Frustrating the Fait Accompli: How Rocket Artillery Changes the Taiwan Situation

Brennan Deveraux and Kyle Marcrum

China is furious about the United States’ recently announced $11 billion arms deal with Taiwan, and for good reason.¹ Beyond simply comprising a significant assortment of military equipment, the package supports Taiwan’s developing asymmetric-warfare concept and effectively transforms Taiwan’s strike capabilities. Just as the rise of rocket artillery in Europe a few years ago challenged the assumed speed at which Russia could seize the Baltic states, the rocket and missile capabilities outlined in the new arms package fundamentally alter the calculus of a potential Chinese invasion across the Taiwan Strait.² Specifically, the emerging capabilities, nested within an asymmetric-warfare concept, provide Taiwan the ability to increase survivability through dispersion, strike targets in China, and concentrate fires to frustrate nearly every step of an amphibious operation.

From Symmetric to Asymmetric

Prior to 2022, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense boasted of its Overall Defense Concept, a plan for “force protection, decisive battle in littoral zone, and destruction of enemy at landing beach.”³ Taiwan claimed the concept applied “  ‘innovative/asymmetric’ operational thinking,” but the concept was a symmetric plan to fight the People’s Liberation Army head-to-head in a final, decisive battle at the beach on which Chinese forces landed.⁴ Despite talk about reforming the defense concept, and against the recommendations of retired admirals, Taiwan seemed to make little progress.⁵

The progress on reforms accelerated after a few key events. The 2019–20 deployment of the People’s Armed Police in Hong Kong signaled the end of “one country-two systems” and the viability of this concept for Taiwan.⁶ The deployment was followed by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and China’s reaction to the former speaker of the US House of Representatives’ 2022 visit to Taiwan. Taiwan realized major theater combat had not gone away, and China was readying for a cross-strait invasion.

Taiwan’s ROC National Defense Report 2023 signaled the start of its move to mount a more realistic defense against the People’s Liberation Army through an asymmetric plan.⁷ The 2025 version of the report built on that shift, highlighting: “For the operational stages of regular crisis management, combat readiness deployment, joint anti-landing, littoral, and coastal combat, defense-in-depth, and protracted war, Taiwan has deployed multiple layers of defense forces and built multiple lines of defense based on the principle of weakening the enemy to prevent the enemy from seizing key positions.”⁸

Taiwan’s defense concept is most developed in its Republic of China 114th Year Quadrennial Defense Review 2025, which notes, “the Armed Forces adhere to the ‘Defensive Posture, Layered Deterrence’ military strategy and adopt a ‘Multi-Domain Denial, Resilient Defense’ approach to operational preparedness.”⁹ The report explains Taiwan will accomplish multidomain denial by establishing a multilayered defense-in-depth approach, employing an “Attrition Strategy” and asymmetric-warfare thinking.¹⁰

Taiwan’s transition to a new form of defense represents an admission the Taiwanese military cannot prevent China from landing military forces in Taiwan, but Taiwan can use a defense-in-depth strategy to grind the People’s Liberation Army down and prevent it from taking key locations. Whereas the Taiwanese military previously planned only to use Taiwan’s greatest advantage—the Taiwan Strait—the military also now plans to use its second-greatest advantage: Taiwan’s mountainous and urban terrain.

In light of Taiwan’s new plans, the December 17, 2025, Defense Security Cooperation Agency notification of the sale of over $11 billion in military equipment signifies Taiwan is aligning its defense spending with its new defense-in-depth strategy to achieve attrition through asymmetric warfare. The package emphasizes one of the most critical components of Taiwan’s emerging strategy: strategic indirect-fires capabilities.

