduct in war). The latter is more salient for them vis-à-vis the use of military force against combatants and noncombatants with the prevalence of rules of engagement for military operations during the ongoing war on terror. Arguably, such rules for fighting wars are clearer and simpler under the model of state-on-state conflict, and they get fuzzier with civil wars and insurgencies. This is especially so against nonstate actors as with the twenty-first-century’s global experience with violent extremist organizations.

Early in the book, Dubik introduces the expression “citizens-who-become-soldiers” to reinforce the link between a government that has a moral obligation to protect and defend its citizens, who in turn become agents of the state in the protection of national security interests. Given that soldiers have moral value and are simultaneously citizens, their activity, effort, and lives, when sacrificed, should be used well.

Dubik identifies an important gap in Walzer’s Just War theory in that it fails to address the moral obligations of political and military leaders in waging war. Ostensibly, senior national leaders guide and direct war-waging strategy, resourcing, and decisions for how war is conducted. Perhaps, most important is the leader’s responsibility to sustain the will of the people—here Dubik completes his allusion to the Clausewitzian trinity. War-waging decisions by political leaders are necessarily in collaboration and coordination with leaders of the military profession. Civil-military relations are thus an integral component of the decision-making processes for Just War deliberations and actions.

Dubik sets the stage appropriately with Samuel Huntington’s *Soldier and the State* (1957) and the precept of objective civilian control for the military profession. Noticeably absent is the mention of Morris Janowitz, the author of military sociology. This reviewer finds it difficult to discuss
civil-military relations and the military profession without addressing the precepts of *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (1960). Janowitz would support military leaders having the agency to influence and shape policy—as Dubik contends is necessary—because the stakes of getting it wrong are so high. Dubik asserts, convincingly, that moral responsibility does not give anyone “the right to be wrong” in waging war. Accordingly, insistence on that authority and failure to establish the conditions (leader climate or organizational/institutional culture) that increase the chances for success are morally bankrupt actions of civilian and military leaders, who have “an obligation to be as right as possible before they make a decision” (93).

Dubik uses three primary cases to test Walzer’s framework for *jus in bello*: the American Civil War, the Second World War, and the combined case of Afghanistan and Iraq. For the ideal war waged rightly, he notes civilian and military leaders had “several months of active analysis, intense and sometimes acrimonious debate, aboveboard and behind-the-scenes maneuvering, contentious analysis, and final argument” (16).

In completing his analysis of less-than-ideal war, Dubik cites cases of broken dialogue “when participants, whether civilian or military are dismissive of the perspectives of others, the dialogue breaks down and is quickly replaced with a faesimile or worse—no dialogue at all” (119). He concludes: “There is no arbitrary line dividing civilian and military war-waging responsibilities” (123) and derives the following five principles for ethical war-waging for national security professionals:

1. Continuous dialogue with senior civilian and military leaders (devise strategy and plans; understand, acknowledge, and address risk)
2. Final Decision Authority with the political-strategic leader in accordance with governing documents (for the United States, the Constitution)
3. Managerial competence in performing enterprise-level functions (US Title 10) that enable the operational force in the conduct of mission across the spectrum of conflict
4. Legitimacy established and maintained with the governed populace
5. Resignation as a form of dissent (moral agency for senior military leaders)

While Dubik provides a framework and set of principles for national leaders, his epilogue presents two sections with important questions by which to judge the conduct of war as ethical and moral. It really comes down to who is to blame and who is responsible for wars waged badly. To judge, Dubik asks simply “is the war being dragged out unnecessarily owing to a refusal to allocate sufficient resources—forces, funds, or strategic attention” (175). The reader is left to conclude that while senior military leaders may be complicit, it is the civilian leaders who are ultimately responsible for waging wars justly.

*Just War Reconsidered* offers a compelling challenge to the existing civil-military debate. When does a military leader’s provision of “best military advice” to inform the development of policy objectives and thereby shape strategy cross the line from influence to insistence? At what point does the option of military resignation threaten civilian
leaders and have an adverse impact on civil-military relations? These questions remain unanswered, but the military profession must have this conversation.

**Fighting Hurt: Rule and Exception in Torture and War**

*By Henry Shue*

Reviewed by David Perry, Professor of Applied Ethics, Davidson College, and author of *Partly Cloudy: Ethics in War, Espionage, Covert Action, and Interrogation*

Philosophers are often accused of living in “ivory towers,” preferring to ruminate about arid abstractions rather than the stuff of everyday human existence. Thankfully, Henry Shue is not that kind of philosopher. Even though he has studied and taught at several top-notch universities, including Princeton, Cornell, and Oxford, his whole scholarly career has been devoted to examining practical ethical and political issues. *Fighting Hurt* gathers 22 essays published over a 40-year period on topics such as preemptive and preventive war, humanitarian military intervention, *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* proportionality, torture, and whether a country facing a “supreme emergency” may justifiably target enemy civilians.

Shue is steeped in the laws of armed conflict and international humanitarian law. Many of the arguments in the book reflect his efforts to interpret treaty law in connection with US strategy and military doctrine, as well as to urge reforms of international legal norms where he finds them wanting. Most chapters will be of interest to Department of Defense lawyers and doctrine writers. A few chapters will be accessible primarily to Just War theorists who have followed recent lines of dense philosophical debate, for example, on whether soldiers fighting for an unjust cause forfeit some rights that opposing combatants retain. While most readers will not study the complete anthology, all strategic leaders will benefit from reading Shue’s careful analyses.

Given that a current presidential candidate has endorsed waterboarding and “worse” interrogation tactics, and threatened to order US government personnel to employ them even if they are illegal, it would be prudent for military and intelligence leaders to reflect on one or more of Shue’s chapters on torture. For decades, Shue has argued against government-sanctioned torture, criticizing the standard “ticking bomb” hypothetical scenario as artificial and unrealistic and condemning attempts by judges and government lawyers to dilute the clear meaning of US-ratified treaties that ban torture under all circumstances. Although I have taken issue with a couple of Shue’s stances in my book *Partly Cloudy: Ethics in War, Espionage, Covert Action, and Interrogation* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2009, 2016), his arguments against legalizing torture, even against suspected terrorists, are powerful and well worth considering.

