Peace and Unity: China’s Growing Military Footprint in Tanzania

Peace Unity-2024

The July and August 2024 Sino-Tanzanian training exercise Peace Unity-2024 (和平团结-2024) provided the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) an opportunity to apply its growing joint expeditionary capability, while also strengthening its relationship with a key strategic partner on the African continent.¹ Commemorating 60 years of bilateral relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Tanzania, the exercise included antipiracy and counterterrorism training events that enabled the PLA to train in Tanzania’s complex terrain alongside elements of the Tanzanian People’s Defense Forces (TPDF) and the Armed Forces for the Defense of Mozambique. Although not the first time PLA units have traveled to Tanzania for combined training events, the Peace Unity-2024 exercise represented a significant increase in scope and scale as PLA Army (PLAA), PLA Joint Logistics Support Force (JLSF), and PLA Information Support Force (ISF) elements were deployed to Africa using multiple methods of transportation, including PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLA Navy (PLAN) strategic lift, such as the Y-20 strategic transport aircraft and Type 071 (Yuzhao)-class amphibious landing dock vessels. The utility Tanzania provides for PLA training and the continued expansion of Beijing’s defense ties with Dodoma represent a challenge to US efforts to counter PLA operational readiness and strengthen its military-to-military relationship with Tanzania.

Exercise Overview

According to PRC media, the Central Theater Command–led exercise comprised a “sea phase” and a “land phase” lasting from July 29 to August 11. Two PLAA general officers—Central Theater Command Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Huang Xucong and Deputy Chief of Staff Major General Ye Dabin—served as the head of China’s military delegation and its exercise director, respectively.²

During the sea phase, a PLAN guided-missile destroyer and two Yuzhao-class amphibious landing docks from the PLA Southern Theater Command (figure 1) conducted maritime patrols, search and rescue, and live-fire training off the coast of Mozambique alongside Tanzanian and Mozambican counterparts. Meanwhile, PLAN Marine Corps special operations “frog men” (蛙人部队) drilled maritime raid operations and three-dimensional shore landings.³

Figure 1. A PLA Navy Yuzhao-class amphibious landing dock, Wuzhi Shan (foreground), and a guided-missile destroyer (background)
(Source: Military Fans World Channel (@ChineseArmy), 全程高能！解放军发布“和平团结-2024” 联合演习纪实大片！看蛙人部队从海上渗透! [High-energy! The PLA releases a documentary on “Peace Unity-2024” joint exercise! Watch the frogmen infiltrate from the sea!] (China: Military Fans World Channel, August 13, 2024), YouTube video,

.)

The land phase took place at the PRC-built combined training center in Mapinga, Tanzania. It centered on counterterrorism operations and was divided into four stages: joint specialty training (联合专业), combined command, tactical training, and live-fire drills. During the joint specialty training component, units from the TPDF and the PLA 82nd Group Army (figure 2) participated in an equipment-instruction module. PLAA soldiers displayed and provided instruction on more than 23 different types of weapons and equipment, including small arms, micro unmanned aerial vehicles, and various engineering, reconnaissance, communication, and infantry vehicles. As part of this event, both sides trained together on counterterrorism concepts and modern battlefield tactics, techniques, and procedures.⁴

Figure 2. Soldiers from the PLA 82nd Group Army standing in formation
(Source: “直击‘和平团结-2024’ | 中坦联合军演，中方陆上参演部队展开立体跨境投送” [Live coverage of Peace Unity-2024 | China-Tanzania joint military exercise, Chinese participating land units conducted three-dimensional cross-border delivery], 中国军网 [PLA Daily] (website), July 26, 2024, http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16327317.html)

Throughout the combined command phase (联合指挥阶段), TPDF and PLAA commanders coordinated and shared operational planning and decision-making responsibilities. PRC media commended the ability of commanders on both sides to solve complex problems and synchronize command-and-control activities. Lastly, the tactical training and live-fire drills involved mixed-task organizations between PLAA and TPDF soldiers to increase coordination. Army special operations forces drilled deep reconnaissance, direct action, and decapitation operations while soldiers conducted combined arms maneuvers in an urban environment to eliminate terrorist threats. Additionally, JLSF hospital units rehearsed battlefield first aid, provided instruction on lifesaving skills to TPDF medical personnel, and administered vaccines to Tanzanian locals.⁵

Participating Chinese ground components, referenced as a battalion-size element, all came from the PLA Central Theater Command and were transported using two PLA Air Force Y-20 transport aircraft (figure 3) and two PLA Navy Type 071 (Yuzhao)-class Type-071 landing platform dock vessels. Based on official PRC media, the following units deployed elements to Tanzania.