A Survivable Fires Network

The fires capabilities outlined in the proposed foreign military sale to Taiwan represent a complete strike network from sensor to shooter, including 155mm, self-propelled howitzers and drones to assist with observation.¹¹ But in relation to the asymmetric concept, the foundation of the strike package is the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, or HIMARS. The wheeled launcher, which gained notoriety in the Russia-Ukraine War, is a versatile system that carries a pod of various munitions, ranging from six precision rockets to a single long-range missile. Taiwan first received these launchers in 2024. But the recent proposal does not simply upgrade Taiwan’s existing launchers; the proposal includes a massive order of 82 new systems.¹²

High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers can operate from dispersed locations, limiting China’s ability to target them. In fact, the systems are designed to operate as independent batteries of eight launchers each. Additionally, for short periods, these groups can be organized into even smaller elements. Doctrinally, four-launcher platoons can support operations with little additional support, and during the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, the US Army deployed small, two-launcher firing packages with their own fire direction centers around the battlefield.¹³

Whether Taiwan will mirror the US military’s approach to rocket-artillery organization or tactics is unclear. But if Taiwan employed launchers like the United States does, these dispersion tactics could allow small firing elements to disperse across the island, converge fires on critical targets, or assign teams to missions supported by associated munitions, including long-range attacks, efforts to achieve area effects, and precision strikes.

Long-Range Attacks

The different munition types included in the arms package provide Taiwan with several distinct ways to shape various aspects of a Chinese invasion. The most controversial munition in the package is the Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS.¹⁴ A pod can only carry a single ATACMS, meaning a HIMARS launcher can fire only one missile before needing to reload. The precision-guided missile can travel up to 300 kilometers and deliver a blast force comparable to that of a 500-pound bomb.¹⁵ With the Taiwan Strait being around 180 kilometers wide, the ATACMS missiles provide Taiwan with a tool to strike directly into China—a tool that can be dispersed across the island and easily hidden, as well as being incredibly challenging to interdict. The package allocates 420 missiles, which could be operationalized both as a deterrent and in support of island defense.

Because the missiles exist and the launchers are difficult to track, China must account for the Taiwanese military’s potential to strike equipment or senior military leaders within a 300-kilometer ring around the island. At a minimum, this threat forces China to prioritize the deployment of ballistic missile defense systems near embarkation sites and assess what systems or personnel it will put at risk. The missiles’ threat ring endangers critical capabilities China will likely station near its side of the strait—in the preparation, execution, or post-invasion stages of an invasion—such as command-and-control headquarters, air defense systems, or long-range fire-support assets.

During an actual amphibious operation, the missiles could focus on striking the embarkation sites of an invading force, beginning the interdiction phase in China’s territory. But once invading forces arrived in Taiwanese territory, the Taiwanese military would need to concentrate its firepower with tactical rockets capable of producing effects across a wide area.

Concentrated Firepower

The arms package includes two types of rockets that could prove useful in engaging an invading force as it established a foothold in Taiwan. Both models fit six rockets per pod and have a maximum range of around 70 kilometers. The range and accuracy of the rockets mean, if it fielded the rockets, the Taiwanese military could concentrate an inordinate amount of firepower on a single location, such as a landing site.

Rocket artillery is not sustainable; it cannot mirror the continuous fire missions and sustained pressure of cannons that have been so important for operations in Ukraine. But for one to two minutes, the launchers included in the arms package could rain hundreds of rockets down on China’s initial invading force, regardless of whether the force established its initial foothold through amphibious or airborne insertion. This destructive fire mission could turn the tide of the battle or at least stifle any initial progress.

The first type of rocket included in the sales package is the standard unitary rocket, the M31A2, which can precisely deliver 200 pounds of explosives.¹⁶ With 756 pods totaling 4,536 rockets, the M31A2 would provide the Taiwanese military with an arsenal for precision strikes. But precision has limitations. These rockets are not designed to strike moving targets or destroy armored vehicles. In turn, the unitary rockets would best serve as a strategic tool for high-value strikes, particularly against military leadership, logistical hubs, or static equipment like radars. Accordingly, these rockets would be useful against only a select few targets during an invasion but would prove to be an essential post-invasion tool—a strategic sniper ready to frustrate an occupier.

