The Life and Work of General Andrew J. Goodpaster: Best Practices in National Security Affairs

By C. Richard Nelson

Reviewed by Charles D. Allen, professor of leadership and cultural studies, US Army War College

The Life and Work of General Andrew J. Goodpaster is part of the American Warrior series from the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) that examines unique historical contributions of individuals with enduring legacies. The subject of this book, Andrew Goodpaster, is an iconic military leader and exemplary national security professional who many feel has not gotten proper acknowledgment commensurate with his impact. This reviewer was understandably cautious and approached the task with healthy skepticism, given the project was sponsored by two activities for which Goodpaster was associated for more than a decade. Written as a biographical tribute, the book is published in partnership with the AUSA, the Atlantic Council, and the Eisenhower Legacy Council.

C. Richard Nelson has impressive credentials as a soldier-scholar and is eminently qualified to present Goodpaster to a new generation of national security professionals. The author retired from two careers—as a US Army officer and an analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency—during which he served on the faculty of the Command and General Staff College as well as the National Defense University. With a PhD in international relations, he also served as director of the international security program under Goodpaster at the Atlantic Council. Nelson thus had close association with the subject to complement his intensive and comprehensive research on Goodpaster. His effort more than adequately addressed the shortcomings noted in the 2013 book Unsung Hero: The Life of Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster by Robert Jordan. Indeed, it is over a hundred pages longer.

Nelson appropriately organizes this book into three major sections: “Earning a Reputation,” “Conducting National Security Affairs,” and “Collaborative Leadership” to present chronologically the growth and development of a farm boy who would become one of the most highly sought after and respected strategic advisors of our nation. A quick reading of the three-page selected chronology (298–300) illustrates the breadth and depth of Goodpaster’s service and contribution to US national security.

Goodpaster’s intellect and leadership talent were recognized while a cadet at the United States Military Academy (West Point). There he caught the attention of Colonel George “Abe” Lincoln who taught in the Department of Social Science. Within five short years after graduation, Goodpaster established himself as a warrior-leader, earning the Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star, and two Purple Hearts as an engineer battalion commander with his unit fighting as infantry in the World War II Battle of Monte Cassino. It was Colonel Lincoln who subsequently advocated for Lieutenant Colonel Goodpaster to be
assigned with him as a strategic planner for Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall. There he learned at the feet of the master strategic leader and thinker Marshall. For his broadening experience, Goodpaster was a member of the initial officer cohort of the “Lincoln Brigade” of soldier-scholars sent off to civilian education—within three years, he earned two masters degrees and then a PhD in international relations from Princeton.

Goodpaster’s reputation for strategic thinking and staff coordination led to his selection to serve with the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General Dwight D. Eisenhower. It was Goodpaster who drafted General Order Number 1 (GO #1) by which Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) assumed operational control of sovereign national forces for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Less than two decades later, the GO #1 drafter would become the SACEUR. The SHAPE assignment was the start of a long mentoring relationship and friendship between Eisenhower and Goodpaster.

When Eisenhower became president of the United States, Goodpaster served as his staff secretary and the president’s defense liaison officer. Goodpaster was clearly the progenitor of National Security Council (NSC) methods and procedures now collectively referred to as the interagency process. Subsequent to the Eisenhower administration, Goodpaster served Presidents John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard M. Nixon in varied capacities interspersed with traditional command and staff assignments for a military flag officer. Those assignments included commanding general of 8th Infantry Division, director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commandant of the National War College, deputy commander of US Military Assistance Command Vietnam, and SACEUR.

In his retirement, Goodpaster continued to serve in the arena of national policy and strategy formulation in advisory groups, commissions, academic institutions, and think tanks. This reviewer read in anticipation of discovering what else Goodpaster had been a part of. Like a strategic “Forrest Gump,” Goodpaster was just off camera for Eisenhower’s New Look, Kennedy and Johnson’s assessment of Vietnam, Nixon’s NATO-Warsaw Pact détente, and as other presidents wrestled with a new world order of the post-Cold War era as well as challenges of a new century.

In reflection, an appropriate subtitle for this book would also be A Profile in Strategic Leadership: A Talent Well-Managed. Goodpaster’s career exemplified the frame of reference development and the metacompetencies (conceptual, technical, and interpersonal) in the US Army War College Strategic Leadership Primer (Gerras, 2010).

Nelson has captured the legacy of principled leadership demonstrated by Goodpaster. As Nelson offers in the preface, “Each new generation of national security officials believes they are facing challenges of unprecedented complexity and uncertainty. In retrospect, however, all challenges are similar to the extent that they all need to be well thought through” (x). This book establishes that Goodpaster, over the course of his long service to the nation, could answer in the affirmative to the question often posed by his mentor Marshall, “Are you confident that you’ve thought this through?” Current and future national security
professionals, both uniformed and civilian, will be well-served to consider and think through the lessons offered by this American warrior-scholar.

Our Year of War: Two Brothers, Vietnam, and a Divided Nation
By Daniel P. Bolger

L ieutenant General (Retired) Daniel P. Bolger writes in the preface of Our Year of War: Two Brothers, Vietnam, and a Divided Nation that he seeks “through the story of Chuck and Thomas “Tom” Hagel, to explain the lasting significance of the tumultuous events of Vietnam and 1960s America”. While he does not fully meet this goal, leaving many aspects of 1960s America and Vietnam unexplored, he does knit together valuable and focused insights on the political and social environment of the mid-1960s, the Army, its culture, and the Vietnam War. He explores how American reaction to the Tet Offensive affected the conduct of the American approach to the war in Vietnam, the Army leadership, and the soldiers who fought there. For Bolger, the Hagel brothers provided a valuable and useful structure for his analysis.

The Hagel brothers’ Army experience began when victory in Vietnam was still expected, and both volunteered for service in the Army. After basic and advance infantry training, both were assigned to Vietnam. Chuck Hagel, the future senator and secretary of defense, arrived first in December 1967 and Tom, a future attorney of note, in mid-January 1968. Through some gamesmanship, the two brothers were assigned to the same platoon of Company B, 2nd Battalion, 47th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division. The two brothers were inseparable, serving as crewmen on the same infantry personnel carrier and often sharing the responsibility of walking point on combat patrols.

Their battalion’s area of operations, west of Saigon, included nearby installations such as Long Binh Post, the Army’s largest, and Tan Son Nhut Air Base. During the Tet Offensive, both installations were major objectives for the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces. The mobility of their units drew them into some of the hardest fighting of the war.

Bolger’s exploration of the post-Tet fallout in the United States is sound. He details and effectively describes how the North Vietnamese public relations victory affected the decision of President Lyndon B. Johnson not to seek reelection and the impact the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy had on the social fabric of the country. He successfully highlights how the rauous 1968 Democratic Party convention in Chicago and the campaign of George Wallace helped facilitate the election of Richard Nixon to the presidency; however, much more can be written about Tet’s effect on the home front. What Bolger does most effectively, however, is explore Tet’s effect on the Army, the Army’s approach to the war, aspects of the Army’s culture, and the effect of the changing environment on those who fought.

The public relations’ victory of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces, though not reflected on the battlefield, led to the departure
of General William C. Westmoreland in the late spring of 1968. Westmoreland, who had been committed to a war of attrition, was replaced by General Creighton W. Abrams Jr., who over the remaining years of combat would, according to Bolger, “shoulder the unwelcome task of losing the war as slowly as possible.” The author discusses how Abrams's approach to the war sought to reduce the adverse effect on the civilian population and to limit US casualties. Abrams's efforts, would eventually lead to the Vietnamization of the war. But, in mid-1968, Westmoreland’s emphasis was major unit combat. In contrast, Abrams placed a greater emphasis on small unit actions and combat patrols.

Bolger uses this transition to begin an interesting examination of command and biases that his military experience enhances. He explores, in some detail, the disconnect that occurs between leaders, even at senior levels. He describes that after Tet, Abrams sought to reduce the adverse impact on the civilian population. Meanwhile, the commander of the 9th Infantry Division, Major General Julian J. Ewell, saw General Abrams’ new approach as an opportunity to take the fight to the enemy. Ewell placed heavy reliance on combat patrols and the use of artillery. His efforts may have contributed to higher civilian casualties, and Bolger highlights how postoperations analysis often identified fewer seized weapons than enemy killed. Some, including those on Ewell’s and Abrams’s own staffs, believed that a portion of the killed were civilian.

Bolger also goes on to examine prejudices in the Army and how commander’s biases affect their evaluation of combat effectiveness. The 9th Infantry Division was a composite unit and included standard “straight leg” infantry, mechanized infantry, and riverine (“Brown Water Navy”) battalions. Ewell disliked his mechanized and riverine units, believing they lacked the “it” of his infantry units. Bolger points out that while some of his distain was a product of an operational environment that limited their effectiveness to specific locales, he also highlights how this dislike adversely affected the leaders and the soldiers of those units. In the Hagel brothers’ situation, Bolger describes how the need to man combat patrols as well as maintain their M113 armored personnel carriers led to undermanned patrols sent to conduct combat operations that placed soldiers at risk and yielded results that only aggravated Ewell’s dislike of his mechanized units.

Bolger also examines how the Army’s personnel policies led to the declining effectiveness of many units that plagued the Army in the final years of the war. He describes when the Hagels began their year of service in Vietnam, their leaders and their noncommissioned officers were experienced veterans with years of service. In this terminology, they knew “the deal.” He then describes the slow loss of experience as the one-year rotation policy and casualties stripped the unit of experienced leadership and highlights that by the end of Chuck Hagel’s tour, he is a platoon sergeant with less than two years of service in the Army.

While not achieving his lofty goals of placing the Vietnam War and the 1960s into context, the book is an interesting read. Neither a pure biography of the Hagel brothers’ experiences in Vietnam nor a complete history of the war, he effectively uses their experiences to provide a good examination of one unit’s travails fighting a war in 1968 that was not to be won.
Inclusion in the American Military: A Force for Diversity


The image chosen for the cover of Inclusion in the American Military: A Force for Diversity says a lot: it is an “old corps” photo from West Point, taken in 2016. It features sixteen black women—cadets posed in front of the 1st Division barracks, outfitted in dress uniforms, wielding sabers, and ready to take on the world. Yet it is not the most well-known image from this photoshoot. It is not the photo of these sixteen women with their fists raised, the one that went viral and attracted reaction and comment from nearly every corner of the internet. That photograph prompted an investigation and may have ramifications for these young officers’ careers for years to come.

Like the cover image, which hints at a controversial backstory but does not confront it head on, this book gives us just a taste of the myriad issues and conversations that continue about diversity in the American military. Inclusion promises a lot and delivers a series of solid essays, but it does not quite deliver the knockout analytical punch that one might hope for. Nevertheless, it is an important volume, and it should find its way onto the library shelves of undergraduate programs, base libraries, and reference collections. The steep price tag makes it a difficult book to recommend to personal libraries.

After a brief introduction that serves as a literature review and overview on diversity within the US military, the book’s eight substantive chapters each address the inclusion of a specific minority into the military. The first section explores questions of race and ethnicity with chapters on African Americans, Hispanics, Asian Americans, and Native Americans. The second section includes three chapters on sex, sexual orientation, and gender and a fourth chapter on religion. The chapter on religion is, in some respects, odd as it explores the integration of not one group, but many. Its inclusion, however, hints at how one might approach some of the broader questions of diversity that are not explored in depth: socioeconomic status, region of origin, disability, family history, and political thought.

