North Korea in Ukraine: Analyzing Authoritarian Cooperation

The deployment of North Korean forces to Ukraine marks a critical inflection point in global security dynamics, challenging long-held assumptions about the limits of cooperation between authoritarian states. This development, unprecedented in its implications, reveals even absent formal alliances or ideological cohesion, the strategic realignment among authoritarian states has the potential to reshape the global order and future conflicts. This shift in global security dynamics warrants closer scrutiny both of North Korea’s immediate motivations, such as its motivation to gain operational experience under modern warfare conditions, and the nature and depth of the alignment between Russia and North Korea that extends beyond short-term, transactional cooperation. By examining North Korea’s intervention, potential future developments in bilateral ties, and the broader regional and global consequences of these dynamics, this analysis underscores the urgency of reevaluating simplistic narratives about authoritarian unity. The strategic realignment among authoritarian actors, though far from the ideological fraternity implied by the term “axis,” poses a significant challenge to the global balance of power and demands a clear-eyed response.

North Korean Intervention in the Russia-Ukraine War

Since fall 2023, North Korea has supplied substantial materiel to Russia for the Russia-Ukraine War. North Korean shipments have included 122mm and 152mm artillery shells, Bulsae-4 antitank systems and missiles, M1989 Koksan 170mm self-propelled guns, improved 240mm multiple rocket launchers, and KN-23 solid-fueled tactical ballistic missiles, remnants of which have been found at or near Ukrainian targets.¹ To meet Russian demands, North Korea has significantly increased defense production while depleting its own strategic reserves. As of October 2024, North Korea reportedly maintained an ammunition stockpile sufficient to sustain a war on the Korean Peninsula for up to three months.² Since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine War, North Korea’s military factories have operated at full capacity, producing ammunition around the clock. By late September 2024, North Korea had shipped over 20,000 containers from the port of Rajin, carrying up to 9.4 million 152mm artillery shells.³ South Korean intelligence assessments suggest, if North Korea’s rate of export continues, it could affect the Korean People’s Army’s ability to sustain a conflict on the Korean Peninsula.⁴ In other words, North Korea is potentially compromising its own military readiness on the Korean Peninsula to support Russia’s needs in the Russia-Ukraine War.

The partnership soon evolved from arms shipments to the deployment of North Korean troops on the battlefield in fall 2024. Reports in October 2024 first indicated North Korean personnel were operating behind Russian lines to support launcher systems for KN-23 missiles.⁵ A week later, Russian Pacific Fleet landing ships and large transport aircraft from the Russian air force began transporting North Korean troops from Chongjin, Hamhung, and Musudan to Vladivostok.⁶ In November, up to 12,000 North Korean soldiers were reportedly undergoing training at five sites in Russia’s Eastern Military District.⁷ The first contingent of 2,600 soldiers, primarily special operations forces from the 11th Corps headquartered in Tŏkch’ŏn, was deployed to the heavily contested Kursk Oblast, where Ukrainian forces had established a foothold inside Russia.⁸ Known as the “Pok Pung [Storm] Corps,” the 11th Corps is North Korea’s premier special operations unit, comprising sniper, light infantry, and airborne brigades.⁹ Colonel General Kim Yong Bok, deputy chief of staff of the General Staff Department and former commander of the 11th Corps, also traveled to Russia to oversee the operations of the deployed North Korean units.¹⁰ These North Korean troops represented the first formal deployment of foreign soldiers in uniform to support Moscow in the Russia-Ukraine War, marking a significant development in the conflict’s internationalization.

North Korea’s intervention in the Russia-Ukraine War is driven by a convergence of strategic, operational, diplomatic, and economic objectives. First, Pyongyang is leveraging the Russia-Ukraine War as an opportunity to evaluate the performance of weapon systems it deems critical for the modernization of the Korean People’s Army. This objective has been underscored by the deployment of key munitions and personnel to the conflict. Specifically, Kim Jong-Un has likely prioritized assessments of the updated 240mm multiple launch rocket system and two new types of suicide drones. Ukrainian and South Korean intelligence confirm North Korea has supplied both 240mm multiple launch rocket systems and domestically produced 170mm self-propelled howitzers to Russia.¹¹ Kim personally oversaw multiple test firings of the updated 240mm multiple launch rocket system with improved rocket-shell guidance in February, April, May, and August 2024, and visited the production facility for the system’s transporter erector launchers in May 2024.¹² Kim Jong-Un’s sustained focus indicates North Korea is closely monitoring the system’s performance in combat. On October 18, 2024, South Korean intelligence confirmed Kim Jong Sik, first vice minister of the Munitions Industry Department and an important leader in Pyongyang’s missile development, visited a KN-23 (Hwasong-11Ga improved tactical ballistic missile) launch site near the Russia-Ukraine front line to provide on-site guidance alongside dozens of North Korean military officers.¹³