In contrast, the second rocket type creates area effects. The M30A2 alternative-warhead rocket is filled with around 180,000 tungsten fragments that can saturate an area with shrapnel.¹⁷ With 447 pods totaling 2,682 rockets, the M30A2 could enable the Taiwanese military to deal a devastating blow to an invading force as it hit the beaches, particularly if Taiwan integrated the rocket into a broader defense plan that leveraged cannon artillery, aerial sensors, and loitering munitions. Defenders could even establish predesignated target reference points at potential landing sites, which rocket-artillery units could rapidly engage from across the island. Taiwan’s ability to concentrate area-effect fires is something China must account for when assessing its military options.

A Silver Bullet?

Although the foreign military sales package would drastically improve Taiwan’s defenses, this shift would be underscored by the limitations of US-made rocket artillery. Military planners—potential invaders and defenders alike—must appreciate four factors.

First, the launchers do not fire anti-ship missiles (at least not yet). Whereas the surface-to-surface missiles included in the arms package could damage a stationary ship, and the tungsten shrapnel of the alternative warhead could interdict certain landing craft, the rockets and missiles are not designed to destroy a naval vessel. Lockheed Martin Corporation is currently developing a land-based, anti-ship missile as a variant of its future precision-strike missile.¹⁸ But China will likely work hard to ensure Taiwan cannot purchase the new missile variant when it becomes operational.

Second, the flight paths of rockets and missiles are more complex than those of cannon artillery, often requiring excessive amounts of dedicated airspace.¹⁹ Consequently, Taiwan will have to figure out unique employment tactics. Alternatively, Taiwan may accept the risk rockets and missiles pose to its aviation assets and embrace the big-sky, little-bullet philosophy. This philosophy may be particularly relevant if dispersed launcher elements synchronize missions across the island.

Third, managing rocket-artillery ammunition is a logistical nightmare, particularly across rough terrain. The massive munition pods take up large spaces and moving them requires a crane. The ammunition can be pre-staged at designated points, but such efforts may be stifled in areas of dense vegetation or on steep terrain. Still, moving these pods, securing them, and keeping the adversary from tracking or sabotaging them creates additional challenges that require extra manpower and risks.

Finally, a rocket-artillery mission is an easily observable event; numerous assets can identify the explosive launch of a rocket or missile. Consequently, to fire a mission is to expose the asset and potentially draw the unwanted attention of actors who are looking to remove one of the launchers from the battlefield. In turn, Taiwan may have to focus on modernizing and integrating protective and counter-drone capabilities to keep its fires network operational after the first salvos of an invasion.

Implications for China

Even with the limitations identified in the previous section, the increased military capabilities the recent foreign military sales package represent have already prompted China to act. China publicly condemned the sale and warned it would leverage “forceful measures” in response.²⁰

The first of these measures addressed the external support for Taiwan directly, calling on the United States to stop “the dangerous moves of arming Taiwan.”²¹ But China’s effort was not limited to strongly worded messages. On December 26, China announced sanctions against 20 defense-related companies based in the United States, including Northrop Grumman Corporation and Boeing Company, as well as 10 executives from similar companies. China was clear in its message: “Any company or individual who engages in arms sales to Taiwan will pay the price for the wrongdoing.”²² This price includes frozen assets, restrictions on a company’s ability to conduct business in China, and prohibitions against sanctioned individuals entering the country.

Just a few days later, on December 29, China shifted its focus back to Taiwan and initiated one of its largest military operations in years. The joint exercise, Justice Mission 2025, incorporated seapower, airpower, and landpower to encircle and isolate Taiwan. China also used the exercise to deploy coast guard ships east of Taiwan, signaling Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait are affairs internal to China.²³ The exercise continued the People’s Liberation Army’s trend of conducting large-scale military operations to demonstrate its displeasure with US or Taiwanese actions, often leveraging these missions to rehearse a blockade or invasion of Taiwan, put pressure on Taiwan’s military readiness, and erode the indicators of a coming Chinese invasion.²⁴ Notably, in Justice Mission 2025, China also fired missiles near Taiwanese ports to disrupt traffic—a tactic reminiscent of the third Taiwan Strait crisis.

