Special Research Topics from
Army and Joint Organizations

stratcom
  1. How does deterrence theory change now that the U.S. faces two nuclear-armed, near-peer competitors?
  2. What are strategies for facing two nuclear-armed, near-peer competitors?
  3. How does the U.S. set deterrence thresholds and how should it communicate those thresholds to adversaries? What is the effect on adversary decision making if thresholds are communicated?
  4. Is stability possible within tripolar long term competition and low level non-kinetic conflict?
  5. How can the US improve the balance of perceived resolve to defend national interests? How might we take a net assessment approach to illuminate this problem of adversary perception of US resolve?
  6. What is the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in deterring strategic or existential attacks? How can declaratory policy impact this?
  7. How can deterrence be restored once it has failed?
  8. What could break deterrence in the 21st century? What could strengthen deterrence?
  9. What is the efficacy of multi-domain deterrence in an economically competitive environment?
  10. How can we shape deterrence of non-nuclear strategic attacks that employ cumulative strategies across systems and domains?
  11. How might cyber attacks on NC3 systems introduce doubt in the reliability and effectiveness of an actor’s NC3 systems? What impacts might this have on strategic deterrence?
  12. How does the wide spread use and effects of sharp power affect the credibility of deterrence?
  13. How does great power competitive conflict affect extended deterrence?
  14. How should we treat information operations in global power competition and with regard to U.S. ability to deter? How do we integrate strategic communications into operations, activities, and investments as well as advocacy?
  15. Considering the environment today and future trends, what decisions would we make about forces and doctrine if we were starting from zero? What does this mean in the context of taking PRC as “the pacing threat”?