• PLAA 82nd Group Army, 127th Medium Combined Arms Brigade⁶
• PLAA 82nd Group Army, Special Operations Brigade
• Joint Logistics Support Force, Central Theater Command General Hospital
• Information Support Force, Central Theater Command Information Communications Regiment⁷

Figure 3. PLA soldiers boarding a Y-20
(Source: “直击‘和平团结-2024’ | 中坦联合军演，中方陆上参演部队展开立体跨境投送” [Live coverage of Peace Unity-2024 | China-Tanzania joint military exercise, Chinese participating land units conducted three-dimensional cross-border delivery], 中国军网 [PLA Daily] (website), July 26, 2024, http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16327317.html)

China’s Expanding Relations and Future Opportunities with Tanzania

On the surface, Peace Unity-2024 benefited China’s and Tanzania’s mutual interest of combined counterterrorism operations. According to official PRC media, the exercise increased both militaries’ ability to conduct counterterrorism operations in coordination, opening a “new chapter in their shared peace and unity.”⁸ However, the military implications extend far beyond the immediate gains in interoperability. Since at least 1965, the PLA has consolidated its military foothold in Tanzania, imbuing a pro-PLA and pro-Chinese Communist Party sentiment through military aid and PLA-sponsored professional military education such as Tanzanian naval officers training at the PLA’s Dalian Naval Academy.⁹ Additionally, a TPDF junior officer serving as the Peace Unity-2024 exercise translator commented on how he had studied in China for four years; two TPDF medical officers had studied in China for four to six years.¹⁰ Although professional military education serves as a significant medium for fostering partnership, bilateral training and exercises have historically furthered China’s and Tanzania’s military cooperation.

The first bilateral training exercise between the PLA and TPDF was Beyond-2014 (超越-2014) where contingents of both militaries’ marine corps participated in a joint counterterrorism exercise.¹¹ Five years later, Sincere Partners-2019 (真诚伙伴-2019) was held in Tanzania between December 2019 and January 2020. This exercise marked the first bilateral training between the PLA and TPDF to incorporate units from the PLAA, namely more than 300 soldiers from the Eastern Theater Command’s 73rd Group Army. This training iteration was the longest to date and encompassed a command post exercise; civilian search and rescue; unmanned-aerial-vehicle tactics, techniques, and procedures; and combat skills such as small-arms marksmanship, demolition operations, and military operations in urban terrain.¹² Lastly, Beyond-2023 (超越-2023) served as the continuation of Beyond-2014, which included both countries’ marine corps and reinforced many of the same training elements highlighted during the 2014 exercise.¹³

Although Peace Unity-2024 was shorter than previous joint exercises, it patterns a continuous military relationship between the PLA and TPDF and an upward trend in PLAA exercise participation. It also affirms a wider strategic partnership between the PRC and Tanzania. Much of the Chinese equipment used throughout the instructional component is fielded by the PLA as well as the People’s Armed Police. The TPDF’s familiarization with this equipment may lead to PRC arms sales for TPDF regional security. Although foreign military sales are not unprecedented between the two countries, China’s arms sales indicate a broader strategy to bolster economic and security ties with African nations like Tanzania.¹⁴ Similarly, the JLSF’s humanitarian medical aid to the Tanzanian people is representative of China’s employment of “vaccine diplomacy.”¹⁵

The PLA and the TPDFs’ increased security cooperation is not surprising. The PRC’s military engagement with Tanzania is predicated on its long-standing economic ties with the country. Chinese economic investment in Tanzania traces back 60 years to when the two countries first established relations, heralding a significant economic partnership.¹⁶ As of quarter four, 2022, Chinese investment projects in Tanzania totaled $9.6 billion, exceeding the United Kingdom and United States in that order.¹⁷ Strong economic ties will likely lead to Tanzania’s increased cooperation as evidenced by Chinese investment in the Solomon Islands.¹⁸

Tanzania’s access to sea lines of communication along the Indian Ocean has long made it an object of consideration for one of the PLA’s next naval installations.¹⁹ As China’s and Tanzania’s economic and defense relationships grow, so do Chinese opportunities to solicit Tanzania for the establishment of a formal security agreement, like the one in the Solomon Islands, that would allow for the prospect of a permanent military or law-enforcement presence in the strategically located country.