The People’s Liberation Army Eastern Theater Command proclaimed the exercise was a “stern warning against ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces and foreign interference forces.”²⁵ A spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China called the drills “a punitive and deterrent action against separatist forces who seek ‘Taiwan independence’ through military buildup.”²⁶ He added, “Anyone who tries to arm Taiwan to contain China will only embolden the separatists and push the Taiwan Strait closer to the peril of armed conflict.”²⁷ In the context of these statements, China has taken a firm stance against military sales to Taiwan, clearly communicating its willingness to escalate to prevent future sales.

Overall, China’s response to the announcement of the arms package—and China’s underlying appreciation of the threat the package’s launcher systems pose—will likely drive three distinct changes in how China views the Taiwan situation.

First, China will leverage all instruments of national power to intensify its efforts to limit the fulfillment of the announced aid package and prevent future arms sales that would significantly enhance Taiwan’s ability to resist China. These efforts may mirror China’s recent economic sanctions against defense-related businesses and could include aggressive cyber and misinformation operations. In conducting such operations, China would aim to limit the supply aspect of Taiwan’s increasing defense capabilities by reframing military aid as a deliberate escalation and setting a precedent for directly targeting businesses and individuals.

Second, China will increase its military pressure on Taiwan by taking actions similar to the recent Justice Mission 2025 exercise, which both demonstrated China’s military power and highlighted how China could punish Taiwan economically by isolating the island nation. Importantly, China will likely link its military pressure to other actions it perceives as escalatory, including Taiwan’s reception of the announced rocket-artillery systems or purchase of other capabilities that enable Taiwan to strike Chinese assets directly, such as air defense systems or anti-ship missiles. China will likely amplify these military actions with additional coercive measures aimed at persuading Taiwan to halt its military modernization, thereby reducing the demand for advanced military equipment.

Finally, if fielded, Taiwan’s increased long-range-fires capabilities will force China to reevaluate how it would conduct preinvasion operations. Whereas this assertion seems obvious, it may be the most significant aspect of this analysis. A shift in Taiwan’s capabilities could alter the observable indicators and warnings of an invasion, as ground-based military units could no longer move to staging areas with impunity. Consequently, to avoid unnecessary escalation, China may have to mask pre-deployment actions within its exercises, focus strategic assets on tracking the new launchers, and articulate how it would perceive Taiwan conducting live-fire exercises with rockets as potentially threatening.

Conclusion

The $11 billion foreign military sales package could reshape how Taiwan envisions its asymmetric-warfare concept. The buildup of a survivable fires network, with rocket-artillery systems being dispersed in small fires packages across the island, limits China’s ability to reduce Taiwan’s defenses before invading. The long-range-strike capability of the ATACMS provides Taiwan with a legitimate way to threaten critical Chinese elements that venture within 300 kilometers of the island. Moreover, the precision and area effects of rockets would allow Taiwan’s defense forces to concentrate massive firepower on any invading elements seeking to secure a foothold on the island.

But Taiwan’s transformation is far from certain. The amount of time between the announcement of a proposed foreign military sale and the fielding of equipment can be extensive. Moving forward, China will undoubtedly attempt to disrupt, delay, or even deny Taiwan’s access to the proposed equipment. China will take such measures because, if fielded, this new equipment would significantly increase the costs Taiwan could impose on China, fundamentally altering the calculus involved in a cross-strait invasion.

Keywords: HIMARS, Taiwan, asymmetric warfare, deterrence, escalation

Brennan Deveraux
Major Brennan Deveraux is a US Army strategist serving as a national security researcher at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. Deveraux has three defense-related master’s degrees and is the author of books on indirect-fire innovation, missiles as emerging technology, and his personal experience exterminating the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria with rocket artillery.

Kyle Marcrum
Colonel Kyle Marcrum is a US Army foreign area officer, currently serving at the China Landpower Studies Center at the US Army War College. Marcrum’s experience also includes serving at the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Office of the Secretary of War, and as a military attaché in the People’s Republic of China, Bangladesh, and Taiwan.

