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Dr. Jeffrey Record

Phone: (770) 557-5227

Photo JEFFREY RECORD is Professor Emeritus at the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama, where he taught strategy for 20 years. Before that, Dr. Record served as pacification advisor in the Mekong Delta during the Vietnam War; Rockefeller Younger Scholar on the Brookings Institution’s Defense Analysis Staff; Senior Fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, the Hudson Institute; and the BDM International Corporation. Dr. Record also has extensive Capitol Hill experience, having served as a legislative assistant to Sam Nunn and Lloyd Bentsen, and later as a professional staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. He is the author of 10 books and 24 monographs, including: Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq; Hollow Victory: A Contrary View of the Gulf War; and The Wrong War: Why We Lost in Vietnam. Dr. Record received his doctorate at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in 1973.

*The above information may not be current. It was current at the time when the individual worked for SSI or was published by SSI.

SSI books and monographs by Dr. Jeffrey Record

  • Ends, Means, Ideology, and Pride: Why the Axis Lost and What We Can Learn from Its Defeat

    July 13, 2017

    Authored by Dr. Jeffrey Record.
    View the Executive Summary

    Axis defeat in World War II often is attributed to its material inferiority against Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. However, was strategic incompetence also a root cause? Did not Germany, Italy, and Japan also pursue territorial objectives that were simply beyond their power?

  • Japan's Decision for War in 1941: Some Enduring Lessons

    February 09, 2009

    Authored by Dr. Jeffrey Record.
    Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was a war that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision for war? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace?

  • Appeasement Reconsidered: Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s

    August 01, 2005

    Authored by Dr. Jeffrey Record.
    Anglo-French appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s has generated a mythology that ignores much of the actual political-military situation at the time and that continues to mislead U.S. foreign policy today.

  • Iraq and Vietnam: Differences, Similarities, and Insights

    May 01, 2004

    Authored by Dr. Jeffrey Record, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill.
    The authors conclude that the two conflicts bear little comparison. They also conclude, however, that failed U.S. state-building in Vietnam and the impact of declining domestic political support for U.S. war aims in Vietnam are issues pertinent to current U.S. policy in Iraq.

  • Bounding the Global War on Terrorism

    December 01, 2003

    Authored by Dr. Jeffrey Record.
    The author examines three features of the war on terrorism as currently defined and conducted: (1) the administration's postulation of the terrorist threat, (2) the scope and feasibility of U.S. war aims, and (3) the war's political, fiscal, and military sustainability. He believes that the war on terrorism--as opposed to the campaign against al-Qaeda--lacks strategic clarity, embraces unrealistic objectives, and may not be sustainable over the long haul.

  • The Creeping Irrelevance of U.S. Force Planning

    May 01, 1998

    Authored by Dr. Jeffrey Record.
    Jeffrey Record examines what he believes is a half-century-old and continuing recession of large-interstate warfare and, since the World War's demise, the unexpected and often violent disintegration of established states. The author's critical analysis leads him to propose significant and controversial changes in planning standards, force structure, and defense spending.

  • Ready For What and Modernized Against Whom?: A Strategic Perspective on Readiness and Modernization

    April 01, 1995

    Authored by Dr. Jeffrey Record.
    The U.S. military continues to prepare for large-scale inter-state warfare even though intra-state conflict is the primary source of violence in the post-Soviet era. Conventional "Cold War" force structures are of limited utility against irregular adversaries operating on their own territory. Accordingly, selected conventional force modernization programs should be reexamined and new force structures considered.