Some of Shue’s most interesting work (exhibited in several chapters) has focused on issues surrounding the targeting of “dual-use” infrastructure in war, for example, in some of the bombing tactics employed against Iraq in 1991 and Serbia in 1999. “If radar and missiles designed to bring down attacking aircraft cannot function without electricity, electricity-generating plants then serve a vital military role. But operating
rooms in hospitals and water-purification plants also do not function without electricity, and they are both central for civilian life” (280). Shue is critical both of relevant laws of war and US-NATO bombing tactics he believes have been too permissive in such cases. He argues instead that a more restrictive rule would be more ethical, both in light of the *jus in bello* principle of noncombatant immunity and in the interest of minimizing gratuitous harms to civilians. “A facility that is . . . dual-purpose, but makes an irrereplaceable contribution to vital civilian needs, should be treated as if it were entirely civilian,” hence, not a legitimate target of military attack (282).

Shue deserves credit for the care he has taken to specify what we ought to mean by *ad bellum* and *in bello* principles of proportionality, and how we should weigh force protection against avoiding harm to non-combatants in military deliberations about war strategies, tactics, and weaponeering. Finally, Shue constructs compelling arguments for morally justifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for humanitarian military intervention and preventive war.
The Future of Violence: Robots and Germs, Hackers and Drones—Confronting a New Age of Threat
By Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum

Reviewed by John C. Becking, US Army

The Future of Violence is an excellent exploration of technology’s impact on modern security concepts. The authors show how technology has altered the world, such that governments are no longer the sole guarantors of security. Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum describe technologies seemingly plucked from Hollywood science-fiction movies: insect-sized drones controlled by smartphones from half a world away that are used to deliver DNA-matched lethal doses of poison; home chemists using publicly available information to create a virus resistant to vaccination which could be dispensed by air to a packed stadium of people; and cyberattacks assuming control of a user’s computer to execute nefarious activities around the world. Published in 2015, the authors concede these technologies will soon show their age or become irrelevant (citing Moore’s Law that computing “power” doubles every two years). Such technological advances, however, showcase the arc of technological capabilities.

Wittes and Blum argue technological advancements have created an environment of distributed offensive capabilities where new technologies allow groups or individuals to conduct offensive actions previously reserved for states. Offensive action, for example, no longer requires an aircraft carrier or the latest stealth fighter. Instead, action could be conducted by an individual via a cyberattack, and achieve the same levels of destruction. They further describe how technological advances have simultaneously created distributed vulnerabilities where increased use and reliance upon technology mean all states, groups, and individuals are vulnerable to attack, corruption, or theft. The authors call this new reality many-to-many threats and spend considerable time describing the political, legal, and moral implications of facing many-to-many threats as opposed to the traditional peer-to-peer threat that characterized the Cold War.

Another intriguing discussion regards the balance of liberty and security. Challenging the common conception that decreasing liberty and privacy is a natural cost to increasing security, Wittes and Blum suggest the most-free societies (Australia, Scandinavian countries, and the United States) are not necessarily the least safe, while the least-free countries (North Korea, Somalia, and Uzbekistan) are not likely to make a visitor feel safe. Rather, they argue the liberty and security balance is more nuanced in a technologically advanced age and is most reflected in terms of privacy.

Modern technology makes total privacy unobtainable as states and corporations gather megadata about individuals and organizations alike. Wittes and Blum suggest the modern perception of privacy is based on the intent for data collection and the nature of the data collected.
A corporation using individual data (to target marketing, for instance) would be considered acceptable while a government using the identical data would be considered unacceptable and a grave infringement upon privacy. They believe this privacy nuance parallels the liberty and security balance.

Throughout the book, the authors describe technologies and threats in relation to central governments, which they term “Leviathans.” These Leviathans still have a significant place in world security, but are seen as exercising shared rather than sole responsibility for societal security. Wittes and Blum highlight the careful balance between the responsibility of the state to secure society with the responsibility of private organizations/citizens to contribute to security. They cite, for example, the hacker group Anonymous’ attacks against ISIL: Anonymous did not act in concert with the international community, but the intended effects were complementary. The authors strongly suggest international governance (treaty organizations like NATO as well as bilateral agreements) will be important to the ability of Leviathans to provide security in the face of technological advances. Overall, a combination of individual, private, and government measures will be required to ensure societal security.

Wittes and Blum spend little time discussing specific policies governments and societies should adopt to deal with the new security realities. With the majority of the book so well developed, this reviewer wishes they had devoted more attention to plotting the way forward for ensuring security.

*The Future of Violence* is an excellent resource for anyone in the security or national policy fields desiring to understand how technology is changing our conception of security. This book will force us to reconsider how technology alters concepts of security.

**The Other Space Race: Eisenhower and the Quest for Aerospace Security**

By Nicholas Michael Sambaluk

Reviewed by Raymond A. Millen, Professor of Security Sector, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, US Army War College

In his book, *The Other Space Race: Eisenhower and the Quest for Aerospace Security*, Nicholas Sambaluk precisely recounts the Cold War dilemmas confronting presidents Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy. While the Cold War was largely an era of US economic prosperity and peace, political and military tensions and competition drove policy decisions in regards to strategic deterrence, ballistic missile research, and the space race. Accordingly, both presidents were compelled to adjust these policies, mainly due to unsubstantiated fears among Americans, interservice rivalries, and astute Soviet propaganda.

As Sambaluk accurately relates, Eisenhower used the National Security Council (NSC) mechanism to formulate long-term policy and strategy. In accordance with his Basic National Security Policy, The New Look, Eisenhower devoted several NSC meetings, as well as
commissioning several committees, to study the inclusion of ballistic missiles in the US nuclear deterrence. This effort paid substantial dividends, resulting in the establishment of the US nuclear triad by the end of the decade. Of significance, the central role of nuclear deterrence resulted in a strong US national security posture without injury to the economy and societal moral fortitude.