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tradoc-1
  1. Dominate the Information Environment. Problem: TRADOC needs to improve how it informs the domestic audience; and provide the tools and training so the Army can gain and maintain the information advantage in the AO along the range of competition to conflict, to ensure informed decision making, protect sensitive information, and affect friendly, neutral, and adversary behavior to our advantage.
    • Is information a domain? If not, how do we approach information operations within and emanating from each domain within the information environment?
    • Is information a war fighting function? If not, how do we characterize it to capture information actions and tasks within information operations?
    • How does the Army establish and maintain information dominance in Competition with peer adversaries?
    • How does the Army establish and maintain information dominance in Conflict with peer adversaries?
  2. Create and deliver exceptional training and education (at echelon) focused on leader development and lethality. Problem: To maintain our human capital advantage, we must maintain and improve our leadership and lethality training, otherwise we will fall behind our adversaries.
    • How does TRADOC adapt to the learning/learner expectations of Gen Z and Gen Alpha?
    • How does TRADOC create a cost-effective CTC-in-a-box/other CTC training for use at home stations?
    • How does the Army train JIIM/whole of government?
    • What does a whole-of-government doctrine look like?
    • How do we train leaders at all echelons to apply DIME tools?
    • What is the proper hybrid of live, virtual, constructive and gaming (L/V/C/G) training to optimize individual and unit readiness?
    • What infrastructure will be required to support 21st century L/V/C/G training?
    • How can TRADOC personalize and tailor instruction to individual student needs – remediating individual weaknesses and further developing individual strengths?
    • What is the ROI for DL and blended/hybrid training and education?
    • How do we integrate lethal capabilities into and throughout the force?
  3. Drive DOTMLPF-P integration for the Army. Problem: It is still unclear how, exactly, AFC and TRADOC mesh together, 1) particularly in handling matters in the 2028-2035 range, keeping in mind that range will continue to move to the right as time passes, 2) and in preparing for, executing, and documenting MDO. The Army People Strategy also assumes, “The Army will increasingly operate with joint, inter-agency, and multi-national partners.”
    • How does TRADOC participate in Future Concept development to speed doctrine development?
    • How does TRADOC stay integrated with Force Modernization efforts in order to speed implementation?
    • What Future Force DOTMLPF-P elements must be invested in today in order to realize full MDO capability by 2028-2035 (data development, recruitment/accessions, training and leader development, etc.
    • In determining how we bridge capability development efforts that may fall into both AFC and TRADOC areas of responsibility, including capability development document such as ICD, CDD, CPD and STRAPs, how do we determine what is a current force capability development effort (TRADOC) and what is a future force capability development effort, and how do we transition between them?
    • How can the Army (TRADOC) benefit from collaboration and sharing training approaches and resources with sister services, government organizations, and possibly allies and select partners? Can we conserve resources and more effectively achieve MDO capabilities in this manner?
    • Should we and how can we collaborate in areas that are enablers across WfFs, such as cyber, information operations, information technology/artificial intelligence, and virtual/constructive/gaming?
    • Should we consider eventually developing a single facilities management construct for all services?
  4. Design, educate, and train the Army of 2020-2028 to posture it for 2028 and beyond. Problem: We need to get more soldiers trained and assessed more frequently, which means we need to make providing the training easier with a similar/better level of effectiveness, and make conducting frequent/timely assessments less of a burden/more attainable. People will only be motivated to conduct frequent assessments if they’re useful – if they tell the individual and the unit something useful for career development and talent utilization, in addition to providing data the big Army can use it its talent management. Also, the CSA has emphasized assessment.
    • How can we use of data to create and promote a culture of assessments?
    • How can TRADOC assess whether or not we’re doing the right thing, now that we no longer have TRAC to assess training effectiveness? Should we stand up a new assessment center? Should we consider something like line-of-sight assessment, i.e. creating an assessment center/group comprised of DA, TRADOC, and CAC SMEs to provide cradle-to-career assessments?
    • How do we measure the effectiveness of BCAP and CCAP as predictors of command success?
    • How can we effectively utilize the NTC data we have to assess how well we’re executing our mission?
    • How can we use of data to improve readiness reporting?
  5. Lead Army’s efforts on culture and the profession. Problem: we have lost the Army culture. We need to focus on training and inculcating, and continuing to develop/evolve the culture. We also need to communicate to those outside the Army what the Army culture and Army profession are.
    • What does a renaissance in the Army Profession look like?
    • How does the Army become more inclusive?
    • How does the Army increase equity/meritocracy?
    • How does the Army care for soldiers, DACs, and families?
    • How does the Army become an inclusive team our nation trusts?
  6. Acquire – Revolutionize recruiting. Problem: Mitigate shortfalls in recruiting numbers, make the Army more representative of American society (an Army People Strategy goal by 2028) in terms of ethnic, racial, and gender representation, attract recruits whose skills and talents already match or are close to the current and future needs of the Army. The Army People Strategy also assumes “intense competition for human resources will remain a significant problem.”
    • How does TRADOC interest Gen Z and Gen Alpha in the Army profession?
    • How do we increase minority accessions into ROTC? What efforts are underway and what has their effectiveness been thus far? What lessons can we apply?
    • How do we increase the geographic diversity of recruits? What efforts are underway and what has their effectiveness been thus far? What lessons can we apply?
    • How do we reduce the number of physical recruiting stations as we move to virtual recruiting, without undermining our recruiting efforts overall? What’s the cost-benefit ratio of a physical recruiting station in a given geographic area (vs. virtual)?
    • How do we give back thousands of NCOs to FORSCOM to address the shortage of E-6s needed in the recruitment effort?
    • How do we identify and take advantage of the opportunities and mitigate the risks associated with talent-based branching?
  7. Drive the development of multi-domain enabling doctrine. Problem: We have determined that the US must fight its adversaries in all domains – land, sea, air, space, and cyber (all within the information domain), yet the Army is trying to write the doctrine while simultaneously developing the concept of operations and the necessary capabilities, and working to determine how to define MDTFs will fit into joint operations and how MDO doctrine will fit into/dovetail with joint doctrine.
    • How does MDO doctrine development fit in with JADO doctrine development?
    • How do we best synchronize TRADOC and AFC capabilities development for the Army to achieve an MDO capable and ready force?
  8. Protection Warfighting Function: Within the framework described by the revised Protection Functional Concept (AFC Pam 525-3-37), consider how the MDO force might protect and secure the force (personnel, units, equipment, facilities, infrastructure, and essential capabilities), deny enemy freedom of action by removing enemy force options through Protection activities, and enable friendly force access into areas of operation during competition and the transition to conflict.
    • What emerging gaps and solution recommendations for systems, organizations/staffs, doctrine and training are needed to enable MDO Protection at echelons above Brigade?
    • How does the Protection Cell/Staff continuously integrate Protection equities during MDO vs. episodic synchronization (as done today)? How do / should Protection WFF activities expand competition and deter adversary actions short of conflict? (DOD and Army policy focus)
    • How does the Protection WfF allow Army commanders at echelon realize a window of opportunity/superiority within the MDO OE?
    • How will Protection be applied in the Strategic Support Area, specifically, Mobilization processes, installation resiliency, and mission assurance in a contested Homeland // should the mission, organization, and structure currently optimized and trained to respond to a nuclear burst in the homeland be reassessed and allocated toward mission assurance requirements?
  9. LSCO in a Nuclear Environment: Given the shift away from COIN to fighting a peer/near-peer threat in large scale combat operations, the specter of fighting in a nuclear environment has become increasingly plausible. This initiative will look at the threat, the impacts a nuclear detonation would have across all phases of an operation in a variety of environments, and current capabilities and readiness to fight and win in those conditions.
  10. ARMY Talent initiatives – Army talent initiatives now are in their first (CCAP, TBB) or second (BCAP) iteration. From a USACC lens it would be interested in seeing someone do some research on Talent Based Branching (specifically for the ROTC cohort) and our Virtual Branch Orientation initiative.