Tanzania’s Significance for PLA Training

Peace Unity-2024 instantiates an improvement of the PLA’s expeditionary capabilities, namely its ability to project infantry, armor, artillery, and support units across a vast distance beyond China’s borders. Eagle Strike-2024 (雄鹰突击-2024)—the bilateral exercise between the PLA and Armed Forces of Belarus conducted prior to Peace Unity-2024—also displayed the PLA’s strategic force projection capabilities to Belarus via the Y-20.²⁰ However, Peace Unity-2024 represents a greater deployment distance using both strategic sealift and airlift capabilities. The employment of the Yuzhao-class landing ships to transport a large tranche of the participating PLA Force to Dar es Salaam demonstrates China’s growing joint force-projection capabilities, requisite for any major campaign.

The integration of general hospital and information-communication-regiment elements is also significant. Theater-command general hospitals are medical treatment facilities subordinate to their respective theater SJLSF Joint Logistics Support Centers. Moreover, information communication regiments and brigades are geographically distributed support units that were once subordinate to the Strategic Support Force (SSF), responsible for establishing communication networks and network defense for Theater Commands.²¹ Following the SSF’s restructuring in early 2024, the same units are now likely subordinate to the newly established Information Support Force (ISF信息支援部队). Given the information communication regiment’s responsibility for Theater Command communications support, its participation in Peace Unity-2024 signifies the Central Theater Command’s direct command and control of the exercise. Therefore, Peace Unity-2024 was not only an opportunity for the PLA to train in combined operations with the TPDF, but also instantiates real-world experience of the PLA conducting joint operations training abroad between the PLA Navy, Air Force, Army, and “strategic arms,” such as JLSF and ISF, under the unified command of a single theater.

Conclusion

Peace Unity-2024 was the fourth exercise between the PLA and TPDF centered on security cooperation. It was also the second exercise to feature PLAA units, as well as strategic sea and air-lift assets, to project PLAA forces across their longest distance to date. The long-established and continuously growing relationship between the PLA and TPDF will facilitate PLA access to strategic installations in Tanzania and additional PLA land-domain training. The unfamiliar nature of Tanzania also offers the elements of ambiguity and unpredictability that are characteristic of war. Thus, Tanzania serves as an ideal proving ground for the PLA to execute military essential tasks in land operations and to test its joint expeditionary capabilities in an operational environment well beyond its borders.

Although China characterizes its military relationship with the TPDF as unequivocally positive, TPDF engagements with United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) cast doubt on Tanzania’s total commitment to the PLA. For example, Tanzania’s military intelligence conference, cohosted with AFRICOM in spring 2024, along with bilateral training with US special operations forces and TPDF participation in the AFRICOM-hosted multilateral exercise Justified Accord 2024, demonstrates the TPDF’s valued cooperation with the United States and its regional partners.²² Tanzania’s balancing of its relationships with the PLA and the US military provides an opportunity for the United States to tilt the scale in its favor. Increasing military aid and the frequency and scale of bilateral exercises between US Army Southern European Task Force, Africa’s subordinate units, and the TPDF will bolster US military ties with Tanzania.

The United States must also pursue a deeper economic relationship with Tanzania. Tanzania’s geographic disposition, history of social stability, resource potential, and diverse investment landscape make it an ideal military and economic partner.²³ The United States must increase campaigning and foreign direct investment in Tanzania to pave the way for additional military activities.

At the strategic level, the advantage Tanzania poses for the PLA’s expansion and development as an expeditionary force cannot be underestimated. Although China will continue to leverage its strategic partnership with Tanzania for increasingly advanced military training and access, the United States can counteract PRC influence through demonstrating a partnership more valuable than what the PRC can provide. In doing so, US military activities can provide legitimacy across the Tanzanian security sector and stimulus for US ally and partner investments in security and the economy that minimize China’s ever-growing footprint in the East African country.