While Eisenhower’s leadership and managerial style steadfastly guided the nation through a dangerous period in the Cold War, it did so at the cost of his presidential power. Eisenhower, the war hero and political outsider, fostered an image of quiet optimism, confidence, and nonpartisanship in the executive office. Few dared to challenge his mastery of national security issues during his first term; however, whereas Eisenhower was an incredibly active and engaged president in the development of policy and strategy, his “hidden hand” management style gave the general impression of inactivity, detachment, and complacency regarding Soviet ambitions.

Even though critics continually assailed the administration with perceived gaps—bomber, nuclear, and economic among others—Eisenhower was able to stave off these assertions, primarily due to public confidence in his leadership. With the Soviet launch of Sputnik in October 1957, however, this trust began to unravel. Critics now spoke of a missile gap and a space gap, creating near hysteria among the American people of an imminent nuclear holocaust. In reality, all the purported gaps favored the United States, but partisan politics and interservice rivalries stoked fears to fever pitch.

Aside from the Democratic Party using the missile gap for the midterm and presidential elections, the US Air Force sought to monopolize aerospace (both the air and space mediums), ultimately with nuclear armed bombers orbiting the planet (i.e., the Dyna-Soar program). Eisenhower persistently fought Air Force efforts to weaponize space, wishing to reserve this realm for peaceful purposes and to keep the space program under civilian control (i.e., NASA). Though the president was primarily interested in reconnaissance satellites to monitor Soviet intercontinental missile and bomber bases, he did see the scientific benefits of space initiatives—as long as the programs were financially prudent and served a practical purpose.

For his part in the space race, Kennedy used the myth of the missile gap to ascend to the presidency. Shortly after the inauguration, however, he backed off when Defense Secretary Robert McNamara inadvertently exposed the myth of the missile gap. Still, senior Air Force officers regarded Kennedy as an aerospace ally in view of his campaign promises and his invocation of the New Frontier. The quintessence of youth, energy, intelligence, and charm, Kennedy showed promise as an Air Force advocate.

Nevertheless, Kennedy, like Eisenhower, wanted to reserve space for peaceful means, though he did relish the competitive aspects of the space race. Furthermore, he ensured NASA remained in control of the space program. As a reflection of his ambiguous space policy though, he chose to support both the space program and the Dyna-Soar program. Where Kennedy differed from Eisenhower was in the realm of national prestige. Whereas Eisenhower saw no practical purpose in a lunar
landing, Kennedy viewed it as a demonstration of US technological and scientific superiority over the Soviets. Ironically, other than for prestige, Kennedy had no real interest in space. Hence, Kennedy provided no vision for the future of space exploration—that would be left to subsequent administrations. Moreover, despite the hype and propaganda, the Air Force Dyna-Soar program could never overcome the technological (and political) hurdles to fulfill program objectives. This program, too, would become moribund before the end of the decade, ending Air Force aspirations for space.

Sambuluk’s well-researched and well-written book captures the zeitgeist of the Cold War. Accordingly, Sambaluk addresses obscure issues surrounding the missile age. Hence, students of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations will find The Other Space Race not only revealing, but also a fine addition to their library.
Mark Landler’s *Alter Egos* examines the political and working relationship between President Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, when she was Obama’s Secretary of State. Landler states Obama and Clinton share a similar foreign policy outlook, but have very different views—based on their upbringings, experiences, and political worldviews—on the use of the military as an instrument of power.

According to Landler, Obama’s childhood in Indonesia and Hawaii, exposed him to a variety of opinions on the nature of US foreign policy, including the belief US leaders could bungle into conflicts they did not understand, thereby doing more harm than good. Obama came to believe many Americans habitually overestimated their country’s ability to shape events in distant countries, and as a rising young politician he easily applied this critique to the George W. Bush administration. Later, as president, Obama came to believe the most important foreign policy decisions were about the careful calculation of risk and avoiding costly interventions in places where US core interests were not at stake.

Clinton, by contrast, sees the military as a useful tool to be deployed sometimes as a “force for good” when resolving tough foreign policy dilemmas. Landler fully accepts that Hillary Clinton is a liberal interventionist, and her hawkish approach to foreign policy is not simply the result of political expediency, though this factor can also play a role. While her husband was president, Clinton believed “the only way to stop genocide in Bosnia was through selective air strikes against Serbian targets” (43). She also pressed her husband’s aides to help support President Bill Clinton on the decision to go forward with punishment air raids against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Operation Desert Fox (1998). Many of her closest aides over the years have shared this outlook, reinforcing and even prodding her to consider more interventionist ideas. Clinton’s hard-edged views on the use of force have been noted by critics throughout her career, including Senator Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump.

As Secretary of State, Clinton was a forceful advocate for the US intervention in Libya, although she was strongly opposed in this effort by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Many of her critics defined this position as a major blunder; however, at the time, Libya had a lot to recommend it, including a manageable population of 6.6 million, important oil resources, and no virulent religious or ethnic divisions. Obama, by contrast, was skeptical of the West’s power to shape events in Libya, but was eventually persuaded by Clinton and others that the intervention would be easy and low cost. Later, as the post-Gaddafi Libyan order descended into chaos, Gates came to believe, “They made exactly the same mistake in Libya that they accused Bush of in Iraq, failure to plan
for what comes after the bad guy is gone” (169). Clinton and especially Obama were both haunted by the unravelling of Libya, however, Obama also blamed himself for being talked into an intervention he had strongly doubted from the beginning.

Looking elsewhere in the Middle East, Obama was skeptical about deeper US involvement in the Syrian civil war and remained satisfied with sending a trickle of weapons to Syrian rebels. Obama’s reluctance to get more involved was also reinforced by the CIA’s “hard look” at the record of providing weapons to insurgent fighters in previous conflicts, which were mostly “miserable failures” (220). The notable short-term exception to this disastrous record was the supply of weapons to Afghan fighters during the Soviet–Afghan war. Under these circumstances, Syria seemed like a bad bet to Obama.

Landler notes both Obama and Clinton maintained a strong interest in Asia and sought to revive the US role there after long years where the central focus of US foreign policy was the Middle East. Clinton spearheaded the effort to focus greater interest on supporting Asian allies, dubbing it the “pivot” (289). Her tough diplomacy with China and heavy focus on Asia is described by Landler as “perhaps her greatest contribution to Obama’s foreign policy, the one in which she indisputably made a mark” (289). Such policies included the sale of weapons to Taiwan and a 35 percent tariff on China for dumping tires into America.