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  • Impact of machine aided language interpretation and translation to the tactical level of Multi-Doman Operations. Given the increased reliability and sophistication of machine aided language interpretation and translation, provide an assessment of the technical likelihood, operational impact, and proposed way ahead of providing small, sophisticated machine aided language interpretation and translation capability to every Soldier.
  • Convergence of Leader Development and Training: discuss the opportunities and leader development programs necessary to take back ownership of our training, leader development and readiness.
  • Historical perspective- Comparative Analysis; How the CTCs and use of Training, Aids, Devices, Simulators and Simulations enabled Combined Arms Proficiency (~1980-1995) – to the growth of our CTC program in the 21st century in the last 5 years during the development of open phasing decisive action and MCTP expansion of integrated and multi-echelon training with the dirt CTCs to train from squad to Corps level.
  • Military Applications of Cloud Computing: Given the history over the last 5-10 years of cloud computing, how has its implementation changed the military IT enterprise? How has it affected tactical communications systems? How should it change how we operate?
  • The Effects of the All-Volunteer Force on Western Society: Since America transformed its military in the 1970s from mostly-draftees to a professional, all-volunteer force, some qualitative and/or quantitative outcomes can be determined. Areas to explore can include: the evolution of operational art since 1975, the use of military force since Vietnam, Western military strategy, or international political changes.
  • Information Dominance on the Modern Battlefield: Given James Gleick’s theory of information in his book, The Information: A History, A Theory, A Flood (2011), compare/explore some parallels with his analysis of how information has evolved over time, with theories of war and how operational art has evolved over time. How has information been used in past military campaigns, and how is it used today? How can Intelligence Communications, Cyber and other Information related capabilities be leveraged to gain information dominance?? An area to explore could be social media and its effectiveness from a military standpoint for command information and operational impact.
  • The Army’s Training Model: The Army’s model of training Soldiers and units, and tracking that training, is focused on MTOE/tactical units that have METL/wartime missions and can train from individual to collective and mission essential tasks in a field environment. The researcher will analyze the Army’s training model and propose a new method for TDA units that perform their missions 24/7 (i.e., strategic Signal units, Cyber units), have limited or no tactical missions, and rarely go to the field.
  • The Role of Social Media and the Army’s Inclusion and Diversity Programs: The Army must look like the face of the nation to continue to recruit and retain America’s finest to fight our nation’s wars. Social media continues to impact future Soldiers as they and influencers consider service in the Army. Where are the Army’s social media programs needing to explore to ensure that all races, creeds, and genders fully understand the values that the Army is built on, and the value of service to the country?
  • Positioning Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Primary, Alternative, Contingency, and Emergency (PACE) Considerations for MDO and LSCO: Develop Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Primary, Alternative, Contingency, and Emergency (PACE) plans to mitigate operational risks incurred by technology constraints or overcome threat technology to Army forces supporting Theater, Corps, Division, Brigade, and below level conducting multi-domain operations across the full range of operational environments.
  • Distance learning effects on Leader Development: The migration of PME to Distance Learning creates a loss of face to face interaction with instructors and peers.  How does this effect/change our approach to Leader Development?
  • Developing “Strategic Thinkers” for the Tactical Force: The recently published (1 May 2020) document entitled Developing Today’s Joint Officers for Tomorrow’s Ways of War: The Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision and Guidance for Professional Military Education & Talent Management describes the need for Professional Military Education to produce “applied strategists who can execute and adapt strategy through campaigns and operations.” The implication of this JPME end state requires changes in how we address “strategic thinking in our PME classrooms to meet the needs of the future at not only the tactical and operational levels of war, but also at the tactical level of war – an extension of what General Krulak phrased as the “Strategic Corporal” in 1999.
  • Frame the theory of war that supports the ongoing Great Power Competition in Information Battle Space. What is the body of theory that has emerged in the past thirty years that supports traditional Revolutions in Military Affairs, and the new Revolution in Human Affairs, that has enveloped the world today?