Jake Vartanian

Jake Vartanian is a military analyst at the US Army War College China Landpower Studies Center. His primary research topics include People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Army operational and tactical capabilities, PLA joint operations, and Chinese strategic landpower. He has worked as a language-enabled all-source analyst at the US Army National Ground Intelligence Center, with a focus on PLA Army capabilities across each war-fighting function, PLA joint operations, and People’s Republic of China military engagements with countries in its periphery. Vartanian is a graduate of the US Defense Language Institute Mandarin Chinese basic course.

Endnotes

1. The Swahili name for the exercise is Amani Umoja-2024. Return to text.
2. Li Rui李岩, “中部战区部队结束在非演习，三位将军出席仪式” [Troops from the Central Theater Command concluded their exercises in Africa, and three generals attended the ceremony], Sina (website), last modified August 14, 2024, https://finance.sina.com.cn/wm/2024-08-14/doc-inciruhu2242933.shtml?cref=cj; and “直击“和平团结-2024” | 陆上方向演习结束，中坦两军参演部队举行闭幕式” [Live broadcast: “Peace and Unity-2024” | The land-based exercise ends with a closing ceremony], Paper (website), last modified August 10, 2024, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_28388351. Return to text.
3. Global Times-Global Network 环球时报-环球网, “和平团结-2024联合演习开幕，军事专家解读三大亮点” [Peace Unity-2024 joint exercise commences, military experts explain three significant highlights], 环球网 [Huanqiu.cn] (website), July 30, 2024, https://m.huanqiu.com/article/4Ip5GWMNbew; Lei Zhao, “PLA Soldiers Acclimatize Themselves before Joint Exercise in Tanzania,” China Military (website), July 29, 2024, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/16327550.html; and Military Fans World Channel (@ChineseArmy), 全程高能！解放军发布“和平团结-2024”联合演习纪实大片！看蛙人部队从海上渗透! [High-energy! The PLA releases a documentary on “Peace Unity-2024” joint exercise! Watch the frogmen infiltrate from the sea!] (China: Military Fans World Channel, August 13, 2024), YouTube video,
   . Return to text.
4. Chinese Embassy in Tanzania, “驻坦桑尼亚大使吕友清出席坦军综合训练中心奠基仪式” [China’s ambassador to Tanzania, Lu Youqing, holds a founding ceremony for the Tanzanian People’s Defense Forces’ (TPDF) Comprehensive Training Center], China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (website), January 18, 2017, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web//gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/fz_677316/1206_678574/1206x2_678594/201701/t20170118_9325873.shtml; Noon Defense and Military Peace Unity-2024; Wang Jinzhi 王金志, “和平团结-2024 联合演戏开幕，军事专家解读三大亮点” [Peace Unity-2024 joint exercise commences, military experts explain three significant highlights], 新华网 [Xinhua News] (website), July 31, 2024, http://www.news.cn/milpro/20240731/311800050047461eab5cbcd5490cae51/c.html; China Daily, “和平团结-2024联合演习：中坦陆上方向演习结束，两军参演部队举行闭幕式.” China Daily (website), August 13, 2024, https://cn.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202408/13/WS66bb1134a310054d254ecaba.html; Global Times-Global Network, “Peace Unity-2024 joint exercise”; and Yang Danpu 杨丹谱, “中部战区参加和平团结-2024联合演习纪实” [On the Spot Report of the Central Theater Command’s Participation in Peace Unity-2024 Joint Exercise], 中央电视台 [CCTV] (website), August 15, 2024, https://military.cctv.com/2024/08/15/ARTI8Q5PgH2uj0LOrOObOhiF240815.shtml. Return to text.
5. Yang, “On the Spot Report”; “军事报道 和平团结-2024 联合演习 中坦陆上参演部队展开全员全装联合战术协同训练” [Military report Peace Unity-2024 joint exercise PLA-TPDF land units initiate comprehensive combined tactical training], 中央电视台 [CCTV] (website), August 9, 2024, https://tv.cctv.com/2024/08/09/VIDEM3b07DTEsnQUH8KVV0xM240809.shtml; Yu Han 于涵, “和平团结-2024”陆上参演部队合帐练兵提升联合指挥能力” [Peace Unity-2024 participating land units enhance combined command capabilities], 中文网 [China Daily] (website), August 9, 2024, http://cn.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202408/06/WS66b228f7a310054d254ebbb2.html; Military Fans World Channel (@ChineseArmy), High-energy!; and “和平团结-2024联合演习 中方出动营级规模地面力量参演” [Peace Unity-2024 joint exercise, PLA component dispatches a battalion-size ground force to participate], 中央电视台 [CCTV] (website), August 29, 2024, https://news.cnr.cn/native/gd/kx/20240829/t20240829_526878055.shtml. Return to text.