Clinton also told her subordinates to work more closely with Asian states concerned about China and took offense at the Chinese belief the United States was in a downward spiral and its representatives (including President Obama) could be treated accordingly. Clinton further normalized relations with Myanmar, allowing its leaders to reduce reliance on China which had turned their country into a vassal state. This initiative was handled almost entirely through Clinton and her subordinates with very little input from the White House.

Landler maintains that, as the Obama administration comes to a close, the President views his two most significant foreign policy accomplishments as the agreement on the Iranian nuclear program and the diplomatic breakthrough with Cuba. He also contends Hillary Clinton, as president, would not have sought a diplomatic solution to the problems with Iran and would have been more open to a military attack on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. Nevertheless, Clinton was of real use to Obama in putting together the program of multilateral sanctions designed to pressure Tehran into negotiations on surrendering its nuclear weapons option. Landler suggests Clinton “set the table” for the diplomatic agreement which was negotiated under the leadership of Secretary of State John Kerry. In dealing with Tehran, she was the “bad cop” while Obama was the “good cop” and both benefited from this belief. The author also believes Obama and Clinton are now in a “delicate succession dance” where they are seeking to help each other for their own reasons (345). Obama realizes his legacy could be undone by Trump’s presidency, and he considers the Iran deal and the climate-change pact to be vulnerable in such circumstances.

Additionally, the book includes a number of interesting points on how the Washington foreign policy machine works. In selecting Clinton as his first secretary of state, Obama recognized the danger of having
an ambitious politician in this key cabinet role. Nonetheless, he also saw significant advantages. In particular, he hoped Clinton’s stature as an important public figure could help repair the US image and diplomatic setbacks he saw as a result of the eight years of George W. Bush’s presidency. Clinton also saw advantages in working with Obama, although her defeat in the 2008 presidential campaign left her with some bitterness to overcome. In one memorable passage in the book, the Brazilian president admitted to Clinton he had never expected Barack Obama to become president. Her more than candid response was, “Well, neither did I” (9).

In summary, Alter Egos is an important look inside the Obama and Clinton formulation and implementation of foreign policy. This study had special resonance during the election campaign between Clinton and Trump, but is also important because the contrasting Obama and Clinton views of foreign policy will continue to be reflected in upcoming strategy debates.

The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service
By Henry A. Crumpton

Reviewed by Mark Grzegorzewski, Professor of Graduate Studies, Joint Special Operations University

To the uninitiated, the intelligence world is full of skullduggery, deceit, and loathsome behavior. Henry A. Crumpton, in The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service, puts a human face on this world while acknowledging the need for clandestine operatives in defense of the nation. Crumpton, a career CIA officer and head of operations at the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center during the 1990s, achieved legendary status for his work in thwarting the Millennium Plot and for his actions in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Accordingly, he is the ideal contributor to a book on covert action.

The Art of Intelligence is a very readable book. Full of anecdotal accounts of a CIA officer’s fulfilling career, it is more a memoir than an academic analysis of the intelligence world and its applicability to policymakers. With multiple references to Sun Tzu and a chapter on Crumpton’s time with the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, it never transitions to a theoretical lens, and readers are left searching for lessons learned by the US government in countering terrorism.

Among other things, the book describes Crumpton’s interagency and counterterrorism career, including his liaison role with the FBI and the institutional distrust between the FBI and the CIA, his involvement in developing armed drones and the resulting pushback from the Department of Defense, and his time at the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center. An important insight provided by Crumpton is much counterterrorism work goes unacknowledged because of the nature of the business. Alternatively, the public only sees acts of terrorism that have not been thwarted by the US intelligence community, rather than the “presumably” many-more instances when terrorism has been foiled.
Crumpton also vividly describes the US fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. His accounts of working directly with Ahmad Shah Massoud and Hamid Karzai are truly wonderful. Readers are left musing what happened to Afghanistan? Crumpton’s answer is how the US government’s failure to plan for Afghan state-building and its premature focus on Iraq contributed to disappointment in Afghanistan. This is a persistent theme throughout the book—the failure of US policymakers, not the failure of US intelligence operatives.

In addition, Crumpton discusses his role as the coordinator for terrorism at the Department of State and attaining the rank of ambassador-at-large, which gave him a brief outsider’s view of the CIA before his retirement from government service in 2007. He also highlights his work at Johns Hopkins, following his government service, which put his CIA career in a theoretical context—something the book is missing.

While Crumpton’s aim to show the nature of intelligence will continue to grow as the nature of war continues to shift, especially in the post-9/11 world, readers are left underwhelmed by his plethora of anecdotal accounts which lack analysis. The book, a reflection of his distinguished service coupled with a treatise on how the CIA is underused, misused, or misunderstood, never details how to restructure the organization to inform policymakers better.

Although Crumpton did not meet his stated goals, I would recommend The Art of Intelligence to veterans and newcomers for its interesting firsthand accounts and its display of how actions taken by others, including policymakers and intelligence operatives, impact US national security. The value of this book lies in the insight it provides into the interlinked worlds of intelligence, policymaking, and warfare.
Ontopower: War, Powers, and the State of Perception
By Brian Massumi

Brian Massumi’s latest addition to our understanding of power may be the most important addition to strategy since On War. To Massumi, an *ontopower* is power that is able to alter perception about a chain of effects, altering the future of the original (41). It is, as its Greek prefix would indicate, a living power. Massumi’s protagonist is the idea of preemption as strategy, and he describes in his book the underlying assumptions on which preemption becomes the only response available to threats. Preemption, because it occurs before the threat emerges, must have as its ontological premise the ability to define a threat after its destruction has occurred. Preemption, in its truest sense, requires perceptions bent to fit the action. In other words, what could be a threat should be attacked because it could attack you. Preemption changes premise from fact to potential.

What Massumi does very well is translate a philosophy of action into epistemological methods. He uses the word “operationalization,” familiar to military planners, to describe this process. This word means “to make into an action.” True to its assumptions, *ontopower* requires descriptions of the environmental system as full of threats. What may be surprising to some, the two dominant descriptive paradigms of modern life, neoconservatism and neoliberalism (43), synthesize a need for this power, one that benefits from an ability to reorganize the complexity of the environment. One militarizes the environment and the other benefits from the creative destruction of the capitalist order. It is in this way preemption, an ontology, becomes epistemology.

