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Dr. Robert W Tucker

ROBERT W. TUCKER is Professor Emeritus of American Foreign Policy at the Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. He is a member of the American Academy of the Arts and Sciences and the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Tucker is the author of The Nuclear Debate: Deterrence and the Lapse of Faith (Holmes and Meier, 1985); The Inequality of Nations (Basic Books, 1977), The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy (Johns Hopkins, 1971), Nation or Empire? The Debate over American Foreign Policy (Johns Hopkins, 1968), The Just War (Johns Hopkins, 1960); and three books with Dr. David C. Hendrickson: The Imperial Temptation: The New World Order and America’s Purpose (Council on Foreign Relations, 1992); Empire of Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (Oxford University Press, 1990), and The Fall of the First British Empire: Origins of the War of American Independence (Johns Hopkins, 1982). He was co-editor of The National Interest from 1985 to 1990, and president of the Lehrman Institute from 1982 to 1987. He has published essays in Foreign Affairs, World Policy Journal, The National Interest, Harpers, and The New Republic. Dr. Tucker received his B.S. from the United States Naval Academy in 1945 and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1949.

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SSI books and monographs by Dr. Robert W Tucker

  • Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War

    December 01, 2005

    Authored by Dr. David C Hendrickson, Dr. Robert W Tucker.
    The authors examine the contentious debate over the Iraq war and occupation, focusing on the critique that the Bush administration squandered an historic opportunity to reconstruct the Iraqi state. They argue that the most serious problems facing Iraq and its American occupiers—criminal anarchy and lawlessness, a raging insurgency and a society divided into rival and antagonistic groups—were virtually inevitable consequences that flowed from the act of war itself.