6. The 127th Medium Combined Arms Brigade was not explicitly mentioned, though the presence of ZTL-11 assault guns and ZBL-08 and ZBL-09 infantry fighting vehicles indicates elements of this brigade participated in this exercise. The 127th Medium Combined Arms Brigade is the only brigade within the 82nd Group Army to field such equipment. Also noteworthy, the 127th Brigade was also the force provider for the UN Mission in South Sudan Peace Keeping Operation in 2017 and has therefore previously deployed to Africa. Return to text.
7. Yang Danpu, “On the Spot Report”; Yu, “Peace Unity-2024”; Military Fans World Channel (@ChineseArmy), High-energy!; Noon Defense and Military Peace Unity-2024; Yingxin Li 李迎新 et al., “直击‘和平团结-2024’ | 中坦联合军演，中方陆上参演部队展开立体跨境投送” [Live coverage of Peace Unity-2024 | China-Tanzania joint military exercise, Chinese participating land units conducted three-dimensional cross-border delivery], 中国军网 [PLA Daily] (website), July 26, 2024, http://www.81.cn/yw_208727/16327317.html; and CCTV (@cctvch), “ ‘中坦 和平团结-2024’联合军演 中方陆上参演部队相继展开立体跨境投送’| CCTV中文” [“China-Tanzania Peace Unity-2024” joint exercise PLA participating land units carry out three-dimensional cross-border delivery| CCTV Chinese] (China: CCTV, July 29, 2024), YouTube video,
   . Return to text.
8. Yang, “On the Spot Report.” Return to text.
9. Paul Nantulya, Chinese Professional Military Education for Africa: Key Influence and Strategy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, July 21, 2023); and CIA Intelligence Directorate, Intelligence Memorandum: Chinese Communist Economic and Military Aid to Tanzania: A Case Study (Langley, VA: CIA Intelligence Directorate, July 1971). Return to text.
10. Military World Fans Channel (@ChineseArmy), High-energy! Return to text.
11. Chinese Embassy in Tanzania, “驻坦桑尼亚大使吕友清观摩超越—2014中坦两军联合训练” [Chinese Ambassador to Tanzania, Lu Youqing observes Beyond-2014 PLA-TPDF joint training], Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (website), November 15, 2014, https://www.mfa.gov.cn/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/fz_677316/1206_678574/1206x2_678594/201411/t20141115_9325575.shtml. Return to text.
12. Ye Qinci 叶钦赐, “真诚伙伴-2019中坦两军联合训练开始” [Sincere Partners-2019 joint training commences], Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China (website), December 28, 2019, http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jsxd/ly/4857680.html; “真诚伙伴-2019 中坦两军联训落幕” [Sincere Partners-2019 PLA-TPDF joint training concludes], 解放军报 [PLA Daily] (website), January 21, 2020, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2020-01/21/content_252666.htm; and “军事报道 中坦“真诚伙伴-2019”联合训练结束” [Military Report PLA-TPDF Sincere Partners-2019 joint training concludes], 中央电视台 [CCTV] (website), January 17, 2020, https://tv.cctv.com/2020/01/17/VIDE1BzGUmWNQm6LL3lGALSc200117.shtml. Return to text.
13. Chen Yunpeng 陈运鹏, Lu Linji 陆琳骥, and Chen Xi 陈曦, “中坦超越-2023海军陆战队联训:砺实战精兵 谱交流新篇” [PLA-TPDF Beyond-2023 Marine Corps joint training: Tempers elite troops for real combat and opens a new chapter in military exchanges], China Ministry of Defense (website), September 21, 2023, http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jsxd/ly/16253416.html. Return to text.
14. Jevans Nyabiage, “China Arms Sales Cement Its Economic and Security Ties in Africa: Study,” South China Morning Post (website), March 14, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3213458/china-arms-sales-cement-its-economic-and-security-ties-africa-study. Return to text.