To Massumi, the juxtaposition of deterrence and preemption creates a new era in security studies. Deterrence is policy; it is the rationalization of competition between peers who are against unitary actors. Preemption supposes there is no benefit for rationalizing. The Cold War was deterrence, but we have entered a new era where threats require responses faster than policy can provide. Massumi makes the point, if our actions create the enemy, then preemption only requires a threat because the threat could become an enemy. But, preemption disturbs equilibriums. It creates reactions that cannot be predicted, and uncertainty is a vague, uneasy threat, and so on. One does not preempt something you can deter, and you do not deter something that can be preempted. Preemption is the logical conclusion of the liberal state’s inability to provide security, what Massumi calls the “perception attack.”

Massumi’s explanation of the militarization of *ontopower* and the machinations of history are his strengths. In joining the concepts that drove the revolution in military affairs to the execution of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, he reveals the transformation of mundane military strategy into a power to the edge (93). Massumi’s connection here of the unknowable threat and the preemptive actions reveal a frightening world in which there are unanticipatory effects that create
father actions, and so on. Capabilities-based operations provide a nexus in which the terminus of action meets the push of past skill and reflex. The role of command is one of modulating emergence in order that the action provides the information required to perceive the threat. Information becomes secondary even as the military relies ever more on information technology (123).

This operationalization and militarization of preemption and Massumi’s description of the role of threat is deeply concerning. Are these assumptions conditioning the security-state to long for the “end of action” that preemption seems to afford? A nation could convince itself of the need to preempt a threat that is not really there, and trigger a war. Massumi approaches the metaphysical with his “confounding aspect” when he invokes Whitehead’s lament about the “unfortunate effect” of “back cast critical thought” (155). There is no pure history from which to learn, no exogenous right. What we know now affects what we knew before. Something happens, and we immediately reconfigure the past to fit the new information. Not doing this could create an unbearable cognitive dissonance, but it is not a one-way street. The past has a force all its own that affects the present and the future. Through his writing, both here and previously, Massumi is issuing a clarion call on the changing nature of power, with preemption becoming a strange attractor bending past and present into a network of constantly changing assumptions (209).

Ontopower is less a guidebook than a warning against assuming we will be right. Without making a moral argument, Massumi effectively describes the moral limitations of the power to preempt, the rewriting of history through the actions of the present, and the confirmation of what could have been into what was. This book should be studied by practitioners of power—professionals who owe it to the country to have discussions now, so as to have answers when policy demands action.

Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse
By Paul Staniland
Reviewed by Patrick Finnegan, Strategy and Security Institute, University of Exeter, with Anthony C. King, Chair in War Studies, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick

Paul Staniland’s Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse is an important contribution to the analysis of terror networks and their motivations. The book compares the organizational structure and strength of militant groups engaged in violent conflict and examines the question of cohesion in terrorist groups. This is necessary as, in Staniland’s words, “the ability of rebels to build strong organizations has been crucial to their military effectiveness and political influence.”

Staniland’s central argument is that the social solidarity and internal hierarchy of terrorist organizations—their social cohesion—will determine their political goals and tactics: “pre-war networks in which insurgent leaders are embedded determine the nature of the organization...
they can build when a war begins.” By focusing on the social links surrounding the initial leadership of these groups, Staniland highlights how social networks determine the development of the organization. He also shows how this development, and later performance, at an organizational level is dependent on the initial social structures of the founders. While this does not explain performance at a ground level, it does show how it may be possible to predict organizational development based upon preexisting knowledge of the founders. This aspect of the book is well suited for readers wishing to understand nonstate actor organizational development, strengths, and weaknesses.

After an initial contextual discussion, readers are presented with a series of case studies, exploring how each of the selected terror groups originated and adapted to the changing situation. Conflicts reviewed occurred in theaters in Kashmir, Afghanistan, and Sri Lanka. A fourth case study is based in Southeast Asia. By utilizing ideas of path dependency, Staniland illustrates how these groups were, in many cases, restricted in the potential forms they could take; shows the difficulty of transition between one form and another; and highlights the impact of destabilization tactics on particular groups.

Networks of Rebellion is an accessible work. It deals with a variety of conflicts, many of which Staniland acknowledges as being under-researched, and presents clear, understandable explanations of each organization under review. In the fifth chapter, for example, Staniland presents organizations which may initially appear to share many similarities, but which can and will act differently based on subtle preconflict differences. He uses the different paths followed by traditional clerics and urban Islamists in pre-Taliban Afghanistan as an example.

Through detailed case studies, Staniland highlights the subtle differences between the groups, which in other studies might be discussed collectively under particular titles such as “religious extremist”—or may not be discussed at all if they are smaller or do not pose the largest threat—and illustrates how subtle differences can have significant implications. For instance, the difference between the links found in revolutionary Islamists and traditional clerics, both religiously minded, resulted in the clerics becoming “obsolete and unequipped to do political battle” compared to the Islamist group with its better connections between leaders.

A negative issue with the book is its difficult position within current cohesion literature. The title suggests the book explains how insurgent groups operate and conduct their missions. This is not entirely true. This is a work of organizational cohesion taken in its literal sense—bonding links. Current cohesion literature focuses more on cohesion defined as actual military practice—task cohesion. For readers seeking an understanding of the latter, they will need to look elsewhere.

That being said, one of the most redeeming features of the book is how it is written. Staniland is honest about the strengths and limitations of his research, and he does not claim to answer all of the questions related to the chosen conflicts. He attempts to answer specific questions by examining specific case studies. When the results differ from the prediction, he is direct and clear about the limitations of this way of
thinking. He is also aware of what the book contributes to the field, in many ways substantially, and what it does not.