As with all edited volumes, the quality of the essays varies, and some tread more familiar ground than others. All of the essays ably cover the basic history for each of the groups examined and suggest areas for future study and analysis. The most successful essays also manage to make an argument that offers an analytical point of view as well. In the first section, Deenesh Sohoni’s essay on Asian American service and citizenship and William C. Meadows’ chapter on Native American service and the syncretic nature of “warrior” cultures stand out in this regard. Sohoni expertly traces two ideas about citizenship,
civic and ethnocultural, and explores the relationship between these two conceptions of what it meant to be fully “American” in light of Asian American military service and the string of legal cases that weighed in on the issue. Meadows’ essay, in addition to covering historical information, also suggests traditions surrounding the “warrior” and the warrior’s reintegration into society have been essential for Native American service members’ understanding of their military service and status as veterans.

In the second part of the book, the essays sometimes veer into advocacy, which is problematic, if understandable. These are, after all, many of the issues that are most politically sensitive in the contemporary United States. In the chapter on the integration of women, which ably traces both the progress women have made and the significant cultural and structural challenges that remain, Janice H. Laurence writes, “it is time to move ahead and more fully accept women in service” (123). Statements like this one, even if they might garner wide support from both scholars, observers, and practitioners, may also open the authors up to (in my mind, unfair) critique about their “objectivity” by accusing them of espousing a political position rather than engaging in scholarly analysis. These essays are likewise limited by the fact that policies and experiences with these integration projects are still very much unsettled and in flux. In the second part of the book, especially, there is a great sense of anticipation, but also some sincere uncertainty, especially in light of the political climate of 2017, about what the future holds.

Each of the eight substantive essays includes some variation on the idea that “x group has served honorably in the military since at least the American Revolutionary War.” This repetition may seem, on first glance, trite and cliché, but it underscores a vital point. The American military is—and always has been—a diverse place. There is no mythological past in which the American military was populated solely by white, cisgender, Christian men. These essays, together, make that point with resounding and relentless evidence, and that is a valuable thing, indeed.

The book’s editors offer five reasons that these, and other, questions about diversity matter. First, they argue that the size of the US military makes it a critical player in national conversations about diversity. Second, the American military imagines itself as a “model for diversity and inclusion in the workforce,” and this idea ought to be interrogated (192). Third, the authors suggest that “if diversity cannot work in the armed services, it may not work anywhere in society” (193). Fourth, they suggest the experience of diversity in the US military suggests that attitudes can and do change over time. Finally, they take a stand against the argument that the military should not be a social experiment, arguing instead that “the military represents a natural experiment of sorts” (194). Each of these five conclusions deserves significant and rigorous further analysis. These essays provide a launching point and a factual baseline from which future studies can work. But the conversations are far from over, and these brief essays, probably most appropriate for an undergraduate classroom or basic research, are far from the last words on this important subject.
Wartime Sexual Violence: From Silence to Condemnation of a Weapon of War

By Kerry F. Crawford

Reviewed by Dr. Patricia M. Shields, professor, Texas State University

For millennia soldiers have used sexual violence as a way to demoralize an enemy and as a reward of victory. Even during World War II, rape was considered inevitable and did not merit formal prosecution at the Nuremberg trials. This changed in the mid-1990s when new social norms, particularly around human rights and women’s rights in particular, encountered the atrocities committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Rwanda. The international community’s explicit and implicit acceptance of conflict-related sexual violence ended. In its place, were forceful condemnation of the practice and initiatives to prosecute perpetrators and to provide aid to victims.

In Wartime Sexual Violence: From Silence to Condemnation of a Weapon of War, Kerry F. Crawford examines how basic changes in the way “advocates and decision makers think about and discuss conflict-related sexual violence” led to a shift from silence to action (2). The shift occurred as wartime sexual violence was reframed as a weapon of war. This captured the attention of powerful members of the security community who demanded, initiated, and paid for institutional and policy change. Crawford examines the legacy of this key reframing.

She does this by providing background information on the use and extent of sexual violence in wartime, by defining the key ideas that make up the weapon of war frame, and by promising a model to evaluate the success of the frame (chapter 1). In chapters 2–4 she examines the impact of the weapons of war frame using three detailed case studies. These include the US response to sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), UN Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008), and Britain’s Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative. The book concludes with an assessment of how well the wartime sexual violence frame worked to secure a lasting and effective anti-sexual violence agenda.

In the first chapter, Crawford developed a six-stage model of potential international responses to incidents of wartime sexual violence. She describes the initial phase or zero phase as one of nonrecognition and no action. The first response stage occurs when sexual violence is documented and is the subject of a report, hearing, or conference. In the second response stage rhetorical condemnation occurs. Leaders condemn the actions in a speech, press release, or impromptu remarks. The condemnation is not followed by resources, however. The third response stage includes an initial commitment. Here a state or international organization issues a binding resolution or policy and devotes resources to address or to mitigate sexual violence. This can be tied to a specific conflict or be more general. The initial commitment is followed by the fourth response stage—implementation and obligation. Here, formal, legal initiatives are translated into military training or deployment. Multilateral peacekeeping operations would be instructed to address sexual violence for example. Finally, in the fifth response
stage lasting behavioral change occurs (norm change). Sexual violence as an aspect of a conflict “is considered unacceptable and effectively held accountable” (38).

_Wartime Sexual Violence_ is a well-reasoned and carefully documented study that examines the weapons of war frame from an international studies perspective. Realism, constructivism, and feminist security studies are used to make sense of intentions and policies. The case study of state and international organization chapters, demonstrates the many ways the weapons of war frame has been used to address the problem of sexual violence during war. These impressive chapters incorporate important details and are unified through the policy development model introduced in chapter 2.

I sometimes got lost in the detail and was happy each chapter presented the model and corresponding case evidence in table format. These tables explained how evidence fit into a larger pattern across cases. All three cases demonstrated that the weapon of war frame incorporated documentation, condemnation, commitment, and implementation. In no case, however, did the frame contribute to norm change. Perpetrators were not consistently and effectively held accountable. Lasting normative and behavioral changes were yet to occur. This, in a way, captures the message of the book. The weapons of war frame effectively activated a sleeping international response. This represents remarkable progress. On the other hand, its narrow focus has serious limitations.

Chapter 2 examines the US response to sexual violence in the DRC between 1990 and 2013. Specifically, it shows how the weapons of war frame contributed to US efforts to confront sexual violence in the DRC. For example, there were house hearings, Secretary Hillary Clinton discussed sexual violence in a visit to the DRC, and the United States withdrew financial support (2013). Chapter 3 shifts the focus to the UN and examines the passage and implementation of UN Resolution 1820 (2008). This resolution “created an obligation to monitor wartime sexual violence occurring in conflicts that are on the Security Council’s agenda, and it established the precedent that sexual violence as a weapon of war is a matter of international security for member states to address” (105). In chapter 4, Britain’s Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative is explored. This generously funded initiative deployed a team of experts to UN agencies dedicated to tackling sexual violence. Britain also leveraged its role as head of the Group of Eight to end impunity for perpetrators.

Although Crawford certainly sees the merit in the weapons of war frame to move an issue onto policy agendas and programs, she is also highly critical. The frame artificially narrowed the broader issue of sexual violence to an international security concern and minimized its importance as a human rights issue. This purposeful framing securitized sexual violence and limited its focus to deliberate wartime atrocities against specific populations.

This book would be attractive to international relations scholars who want to examine the impact of a change in policy framing on the actions of the security community. Scholars new to the issue of wartime sexual violence will find a great introduction including historical context and useful definitions. Clearly, the world has made great progress and there is still a long way to go to stop sexual violence during war.
Reading and evaluating an edited volume often produces a mixed bag of thoughts and emotions. Much like listening to an album where a few truly great songs are overwhelmed by an avalanche of mediocre “fillers” that sound more like your old high school grunge band than a professional musician, edited volumes often have a similar nefarious reputation of sacrificing quality for quantity. I am pleased to report that *Strategy: Context and Adaptation from Archidamus to Airpower* largely avoids this trap.

*Strategy*, a collection of eleven thoughtful essays written by faculty members of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, is not about what strategy is. Rather its primary focus is an extended discussion of how to think about strategy. Despite the impressive breadth of topics covered, the underlying themes are the same: the book is about interaction. While we tend to view strategy from a military or political perspective, the authors of these essays want readers to understand the relationship between strategy and the environment in which that strategy is developed. This is because strategy, whether we care to admit it or not, is influenced both directly and indirectly, both positively and negatively, by the perceptions, beliefs, and even the educations (yes, pedagogy matters) of those crafting it. As the essayists note repeatedly, context matters. As such, this volume differentiates itself from other books about strategy by studying how contextual conditions affect our strategic cognitive abilities.

As the title implies, the topics—and the methods used to explore them—vary greatly in this book. James Wood Forsyth Jr. provides a useful critique of realism, relying heavily on Thucydides. M. V. Smith argues space has already been militarized and, as such, spacepower can become an effective form of deterrent. Richard J. Bailey Jr. explores the cyber realm and wonders whether our existing decision-making structures are ill-suited for the age of cyberwarfare. Readers interested in irregular warfare will find Mark O. Yeisley’s exceptional essay particularly valuable if somewhat controversial, as he claims US airpower has performed “brilliantly” in this arena. I found Stephen E. Wright’s examination of the roles and differences between strategists and planners, along with the sources of disconnect between the two, of profound interest and importance.

My one sustained critique of the book as a whole is that several of the essays tend to lose focus of their greater arguments or get caught up in protracted discussions on points that could have been made more quickly or are not of direct importance to their larger arguments. In
other words, they drift into the weeds or off on tangents that didn’t best highlight the central findings of their research. To be clear, this doesn’t impact the overall quality of thought produced in this volume. But it is certainly something to be made aware of.

The target audience for this volume is students of strategy. Students at the various command and staff colleges and war colleges may find this volume particularly useful. Yet anyone with an interest in strategy will surely find this book of value. This is a great “thought” book, designed to encourage healthy and productive intellectual debate—something the field is currently lacking.

The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Power

By Eliot A. Cohen

Reviewed by Steven Metz, US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute

The United States may be the most psychologically insecure great power in history. For some reason Americans repeatedly question whether they are worthy of global leadership and whether hard power—military force—should play a central role in their nation’s strategy. These periods of self-doubt seem particularly intense following conflicts with unsatisfactory endings. This happened in the 1970s following Vietnam and now, after sixteen years fighting violent Islamic extremism, the United States is once again contemplating the purpose and nature of its national power, with some on both the political right and left calling for strategic disengagement.

In The Big Stick Eliot Cohen makes an elegant, erudite case for American global leadership and strength from a right-of-center, realist vantage point. There is nothing shocking or pathbreaking in the book; however, as Professor Cohen intended, it provides a reminder of things Americans once knew and believed but now seem to be forgetting.

Cohen begins with an inventory of American power—what might be called a strategic net assessment. He concludes that, while America may not have the same expansive global dominance as it did immediately after the end of the Cold War, the United States remains militarily superior to any challenger or enemy, and has the economic strength to sustain it. Calls for American disengagement are not, Cohen believes, inevitable or even necessary but a reflection of political and leadership challenges. The United States can and should, he argues, sustain its preeminent world role.