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armyfutures
  1. Decision Dominance: Given the future requirements to operate at machine speed in all domains against a peer adversary, how does a commander sense, understand, decide, act, and assess faster and more effectively than any enemy, while degrading the quality of enemy decision-making? (POC: AFC Futures and Concepts Center)
  2. Protection and Deception: When facing a peer adversary that is able to sense and strike U.S. formations at long distances, how does the Army use passive and active protection measures on and from land to maintain combat power, confuse enemy decision-making, and create multiple dilemmas for the enemy? (POC: AFC Futures and Concepts Center)
  3. Sustained Operations: In an austere environment with contested logistics, how does the Army maintain combat power of forces to enable the control of operational tempo in the defense and subsequent transition to the offense? (POC: AFC Futures and Concepts Center)
  4. Defensive Operations: Considering that peer adversaries are likely to strike first against U.S. forces and their allies using assets from across all domains, how do Army forces disrupt enemy offensive actions, isolate elements of the enemy force from their supporting domains, and defeat them in detail? (POC: AFC Futures and Concepts Center)
  5. Prepare and Expand the Theater: Given the long distances and geography that favors our peer adversaries in many potential conflicts, what conditions must be set by the Army prior to large-scale armed conflict to enable successful operations? (POC: AFC Futures and Concepts Center)
  6. Command Resiliency: With the emergence of a peer adversary that deliberately targets command structures and commanders in all domains, how can the Army prepare adaptive leaders, including their subordinates and staffs, to face physical, virtual and cognitive threats? (POC: AFC Futures and Concepts Center)
  7. Future Character of Warfare: Are emerging technologies changing the balance between offense and defense at the operational level of war? (POC: AFC Futures and Concepts Center)
  8. Concepts/Future Doctrine: How should Army and Joint concepts related to “key terrain” change when incorporating multi-domain and information-related dilemmas (e.g., physical, virtual, and/or cognitive)? (POC: AFC Futures and Concepts Center)
  9. Logistics and Concepts/Future Doctrine: What are the potential shortfalls in the Army’s intention to conduct “distributed logistics” for future operations in contested environments? Note: The constraint has been in CL V quantities, not haulage (except for strategic lift – DoD is short C17s and boats). Detailed “distributed logistics” insights, even on more narrowly defined topics, would be extremely helpful. (POC: AFC Futures and Concepts Center)
  10. General Engineering and Future Concepts / Requirements: Do we have sufficient future DOTMLPF-P solutions for Army forces to repair destroyed APODs/SPODs during future conflict against peer/near-peer adversaries? If not, what are the critical gaps, including in the INDOPACOM and EUCOM theaters? (POC: AFC Futures and Concepts Center)
  11. Future Organizations: How should the integration of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning change the structure of Army staffs at echelons above division? (POC: AFC Futures and Concepts Center)
  12. Autonomy for CBRN Decontamination: What are the optimum set of attributes (current Chemical Company configurations vs. a modernized design that incorporates autonomous and robotic capabilities)? Consider advantages and disadvantages of various organizational concepts for a mobile robotic CBRN Decontamination capability in support of Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)? (POC: AFC Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM))
  13. Operational Parameters for Extreme Environments: Envision Joint Force projection into regions of extreme environment, such as the Artic/Antarctic/deserts. What unique challenges are presented by these situations and what is required for success/overmatch of adversaries in these settings? (POC: AFC Acquisitions and Systems Directorate)
  14. Opportunities and Risks of Force Augmentation Technology: As advances in technologies to augment warfighter performance are integrated into the Army (such as manned/unmanned vehicle teaming, increased situational awareness information from sensors/networks/AI, robotics, and exoskeletons for soldier enhancement), what novel operational models/strategies become available? What risks could be associated with the adoption of these technologies? (POC: AFC Acquisitions and Systems Directorate)
  15. Risks to Technological Overmatch: Is there a risk of becoming too dependent on advanced technology to Army operations? As adoption of robotics, autonomous systems, advanced sensors/information technology supplants “humans in the loop,” are unforeseen vulnerabilities created that could lead to defeat through a “domino effect” of technological failures? (POC: AFC Acquisitions and Systems Directorate)
  16. The Technology Transition Gap: The technology “valley of death” gap between government and civilian research and development centers to fielded equipment remains a major challenge. How should AFC handle managing technology transition from applied research to integration with new or existing platforms? Can you run technology transition like a program successfully? (POC: AFC Acquisitions and Systems Directorate)