The closing chapter is the book’s most important. Staniland lays out what his theory can and cannot explain. He presents recommendations for future research and policy and opens the door for a wide range of research activities that can build directly upon his work and focus on the questions he omitted. One of the most important elements to take away from *Networks of Rebellion* is that “conflict does not play out on a blank slate that actors can make and remake as they wish. Instead, the past shapes leaders’ options in the present.”
Middle Kingdom & Empire of the Rising Sun: Sino-Japanese Relations, Past and Present
By June Teufel Dreyer

Reviewed by Michael A. Spangler, Visiting Professor, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, US Army War College

June Teufel Dreyer, a political science professor at the University of Miami, offers readers a broad historical introduction to China-Japan relations, but breaks no new ground to explain their power rivalry or to assay their likely future directions. Dreyer begins with the first documented contact between the Chinese and Japanese in the late Han dynasty and touches on their clashes on the Korean peninsula during the Tang and Ming dynasties that bookend the failed Yuan dynasty invasions of Japan in the thirteenth century. She then devotes most of her book to the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries when Japan occupied Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, and China’s eastern seaboard.

Dreyer’s chief strength lies in her detailed discussion, often drawing on primary sources, of political groups in both countries that held conflicting opinions about trade, military strategy, and the growing role of the United States in the region. She spotlights little-known facts that flesh out readers’ understanding of Sino-Japanese relations—for example, Dreyer cites often-insulting terms both sides applied to each other during their turbulent history. She notes China’s declaration of war against Japan in 1894 referred to its adversaries as “dwarf pirates,” while in 2004 a Japanese Diet member called China “a Yamata-no-Orochi,” that is, “a mythical eight-headed, eight-tailed dragon reputed to attack a village each year to eat one of its female children.”

Dreyer argues Sino-Japanese clashes are “merely symptoms” of an underlying problem, namely the unwillingness of either state to accept the other as an equal or to accept a position of inferiority vis-à-vis the other. She notes the Chinese have long regarded themselves as civilized and all others (including Japan) as barbarians or inferiors. Japanese nativists ridiculed this claim because barbarians had conquered China and been recognized as its leaders several times. To these Japanese nativists, Japan was the true Middle Kingdom, especially after it adopted Western-inspired industrial and military reforms that placed it on an upward trajectory of national power. Dreyer argues the Japanese were “psychologically prepared” to undergo these reforms because they had borrowed “so heavily from China in the past.” What a back-handed compliment to China and a put-down of Japan’s own cultural gifts for self-criticism and improvement!

Arguably the most horrific episode in Sino-Japanese history was Japan’s Nanjing Massacre in December 1937. Nanjing, then the capital of the Republic of China, was devastated by the Imperial Japanese Army reportedly killing 300,000 people, according to Chinese accounts. To this day, Dreyer concludes, this campaign “remains . . . a massive impediment to efforts at Sino-Japanese reconciliation.” In 1985 when Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone made his government’s first post-World War II visit
to Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine honoring Japan’s war dead, anti-Japanese protests by students broke out in several Chinese cities. Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s visits to Yasukuni draw strong rebukes from China today.

In 1951, Japan and its World War II adversaries concluded treaties that affirmed Japan’s sovereignty and ended Allied occupation. The US-Japan treaty called for a continued US military presence in Japan to strengthen regional security in East Asia where the Korean War had broken out a year earlier. In China, however, Communist Party officials viewed the US forces as a potential threat. Dreyer observes that the Chinese began to see the US-Japan alliance as designed to “wage war against China and the rest of Asia.” Dreyer could have added that many Chinese opinion makers today frame the US policy of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific in similar terms. They fuel China’s encirclement anxieties by claiming, inter alia, Japan and other neighbors are challenging China’s maritime claims due to US support, Japan’s prime minister is moving to reinterpret his country’s pacifist constitution with US acquiescence, and the United States is shepherding a trans-Pacific trade deal that includes Japan while excluding China.

China’s weakness throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries constitutes a historical outlier, not the norm of its history. By reverting to its mean, China today may be enjoying a relatively stable period during which it increasingly reasserts its influence as a major world power. If this is true, it is not surprising Dreyer contends “the intervals between Sino-Japanese confrontations have become shorter, positions more intransigent, and the probability of reaching compromises progressively reduced.” The best we can hope for, Dreyer suggests, is a carefully managed “uncomfortable peace.” No wonder she ends Middle Kingdom & Empire of the Rising Sun with a Chinese proverb she translates as “stones that cannot escape each other rub each other smooth.” Clearly, she believes the grating Chinese and Japanese stones will become smoother either through greater cooperation or violent conflict. Readers are left to decide.
Using the lens of history and five twentieth-century campaigns and battles, Douglas Macgregor’s *Margin of Victory: Five Battles that Changed the Face of Modern War* delivers an incisive account of the salient reasons for success and failure in war and what the United States needs to do to ensure its future margin of victory. Macgregor asserts that a nation’s ability to adapt its military organization, technology, and human capital to dominate enemies and threats will ensure its victory in the critical first battles of future high-intensity conflict. He also warns that the last 15 years of counterinsurgency and occupation duty has atrophied the US military’s ability to succeed in this environment, particularly so for the US Army.

Thematically linked, each chapter offers a unique historical vignette—the battle of Mons in 1914, the battle of Shanghai in 1937, the destruction of German army group center in the western Soviet Union in 1944, the counterattack across the Suez Canal in 1973, and the Battle of 73 Easting in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991. Although some of the chapters support the author’s arguments better than others, their overall message is clear: wars are often decided in the decades before they begin, not by just-in-time technology, rushed task organization, or the surprising impact of key leaders on the spot. The book concludes with specific, well-considered reform recommendations for the US Department of Defense.

An iron fist of a read, *Margin of Victory* is generally coherent and supported by ample and relevant evidence; however, Macgregor does not always choose the best historical examples to support his main points, and he sometimes strays into unsupported commentary on previous national policy and unnecessary declaratives. Add to this Macgregor’s affinity for high-intensity conventional warfare, and the balance of the book suffers.

The book opens with a less-than-expected first example: the battle of Mons. While Sir Richard Haldane’s reforms of the British army were underway, they had little strategic impact on the Western front in the fall of 1914. The narrative gains strength as it unfolds further in the battle of Shanghai, where Japanese resistance to needed reforms and the exorbitant price they paid in blood and material for courting hubris exposed their failure to adapt their military organization, their poor use of nascent armored forces, and their refusal to take advantage of the synergy of jointness.