The bulk of the book then assesses America’s four security “problem sets”: China; “revisionist middle powers” like Russia, Iran and North Korea; violent Islamic extremism; and ungoverned spaces, particularly space and cyberspace.

Of these China is the most vexing and potentially dangerous problem. “No geopolitical challenge to the American world role,” Cohen writes, “comes close to that posed by the newly prosperous, nationalistic, and sometimes belligerent Middle Kingdom” (101). Deterring China
requires an “ability to generate large forces in relatively short periods of time” but also the ability to fight a long war (120). And the United States must be able to exploit China’s weakness: since it is ruled by a “regime dependent on economic prosperity” the United States needs a “powerful navy and air force that can reassure, strengthen and protect allies, and cripple China by blockading its ports and disrupting its commerce” (120). For this reason, Cohen advocates a “substantial naval and aerial buildup in the Pacific” (121).

However taxing, the Chinese security problem is relatively straightforward. Countering violent Islamic extremists—“jihadis” as Cohen calls them—is significantly more complex, in part because the enemy is a fluid network rather than a nation ruled by an identifiable regime, and in part because the foundation of the extremists’ power is an ideology rather than tangible national resources that can be targeted militarily. “By 2015 the war that one president had hoped to win (in part) through a shock diverted to the Arab world and an appeal to representative government and that another president had hoped to secure by routine, if selective and exquisitely precise, killing,” Cohen notes, “was not close to success, save in one key respect—preventing another mass attack on the American homeland comparable to 9/11” (142). That said, Professor Cohen’s recommended approach is continuing the current course: “wearing down terrorist organizations, dividing them, waging political warfare against their base, as a last resort intervening to help stabilize countries threatened by them” (147).

On the other two problem sets—containing and deterring revisionist middle powers and helping stabilize the global commons—Cohen concludes the United States has generally taken the right approach but needs more military resources to sustain its edge. Because the security problem set requires such diverse capabilities, “America needs a substantially larger military than the one it now has” (195).

While the power of Cohen’s prose and logic will leave most readers convinced that hard power has enduring utility and that the United States needs a bigger military, two points merit further consideration. One is treating the conflict with violent Islamic extremism as a variant of war. In this Professor Cohen is very much in the mainstream, but a case can be made that not all uses of armed force should be portrayed or treated as war, and that approaching the task of “managing the barbarians”—something that civilizations have had to do for millennia—does not really fit the concept of war with its implication of a discrete beginning and end to the conflict.

Second, Army readers will recognize the military expansion that Professor Cohen advocates mostly means more air and naval power. His view of landpower reflects a longstanding tradition: the United States needs a relatively small active land force, heavy on special operations and partner support capabilities and the ability to mobilize a larger force if a protracted major war occurs. While some landpower advocates may take issue with this position, support for it is growing. When a scholar of Cohen’s stature makes a case for it, everyone interested in US security, whether in the military or outside it, must take it seriously.
Strategic Theories

By Admiral Raoul Castex

Reviewed by Dr. Lukas Milevski, Baltic Sea Fellow in the Eurasia Program at Foreign Policy Research Institute

Admiral Raoul Victor Patrice Castex (1878–1968) is le stratège inconnu, the unknown strategist. He was a naval officer predominantly of the French Third Republic, so prolific that in maritime strategy his writings are second only to Alfred Thayer Mahan. His magnum opus was a five volume work published between 1927 and 1935 initially comprising 2,493 pages titled Théories Stratégiques, with a sixth volume published posthumously. Strategic Theories, the abridged English edition first translated by Eugenia Kiesling in 1994, was reprinted in a paperback edition in 2017. Weighing in at a mere 428 pages of text, Strategic Theories cannot of course compare in magnitude to the original work.

The chapters included in Strategic Theories are drawn from all five of the core volumes of Théories Stratégiques. As not just translator but also editor, Kiesling’s ambition was to emphasize the numerous highlights of Castex’s strategic thought rather than provide a direct translation of the whole work into English. Choices were necessary, as she emphasized that Castex’s work could be understood in three distinct ways: “as a prescriptive strategic handbook, as a text in the history of strategic thought, and as a source of insight into French military policy in the years between the costly victory of 1918 and the wrenching defeat of 1940” (xviii).

Three of Castex’s favorite strategic themes run through Kiesling’s translation: Castex’s theory of strategic manoeuvre, the idea of stratégie générale, and his particular theory of “perturbation.” Kiesling also excised many of the chapters of historical narrative, while keeping only two on German naval operations in the North Sea from 1914 to 1916 as examples of Castex’s style of historical narrative and analysis, particularly the manner in which he incorporated and employed his own idiosyncratic theoretical concept of manoeuvre. At the core of the work, of both the conceptual and historical chapters, is Castex’s method of studying strategy.

As a French admiral, Castex confined much of his writing, but not his perspective, to maritime strategy. Castex was a strong believer in stratégie générale, or what today would be understood as joint warfare—cooperation among the services. Also befitting a French admiral was his emphasis on the idea of manoeuvre, which is “to move intelligently in order to create a favorable situation” (102). Although he discussed it primarily within the context of maritime strategy, the concept is clearly one of general strategic relevance. It was comparable to ideas emerging at the same time elsewhere in Europe, whether from the writings of J.F.C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart or the soviet invention of operational art.

Castex’s conceptual and theoretical reflections are as relevant today as they were when first committed to paper, whether manoeuvre, the emphasis on jointness, or his writings on the relationship between policy and strategy. This latter topic represents Castex’s third volume, forming
the centerpiece of his work. His exploration of the topic is sure to be of interest to anyone academically or professionally invested in strategy, as he examines it from a number of angles including policy’s influence on strategy as well as the reverse, an interaction which ultimately led Castex pessimistically (or perhaps realistically) to describe the ultimate product of the two as the least bad compromise.

Castex also dwelt on the subjects of offense and defense, treatments which are less satisfying, in part because he contradicts Clausewitz without ever seriously engaging with him—the latter a recurrent theme through his work which was reflective of Castex’s attitude toward the Prussian. His theory of perturbation is, from our modern perspective, probably the most antiquarian aspect of his work. This theory stipulates, in brief, that in every century, Europe gives rise to a single power—the perturbateur—which aims to revise the great power system on the continent: Spain, then France, then Germany, and as Castex was writing the Soviet Union was already looming as the next perturbateur.

Yet this was merely localized perturbation, for Castex also applied the theory on a global scale, in the context of an anticipated general East-West conflict, with the non-Western world cast in the role of the barbaric perturbateur eager to tear down the West, which was the pinnacle of human civilization (at least up to that point in time). In Castex’s eyes, seapower necessarily plays a decisive role in such a struggle between East and West, even though he also acknowledged that landpower was the queen of stratégie générale.

For anyone who seriously studies or practices strategy, reading Castex is rewarding, albeit unevenly so. He provides an idiosyncratic, interwar French perspective on topics of eternal relevance, including but not exhausting the conduct of military operations, civil-military relations, the influence of geography on strategy, offense and defense, and through the theory of perturbation, on international relations on a continental and even global scale. At the heart of his treatment of all these topics is his basic method of strategic analysis, wherein he artfully combines a historically induced sense of strategy together with the specific material conditions which must be taken into account for any strategic analysis to be of practical value.
Organized Violence after Civil War: The Geography of Recruitment in Latin America

By Sarah Zukerman Daly

Reviewed by Dr. R. Evan Ellis, research professor for Latin America and the Caribbean for the US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute

Internal conflict and violence in Colombia is one of the most extensively covered topics in Latin American studies. The mixed criminal and political nature of the combatants and the associated processes of peace and demobilization are some of the most polemical topics in the discipline. In the present context, the controversial 2016 agreement between the Colombian government and representatives of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to demobilize, and the ongoing negotiations with the National Liberation Army (ELN) to do the same lends importance to understanding the conditions under which such processes succeed or fail. For this reason, Sarah Zukerman Daly’s excellent study of the factors driving remobilization and the return to violence of Colombian armed groups demobilized from 2003–6 is both important and timely.

Daly’s book is an outstanding work of political science, effectively integrating quantitative methods with a detailed comparative analysis of cases, extensive field research, and a demonstrated deep knowledge of her subject. The work makes a significant contribution to our understanding of Colombia, the dynamics of internal conflict, and the determinants of successful outcomes in conflict resolution between groups.

At its core, Daly’s work argues social networks are more important than other factors such as group character or access to resources in determining whether demobilized groups in an armed conflict will reconstitute their military structures and return to violence. She maintains the critical factor is the local versus nonlocal basis of the group’s recruitment. In her analysis of the 37 paramilitary groups demobilized in Colombia by agreement with the government from 2003–6, Daly finds that, while nonlocal recruitment did not necessarily make groups less effective on the battlefield (e.g. the nonlocally recruited Catatumbo block, prior to its demobilization, was highly capable militarily relative to other groups), nonlocal groups dispersed from the zone of operation after the agreement (often to their areas of origin) more than their locally recruited counterparts, reducing the influence of the group and its ability to remobilize, while also impairing communications and preventing commanders from adequately assessing the changed situation of the group in the face of subsequent incentives remobilize.

Daly finds that, regardless of other factors such as the character of the group (e.g. criminal versus ideological motivations), in areas dominated by locally recruited groups, following demobilization, group organizational coherence declined less rapidly, and former leaders retained a clearer
understanding of the group situation and balance of power, helping to avoid remobilization and return to violence driven by miscalculations.

By contrast, where one or more of the militias was primarily nonlocal, the erosion of group power, combined with the increased possibility of miscalculation regarding the balance of power and group’s ability to reconstitute itself, made remobilization and renewed violence more likely. Impressively, Daly’s parsimonious theory accurately predicts remobilization in 31 of the 37 cases examined.

Daly’s effective integration of solid quantitative analysis with detailed case studies is particularly impressive. On the quantitative side, Daly employs numerous databases from the Colombian government, transnational, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as her own field surveys, and the use of her own expert knowledge and external authorities to categorize group characteristics and geographically located events. She creatively uses the geolocation of data on groups, events, and individual combatants to make credible data-based conclusions regarding local versus nonlocal groups.

Daly takes the time to explain the origins and calculation of her results, and walks the reader through the exploration of alternate hypotheses in a manner that is credible without being excessively technical for those who are not experts in statistics and other quantitative methods.

Her qualitative analysis is equally impressive as an example of the power and correct application of the comparative method. The cases that she examines in-depth, the Bloque Cacique Nutibara in Medellín, the Bloque Catatumbo, and the Bloque Elmer Cardenas, skillfully cover the three major permutations of her analysis (all groups locally recruited, all groups nonlocally recruited, and a mixed case). Daly’s narrative maintains its focus on the key variables of her theory, while giving the reader a feel for the detailed context and why each situation unfolded as it did, including effectively placed quotes from conflict participants, and other demonstrations of insight gained through the local commanders, militia members, and community members she has interviewed.

If her analysis has a weakness, it is the relative lack of attention, outside of her case study chapters, to the FARC and ELN as key players in the conflict dynamics where they were operating.

While Daly’s work does not explicitly touch upon the 2016 agreement between the Santos government and the FARC in Colombia, it suggests several hypotheses regarding future prospects. In the cases examined by Daly, social and political pressures ultimately led the Colombian government away from the “deal” that the paramilitary leaders expected when they entered talks, ultimately contributing to the imperatives for their remobilization.

