Study of Internal Conflict

This page captures research and analysis by SSI professors, USAWC faculty and students, and research assistants into the causes and outcomes of internal conflicts since 1945 as part of the ongoing Study of Internal Conflict (SOIC). Research and analysis will also include topics in Unconventional and Irregular Warfare.

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Study of Internal Conflict

This page captures research and analysis by SSI professors, USAWC faculty and students, and research assistants into the causes and outcomes of internal conflicts since 1945 as part of the ongoing Study of Internal Conflict (SOIC). Research and analysis will also include topics in Unconventional and Irregular Warfare. 

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Reports & Monographs

Recommendations for Success in Afghanistan

Recommendations for Success in Afghanistan
By Dr. M. Chris Mason
 

Trending Topics 

The War in Afghanistan Is Not Over

By Dr. M. Chris Mason

“The Taliban have control over 32 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. But one, Panjshir, is firmly in government hands, and a second is contested, with at least three districts retaken by Northern Resistance forces on August 20. We should not as a nation be rushing to raise the white flag of surrender to the Taliban and throw our Afghan allies under the bus before the Taliban even get the flagpole erected and the bus started. Under both international law and the Afghan Constitution, the lawful President of Afghanistan is now …”

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COIN Doctrine Is Wrong

By Dr. M. Chris Mason

“Counterinsurgency does not increase the legitimacy of, or support for, central governments engaged in internal conflicts. Recent research shows quantifiable degrees of government legitimacy, national identity, and population security are necessary precursors and accurate predictors of a government’s ability to outlast a civil uprising. Because the first two predictors—government legitimacy and national identity—can be measured and do not increase during a conflict, the probability of government failure in most cases can be accurately predicted when the conflict starts.”

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Viet Cong
Nation Building is an Oxymoron

By Dr. M. Chris Mason

“Nations are not built. They form almost imperceptibly from within over long spans of historical time. Since the end of World War II, no country that was not a nation has ever won a counterinsurgency or suppressed a civil war. Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency is wrong because it is premised on the false assumption that support for an existing government can be increased during a civil war/insurgency as a result of the counterinsurgents’ actions. There is no historical evidence to support this assumption.”

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The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan

By Dr. M. Chris Mason

“The wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan were lost before they began, not on the battlefields, where the United States won every tactical engagement, but at the strategic level of war. In each case, the U.S. Government attempted to create a Western-style democracy in countries which were decades at least away from being nations with the sociopolitical capital necessary to sustain democracy and, most importantly, accept it as a legitimate source of governance…”

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COIN Doctrine is Wrong
Podcast by Dr. M. Chris Mason Listen Now Podcast

Back to the Future: Getting Special Forces Ready for Great-Power Competition
Barnett S. Koven, Dr. M. Chris Mason Read Now

Strategic Insights: Better Late Than Never
By Dr. M. Chris Mason Read Now

Smart Talk: The way forward in Afghanistan not a simple path
Podcast by Dr. M. Chris Mason Listen Now Podcast

 

Backgrounders

“The Fog of Peace,”
Foreign Policy
By Thomas H. Johnson and Dr. M. Chris Mason

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 “The Will to Fight – Reviewing
the FID Mission,” Strategic Insights 
By Dr. M. Chris Mason

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 “Obama’s Indecent Interval,”
Foreign Policy 
By Thomas H. Johnson and Dr. M. Chris Mason

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