  17. Persistent Modernization is a major goal for Army Futures Command. Should the Army try to implement capability sets or Minimal Viable Product in a similar manner and tempo to DevSecOps used in the software community? How should technology development, analysis, testing and programs be structured to enable this?  What changes are needed to the requirements process, testing, and sustainment systems to enable persistent modernization in a timely fashion? (POC: AFC Acquisitions and Systems Directorate)
  18. Systems Testing Model: Historically, new military hardware and software has been tested in carefully designed and controlled Operational Tests with either dedicated test units or tasked formations. Recently the Army has started using Soldier Centered Design to help inform development efforts and capability needs through learning versus demonstration where honest feedback and redesign is expected. What are ways the Army can more systemically get continual learning from an S&T perspective versus a fielding perspective through Soldier Centered Design? (POC: AFC Acquisitions and Systems Directorate)
  19. Innovation Model: Traditional Major Defense Contractors are beginning to start internal venture capital activities that are theoretically comparable to what large technology companies like Google and Microsoft have done. Will it be possible for these organizations to truly innovate in this space and incentivize non-traditional defense partners to work with the government? Will their corporate culture enable true revolution in technology development or ultimately just identify evolution in existing solutions? Likewise could internal government lean start-up models also be able to truly innovate and incentivize non-traditional organizations to work with the government? (POC: AFC Acquisitions and Systems Directorate)
  20. Talent Management Modernization: When considering recent and emerging technical fields such as software development, artificial intelligence, hypersonic, etc., should the Services adopt a new approach to train and promote military personnel management? Should Services employ different model of PME such as skill-based rating schemes, team-based rating schemes, and use of talent-based transition between ranks instead of longevity for these technological fields? (POC: AFC Human Capital)
  21. Future INDOPACOM Battlefield Requirements: How will Land Force armored/mechanized capabilities integrate in the INDOPACOM theater in competition and conflict? How does the Army balance the resource and organizational requirements of force structure versus modernization to meet DoD capability demands? (POC: Next Generation Combat Vehicle Cross Functional Team)
  22. Capabilities Requirements and Development: How does the Army redefine DOTMLPF-P management/processes in support of Army modernization? (for example, roles and responsibilities of Army Capability Managers (ACMs), proponents, Centers of Excellence (COEs), Combined Arms Center (CAC), etc)? (POC: Next Generation Combat Vehicle Cross Functional Team)
  23. Future Force Competencies: How will the Army recruit, assess, train, and retain talent needed to operate and support modernized/advanced combat systems and capabilities that are largely software based?  How will the Army need to adjust the desired attributes of Soldiers in order to optimize advanced system employment on the battlefield? (POC: Next Generation Combat Vehicle Cross Functional Team)
  24. Open Architecture Technology: How will modular/open-system technology impact Army supply chains and processes that must adapt to logistical requirements and changing battlefield conditions for competition to conflict? (POC: Next Generation Combat Vehicle Cross Functional Team)
  25. Digital Engineering: How should the Army incorporate digital engineering principles across the modernization enterprise and DOTMLPF-P? (POC: Next Generation Combat Vehicle Cross Functional Team)
  26. Decision Making Process: How can AI/ML be used to streamline the operations process in both deliberate planning and rapid decision making? (POC: Next Generation Combat Vehicle Cross Functional Team)
  27. Influence of Service Culture on Modernization: How does the Army modernize in an inherently joint/combined world (mitigating service competition/bias and challenges of interoperability)? (POC: Next Generation Combat Vehicle Cross Functional Team)
  28. Modernization and Transformation: Examine transformation models in industry and organizations to identify examples for how the Army should transition from legacy systems to new modernization capabilities? (POC: AFC Commander’s Action Group)
  29. Future Arctic Posture: How will modernization and technologies support the Army’s implementation of the Arctic Strategy, “Regaining Arctic Dominance”? What technologies are needed to support the Army’s Arctic force posture and what might be an effective mix of COMPO 1 / COPMPO 2 capabilities to ensure the Army can mobilize, project, and sustain combat power? (POC: AFC Commander’s Action Group)
  30. International & Allied Perspectives on Modernization: Considering the United States Army will fight future conflict as part of a Joint and Combined Force, how do our key allies prepare to fight in the future battle space? What are the opportunities and challenges with a collaborative approach to technology development and what are the risks of modernization and interoperability? (POC: AFC Commander’s Action Group)