In the current context, the economic and political difficulties of the Colombian government in fulfilling promises regarding land reform, crop substitution programs, the development of remote areas, and transitional justice potentially create similar pressures for groups to remobilize or metamorphize into new types of extralegal entities. Daly’s work suggests that, in the context of such problems, different FARC fronts and blocks are likely to respond differently, based in part
on the local or nonlocal origins of their own combatants, in ways that the Colombian government can prepare for.

Daly’s work also finds the availability of resources from criminal enterprises does not play a determining role in remobilization and violence. Indeed, in her case studies, she notes that groups can appropriate criminal income without reconstructing former military structures. Thus, as coca production in Colombia continues to grow with no prospect for the resumption of aerial glyphosate spraying, Daly’s work ironically suggests criminal groups could significantly expand their influence over the Colombian state, even while violence declines and Colombian politicians laud the success of the peace process.

Organized Violence after Civil Wars is a must-read for both scholars and policymakers far beyond Colombia and Latin America, insofar as that the permanence of demobilization by armed groups is fundamental to the success of negotiated settlements in a broad array of countries. This work contains generalizable, data-based insights potentially relevant as a tool to anticipate areas of risk in those cases, and to manage the survival of the peace.

America’s Digital Army: Games at Work and War

By Robertson Allen

Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College

Written by Robertson Allen—an ethnographer with expertise in digital games, war, and violence—America’s Digital Army: Games at Work and War is part of the Anthropology of Contemporary North America series published by University of Nebraska Press. Foremost an academic and theoretical work hailing from the field of anthropological cultural studies, game studies and Marxist influences are also evident. Additionally, the book presents a case study and offers a descriptive narrative that is more military professional in its orientation.

The book focuses upon the America’s Army project (later Army Game Project) that ran from July 2002 (the original online game release) to roughly June 2009 (the release of the third version). The book is intertwined with research themes and arguments related to the proposition “that digital games and simulations act as channels for enlisting and militarizing immaterial labor” and “that virtual soldiering is central to how contemporary US military institutions exert power over individuals” (36, 163). The underlying ethnographic research (utilizing field sites immersion, data collection, and analysis) was partially funded by the National Science Foundation, along with some additional academic support, as well as the cooperation of elements of the US Army and many of the game designers and programmers involved with the America’s Army and derivative projects themselves, which was initially approved by the project director, Casey Wardynski, at the United States Military Academy, West Point.

The case study related to America’s Army (AA)/Army Game Project is a fascinating one and is uniquely facilitated by the author’s association
within the project for ethnographic purposes. America’s Army is a highly successful, award winning, and innovative first-person shooter (FPS) online game created by the US Army utilizing the Unreal Engine (a well-known game development tool). Unlike many FPS games that promote individualistic play, America’s Army stresses team play and ethical adherence to the legitimate rules of engagement with penalties for nonadherence. Depending on one’s perspective, the game can either be considered a form of strategic communication and recruitment marketing for the Army or a form of slick high-tech propaganda. Integral components of the game include archetypes related to the use of a “swapping paradigm”—so that opposing teams playing the game “appear to themselves as US soldiers but to one another as enemies”—and the use of “aspirational figures” for recruitment purposes (67, 88).

Gore is minimalized in game-play with the opposing force initially appearing as generic terrorists and later as the forces of the fictional nation of Czervenia with its own made up language and geography (67–69). The latter is representative of a Krasnovian-like opponent some readers may remember from their old National Training Center rotations. The history of the primary FPS game can be viewed from inputs, game design and production, outputs, and impact perspectives. Related project components such as the Army Experience Center (AEC), Virtual Army Experience (VAE), Real Heroes, and graphic novels are also discussed in the work.

Given the bureaucratic nature of the US Army, it is a wonder that such an entrepreneurial Silicon Valley game was created, although over time fissures developed both between Army elements and the designers and contractors and within the competing Army elements. Of note, elements of the project are still in existence with the America’s Army website (https://www.americasarmy.com) offering a Steam link to the AA: Proving Grounds game (released October 1, 2015), a link to AA Comic Issue #15, and other franchise elements.

Criticisms of the work are minor, but they do inhibit an easy reading. They do not focus upon the main effort itself but rather on some of the terminology and concepts utilized and the need for additional useful supportive information. While the US Army has been routinely criticized for its own internal nomenclature, this anthropological study is also guilty at times of slipping into its own use of discipline jargon and worldviews. Cases in point are the use of the terms “post-Fordist” (the information economy and social networks), “immaterial labor” (knowledge workers and those with soft skills), and constructs focusing on “the society of control” (a shift from binary disciplinary institutions [e.g., defined hierarchical organizations] to a diffused and distributed disciplinary form of power across society [e.g., interlocking networks blurring institutional boundaries]), and “pervasive cultural militarization” (partially by means of using high-tech labor and the blending of entertainment and war technologies and economies) (28–33).

With regard to supportive information, the addition of a timeline of significant America’s Army project and franchise (e.g., VEC, VAE, et al.) events is very much needed in order for the reader to understand the underlying chronology of this study. Additionally, a figure and a table that show the relationships of the America’s Army components and entities—both governmental and contractors—as well as input and
output metrics (e.g., budgets, downloads, experience visitors, et al.) to better describe the program would be helpful.

The work operates on multiple levels of abstraction with an inherent tension between its academic (theoretical) component and its professional (descriptive) component evident. The reviewer enjoyed the descriptive over the theoretical aspects of the work but ultimately saw the value of such a focused ethnography being turned, in this instance, inward upon the US Army and its game design and programming contractors rather than being applied to cultural groups in say Afghanistan or Iraq, as was done with the Human Terrain System. Given Allen’s unique and sustained ethnographic access to the America’s Army program, this book—while conceptually bifurcated—now has to be considered the authoritative work on this subject matter.

**Humanitarian Economics: War, Disaster, and the Global Aid Market**

By Gilles Carbonnier

Reviewed by Jill Russell, teaching fellow, Defence Studies Department, King’s College London

Whether treasure and trade, resources and manufacture, or banking and finance, the breadth of economic influences upon conflict cannot be underestimated. Nevertheless, the subject does not figure significantly enough in the scholars’ and practitioners’ realms of diplomacy and war. While important as a work in its own subject, Gilles Carbonnier’s slim but powerful primer on the field of humanitarian economics in theory and practice is also an excellent demonstration of the valuable perspective that economic analysis can bring to intellectual and practical approaches to military affairs. This review will briefly assay the course of the book’s argument and the detail in support, before turning to an examination of the critical ways in which the work interacts with important readerships.

Considering the book’s broad assets, there are several which demand mention here. *Primum inter pares* is Carbonnier’s writing, being both thoroughly readable and well researched. There is a masterful literature review of the relevant scholarship in his field that is complemented by a range of collected and noted reference materials. On this basis, it is a work to be consulted to gain a foothold in the subject and indications for further research and reading. Building on this mastery of the scholarship, the author also further demonstrates his own balanced understanding between study and practice. No doe-eyed naif in the field, Carbonnier adds his experience to the depth of analysis, such that the practical and the intellectual issues are addressed equally, offering consideration of what to do regarding policy as well as how to approach gaps in the research and analysis.

On the detail itself, I would split this book into two parts. The first is broad and universal the latter is specific to narrower topics. Chapter 1, “Reason, Emotion and Compassion,” is the sort of unifying, metadiscussion one imagines when considering Clausewitz’s opening
pages in *On War*. Mirroring the avoidance of economics in the scholarly traditions on war, Carbonnier confronts the dearth of economics scholarship in his own field of humanitarian work. Traditionally, economics viewed such emotional aberrations to rationality as altruism and war “as an exogenous event neither amenable to economic analysis nor worthy of scholarly interest” (4). He uses this intellectual tension to examine the current bounds of humanitarian economic inquiry. The second chapter, “The Humanitarian Market,” offers an overview of the growing human security sector since its early days in the late nineteenth century. Taken together, these chapters provide an excellent primer on economics, humanitarianism, and war. In the second half of the work, the chapters explore the economics scholarship and practice against the variety of standard contingencies that would fall under the broad umbrella of humanitarian activities. In these chapters, rich in scholarly and empirical references and sources, the author reviews how humanitarian economics interact within different security realms. These dynamics include the issues related to war, terrorism, disaster, and survival, highlighting how each situation is influenced by the economic component. And although the book is easily readable in total, these chapters can easily be used independently for subject-specific inquiry.

But even as this is an excellent primer of its own subject, the work has a broader application to the world of military affairs and should be viewed as mandatory for the *Parameters* readership. This relevance is defined by what it can offer to professional military education (PME), military affairs scholarship, and the security policy arena. Turning first to PME, it is a singularly important read because economics is a poorly studied subject within the military academy. As this work focuses on the economics of a discrete portion of national security and conflict, it offers a particularly relevant lens by which military professionals can enter economics beyond budgetary topics. More important in the contemporary security framework, humanitarianism is on the rise as a critical mission area for armed forces, America’s allies, and partners. The future operating environment in the littorals is largely premised on their vulnerability to climate related disasters, as in Haiti or Indonesia. Related, urban conflict models will relate to the humanitarian requirements of civilians in war zones or security as an element to medical operations, as in Sierra Leone.

In the security policy world, the book is a cautionary tale. At the most fundamental level, the monetary value of the humanitarian sector demands best practices. And as the demands of humanitarianism will only grow in the twenty-first century, to leave the sector as an afterthought in the security policy arena will warrant being considered negligence. While this work is necessary to begin to understand the complexity of the issues in these events, it should also alert the practitioner to consider economic scholarship elsewhere.

As concerns the academy, the work is valuable. Most basically, considering its value in the classroom, the book is exceedingly teachable and applicable across a number of security related academic fields. Moving to research, the book identifies and begins to fill a critical void. There is little room to dispute that the scholarship on economics and conflict is entirely too thin. Limited to issues related to resourcing armed forces or the costs of weapons programs and defense budgets, the...
economic perspective in military affairs demands expansion. Finally, to give a sense of its potential to military affairs scholarship, the book has the feel of Walter Millis’s call to military history to expand its purview to include the social and cultural dimensions in its analysis.

**International Law and New Wars**

By Christine Chinkin and Mary Kaldor

Reviewed by Cornelia Weiss, a colonel in the US Air Force Judge Advocate Reserve Corps

Christine Chinkin and Mary Kaldor’s *International Law and New Wars* should be on the reading list of every service as well as that of the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and it should be taught in every war college. Why? As children of military members are now serving in the post-September 11, 2011 war in which their mothers and fathers engaged, we are facing the possibility of third and subsequent generations fighting in similar iterations.

The authors contend “it is the failure to take into account the logic of new wars that, to a large extent, explains why most responses to new wars are so problematic” (7). Rejecting Clausewitzian “old war” thinking, the authors of this book argue that, in “new wars,” “armed groups have more to gain from war itself, from fighting, than from winning or losing” and “where wars have more of the logic of a mutual enterprise than the logic of a contest of wills, they are likely to lead to persistence and spread, to be long, sporadic, difficult to end and difficult to contain geographically, in contrast to Clausewitzean war that tend to the extreme” (7).

