Joaquin Camarena
©2026 Joaquin Camarena
CLSC Quick Takes offer expert analysis of select sources and provide timely insight in a succinct format rather than as formally cited academic products.
Discovery
In late November, the CCTV National Defense and Military Channel published a music video titled “Battle Song Sung for Victory” involving elements of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC) 188th Marine Brigade. An armor company within the brigade displayed two ZTZ-96 main battle tanks (MBT) in the video. The brigade also displayed two ZTZ-96A MBTs, ZBD-86A infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and two ZBD-05 amphibious IFVs during a formation to begin winter training in early January.
The PLANMC established a tank company in the brigade’s amphibious combined arms infantry battalions and light mechanized battalions to provide anti-armor support to the units. Another tank company appears to be assigned to the brigade headquarters to support air assault battalions and reinforce other units. The tank companies continue to utilize the legacy 10-tank structure rather than adopting the People’s Liberation Army Army’s (PLAA) 14-tank configuration despite the brigade’s transfer from the PLAA to the PLANMC in 2023.
Analysis
The PLANMC’s establishment of tank companies shows how the branch is equipping its brigades to conduct self-sustained amphibious and expeditionary operations. The use of ZTZ-96s and ZTZ-96As, however, illustrates how the PLANMC will use older equipment to arm its units despite the branch’s elevated importance. The PLANMC created the tank companies to provide the brigades with an organic anti-armor capability to destroy American and Taiwanese M1A2 Abrams, Japanese Type-10, and other tanks. The capability would also decrease the need for the PLAA to attach ZTZ-99As or ZTZ-99Bs to provide anti-armor support to marine brigades during operations. The brigades would also use the tanks as the main effort during the initial phases of offensives and breakout operations to penetrate enemy lines.
The ZTZ-96s and ZTZ-96As, each fitted with a 125mm gun, show how the PLANMC will use older equipment to develop capabilities for their brigades until newer tanks become available. Other PLANMC units field the ZTQ-15 light tanks with 105mm guns. The PLANMC uses the ZTQ-15 despite having decreased firepower because they determined that the tank’s maneuverability is more important in most scenarios where it would be deployed. Additionally, the PLANMC judged the GP-105 Tube-Launched Anti-Tank Guided Missile (TL-ATGM), a munition the ZTQ-15 can fire, as having an acceptable anti-armor capability to destroy tanks it would encounter, such as the M1A2Ts. The 188th Marine Brigade, and possibly the 200th Marine Brigade, another PLAA-turned-PLANMC brigade, however, will likely retire the ZTZ-96s and ZTZ-96As as more ZTQ-15s become available.
Implications
The tank companies are another aspect of the PLANMC’s overall expansion of its units and capabilities to enable the branch to conduct more self-sustained operations. This assertion is supported by the PLA’s decision to expand the number of marine and special operations brigades that fall under the PLANMC. Furthermore, the branch would have more flexibility conducting a variety of operations without requiring outside support from PLAA units.
The tank companies also demonstrate the PLANMC’s emphasis on increasing the firepower of the brigades at the tactical level. In addition to the MBTs, the PLANMC is incorporating the PCL-181 155mm truck-mounted howitzer and the new Type-05 amphibious 120mm mortar howitzer and the Type-05 amphibious AFT-10 ATGM carrier into its units. These systems will increase the indirect fire and anti-armor capabilities of the ACAIBs and LMBs and complement the ZTZ-96, ZTZ-96A, and ZTQ-15’s capabilities. These capabilities collectively would allow the marine brigades to conduct self-sustained expeditionary operations more effectively than they currently could. This growth would probably also extend to the PLANMC’s aviation capabilities, as the branch sets up more aviation brigades that can use light attack or fixed-wing aircraft.
Strategic Message
The tank companies illustrate how the PLANMC is incorporating capabilities into its units that would allow the branch to conduct expeditionary operations without issues. The requirement is important because the PLANMC’s expeditionary nature means it will have to conduct operations with little outside support from other branches. China will increasingly rely on the PLANMC to act as its expeditionary force to protect its overseas interests, similar to the United States Marine Corps. The PLANMC would require its brigades to be modular units that can be modified according to the missions’ operational requirements. The unit would align with the types of missions that China has outlined for the PLANMC to conduct both now and in the future. Furthermore, to develop units similar to the deployed US Marine Expeditionary Units, the PLANMC would need these capabilities. The expeditionary units would require their own self-sustainable capabilities, such as anti-armor and air defense, that the PLANMC is actively incorporating into their brigades.
Keywords: PLANMC, PLA Navy Marine Corps, amphibious combined arms, PLA expeditionary operations, Chinese tanks
Joaquin Camarena
Joaquin Camarena is a former United States Marine Corps intelligence analyst who runs Sino Talk, an entity devoted to monitoring the PLA’s developing capabilities. His main focuses are PLAN and PLANMC expeditionary capabilities and PLA modernization efforts.
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