North Korea is also likely assessing its new combat drones in the conflict. Ri Chang Ho, director of the Reconnaissance General Bureau since 2022, is among the commanding officers sent to Russia.¹⁴ According to Yang Uk, a research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Ri likely directed the December 2022 drone operation that breached South Korean airspace over Seoul.¹⁵ Ri’s deployment to the Ukrainian battlefield suggests an effort to test and improve North Korea’s drone capabilities under combat conditions.¹⁶ Kim Jong-Un has, on multiple occasions, personally overseen the testing of two new suicide drone models—delta winged and cross winged—at Panghyon airfield in 2023 and 2024.¹⁷

Operationally, North Korean forces also stand to gain valuable combat experience from their deployment in Ukraine. Participating in a modern, high-intensity conflict allows North Korean troops to observe and adapt to emerging technologies, particularly the use of drones and precision fires by both Ukrainian and Russian forces. As mentioned, drone warfare is a relatively unknown quantity in North Korea, and the North Korean leadership considers exposure to drone warfare highly valuable. South Korean officials have also confirmed North Korean fighter pilots, trained to operate older aircraft such as the Su-25, MiG-23, and MiG-29, are undergoing training in Russia on more modern Russian platforms.¹⁸ Of course, the value of combat experience can only be realized if enough commanding officers and participating units survive the war to bring combat-related lessons back to North Korea. Notably, the deployment of special operations forces, designed to be more resilient and adaptable in extreme conditions, may be an intentional effort to ensure sufficient personnel endure the conflict to relay critical insights.

North Korea’s involvement in the Russia-Ukraine War also delivers critical diplomatic and economic benefits to the isolated North Korean regime. Russia has already demonstrated its willingness to shield North Korea from international pressure, most notably by vetoing a UN Security Council resolution to renew the Panel of Experts overseeing sanctions enforcement in March 2024.¹⁹ During his subsequent visit to Pyongyang, Vladimir Putin further condemned the international sanctions regime imposed on North Korea, likening North Korea’s economic struggles to the Siege of Leningrad.²⁰ Economically, the war has provided North Korea with access to essential resources, including deliveries of flour and corn in May 2024 and substantial illicit oil transfers amounting to over a million barrels since March 2024.²¹ Munition sales to Russia, estimated at $300 to $600 per shell, could earn North Korea $700 million to $1.4 billion—up to four times its total exports in 2022.²² Even after the war, Russia is likely to continue purchasing North Korean munitions to replenish Russian stockpiles, creating a long-term revenue stream. The influx of cash from Russia provides North Korea with an unprecedented ability to expand imports of consumer goods and industrial materials. Although economic gains from the Russia-Ukraine War will improve living conditions for North Koreans, the gains will also enable the regime to acquire advanced military technology for its aging force.

In the long term, North Korea’s alignment with Russia could yield other strategic dividends. A deepening military relationship with Moscow enhances Pyongyang’s leverage in future negotiations with the United States, particularly if Russia commits to closer relations or a formal alliance. North Korea may now also expect Russian military assistance in the event of a renewed conflict with South Korea. Additionally, Pyongyang seeks advanced military technologies from Russia, including fighter aircraft, air-defense systems, and surface-to-air and other ballistic missile technology. Such bilateral technology transfers would significantly strengthen North Korea’s conventional and strategic capabilities in a future war.

Conclusion

This article has highlighted the fact that growing strategic alignment among powerful authoritarian states can drive profound consequences on the battlefield. In the case of the Russia-Ukraine War, North Korean ammunition and personnel have played a key role in Russian sustainment. More broadly, North Korea’s potential willingness to degrade its own military readiness on the Korean Peninsula demonstrates how the bilateral partnership is increasingly built on mutual vulnerabilities and strategic trust rather than straightforward transactional exchanges.