*International Law and New Wars* includes within its category of new wars violence in Syria, Ukraine, Libya, Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan. That is, new wars “take place where states are weak or failing, where governments lack legitimacy” (519). With regard to the threat of the day, the Islamic State (IS), the authors contend the group is a “symptom—a response to the sectarian behavior of the Iraqi government and the collapse and abuse of state authority in parts of Syria” while arguing that “IS has not been able to move into areas where local authorities command respect and support” (519). The authors offer a solution: “human security” which “entails a law-based rather than a war-based approach to security” (528). They base their argument “on the reality that war methods do not work” and contend that it “is unlikely that military action can inflict long-lasting defeat on IS or other terrorist networks” (533).

*International Law and New Wars*, in addressing the law-based approach to human security, contends that international humanitarian law (IHL) provides an inadequate legal framework for addressing new wars as it is based on old war assumptions. Instead, it maintains a triad of humanitarian laws is required: IHL, criminal law, and human rights law “not that IHL should be rejected, but rather that it needs to be complemented by human rights law, which has at its heart the dignity of human beings, and international criminal law, which at least
in theory increases the accountability of those who use force” (539). Under this approach, America would not have responded to the events as “an attack by a foreign power on the United States that demanded a military response” but instead would have “treated what happened as a humanitarian catastrophe and focused on the needs of the victims, methods of preventing any repetition, and efforts to arrest those responsible” (507).

*International Law and New Wars* asks the reader to engage with many questions: “Can a government that is committing gross violations of human rights against its own people request assistance from another government, even though the objective is ostensibly to defeat an extremist group, IS, in opposition to that government?” (146) “Why is the community of the state privileged over the town, or region, or even horizontal communities of shared belief, for example that cross state boundaries?” (170) And “Can war, which of its nature is collective on both sides, be used to protect individual rights?” (225)

*International Law and New Wars* addresses various models used as justification for war ranging from the “war on terror” to a “responsibility to protect/humanitarian.” The authors contend

Military interventions in the name of the War on Terror (Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria) or geopolitics (Georgia and Ukraine) . . . far from causing violence to cease . . . have tended to fuel the mutual enterprise that constitutes a new war. And those military interventions in the name of humanitarianism or the Responsibility to Protect (Kosovo, Libya, and Cote d’Ivoire) may well have succeeded in avoiding or reversing immediate humanitarian catastrophes, but they also involved violence and have empowered violent actors that are associated with continuing polarization, instability and disorder. (479)

Like Thucydides’ *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, this is a book that should be read again and again. It is an energizing vehicle for facilitating vigorous discussion. Coauthored by two intellectual pioneers in the separate fields of security and international law, *International Law and New Wars*, like *On War*, is not an easy read. More complex than *On War*, it does, however, provide those seeking solutions an arena in which to grapple with how best to engage with international law and new wars.

**Power and Restraint: The Rise of the United States, 1898–1941**

By Jeffrey W. Meiser

Reviewed by Andrew L. Ross, professor of International Affairs, George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University

Realists tell us that rising states are war prone and revisionist, intent on reshaping the world order. Rising powers are expected to be expansionist. In a masterful book, Jeffrey Meiser, an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Portland and an associate professor at the College of International Security Affairs at the National Defense University, focuses on a critical exception: the United States. Why did the United States as a rising power not become a revisionist power? Why did the United States expand so little, compared
to other rising powers, such as Great Britain, Japan, Germany, and the Soviet Union during its rise from 1853–1941? Why was American grand strategy more restrained than that of other rising powers?

These are the central questions animating this important book, a work that has implications for not only our theoretical and historical understanding of America’s rise but for contemporary American grand strategy. Meiser persuasively argues, “the United States exhibited a grand strategy of restraint during its rise to the status of potential hegemom because the domestic political structure of the United States delayed, limited, undermined, and prevented the implementation of an expansionist grand strategy” (24).

Domestic structural restraint—institutions and culture—led to strategic restraint. Repeatedly, the separation of powers, federalism, and anti-imperialist norms delayed and limited expansion and fostered retrenchment. Congress, elections, public opinion, public and presidential (particularly Woodrow Wilson, Warren G. Harding, Herbert Hoover, and Franklin D. Roosevelt) sentiment—all served to temper imperial ambitions.

From the start in this convincing challenge to the conventional wisdom, Meiser proceeds clearly and systematically. Key terms and concepts—rising power, expansion, restraint, grand strategy, institutions, strategic culture—are defined. The research design—methodology, case selection—is carefully explained. Meiser draws upon an exhaustive, if not exhausting, set of 34 cases ranging from the annexations of Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam to interventions, occupations, withdrawals, and noninterventions in Central America and the Caribbean. Within-case process tracing and counterfactual analysis (after all, for Meiser, US strategic restraint from 1898–1941 is a case of a dog that didn’t bark) are employed.

The theoretical target, the essentially realist theory of expansion, is clearly and fairly explained at the outset of chapter 1. Unlike some prominent contemporary realists, Meiser admirably refrains from caricaturing rival theorists. Also in chapter 1, Meiser draws upon and integrates international relations, comparative politics and American politics research on the domestic sources of international political behavior to develop a sophisticated domestic-structural theory of restraint.

The conditions under which great power restraint is likely are explicitly identified (19–21). Counterarguments, particularly those of defensive realists and economic interest group theorists, are seriously and constructively engaged (again, caricatures are avoided). In the set of six well-developed, meticulously-documented, and nuanced chapters that constitute the empirical heart of the book, Meiser shows how the relative importance of domestic structural restraints—the separation of powers, federalism, and anti-imperialist norms—varied over time.

Initially, checks and balances and anti-imperialist norms held sway. Subsequently, public opinion and presidential anti-imperialism compensated for weaker institutional constraints. Finally, presidents tempted by imperial ambitions were constrained by the separation of powers, electoral concerns, and public opinion. The argument “that between 1898 and 1941 the American domestic political structure
presented policymakers with strong incentives to oppose territorial expansion’’ is shown to be empirically robust (260).

Meiser appropriately closes out this impressive volume with a discussion of its theoretical and practical implications. Unsurprisingly, he concludes, “international relations theories of rising power grand strategy are incomplete,” our understanding of the behavior of rising powers requires “a more systematic account of the influence of domestic structure on foreign policy” (264). Meiser briefly, too briefly, touches on the implications of his work for contemporary calls for American strategic restraint. He nicely makes the case for the significance of emphasizing domestic political structure, and restraints, in assessments of the rise of China, which have been more alarmist than not.

More could have been written about the implications of this work for both theory and practice. The theoretical work that Meiser correctly finds incomplete is realist work. He draws on liberal and constructivist theories to unpack the black box of the state to reveal that domestic political structures shape state preferences, including those of rising states. It is unclear why Meiser stops short of explicitly calling out realism. Realism is not only not a theory of foreign policy, it is not a theory of grand strategy.

On the practice front, the discussion of contemporary calls for American grand strategic restraint are limited to those made by the likes of realists such as Barry Posen. Yet Meiser’s focus on the restraining effects of political structure is more G. John Ikenberry and John Ruggie than Barry Posen. To paraphrase Ruggie, the rise of an American hegemon was no less significant than the rise of an American hegemon. [International Organization, 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998), 863]

It must be noted, finally, that for a modern work of social science, this is a remarkably accessible volume. Meiser has, thankfully, kept the book blessedly free of the mind and soul numbing accoutrements of what passes for political science these days, at least the form of methodologically-induced, small-ball political science that is featured in the likes of the American Political Science Review, the American Journal of Political Science, and the Journal of Politics.
Throughout its history, the United States Army struggled to define its identity during interwar years. Executive branch administration turnover, the pace of technological advancements, and changes in demographics are among the contributing factors policy and military leaders must consider to reshape the Army for the next war. The period between the Korean Armistice Agreement in 1953 and the commitment of US ground forces to Vietnam in 1965 was arguably the foundational era of the modern challenges in defining the American military force of the future. During those 12 years, US Army policy and strategy leaders set about to design a modern army that could meet the threat of tactical nuclear strikes on the battlefield. Today, joint leaders are defining skills and attributes necessary across the armed services to meet both the known and unknown aspects of cyberwarfare, while contending with the exponential commercial advancements in that domain. In contrast, US Army leaders in the post-Korean War period not only sought a model that would deter or respond to the nuclear threat, but that would also catch up to the technical proficiency of its air force and navy competition.

Brian McAllister Linn skillfully analyzes this overlooked period in US Army history in his recently published *Elvis’s Army: Cold War GIs and the Atomic Battlefield*. Entrenched institutions by nature are slow to accept change. Linn painstakingly reinforces that common assertion in his examination of the army’s 1950s modernization efforts challenged by friction from within and outside the service. For the dozen years prior to 1953, American soldier (and marine) skills predominantly focused on small arms and crew-served weapons proficiency in infantry and armor force-on-force tactics to compel an adversary to surrender the field. Those skills are still the basic requirement for all service members today. However, the 1950s added the new challenge of long-range nuclear artillery and missiles not necessarily delivered by a bomber fleet. By middecade, the air force and navy had cornered the market on developing a skilled force to deliver and counter nuclear arms. The army faced a relevancy conundrum of reinforcing the necessity of preparing land-based operations against the Eisenhower administration’s caution against a growing military-industrial complex and of focusing on advancing the growing middle class economy as part of the Cold War strategic arsenal. Linn successfully navigates the complexities of the social, technological, and military cultural factors considered, or ignored, in leader decisions to reinvent the US Army.

Linn’s narrative chronicles army enterprises introduced to bring the institution into the atomic age and the social norms affecting the individual and collective rank and file. Desegregation, imposed moral standards, and on-base civilian education equivalency programs, whether
instituted by statute or voluntary practice, all influenced the attitudinal responses to the change in technical training. Linn provides a no-holds-barred assessment of US Army chiefs of staff General Matthew Ridgway and General Maxwell Taylor as they introduced training doctrine aimed to ready the postwar force for an improbable feat on a nuclear battlefield. Leadership promoted a resurgence of public relations to tell the army story and narrow the growing civil-military divide. Linn’s statement on page 235 that career officers questioned self-promotion of a branch that was unable to agree on an organizational vision resonates today. The chapter discussing marketing the improved army reflects Linn’s appreciation of the effects of such a divide. The emerging popular culture, usurped by expanding commercial advertising, connected soldiers with the American public more readily than during the war years. However, the army was unable to co-opt 1950s advertising to pique the interest of recruits prequalifying for the skills necessary for the nuclear army.

Scholarly history of the army often overlooks what the casual reader considers mundane and dull as compared to the perceived excitement of battlefield narratives. Building on his premise in *The Echo of Battle* (2009), Linn provides a well-researched, focused study of the army’s peacetime personality crisis at a time of stiff peer competition from the Soviet Union. As a son and nephew of Elvis-era airmen, soldier and sailor draftees, this reviewer appreciated Linn’s important study on what defined them and their societal contributions as Cold War veteran civilians during the Vietnam War years. The themes and narrative arc of *Elvis’s Army* continue to resonate today. Military and policy senior and midlevel strategists should include it in their bookshelves.

**Losing Binh Dinh: The Failure of Pacification and Vietnamization, 1968–1971**

By Kevin Boylan

Reviewed by J. P. Harris, Senior lecturer in war studies, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst

Kevin Boylan’s monograph is an impressive contribution to the history of the Second Indochina War. With over forty pages of notes, it is obviously a serious piece of scholarship based on detailed primary research. It provides a mass of hard, factual information on developments in Binh Dinh between 1969 and 1971 not available (to the best of this reviewer’s knowledge) in any other published work. Therefore anyone attempting to build a library that covers this war in a comprehensive way needs to include Boylan’s work, and anyone trying to reach an in-depth understanding of the war should read it. It is at least arguable that we need many more detailed monographs, such as Boylan’s, on particular parts of South Vietnam at particular periods of the war before it will be appropriate for anyone to attempt yet another single volume history of the conflict as a whole.