Patient readers are rewarded in the middle of the book. The 1944 collapse of German army group center and the 1973 Suez campaign are towering examples of victory achieved through needed reforms and...
superb human capital. Macgregor adeptly lauds the seriousness and impressive utility of Soviet interwar reforms, not only in technology, but also in organization and doctrine. The Soviet use of mobile armored and related forces with integrated air support conducting shock and deep operations inside a unified general staff structure was nothing short of revolutionary for a state that just two years before nearly faced extinction. Equally impressive was the 1973 Israeli counterattack across the Sinai Peninsula and Nile River, leveraging speed, surprise, and a culture of mission command that rewarded small-unit initiative. Front and center in these two examples, Macgregor makes his point clear: fast and well-protected armored forces were vital to ensure a solid margin of victory.

In the final example, Macgregor highlights the Battle of 73 Easting during Operation Desert Storm. While this battle was wholly tactical and not particularly decisive to the outcome of the campaign, Macgregor shows why excessive caution and a lack of true jointness are threats to victory and why aggressive leaders imbued with a culture of mission command are needed at all levels.

But what about the types of modern, “wicked” problems that do not lend themselves to solution by highly mobile armored forces with joint fire support, yet remain vital to our national interests and need a military response? The author gives foreign policy prescriptions that dismiss many of these, and they weaken his arguments. The range of military operations is well-established in US joint doctrine for a reason, and we would be wise to remember that soldiers did not invent the range; national policy did.

Macgregor concludes with innovative and powerful recommendations. First, the Department of Defense should create a national chief of defense and staff with full operational and administrative authority. Second, the geographic combatant commands and services should cash in bloated and unnecessary layers of command, such as the service components, and replace them with robust and agile regional joint task forces. At a minimum, this would reduce decision cycles and improve joint integration. Third, all services, but particularly the Army, need organizations far less suitable for occupation and more capable for decisive, mobile, and high-end joint combat. To be sure, Macgregor’s repeated warnings about the need for decisive victory on short notice against high-end asymmetric threats are well founded and supported by recent scholarship. But, this fact does not mean the United States should neglect security cooperation, presence for assurance and deterrence, and permanent alliances to achieve it. Our national interests demand a more balanced approach.

Whether you agree with the author or not, Margin of Victory is a worthy read with several well-considered recommendations that will prompt critical thinking and debate among senior military leaders and others in the defense community about how we fight—and what it might take to win the next war.
Invasion: The Conquest of Serbia, 1915
By Richard L. DiNardo

Reviewed by James D. Scudieri, Senior Historian, US Army Heritage and Education Center

This book is a major contribution to understanding one of the lesser-known and under-studied campaigns of the First World War still dominated by the Western Front. It is part of the publisher’s “War, Technology, and History Series” whose editor highlights the challenge to analyze “the precise role of technology.” This work is a case study from the principal Central Powers’ perspective. The author has made extensive use of German and Austrian sources.

The introduction articulates the book’s scope and context clearly and succinctly. It juxtaposes this final invasion of Serbia with the Central Powers’ previous, combined operation against Russia earlier in the year, the stunning victory at Gorlice-Tarnów, which the author covered in an earlier book in the same series. The latter was a high-water mark of German and Austro-Hungarian cooperation, liberating Austrian Galicia and conquering Russian Poland in May–July 1915. The invasion of Serbia in September–November 1915 was the last for the “military marriage” of August von Mackensen as commander and Hans von Seeckt as his Chief of Staff.

The first chapter is a whirlwind review of nineteenth-century European history, national developments, diplomacy, and conflicts. The start of the twentieth century saw increasing German diplomatic isolation, but particularly Austrian fear of an expansionist Serbia as a mortal threat. The chapter reviews the embarrassing Austro-Hungarian failures to subdue Serbia in the latter half of 1914, emphatically stating Austrian Chief of Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf should have comprehended Austria-Hungary could only fight on one front at a time. The main effort should have been Galicia against the Russians, not both simultaneously.

Chapter 2 considers strategic priorities and decisions in March–September 1915. Turkish membership in the Central Powers from October 1914 had raised the requirement to develop a landline of communications. Any future missions also had to account for the devastating Austro-Hungarian defeat in the winter Carpathian Campaign against Russia. Significantly, German Chief of Staff Erich von Falkenhayn established alliance strategic prioritization of a Serbian operation—without consideration of civilian policymakers.

Chapter 3 covers plans and preparations, including assigned forces, which composed a joint and combined campaign. Under command were German, Austro-Hungarian, and Bulgarian troops; aviation elements; and the Austrian-Hungarian Navy’s Danube Flotilla. The text includes a superb review of commanders, German and Austrian, down to division. This cast of characters brought quality and experience to the conduct of the operation.

Chapter 4 discusses the opening moves between September 25 and October 12. Chapter 5 focuses on the decisive 10 days from October 12 to 22. Chapter 6 highlights the subsequent fall of key cities from
October 22 to November 5. Chapter 7 summarizes the pursuit on November 6 to 30. These chapters convey the continual challenge to comprehend ground truth and to demonstrate flexibility to adapt and retain initiative. Indeed, campaign success did not deliver the intent to destroy the Serbian Army around Kosovo. Nonetheless, Mackensen’s operation had achieved the defeat of Serbia and the establishment of a line of communications for about 67,000 casualties.

Chapter 8 analyzes post-campaign considerations from December 1915 to January 1916, and Chapter 9 provides overall assessments. Serbian remnants escaped to Adriatic ports, where Allied shipping evacuated them. Reconstituted on Corfú, a new Serbian army would fight out of Salonika. Worse, the defeat of Serbia marked the end of the closest German and Austrian cooperation. As with the Gorlice-Tarnów operation, the perennial spats between Falkenhayn and Conrad had magnified difficulties. The final conquest of Serbia also exacerbated the less-than-harmonious relations between the German High Command and the German operational headquarters on the Eastern Front. German and Austrian strategic priorities increasingly diverged as Austrian dependence on German military assistance increased.