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dag4

Topic 1 (G-46): Research and examine “Improving Data Quality to Enable Equipment Readiness Decisions” to determine causal factors to inform requirements, including resources, and make a recommendation to DCS G-4 regarding changes to policies, programming, and/or budget to resolve data quality issues. We are limited in our ability to see, understand, and leverage data from our logistics enterprise systems to improve our operational decision-making and outcomes. The Army needs to improve the quality of its data in order to leverage it as a strategic asset in support of agile and resilient logistics.

Topic 2 (G-43/5/7): Research and examine “Evaluating Installation Deployment Readiness and Capacity” to determine causal factors to inform requirements, including resources, and make a recommendation to DCS G-4 regarding changes to policies, programming, and/or budget to resolve. Evaluate existing Army processes for measuring the deployment readiness and capacity of Power Projection Platforms (PPPs) and Mobilization Force Generation Installations (MFGI) and recommend an automated Common Operating Picture solution to generate monthly reports summarizing key metrics

Topic 3 (G-44M): Research and examine “Cost-Effectiveness of Additive Manufacturing in Support of MDO” to determine causal factors to inform requirements, including resources, and make a recommendation to DCS G-4 regarding changes to policies, programming, and/or budget to resolve. Assess the costs and benefits associated with leveraging additive manufacturing (AM) and complementary capabilities, at the strategic, operational and tactical levels in support of Multi-domain Operations (MDO) in the Joint-Interagency, Intergovernmental and-Multi-national (JIIM) environment.

Topic 4 (G-44S): Research and examine “Adoption of Army Hand Held Terminal AIT Devices for Property Inventory Execution” to determine causal factors to inform requirements, including resources, and make a recommendation to DCS G-4 regarding changes to policies, programming, and/or budget to resolve. Identify the impediments to soldiers and units adopting and using hand held terminal (HHT) automatic identification technology (AIT) devices. Identify changes in policies, training, hardware, and other areas to overcome these impediments.

Topic 5 (G-43/5/7): Research and examine “Improving Army Strategic Readiness Assessment (ASRA) Sustaining Tenet Metrics” to determine causal factors to inform requirements, including resources, and make a recommendation to DCS G-4 regarding changes to policies, programming, and/or budget to resolve. Provide new ASRA metrics so that Army Senior Leaders have meaningful measures and indicator assessments that portray a holistic view of current and projected sustaining tenets of readiness to enable the Army to successfully execute operation plan (OPLAN) requirements. Inform updates to Department of the Army Pamphlet 525–30 (DA Pam 525-30).

Topic 6 (G-44S): Research and examine “Accounting for Government Furnished Property within the Army” to determine causal factors to inform requirements, including resources, and make a recommendation to DCS G-4 regarding changes to policies, programming, and/or budget to resolve. Analyze the existing federal and Department of Army policies, manning, training, and the automated systems involved in the accounting of government furnished property (GFP) in order to determine the root causes for the Army not properly identifying GFP within contracts and the inability to account for it in automated systems.

Topic 7 (G-43/5/7): Research and conduct an “Army Rail Assessment” to determine causal factors to inform requirements, including resources, and make a recommendation to DCS G-4 regarding changes to policies, programming, and/or budget to resolve. Analyze the Army’s railway fleet investment strategy and identify courses of action that will allow the Army to consider options, including owning and maintaining rail infrastructure, relying on contracting support, or a mixed strategy to meet each installation’s Power Projection Platform (PPP) and Mobilization Force Generation Installations (MFGI) specific needs at reduced risk.