North Korea’s deployments to Ukraine also entail potential domestic political costs. Despite Pyongyang’s efforts to suppress information domestically, South Korean intelligence reports suggest public discontent is apparent inside North Korea, with the reports including accounts of grieving families following the departure of North Korean forces.²³ Speculation has emerged North Korean unrest contributed to the need for the Fourth Conference of Battalion Commanders to reinforce internal discipline. The domestic risks further demonstrate North Korea’s willingness to bear costs for Russia, challenging dominant narratives about the limitations of authoritarian state cooperation.

Looking ahead, increased specialization within the North Korea–Russia military relationship would signal deeper strategic trust and open new avenues for cooperation in external security matters. This cooperation could follow the Russia-Belarus model, whereby Belarus transfers Soviet-era equipment, which Russia then modernizes for both states. Such specialization and integration create synergies and heighten the costs if cooperation is disrupted, underscoring the level of strategic trust involved. To counter authoritarian collusion and mitigate its risks, analyzing metrics of strategic trust is critical, enabling a clearer understanding of the partnership’s trajectory. Only through this analytical approach can the United States and its allies effectively anticipate and address the growing threat posed by authoritarian cooperation.

Jake Rinaldi
Dr. Jake Rinaldi is a defense analyst in the China Landpower Studies Center within the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College. He holds a PhD and an MPhil from the University of Cambridge, where his doctoral dissertation examined China–North Korea military relations, and his master’s degree focused on China’s nuclear forces.