The role of technology is integrated throughout the text. The Central Powers leveraged several technical enablers. Specialists extracted the maximum benefit from available rail lines. Army and aviation services had well-integrated aerial reconnaissance. Commanders fielded a preponderant advantage in artillery overall—and heavy artillery in particular. The Germans capitalized on signals and communications to facilitate offensive operations, including frequent movement of higher headquarters forward as necessary. Nonetheless, technology was not a panacea; warfare still required careful planning, logistics, and sustainment. Skilled commanders and staff wielded them with seasoned expertise; they did not own a monopoly. Admittedly, they fought an outnumbered and war-weary foe.

Unfortunately, there are numerous errors in the text. The significant quantity of editing oversights is difficult to comprehend. These do little justice to the author’s efforts. One factual error is to categorize both the German SMS Goeben and SMS Breslau as light cruisers; the former was a battle cruiser.

Invasion: The Conquest of Serbia, 1915 provides a thoroughly researched, well-written case study in a mere 138 pages, not including endnotes, on a joint and combined operation from a century ago. The analysis underlines the clashing perspectives of different headquarters’ echelons. One of the more intriguing aspects of the book concerns the ready German concession to Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria of responsibility for post-conflict occupation. That period is another story entirely.
Braddock’s Defeat: The Battle of the Monongahela and the Road to Revolution
By David L. Preston

Reviewed by LTC Jason W. Warren, Concepts and Doctrine Director, Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College

Reading terrain in relation to the adversary is often the key to tactical victory. It also makes for the beginnings of a first-rate military history, as David L. Preston demonstrates in his profound *Braddock’s Defeat: The Battle of the Monongahela and the Road to Revolution*. Preston paddled, hiked, and drove his way to an excellent analysis of the maneuver and decision-making of the French, Indians, British, and colonists during this epic campaign in the 1755 American wilderness. His on-the-ground treatment of events renders this study the definitive work of the first conventional British ground operation of the French and Indian War, and as Preston shows, with wide-ranging implications for Europe in the Seven Years’ War, and eventually, the American Revolutionary War.

Hesitant at first to purchase what I considered yet another treatment of this infamous engagement, Preston’s excellent lecture at the Ohio Country Conference convinced me to rethink my impression. I was more than rewarded. *Braddock’s Defeat* is one of the most thorough military history accounts of any topic, combining detailed strategic, operational, and tactical examinations with the best of modern military history’s cultural considerations. In so doing, Preston revives Braddock’s reputation as a sensible military man, sensitive to the need to cultivate indigenous allies, while placating the infighting colonists. The Indians themselves become the main agent of victory for the battle, acting in conjunction with French officers and cadets in crushing the British flankers and pouring deadly enfilading volleys into Braddock’s beleaguered column.

Preston’s uncovering of rare Indian voices in the record adds brilliantly to this analysis. Braddock’s defeat was a matter of initial Indian success in an ambush, in a fashion similar to what I have discovered occurred repeatedly in the Great Narragansett War (traditionally King Philip’s War). An initial accurate volley into a European column negotiating difficult terrain by a large number of concealed Indians usually led to a rapid and decisive Indian victory. Although it may have been more useful in the section about the battle itself, the counterfactual allusion to how Braddock might have reacted tactically is a critical piece of Preston’s analysis (315–316). Subsequent Indian fighters, like Henry Bouquet, Robert Rogers, and “Mad” Anthony Wayne, employed such tactics against Native Americans, perhaps making good Braddock’s supposed final words, “We shall better know how to deal with them another time” (273). As with many commands unprepared for the enemy, there was no next time for Braddock and many of his troops who were killed in action and mutilated in accord with Indian cultural affinities in war.

Preston does not conclude with new consideration of Indian material, but uncovers original French sources in Caen’s archives and elsewhere which produced, among valuable maps, a hitherto unknown account of the French battle plan. I once attended the lecture of a well-known and popular Second World War historian, who, when asked...
about the German sources he had examined for his massive volumes, replied he had not considered them. Wrong answer. Preston avoids this one-sided pitfall of writing military history by examining both Native and French sources. He also reveals American historians have usually filtered the extant English primary sources on Braddock through an American-Whiggish lens, distorting the British commander’s ability as a field commander and effective purveyor of colonial-Indian policy.

Preston’s championing of irregular warfare in the “Consequences” and “Epilogue” sections, however, establishes a sense of false dichotomy between European “conventional” and American “irregular” warfare. (He also sometimes conflates ranging and light infantry tactics, which were not always identical.) The Western–Near Eastern tradition of light infantry musketeers developed in earnest during the endemic warfare between the Ottoman Turks, particularly the Janissaries, and the Spanish Habsburg’s light infantry in the sixteenth-century Mediterranean theater. Gustavus Adolphus later employed light infantry effectively during the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648). In the New World, John Mason of Connecticut utilized light infantry and ranging tactics (some of which he had experienced in the Thirty Years’ War) in the Pequot War (1636–1637), as did later Connecticut leaders and Massachusetts’ Benjamin Church in the Great Narragansett War (1675–1676). Wayne Lee in Barbarians and Brothers also details the circulation of irregular military methods within the Anglosphere.

Preston should have given his audience the “Paul Harvey” by detailing the other side of the story concerning conventional forces’ initial losses. For every Braddock’s defeat, there was a Quebec, for every St. Clair’s debacle (Battle of Wabash), a Fallen Timbers, for every Isandlwana (Anglo-Zulu War), a Battle of Ulundi. This treatment of irregulars extends in the American case to George Washington (whose excellent treatment in the book is noteworthy), who sought not to build a perfect hybrid of conventional and irregular units, but rather to utilize light infantry and irregular tactics in complementary fashion for decisive conventional combat. This relationship does not apply in the inverse, as the operations in Quebec (1759) and Yorktown (1781) were both war-ending conventional campaigns. While David Hackett Fischer (who wrote an editor’s note for Braddock’s Defeat) demonstrates in Washington’s Crossing the utility of American light forces to set the stage for conventional battle—the reverse remains untrue—conventional forces do not usually set the stage for war-ending victories of irregular or militia forces.

This book must be read by those interested in early American, ancien régime European, or military history. Preston has crafted a truly special and remarkable account.