Yet some readers may find one aspect of Boylan’s work disquieting: his militant partisanship for a particular faction among American historians is proclaimed in the introduction, referred to in the main
body, and reemphasized with great fanfare in the conclusion. Boylan apparently sees writing the history of this conflict as a sort of intellectual war in its own right in which members of the “orthodox” school are locked in combat with their enemies, the “revisionists.” The orthodox belief, according to Boylan, is that the American intervention in Vietnam was misguided, futile, and from the outset doomed to defeat. The revisionists, by contrast, see some sense in what the American intervention was intended to achieve and suggest another outcome was possible had the war been fought differently. Boylan admits there is some variety of views among the revisionists and concedes there are historians whose work does not fit neatly into either of these entrenched positions. He makes it clear, however, that his personal foxhole is deeply dug on the side of orthodoxy; his monographs a powerful intellectual weapon supporting that creed.

It must be conceded that Boylan’s conception of American scholarship in this field as a sort of ideologically-driven civil war between historians has some basis in reality. But such a state of affairs is surely unhelpful to the pursuit of a mature and balanced historical understanding and is greatly to be deprecated.

An introduction normally offers an account of the inception of a project, but Boylan’s does not really do this. The reader may thus be left with the suspicion that his purpose from the outset was to find and publish evidence reinforcing the position that the war was, from the American point of view, futile and “unwinnable.” It is also possible to infer, from a remark made towards the end of the introduction that the intention to discredit the concept of population-centric counterinsurgency was revived in the US armed forces during the Iraq War. This may be a naïve and old-fashioned view, but should not historians try to keep an open mind when they begin research, allowing the evidence to take them wherever it leads? It is indeed possible that Boylan adopted such an approach, but the tone of the introduction, and much of the rest of the book, suggests otherwise.

Binh Dinh was particularly important because it was one of the largest and most populous provinces in South Vietnam, lying in a crucial geographical position between the central highlands and the coast. Until 1968 it was just about the most completely Communist-dominated province in the country, as it had been since at least 1949. The destruction or withdrawal of Communist “main force” units as a result of the intense fighting of 1968 seemed to give the Americans and the South Vietnamese government the chance of some real pacification (i.e. actual village-level counterinsurgency) in this province. In 1969 the 173rd Airborne Brigade was employed in Operation Washington Green, which supported South Vietnamese provincial and locally-based troops. Initial results appeared encouraging. But Boylan argues that both pacification and Vietnamization had failed in Binh Dinh by late 1971. He goes on to contend that such failures were the underlying realities across South Vietnam.

Boylan convincingly indicates that much of the Communist political and logistical apparatus, the “Viet Cong infrastructure,” survived in Binh Dinh. He is far too good and honest a historian, however, to bury evidence that might be used against other aspects of his case. In a province that had formerly been a major recruiting ground for
Communist troops, the great bulk of the fighting on the Communist side in 1969–1971 seems to have been done by men from North Vietnam. While South Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces were generally pretty poor in Binh Dinh, they had some notable successes. At certain times and places the Communists seemed to be losing control of Binh Dinh’s civilian population. Determined to show they were still a force, the Communists lashed out with indiscriminate terrorism indicative of desperation if not of panic.

Studies of other provinces (most notably Jeffrey Race’s on Long An) show that locally-based South Vietnamese government forces became devastatingly effective there during this period. By 1971, the Communist Party in Long An was in a very weak position; the success or failure of the Communist cause in the South depended almost entirely on the North Vietnamese Army since relatively few southerners were fighting on that side. Yes, facing the massive Communist offensive of 1972, South Vietnamese government troops needed massive US air support to hold their own, but US ground troops had practically never done serious fighting in Vietnam without that kind of help.

From the beginning of 1973, American air support ceased. The war did not. Progressively abandoned by their erstwhile allies, the South Vietnamese armed forces fought on for another twenty-eight months, an interval considerably longer than that separating Chancellorsville from Appomattox and slightly exceeding that separating the end of the Stalingrad fighting from the fall of Berlin. It is estimated that South Vietnamese government forces lost over 50,000 dead in addition to other casualties during that period. If this war was truly unwinnable for the anti-Communist side it was surely because the American political system, and the American public, could not sustain the will to support the southern state, not because the people of South Vietnam had an underlying collective desire for a Communist government.

Oppose Any Foe: The Rise of America’s Special Operations Forces

By Mark Moyar

Reviewed by Rebecca Jensen, PhD candidate, University of Calgary, dissertation fellow at Marine Corps University

Since September 11, 2001, the budget for special operations forces (SOF) in the US has quintupled, while its staffing has doubled, and the number of general officers and flag officers associated with SOF has increased eightfold. These forces are used in an increasing range of theaters, are considered without equal tactically, and have the capacity to underpin a new strategy for advancing American interests. Despite the rapid rise of SOF, there is little comprehensive academic work on the origins, evolution, and future of these forces.

Mark Moyar’s Oppose Any Foe corrects that deficiency. An academic who has published on military operations and Special Forces in the past, Moyar has also taught at the Joint Special Operations University, which allows him to bring both a command of the literature and theory.
and contact with the world of practitioners, to this work. The result is a useful history of the American SOF world, an examination of its often complex and ambiguous relationship with policymakers and other elements of the military, and a look at the challenges and opportunities facing SOF, and those who would use SOF as a policy tool, in the future.

As Moyar acknowledges, while many books have been written about individual feats and missions carried out by SOF, and histories of particular units from the SOF community abound, these tend to take on a hagiographic tone and do not attempt to synthesize these individual components of the story into a synopsis that examines broad trends, commonalities, and differences between services, missions, and time periods. From the birth of SOF in World War II, Oppose Any Foe traces the development, employment, and often subsequent disbanding of the various units that were the forebears of today’s SOF. A frequent pattern, he points out, is of mixed operational success, with victories being perceived as threats by the parent services of the SOF units who saw in well-publicized and successful missions a potential challenge to their autonomy, identity, and resources.

The history of SOF is as much one of institutional struggle as of warfare, in Moyar’s telling. From its earliest days, it clashed with the OSS, forerunner to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), about the scope of its missions, and conflict that was mirrored at the level of civilian direction. If SOF and regular units often worked in harmony, complementing each other, in wars from the Korean peninsula until the wars of the twenty-first century, they equally often clashed, whether when SOF were tasked with roles more suited to regular infantry, or when lack of coordination between SOF and regular units operating in the same space led to inefficiencies, or even worked at cross purposes.

The meteoric rise of SOF after 9/11 fills almost the second half of the book. The role that Special Forces played, alongside the CIA, in supporting the Northern Alliance in expelling, or at least marginalizing, the Taliban in northern Afghanistan, counts as a great success in the wars fought there, even if it was not matched by efforts against al-Qaeda near Pakistan in the east. The initial phases of the war in Afghanistan, in which both special and conventional forces achieved great operational success, set the stage for yet more bureaucratic wrangling for personnel, resources, and assignments.

The model of counterinsurgency adopted in Iraq, and then in Afghanistan, following the publication of Counterinsurgency, Field Manual 3-24 in 2006, created breathing space for both types of forces. A widely dispersed presence throughout the theater—in which small units would patrol, live amongst the locals, and establish rapport while providing security wherever possible—called for extensive involvement of conventional forces, who often used skills outside those they had mastered in training. These efforts were complemented by the “industrial counterterrorism” pioneered by General Stanley McChrystal, in which the tempo of operations increased by an order of magnitude, and networks of insurgents were often rolled up before any members were aware that one of their own had been captured. It is not an overstatement to say this combination, of retail counterinsurgency throughout the country with the frequent and effective use of SOF strikes, represented a novel strategy; nor that it was one that saw great success in its initial phases.
At this point, however, Moyar moves to perhaps the most innovative and valuable section of his argument. The acclamation, and adulation, that accompanied news of successful SOF raids, in particular the killing of Osama bin Laden, fed into a culture of self-aggrandizement among SOF, particularly among former SOF members, who broke unspoken (and occasional formal) codes against publicizing their work. This hubris came to be mirrored, to some extent, by the most senior leaders of SOF, who expected their remarkable accomplishments to insulate them from criticism or scrutiny in Washington, DC. Congress ultimately struck back, cutting the funds upon which SOF had been expecting to set up the infrastructure to become a de facto separate service.

Additionally, the increased emphasis on direct action, raids, and a rapid tempo of deployment, in addition to creating tremendous strain on the personnel and families of SOF units, drew time and resources away from what had been a core responsibility of SOF since their inception: security force assistance, the training and mentoring of local forces in support of American strategic goals. Such missions require deep knowledge of language and culture, and the establishment of lasting relationships with local militaries and political figures, a role essentially antithetical to the brief, spectacular raids for which SOF had gained so much publicity and admiration since 2001.

Ultimately, Moyar concludes, SOF will have to be reintegrated into the broader military community, complementing their efforts rather than competing with them, and working under combatant commanders and unified theater commanders. The challenge then will be maintaining the essential differences of SOF, which attracts different personality types and invests in different and often more extensive and costly training, while harmonizing operations and administration with those of the conventional forces of all services. This integration is not likely to succeed, Moyar cautions, without a better understanding of the history, capabilities, and limitations of SOF.


By David Hunter-Chester

Reviewed by June Teufel Dreyer, professor of political science at the University of Miami

David Hunter-Chester has produced the first English language treatment on the development of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), which like Voldemort, cannot be called by its true name: an army. Drawing on a wide range of sources in English and Japanese, Hunter-Chester guides the reader through the protracted debates that resulted in Article Nine of the Japanese constitution in which the nation renounced not only war but the means to prosecute it. Although American pressure was instrumental to the final document, the author makes clear that there were differences of opinion among the Americans involved in the process on how extreme disarmament should be. As the Cold War between the United States and its former
ally the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics intensified, those who felt that a perpetually unarmed Japan, far from assuring peace, would instead undermine international security, began to seem more realistic. The problem of how to do this within the confines of the constitution is a central focus of this important work.

Initially founded in 1950 as a relatively small group equipped with only light infantry weapons, the National Police Reserve (NPR) was renamed the National Safety Force two years later, with its current name of GSDF conferred in 1954. Particularly in the early period, tremendous care was paid to avoid the appearance of remilitarization: the top officer of the reserve was referred to as “mister” or “superintendent” rather than general. To avoid the standard term for soldier, gunjin, enlistees were referred to as taiin, unit members, and their officers as kanbu, meaning staff members. The design of uniforms presented similar difficulties: they must not look too much like the pre–1945 styles of the Imperial Japanese Army, nor should they too closely resemble those of the conquerors. Initially, there was even reluctance to use the GSDF to aid humanitarian disaster response efforts, lest there be a public backlash.