15. “新冠疫情：中国加码全球疫苗供应 “疫苗外交”再升温” [COVID-19: China raises the quota of global vaccine supply, “vaccine diplomacy” is on the rise], BBC News Chinese (website), August 11, 2011, https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/world-58158134. Return to text.
16. Wang Jingjing 王晶晶, “坦桑尼亚副总统：持续扩大坦中两国投资和贸易规模” [Vice President of Tanzania: Continue to expand the scale of investment and trade between Tanzania and China], 新华丝路 [Xinhua Silk Road] (website), March 28, 2024, https://www.imsilkroad.com/news/p/520136.html. Return to text.
17. Jacob Mosenda, “China Out to Cement Status as Biggest Foreign Investor in Tanzania,” Citizen (website), March 21, 2024, https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/china-out-to-cement-status-as-biggest-foreign-investor-in-tanzania-4563424. Return to text.
18. For detailed information on Chinese foreign direct investment in the Solomon Islands, see “对外投资合作国别（地区）指南, 所罗门群岛” [Country (region) guide to foreign investment and cooperation, Solomon Islands], in Foreign Direct Investment Report 2022 (Beijing: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 2022). Return to text.
19. Eric A. Miller, “More Chinese Military Bases in Africa: A Question of When, Not If,” Foreign Policy (website), August 16, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/16/china-military-bases-africa-navy-pla-geopolitics-strategy/. Return to text.
20. Wang, “Military Experts Explain.” Return to text.
21. “七大军区11个总医院，军改后都划入联勤保障部队，只有一个例外” [11 General hospitals under the seven major military districts are incorporated into the Joint Logistics Support Force after the military reform, only one exception], 袁老师说历史 [Mr. Yuan talks about history] (blog), May 25, 2024, https://www.163.com/dy/article/J3C1GH060543GX5X.html; Wang Jia 王佳, “战略支援部队某信息通信团官兵发挥能动性和创造力” [Soldiers of an information communication regiment of the Strategic Support Force exercise initiative and creativity], 解放军报 [PLA Daily] (website), February 9, 2021, http://www.81.cn/zz_208563/9983780.html; J. Michael Dahm, “A Disturbance in the Force: The Reorganization of People’s Liberation Army Command and Elimination of China’s Strategic Support Force,” Jamestown Foundation (website), April 26, 2024, https://jamestown.org/program/a-disturbance-in-the-force-the-reorganization-of-peoples-liberation-army-command-and-elimination-of-chinas-strategic-support-force/; and Zhao Xiaojun 赵骁军, Shang Chenglong 商成隆, and An Puzhong 安普忠, “战略支援部队某旅建设 ‘智慧仓库’ 提升保障质效” [A brigade of the Strategic Support Force built a “smart warehouse” to improve the quality and efficiency of support], Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China (website), November 25, 2023, http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/wzll/zlzybd/16269087.html. Return to text.
22. United States Africa Command Public Affairs, “U.S. and Tanzania Co-Host Military Intelligence Conference,” press release, May 9, 2024, https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/35471/us-and-tanzania-co-host-military-intelligence-conference; United States Africa Command Public Affairs, “U.S. Africa Command Special Operations Forces Train alongside Tanzanian Partners,” press release, November 21, 2022, https://www.africom.mil/article/34917/us-africa-command-special-operations-forces-train-alongside-tanzanian-partners; and “U.S. Africa Command Spearheads Multinational Military Exercises to Boost Global Security and Cooperation,” US Embassy Dar Es Salaam (website), April 4, 2024, https://tz.usembassy.gov/u-s-africa-command-spearheads-multinational-military-exercises-to-boost-global-security-and-cooperation/. Return to text.
23. “Tanzania Rare Earth and Critical Minerals,” International Trade Administration (website), August 24, 2023, https://www.trade.gov/market-intelligence/tanzania-rare-earth-and-critical-minerals; CIA Intelligence Directorate, A Case Study; and “China-Tanzania Business Forum,” Tanzania Investment Centre (website), March 27, 2024, https://www.tic.go.tz/events/china-tanzania-business-forum. Return to text.

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