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DAG2-1
  1. Mission Partner Environment. Identify policy adjustments needed to the authorities detailed in National Disclosure Policy 1-0 to: better enable Mission Partner Environments, aid Commands’ ability to execute these policies, enable broader sharing to support coalition operations, and, at the same time, protect mission partner information from indiscreet sharing with other partners.
  2. Deep Sensing. Examine the future sensing requirements and mixtures for the U.S. Army to recognize, characterize, understand, and target with emerging complex communications (software-defined radios, frequency hopping at multiple-thousands per minute, etc.).  Identify the implications for sensing based on advances in adversary counter-ISR and counter-C5ISR capabilities.
  3. Counterintelligence. Examine the intelligence collection efforts of the PRC and Russia against the United States from a historical perspective. Identify how these collection efforts have changed and how those changes have driven U.S. counterintelligence at home and abroad.
  4. Great Power Competition. In the face of growing PRC and Russian anti-satellite capabilities, examine how the United States must evolve its space-based capabilities to ensure support to U.S. warfighting efforts in the Space Domain.
  5. Changing Demographics. Every generation of enlisted, officer, and civilian that joins the Army brings with them a technology bias (sometimes preferring and sometimes eschewing automation and technology).  Examine how the Army should invest in technology that will both enable and appeal to the changing demographics and technology proficiency in the Army.
  6. Protecting Trade Secrets. In 2018, the estimated economic loss to PRC intellectual property theft was over $600 billion. A 2019 survey of U.S. corporations assessed that 20% of corporations experienced intellectual property by the PRC in the last year. Examine if the United States is in a post-intellectual property protection world and what must be done to protect intellectual property.
  7. Geographic Net Assessment. Examine how the U.S. Army should array and safeguard emerging technology, beyond merely investing in “more” technology, to offset and maintain overmatch of the overt implementation of adversary artificial intelligence and automation technologies.
  8. Applied Strategic Art. Examine how the U.S. Army should optimize Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance sensors to contend with threats and challenges across the spectrum of conflict while balancing limited resources dedicated to both Army modernization and its enduring global commitments.
  9. Applied Strategic Art. Examine how the U.S. Army integrate and employ artificial intelligence-enabled technologies to support mission command at multiple echelons with greater speed, precision, and accuracy without cultivating risk for the command.
  10. Applied Strategic Art. Identify the implications of the anticipated application of machine learning and artificial intelligence to the intelligence cycle and predictive intelligence analysis training and examine how they should be accounted for.
  11. Strategic Forecasting. Examine how he U.S. Army can reconcile the integration of artificial intelligence to short the “senor-to-shooter” timeline against near-peer adversaries with the moral and ethical implication of movement toward an automated targeting process.
  12. Strategic Forecasting. Explore the implications of for the future of the U.S. Army warfighting efforts given the increasing global proliferation of technological advances.
  13. Strategic Forecasting. As the U.S. prepares a force to support Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) by 2028, and fully operational in MDO by 2035, examine how it can ensure it maintains an ability to deter across a continuum of competition featuring adversaries who operate in the “Gray Zone” or employ “systems-based” operational concepts below the threshold of large-scale ground combat operations.
  14. Industrial/Enterprise Management, Leadership, and Innovation. Examine the implications of the U.S. Army’s movement towards large-scale ground combat operations on commanders’ force employment decisions given the emergence of precision targeting and international society’s concomitant delegitimization of state-based conflict.
  15. Industrial/Enterprise Management, Leadership, and Innovation. Examine how the U.S. Army can posture to support the Public Affairs and Information Operations, Information Warfare, and Information Maneuver necessary to maintain sustained political will – including recruitment and retention efforts – during large-scale ground combat operations.