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Endnotes

1. National Intelligence Service, “북한 특수부대 러-우크라 전쟁 참전 확인” [North Korean Special Forces Participation in the Russia-Ukraine War Confirmed], press release, October 18, 2024, https://www.nis.go.kr/CM/1_4/view.do?seq=320; “軍 北,최장 3개월 전쟁 물자 확보... 군수공장 최대 가동中’ ” “Military: ‘North Korea Secures up to 3 Months of War Materiel... Defense Factories Operating at Full Capacity,’ ” The Chosun Ilbo, October 23, 2024, https://www.chosun.com/politics/north_korea/2024/10/23/HZGMITAUDNDWJOKA4GFZJ73RPM/; and Gim Yong-rae김용래, “FT ‘북, 러에 자주포·방사포 70문 지원…일부 쿠르스크로’ ” [FT: ‘North Korea Provides 70 Artillery and Multiple Rocket Launchers to Russia… Some Sent to Kursk’], Yonhap News Agency, November 17, 2024, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20241117009600009. Return to text.
2. “North Korea Secures.” Return to text.
3. “North Korea Secures.” Return to text.
4. “North Korea Secures.” Return to text.
5. Emma Graham-Harrison and Justin McCurry, “North Koreans Deployed Alongside Russian Troops in Ukraine, Sources Say,” The Guardian, October 10, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/oct/10/north-korea-engineers-deployed-russia-ukraine. Return to text.
6. National Intelligence Service, “Special Forces Participation.” Return to text.
7. “Russian Paratroopers and Special Forces Train DPRK Military at Five Training Grounds in Russia,” SPRAVDI, October 31, 2024, https://spravdi.gov.ua/en/russian-paratroopers-and-special-forces-train-dprk-military-at-five-training-grounds-in-russia/. Return to text.
8. Howard Altman, “Nearly 11,000 North Korean Troops in Russia Preparing to Enter the Fight Says Ukraine’s Spy Boss,” The War Zone, October 18, 2024, https://www.twz.com/news-features/nearly-11000-north-korean-troops-in-russia-preparing-to-enter-the-fight-says-ukraines-spy-boss. Return to text.
9. YTN, “우크라군이 입수한 ‘북한군 명단’...최상단에 적힌 김영복의 정체” [‘North Korean Military List’ Obtained by Ukrainian Military... Kim Young-bok’s Identity at the Top], hosted by Yoon Jae-hee, video broadcast, October 28, 2024, https://www.ytn.co.kr/_ln/0134_202410281055377069. Return to text.
10. “North Korean Military List.” Return to text.
11. Ha Chae-rim하채림, “폭풍군단에 장사정포까지…러 향한 김정은 ‘쇼케이스’ 재확인” [Special Operations Forces and Even Long-Range Artillery . . . Confirming Kim Jong Un’s ‘Showcase’ for Russia], Yonhap News Agency, November 20, 2024, https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20241120117500504. Return to text.
12. Voice of Korea, “경애하는 김정은동지께서 국방공업기업소들에서 생산되고있는 240㎜방사포무기체계의 검수시험사격을 보시였다” [Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Observes Inspection Test-Firing of the 240mm Multiple Rocket Launcher Weapon System Produced at Defense Industrial Plants], KCNA Watch, August 28, 2024, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1724792679-576124048/; “조선민주주의인민공화국 국방과학원 국방공업기업소들에서 생산되고있는 240mm조종방사포탄 검수시험사격진행” [DPRK Academy of Defence Sciences Conducts Test-Fire of 240 mm-Caliber Controllable Multiple Rocket Launcher Shells], KCNA Watch, October 9, 2024, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1728425398-950010369/; Tarao Goo, “北朝鮮が今年に実施した多連装ロケット砲の発射試験場所の特定” [Identifying Locations of North Korea’s Multiple Rocket Launcher Tests This Year], note.com, October 11, 2024, https://note.com/tarao727/n/na416b532cf67; Christopher Miller, “North Korea ‘Supplying Russia’ with Long-Range Rocket and Artillery Systems,” Financial Times, November 17, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/83ad844b-8ebd-45a9-9c12-9c4c8506e25b; and Ha Chae-rim, “Kim Jong Un’s ‘Showcase.’ ” Return to text.
13. “북 미사일 개발 핵심 주역, 러시아 발사장 현지지도” [North Korea’s Key Player in Missile Development, On-Site Guidance of Russian Launch Site], The Dong-A Ilbo, October 19, 2024, https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/all/20241019/130248531/2. Return to text.
14. “우크라 전장서 최신드론전 배우나...‘체포된 북한군 증언도 나와’ ” [Will They Learn the Latest Drone Warfare on the Ukrainian Battlefield?], YTN, November 1, 2024, https://www.ytn.co.kr/_ln/0134_202411010902069670. Return to text.
15. “Latest Drone Warfare.” Return to text.
16. “Latest Drone Warfare.” Return to text.
17. Korean Central News Agency 조선중앙통신, “김정은원수님께서 무인기성능시험을 현지에서 지도” [Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Oversees Performance Test of Drones], The Chosun Ilbo, August 26, 2024, https://chosonsinbo.com/2024/08/26-216/; and “경애하는 김정은동지께서 전승 70돐을 맞으며 로씨야련방 국방상 쎄르게이 쇼이구동지와 함께 무장장비전시회장을 돌아보시였다” [Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Visits Weaponry Exhibition House with Sergei Shoigu], KCNA Watch, July 27, 2023, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1690420208-562477552/. Return to text.
18. TV Chosun, 격전기에 꽂힌 인공기… ‘北 조종사들도 러시아서 훈련 정황’ [North Korean Pilots Are Also Training in Russia] (TV Chosun, October 22, 2024), YouTube video,
    . Return to text.
19. UN, “Security Council Fails to Extend Mandate for Expert Panel Assisting Sanctions Committee on Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” UN press release SC/15648, March 28, 2024, https://press.un.org/en/2024/sc15648.doc.htm. Return to text.
20. Samuel Ramani, “From Reluctant Enforcer to Outright Saboteur: Russia’s Crusade Against North Korea Sanctions,” 38 North, June 24, 2024, https://www.38north.org/2024/06/from-reluctant-enforcer-to-outright-saboteur-russias-crusade-against-north-korea-sanctions/. Return to text.
21. Jean Mackenzie, “Satellite Images Show Russia Giving North Korea Oil, Breaking Sanctions,” BBC, November 22, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjr4pr0gyyzo. Return to text.
22. Seungho Jung and Jongmin Lee, “Economic Implications for North Korea of Strengthened Relations with Russia amid the Russia-Ukraine War,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 36, no. 4 (December 2024): 449–73. Return to text.
23. Darcie Draudt-Véjares, “Ukraine Is Evolving into a Proxy Battlefield for Korean Peninsula Tensions,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 24, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2024/10/north-korea-troops-russia-ukraine-proxy-war?lang=en. Return to text.