Endnotes

1. 1. Ben Blanchard and Michael Martina, “US Announces $11 Billion Arms Package for Taiwan, Largest Ever,” Reuters, December 18, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/taiwan-says-us-has-initiated-111-billion-arms-sale-procedure-2025-12-18/.
2. 2. Brennan Deveraux, “Rocket Artillery Can Keep Russia Out of the Baltics,” War on the Rocks, May 20, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/rocket-artillery-can-keep-russia-out-of-the-baltics/. This article reframes a RAND Corporation assessment about how rapidly Russia could conduct a fait accompli by seizing the Baltic states. The article asserts the reintroduction of rocket artillery to the theater drastically impacts the timeline of a Russian assault.
3. 3. Republic of China Ministry of National Defense, 2019 National Defense Report: Ministry of National Defense R.O.C. (Ministry of National Defense, December 2019), 68.
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5. 5. Tommy Jamison, “Taiwan’s Theory of the Fight,” War on the Rocks, February 21, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/02/taiwans-theory-of-the-fight/; and Michael A. Hunzeker, “Taiwan’s Defense Plans Are Going Off the Rails,” War on the Rocks, November 18, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/taiwans-defense-plans-are-going-off-the-rails/.
6. 6. Greg Torode, “Exclusive: China’s Internal Security Force on Frontlines of Hong Kong Protests,” Reuters, March 18, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/exclusive-chinas-internal-security-force-on-frontlines-of-hong-kong-protests-idUSKBN2150JQ/.
7. 7. Republic of China Ministry of National Defense, ROC National Defense Report 2023 (Ministry of National Defense, September 2023).
8. 8. Republic of China Ministry of National Defense, ROC National Defense Report 2025 (Ministry of National Defense, October 2025).
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11. 11. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States – M109A7 Self-Propelled Howitzers,” news release no. 25-108, December 17, 2025, https://www.dsca.mil/Press-Media/Major-Arms-Sales/Article-Display/Article/4363063/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-office-in-the-united-states-m109a7; and Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States – ALTIUS-700M and ALTIUS-600 Systems,” news release no. 26-09, December 17, 2025, https://www.dsca.mil/Press-Media/Major-Arms-Sales/Article-Display/Article/4363162/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-office-in-the-united-states-altius.
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13. 13. Brennan S. Deveraux, Exterminating ISIS: Behind the Curtain of a Technological War (Casemate Publishers, 2025).
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16. 16. “GMLRS: The Precision Fires Go-To Round,” Lockheed Martin, n.d., accessed January 23, 2026, https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/products/guided-mlrs-unitary-rocket.html.
17. 17. Mahir Zeynalov, “The Sniper of Artillery: Ultimate Guide to the M142 HIMARS,” The Defense Post, July 15, 2025, https://thedefensepost.com/2025/07/15/m142-himars-guide/.
18. 18. Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, “U.S. Army Demonstrates Anti-Ship Potential in the Philippines,” Naval News, June 17, 2025, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2025/06/u-s-army-demonstrates-anti-ship-potential-in-the-philippines/.
19. 19. Brennan Deveraux, “Responsive Rockets Through Proactive Airspace Management,” Fires (May 2017): 33–37.
20. 20. “China Threatens Retaliation over New U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan,” Modern Diplomacy, December 19, 2025, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/12/19/china-threatens-retaliation-over-new-u-s-arms-sales-to-taiwan/.
21. 21. “China Sanctions 20 U.S. Defense Companies and 10 Executives over Taiwan Arms Sale,” PBS News, December 26, 2025, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/china-sanctions-20-u-s-defense-companies-and-10-executives-over-taiwan-arms-sale.
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23. 23. John Dotson, “The PLA’s ‘Justice Mission-2025’ Exercise Around Taiwan,” Global Taiwan Brief 11, no. 1 (2026).
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27. 27. Dotson, “Exercise Around Taiwan.”

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