Glossary of Terms and Acronyms

5G Fifth generation technology standard for cellular networks
A2AD Anti-Access and Area Denial
ADA Air Defense Artillery
AOC Area of Concentration
AOR Area of Responsibility
APB Acquisition Program Baseline
APS Army Prepositioned Stocks
ARCYBER United States Army Cyber Command
ASCC Army Service Component Command
ASOS Army Support to Other Services
BCT Brigade Combat Team
BMD Ballistic Missile Defense
C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
CASA Central Asia/South Asia
CFT Cross-Functional Team
COIN Counterinsurgency
CONUS Continental United States
CSA Chief of Staff of the Army
CT Counterterrorism
CWMD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
DA Department of the Army
DOD Department of Defense
DOS Department of State
DOTMLPF-P Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
DSCA Defense Support of Civil Authorities
EAB Echelon Above Brigade
EU European Union
FDO Flexible Deterrent Options
FDR Foreign Disaster Relief
FHA Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
FID Foreign Internal Defense
FVEY Five Eyes – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States
FY Fiscal Year
GCC Geographic Combatant Command
HA Humanitarian Assistance
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JFLCC Joint Force Land Component Command
JGSDF Japan Ground Self Defense Force
JIIM Joint, Intergovernmental, Interagency, and Multinational
JTF Joint Task Force
KSIL Key Strategic Issues List
MAIS Major Acquisition Information Systems
MASCAL Mass Casualty
MDAP Major Defense Acquisition Programs
MDO Multi-Domain Operations
MDTF Multi-Domain Task Force
MFGI Mobilization Force Generation Installation
MOS Military Occupational Specialty
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS National Defense Strategy
NEO Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
OCONUS Outside the Contiguous United States
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PME Professional Military Education
PPP Power Projection Platform
PRC People’s Republic of China
RCCTO Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office
ROK Republic of Korea
SDDC Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SECARMY Secretary of the Army
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SFA Security Force Assistance
SFAB Security Force Assistance Brigade
SOF Special Operations Forces
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UGF Underground Facilities
US United States
USARAF United States Army Africa
USARCENT United States Army Central
USAREUR United States Army Europe
USARNORTH United States Army North
USARPAC United States Army Pacific
USARSOUTH United States Army South
USASMDC United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command
USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command
USAWC United States Army War College
USCENTCOM United States Central Command
USEUCOM United States European Command
USG United States Government
USINDOPACOM United States Indo-Pacific Command
USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command
VEO Violent Extremist Organization
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WPS Women, Peace, and Security
5G Fifth generation technology standard for cellular networks
A2AD Anti-Access and Area Denial
ADA Air Defense Artillery
AOC Area of Concentration
AOR Area of Responsibility
APB Acquisition Program Baseline
APS Army Prepositioned Stocks
ARCYBER United States Army Cyber Command
ASCC Army Service Component Command
ASOS Army Support to Other Services
BCT Brigade Combat Team
BMD Ballistic Missile Defense
C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
CASA Central Asia/South Asia
CFT Cross-Functional Team
COIN Counterinsurgency
CONUS Continental United States
CSA Chief of Staff of the Army
CT Counterterrorism
CWMD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
DA Department of the Army
DOD Department of Defense
DOS Department of State
DOTMLPF-P Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
DSCA Defense Support of Civil Authorities
EAB Echelon Above Brigade
EU European Union
FDO Flexible Deterrent Options
FDR Foreign Disaster Relief
FHA Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
FID Foreign Internal Defense
FVEY Five Eyes – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States
FY Fiscal Year
GCC Geographic Combatant Command
HA Humanitarian Assistance
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JFLCC Joint Force Land Component Command
JGSDF Japan Ground Self Defense Force
JIIM Joint, Intergovernmental, Interagency, and Multinational
JTF Joint Task Force
KSIL Key Strategic Issues List
MAIS Major Acquisition Information Systems
MASCAL Mass Casualty
MDAP Major Defense Acquisition Programs
MDO Multi-Domain Operations
MDTF Multi-Domain Task Force
MFGI Mobilization Force Generation Installation
MOS Military Occupational Specialty
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS National Defense Strategy
NEO Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
OCONUS Outside the Contiguous United States
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PME Professional Military Education
PPP Power Projection Platform
PRC People’s Republic of China
RCCTO Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office
ROK Republic of Korea
SDDC Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SECARMY Secretary of the Army
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SFA Security Force Assistance
SFAB Security Force Assistance Brigade
SOF Special Operations Forces
TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UGF Underground Facilities
US United States
USARAF United States Army Africa
USARCENT United States Army Central
USAREUR United States Army Europe
USARNORTH United States Army North
USARPAC United States Army Pacific
USARSOUTH United States Army South
USASMDC United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command
USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command
USAWC United States Army War College
USCENTCOM United States Central Command
USEUCOM United States European Command
USG United States Government
USINDOPACOM United States Indo-Pacific Command
USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command
VEO Violent Extremist Organization
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WPS Women, Peace, and Security