Deftly interweaving an institutional history of the GSDF with policy issues, the author details the tremendous obstacles that impeded the development of the force. Domestic resistance stemmed partly from revulsion against the militarist regime that had brought such destruction on Japan and partly for economic reasons. We see American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles urging a recalcitrant Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru to rearm, with Yoshida arguing that doing so would impede his country’s efforts to rebuild its damaged infrastructure as well as arouse both internal and foreign concerns. Who won may be inferred from the emergence of the Yoshida Doctrine, under which Japan would focus on economic development while the United States would be the guarantor of its security. The doctrine shaped defense policy for decades to come, as American pressure, euphemistically referred to as gaiatsu, or foreign pressure, nudged successive governments forward in what might be called constrained rearmament. In truth, many of them used gaiatsu to rationalize what they wanted to do anyway.

Each attempt to expand GSDF functions met great internal resistance, with the most violent being the Anpo riots of 1960 in which otherwise loosely connected leftist forces came together to protest the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. At the same time, a countertrend grew with the revival of nationalism, exemplified a decade later in the ritual suicide of internationally acclaimed author Mishima Yukio, in protest against the suppression of Japan’s martial tradition. Ironically, the author points out, the GSDF’s rejection of Mishima’s call for it to conduct a coup to restore Japan’s pride had the opposite result: members pledged to serve the civilian government held fast and demonstrated that a coup was unthinkable.

The 1990s proved a tenkanten, or turning point, with the combination of a strong prime minister elected in 2001, Koizumi Junichiro, international criticism of Japan’s at first timid assistance in the Persian Gulf War, and rising perceptions of danger from North Korean nuclear proliferation as well as the rise of China as both an economic and military threat. Even so, there was resistance: when, in 1992, the Koizumi government
submitted a bill allowing the Japanese to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations to the Diet, members of the opposing Japan Socialist Party staged an “ox-walk” protest, a kind of filibuster technique that involved painfully slow walking into the legislative chamber in order to slow down the vote. The tactic backfired, with the bill passing and a public backlash punishing the party in the next election.

Hunter-Chester places the GSDF’s search for identity in the larger context of Japan’s identity as a nation. A chapter subtitled “Reimagining the Soldier” traces the image of military figures in popular culture—manga, anime, books, mass market films, and art cinema. As the author notes, every society needs heroes, and the image of the military in these has become more positive. In a case in point, he summarizes the plot of the 2001 reboot of a Godzilla film in which Godzilla is overtly identified with the spirits of Imperial Japanese forces slain in World War II. The film opens with a lecture on the role of the GSDF under the Japanese constitution; at the end, Godzilla is, of course, slain. Although the hero is a sailor rather than a GSDF member, Hunter-Chester deems the film to be a cinematic validation of the GSDF as a whole.

Over the past seven decades the GSDF has evolved into a thoroughly modern force now largely accepted by society and even valued for its humanitarian assistance work. Still, barriers to its participation in combat remain and are unlikely to be changed by any event short of a catastrophe. Current Prime Minister Abe Shinzo has moved the process forward, albeit slowly, in the face of popular resistance. Though he does not explicitly say so, Hunter-Chester seems optimistic that it will eventually get there, hopefully without the impetus of a major catastrophe.

This book is a fine work of scholarship that should be of interest to all those concerned with America’s most important ally. While somewhat peripheral to the author’s concern, some discussion of how Japan’s neighbors viewed the gradual moves toward rearmament would have been useful. This reviewer hopes that Hunter-Chester’s publisher will consider a paperback version of the book, since the high price of the hardback may discourage those who should read it.

**Combined Operations: A Global History of Amphibious and Airborne Warfare**

By Jeremy Black

Reviewed by Robert Bateman, a retired Army lieutenant colonel and former strategist assigned to the Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense

A few decades ago, when I was in graduate school, Professor Jeremy Black had, perhaps, a “mere” 40-plus titles to his credit. Today that number is more than 100, with twenty of them appearing in just the past five years. This is an incredible pace in any field; but for an academic historian, it is essentially unmatched. Yet such efforts do come with a cost. Usually that is in accuracy, though not in this one, nor to be fair, in most of his works. True, in Combined Operations Black does make a few, niggling, and I would assess, excusable errors. It happens. But they are
minor, and only specialists will pick up on them. No, here the problem, if one is to call it such, is that for all intents and purposes this book lacks a thesis.

Now that does not necessarily mean that the work is without value. Indeed, one could make the very valid argument that in writing this unified book on a single theme, Black created a decent single-source survey on the topic. It is shallow, of course, because it is almost impossible to cover the stated topic, encompassing some 3,000 years of history in just 247 pages, with any depth. But for those who are seeking a deeper meaning, or even perhaps some guiding principles extracted from the study of a particular era or type of conflict, there is little here beyond a skeletal framework. This is a recitation.

Just looking at a few of the other titles Black recently published gives one an indication of why this may be. Last year he published Naval Warfare: A Global History since 1860 as well as Air Power: A Global History. These two books, obviously, rely upon the same batch of research that led to the first two books. But with Combined Operations, there is at least the slightest thematic twist to make it nominally a separate work. The endnotes also tell part of the story in that his sources for the Ancient period through the 1700s are almost exclusively secondary, a survey of the extant literature. Not until he enters the period in which he started his own scholarship does he begin to use primary sources, and those are almost exclusively British.

All of this means Combined Operations is little more than a reference. And that can be fine for some readers. Indeed, this book does have utility for those deeply steeped in history because a literature survey can be a wonderfully useful thing. Though there is no bibliography (a curious omission), one can extract volumes from the endnotes.

Still, even for the period in which he is an acknowledged primary source, using expert Black is confined. To showcase this expertise, consider the example of combined operations—which means “more than one service” by his formulation and “joint” to today’s American military—that recounts General James Wolfe’s multiple landings and eventually successful assault upon Quebec in 1759. Wolfe died, as did his French opponent the marquis de Montcalm, in that fight. But it changed history in a fundamental way. Black gives it three paragraphs.

Similarly looking at the massive littoral and riverine operations of the American Civil War—arguably the largest combined operations period of the entire nineteenth century, and the War of 1812—included, gets a whopping two pages. This is wrong. More than 300,000 men, at sea and on land, in combined operations from 1861 to 1865 are dismissed in two pages? Really? Leaping forward, the Battle of Iwo Jima gets just a few paragraphs, as does the Allied Invasion of Sicily, operations in the south of France, and even D-Day on June 6, 1944. Now we are up to millions of men addressed in the briefest of summary statements. One cannot avoid observing that most of these men were not British.

The best history helps us understand. This principle applies to all areas of history, though usually it is delayed and muted in effect by practitioners, history matters. In the field of military history this has a direct and obvious utility for professionals.
There is a horrid tendency among historians writing reviews to essentially say, “If I wrote that book I would say . . .” This is not right, and I reject that idea. I could never write this book, but that is a personal choice. Black’s book has merit. It is accurate, with only tiny errors in the things he chooses to cover, and for future scholars it brings together a body of secondary and, in a limited way, some primary sources. If this is an area where a professional needs to study then this book is the obvious starting point, as it marks the trail for where one might go for a deeper understanding.

American Airpower Strategy in World War II: Bombs, Cities, Civilians, and Oil

By Conrad Crane

Reviewed by Jeremy Black, professor of history at Exeter University

An effective study when it came out in 1993, American Airpower Strategy in World War II: Bombs, Cities, Civilians and Oil is an excellent second edition that reflects Crane’s careful scrutiny of the field since. The flaw in the original remains, but it is shared by most work on World War II airpowers namely, a failure to incorporate the situation at sea, where aircraft turned out to be of great tactical, operational and strategic significance, notably against shipping, not only against surface vessels and submarines, but also against shore targets. This significance, moreover, helps to shift attention from the bombing of civilians as well as ensure precision bombing remained highly important. Indeed, airpower was crucial for bombing surface and submarine targets at sea.

Crane, by focusing on strategic bombing on land, however, becomes far more concerned about issues of morality, and they come to play a major role in his discussion of effectiveness. This aspect is particularly seen in the chapters on “Strategic Airpower in Limited Wars” and on “Legacies,” but the issues of effectiveness and morality in effect cover independently operating variables that cannot be fixed in a model of appropriate air warfare. In fact, the idea of conflict not entailing civilian casualties is of limited applicability, and this is especially so if the issue of indirect casualties is considered.

Ironically, the emphasis on the situation in World War II is misleading as subsequent conflicts were very different in character, and notably so, as the power employing such airpower was not similarly threatened. In 1944 and 1945, the German use of rocket attacks, an aspect of strategic bombing that attracts insufficient attention, notably, from German apologists, ensured there was a degree of symmetry, and practice, that Allied bombing often involved more “precision.” The situation subsequently has been different, which makes the North Korean acquisition of long-range missiles of interest. Despite the limited relevance of World War II, the use of airpower then set much of the tone for subsequent discussion, as well as the intellectual, legal, emotional, and visual understanding of air warfare. This element was particularly true for popular culture, as the conflict dominated war films. In practice, the role of missiles was underplayed, ensuring subsequent shifts in the
relationship between bombers and missiles were not approached in an appropriate contexts.

**Nine Days in May: The Battles of the 4th Infantry Division on the Cambodian Border, 1967**

By Warren K. Wilkins

Reviewed by Dr. Kevin M. Boylan, history instructor at Emmanuel College

The late Russell Weigley once observed that although combat is the defining characteristic of warfare, academic military historians display an odd aversion to writing about it. This remains true today, and battle histories that delve into the gory details of tactical engagements are still generally written by veterans, journalists, or amateur historians; often aim at the popular market; and frequently lack objectivity and scholarly rigor. But Warren K. Wilkins’ *Nine Days in May* is an example of the genre at its best. The book is exhaustively researched (drawing upon Vietnamese language publications, archival documents, and interviews with dozens of American veterans), well-written, and conveys all the brutality, confusion, and terror of close quarters combat while maintaining its objectivity and scholarly tone.

Wilkins’ subject is Operation Francis Marion, which pitted the US 4th Infantry Division against the 1st North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Division in Pleiku province during May 1967. Both sides welcomed these battles in the wilds along the Cambodian border in South Vietnam’s strategic central highlands. General William C. Westmoreland, the top US commander in Vietnam, sought to keep the NVA as far as possible from the densely-populated coastal plains, while B-3 Front Commander General Chu Huy Man aimed to undermine allied pacification efforts in the lowlands by drawing American troops away from them. Since two of the 4th Division’s brigades were on the coast, the units screening the border found themselves outnumbered when they ran into the 32nd and 66th NVA Regiments. Another brigade shifted into the highlands, but its battalions were fed in one at a time, and at no point were there more than two of them in the field opposing the pair of enemy regiments. And since a company generally had to be left behind to guard firebases, most American battalions operated at only two-thirds strength.

*Nine Days in May* is organized into three parts, each of which describes the battle of a specific US battalion (the 1/8th, 3/12th, and 3/8th Infantry) in painstaking detail. These units encountered few of the disciplinary problems that afflicted draftee units later in the war because they were still manned predominantly by “originals” (i.e., soldiers who had been serving in the 4th Division when it deployed to Vietnam in late 1966). But Wilkins stresses none of the battalions had yet seen action against NVA regulars and found them much tougher opponents than the Vietcong they had encountered in the coastal plains. As one veteran put it, “We bumped into ‘Mr. Charles’ in the Highlands, instead of ‘Charlie’” (295).

Wilkins’s accounts of the five major battles fought during Francis Marion are gripping, graphic, and highly revealing. For his
minute-by-minute dissection of these engagements shows that while the US battalions were cohesive, well-trained, and generally well-led, they were no match for the NVA in fieldcraft or familiarity with the remote area of operations. They were thus consistently taken by surprise, thrown on the defensive, and obliged to fight on the enemy’s terms. They were also handicapped by their reliance upon helicopters for resupply and reinforcement, even though landing zones were rare in the triple-canopy jungle, and by having to fight so close to the foe’s cross-border sanctuaries. Since the Johnson administration refused to admit publicly that NVA were operating in Cambodia, absurdly restrictive rules of engagement even prevented the 4th Division from striking hostile mortars that were openly firing across the border.

The 4th Division ultimately prevailed in all five battles thanks to the skill and bravery of its troops, and massive supporting fires. Wilkins characterizes Francis Marion as a victory because the enemy suffered disproportionately heavy casualties, as Westmoreland intended, and a planned NVA offensive in the central highlands was forestalled. However, he notes that General Chu Huy Man had also achieved a primary objective by pulling US formations away from the plains, and observes that American casualties were so numerous that the “original” battalions ceased to exist and many 4th Division soldiers felt “more like survivors than winners” (242). Wilkins ultimately concludes that Francis Marion was a sterile victory because its outcome did little to alter the strategic stalemate in the central highlands.

While Nine Days in May is good narrative microhistory, analytical issues do not always get the attention they deserve. For instance, although Wilkins describes soldiers being amazed by enemy firepower, he does not delve into the reasons why NVA infantry units were superior in that respect. The fact that they fielded belt-fed Ruchnoy Pul’emyot Degtyaryova (RPD) machine guns at the squad level while American squads had only a pair of box magazine M16 rifle variants is not mentioned. Nor is the vast superiority of the ubiquitous NVA rocket-propelled grenade launchers over the disposable, short-ranged US light antitank weapon. Wilkins also does not explore how the NVA managed to bring significant numbers of mortars into action, including heavy 120mm models, when American units found them too cumbersome to carry.

Some key macrolevel topics are also given short shrift. For example, Wilkins describes early on how the 4th Division’s commander, Lieutenant General William R. Peers, intended to employ a defense in depth, engaging NVA regulars only after they had penetrated some distance inside South Vietnam and no longer had easy access to their Cambodian sanctuaries. Later he explains that Peers was overruled by his superior, General Stanley R. Larsen, who insisted that the NVA be hit as close to the border as possible. Yet Wilkins never really reaches any conclusion as to whether it was an error to fight so close to border—or if Larsen deserves to be condemned for the heavy losses Peers’s troops suffered there.

Nine Days in May is, nonetheless, a riveting battle narrative that graphically illustrates the cruel realities of how search-and-destroy operations targeting NVA regulars functioned at the tactical level. Since virtually every engagement of note fought during Francis Marion was
enemy initiated, Wilkins also demonstrates the futility of Westmoreland’s efforts to destroy Communist regular units through attrition. None of the May 1967 battles would have occurred if the 1st NVA Division had not wanted them to.

My Enemy's Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the American Withdrawal

By Avinash Paliwal

Reviewed by Dr. Sumit Ganguly, Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations, Indiana University

Though not widely known, India is currently the fifth largest aid donor to Afghanistan. Its assistance, within the foreign aid community, however, has been recognized as one of the most effective. Nevertheless its strategic presence in the country has mostly been circumscribed. In part, until the last days of the Obama administration and the advent of the Trump regime, the United States had actively sought to limit India’s role in the country strictly to developmental assistance. America’s reluctance to allow India to play a larger role in the country stemmed mostly from Pakistan's misgivings about permitting India to expand its presence.

Only when substantial frustration grew with Pakistan and its unwillingness to rein in support for the Afghani Taliban in the waning days of the second Obama term did some American officials express a willingness to grant India a wider role in the country. The Trump administration has actually urged India to step up its assistance and may not be averse to seeing India even broaden its security role.

Avinash Paliwal’s book deftly demonstrates, contrary to Pakistan’s stated concerns, Indian policymakers may not be in accord in seeking a more substantial security presence in Afghanistan. The lack of a consensus on expanding India’s security footprint in Afghanistan, Paliwal argues, stems from the existence of policy coalitions with divergent views within the Indian foreign and security policy establishments. He suggests these coalitions, for analytic purposes, can be divided into two distinct groups: partisans and conciliators. Partisans wish to pursue a more aggressive set of policies toward Pakistan and are not chary about using Afghanistan as a staging ground for these efforts. Conciliators, on the other hand, are reluctant, if not opposed, to such strategies and would prefer simply to work with Afghanistan to develop friendly bilateral ties.

It is important to underscore these coalitions cut across intelligence, defense, and foreign policy bureaucracies. Proclivities aside, their ability to pursue particular strategies have been either boosted up or hemmed in based upon the preferences of particular prime ministers who have sought to impose their will.

The strength of these coalitions, he shows, have waxed and waned over time and have thereby led to significant policy shifts. One fascinating and counterintuitive leitmotif, however, that clearly emerges from his detailed historical exegesis is that India has, on a number of occasions, refrained from imposing costs on Pakistan even when opportunities have presented themselves. Such self-abnegating choices clearly run counter
to the popular assumption that anti-Pakistani animus has consistently informed Indian policy toward Afghanistan. For example, Paliwal shows that Indian leaders as diverse as Inder Kumar Gujral to Narasimha Rao on the basis of both political conviction and circumstance eschewed opportunities to create havoc in Pakistan using Afghanistan as a proxy.

Paliwal, who has a granular knowledge of the complexities of Afghanistan’s history and recent domestic politics, also shows the difficulties that India has encountered in formulating and implementing coherent policies because of the existence of a range of political factions and ethnic fissures in the country. Courting favor with a particular faction or group has often risked alienating others. During the time when the Taliban was consolidating its hold over the country India was to face this problem in a particular acute fashion.

It is to Paliwal’s credit that he does not shy away from tackling contentious issues that have vexed relations between India and Pakistan as well as Pakistan and Afghanistan. Specifically, he quite forthrightly tackles Pakistan’s vehement claims that India has sought to foment separatism in the troubled Pakistani province of Balochistan that lies athwart Afghanistan. He argues that the truth about India’s involvement in Baloch and also Pashtun issues is complex. It falls significantly short of Pakistan’s lurid claims but is nevertheless not entirely untrue. Obviously, when provoked with attacks on its own soil or on its assets in Afghanistan, Indian policymakers have contemplated and even carried out retaliatory acts in Pakistan. Given the existence of both Baloch and Pashtun separatist movements within the country these have proven to be the logical venues for exploitation.

Paliwal also shows how an abiding concern about Pakistani support for insurgents in Kashmir has profoundly shaped India’s policies toward Afghanistan on particular occasions. For example, despite reservations about the mujahideen led government after the fall of Najibullah, New Delhi chose to reach out to the new dispensation in Kabul. This decision, in considerable part, stemmed from New Delhi’s concern that Pakistan would exploit the emergence of the mujahideen regime to stir further discord in Kashmir.

The book’s scope, its careful research based upon declassified documents, extensive use of interviews with former and serving officials and reportage and its organization combine to make it a substantial contribution on India’s foreign policy toward an important neighboring state. Given the paucity of scholarly analysis of this subject Paliwal’s book constitutes a most useful step in addressing a crucial lacuna in the extant literature.
India’s Wars: A Military History, 1947–1971
By Arjun Subramaniam

Reviewed by Dr. Patrick K. Bratton, associate professor of national security strategy at the US Army War College

While there is an abundance of books on Indian cultural, religious, social, and political history, quality books on the military history of South Asia are rare. This is ironic given the world’s focus on a rising India and its military power. Arjun Subramaniam’s book is an important step in filling this gap. The author is a retired Air Vice Marshall of the Indian Air Force. His work draws deftly upon both his experience and his historical research. From the start, the author sets the tone and intent of the book to be a first cut of Indian military history or, as the author terms it, a “sighter burst” in old fighter pilot slang. The book gives a sweeping narrative history of India’s military and conflicts, focusing on the first decades after independence from the first Indo-Pakistani War in 1947 to the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971.

The book seeks a wide audience, general readers interested in the subject and specialists. Even scholars who are familiar with these conflicts will have much to gain from the author’s weaving together of many overlooked details. The book is based upon published secondary sources, the author’s extensive research into personal memories, and the drawing together of other firsthand accounts. The lack of primary sources and archival work is understandable, considering both the limitations on access to Ministry of Defence archives and the book’s intent of being a “first cut” of Indian military history. The author mixes narrative histories of the wars in question with analytical sections that examine the conflicts in terms of strategic, operational, and leadership lessons.

The book is valuable in several ways. First, it takes a joint perspective (or “triservice” from the Indian view). Traditionally, the accounts of these conflicts have focused on the Indian army, which makes sense given both the dominance of India’s army and that India’s wars have been over defense of homeland and territory. Subramaniam, however, gives substantial attention to the important role that the navy, and particularly the air force, played in conflicts. The author also reassesses the respective performances of both the Indian and Pakistani air forces during the wars, by examining not just their air to air record, as is commonly done, but also their ability to work with their respective armies. Even in conflicts where there was no air to air combat, like Kashmir (1947–48), the Indian Air Force played a vital but forgotten role in getting ground forces to the theatre in time to fight and supporting them during the war.

Second, this joint approach allows the author to bring to light many overlooked aspects. Subramaniam’s coverage of the early days of the Indian Air Force and navy in the interwar and Second World War years yields several gems. For example, while the slow process of “Indianization” of the British Indian Army through the 1920s to the 1940s is well known, it would surprise many readers to learn that the Indian Air Force was conceived from the start as an “all Indian” force with no British officers. Similarly, many of the forgotten conflicts are
covered in detail, like the use of the military to occupy Hyderabad in 1948 or Goa in 1961.

Third, perhaps the greatest strength of this work is the large number of personal vignettes the author has unearthed. He put in the effort to not only gather memories of various officers, but also contact those still living or their relatives to record their stories. Many of these accounts are not generally known and are of interest. The author utilizes these stories to effectively bring to light much of the backdrop to military operations. Military historians often focus exclusively on frontline tactics and operations, while neglecting the support functions or secondary theatres. For example, when discussing the origins of the Indian Air Force, Subramaniam tells the story of Indra Lal Roy, a pilot in the Great War, and includes examples of the sketches he did during the war in France. Similarly, he relates the experiences of soldiers and pilots fighting at high altitudes in Ladakh during the Bangladesh Liberation War which are generally not known.

Given the work is a general overview, some views and choices are open to debate. When the book shifts from the tactical and operational levels to the strategic and political ones, the book reflects many dominant narratives in the Indian military about the Indian political elite, in particular Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Subramaniam makes strong assertions about Nehru’s liberal-idealism and “diffidence” about security issues without much engagement in recent scholarship that has questioned and problematized this narrative. Similarly, while the author makes a valid assertion that examinations of Indian military culture should include the influences of armies and traditions before the Europeans arrived on the subcontinent, he surprisingly dismisses the contribution of the Mughal dynasty to Indian military heritage. Given the dynasty’s impact on the social, economic, political, and military history of India, this is a debatable point.

Fortunately, these aspects are not critical to the book and its purpose. The author gives a readable narrative of India’s military history and also brings in perspectives from the other services to give a fuller picture of those wars than is generally acknowledged. It is a recommended addition to any library on South Asian military history.