Jacob Stoil
©2026 Jacob Stoil
With the failure of ceasefire negotiations with Iran, the United States has chosen to escalate pressure on Iran by instituting a blockade of select Iranian ports. If this interdiction does not force Iran to end its attempts to control the Strait of Hormuz and to acquiesce to US ceasefire conditions, the question of what military options remain persists. Public discussions within a diverse collection of media outlets from CNN to Newsmax have included the possibility of the United States taking hold of some of the many Iranian-controlled islands that lie in the Persian Gulf.
Strategic Rationales and Risks Involved in Taking One or More Islands
There are three strategic rationales for seizing one or more islands, along with critical risks in the tactical and narrative spaces that warrant substantial consideration. The first reason for seizing one or more islands is to influence Iran toward ceasefire negotiations or to trade for concessions during negotiations. In such a case, the ideal territory to seize would be relatively easy to take and hold and valuable to Iran.
Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz provides a second rationale. The positions of the islands mean that whoever controls the islands around the strait can interdict anyone attempting to close or cross through the strait. Iran uses several island positions to reinforce its defensive and blocking positions around the strait. It does this by positioning military systems (such as small boats and weapons systems integral to closing the straits), together with garrisons and surveillance and targeting systems on some of the islands astride and proximate to the shipping routes.
Finally, holding some or all the islands in a long-term occupation could provide two strategic benefits. In the first instance, it could place US or partnered forces in a position to impede Iranian operations in the region and the post-conflict reconstitution of Iranian capabilities. In essence, the United States could reverse the benefits Iran enjoys by positioning surveillance and detection equipment—along with ground-based weapon systems and, potentially, air defense or drone interdiction systems—on the islands. This form of power projection would resemble a small-scale version of the Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) that the US Marine Corps intended for the Pacific. Additionally, if Operation Epic Fury ends with a contested result wherein Iran and the United States both claim victory, holding Iranian territory at the end of the war could offer tangible support to the US narrative that Iran lost and mitigate the effects of Iranian information efforts.
Equally, risks apply to any attempt to seize one or more of the islands. While these risks are not the focus of this article, there are, of course, the inherent tactical challenges of seizing and holding an island close to an enemy coast. These challenges include the potential for a contested landing and having to clear Iranian subterranean facilities as well as leaving US personnel in range of Iranian drones and artillery systems. In some cases, the necessity of maintaining the occupation of Iranian civilians would further complicate the situation. On the strategic level, these challenges would increase over time and would also pull US forces away from other theaters. At the same time, any unilateral decision to withdraw from seized territory, even years later, would risk being perceived in the Middle East as defeat.
An equally significant risk would come from the perception that US interests in Iranian oil drove any US occupation. This perception would allow Iran to characterize US actions as similar to those in which it took part in the mid-twentieth century, such as when the United States supported a coup against the democratically elected government of Persia in part to back US oil interests. If Iran successfully framed US operations as a continuation of colonial interference, it might be able to rally domestic support to its position and carve off Middle Eastern support and global tolerance for US operations.
While these rationales and risks are to some extent true for any Iranian-controlled island or island group in the Persian Gulf, not all islands are equal. The risks, opportunities, and strategic implications of each island or island group are not the same. For example, some islands—such as Sirri, Faror, and Farsi—are only of strategic relevance if seized in concert with others, while some islands and island groups have an inherently high value for one of the strategic rationales.
Evaluating Strategically Important Islands and Island Groups
Kharg Island
Far north of the Strait of Hormuz, Kharg Island is roughly five miles long and sits approximately 19 miles from the coast of Iran. It sits in the Doroud oil fields and is a rare deepwater port in the Persian Gulf, which gives it outsized importance for Iran’s oil industry and as the terminal for as much as 90 percent of the country’s crude exports. While Kharg Island’s position means it will not have any significant impact on opening the Strait of Hormuz, Kharg Island might provide sufficient value to trade in ceasefire negotiations. While it may be inconvenient for Iran to do without Kharg Island, its loss could ultimately be mitigated over time by rerouting a portion of the oil infrastructure (admittedly at great cost) elsewhere.
This ability to mitigate the loss of Kharg Island also means Iran might choose not to negotiate for it and instead leave the United States committed to garrisoning the vulnerable island. Iran might do this with the belief that the United States is not interested in maintaining a significant presence in the Middle East. Iran might justifiably assume the United States would eventually withdraw and, therefore, Iran will regain control of the island in the fullness of time. Finally, as the primary rationale for seizing Kharg Island would be its importance to the oil and gas industries, any US operation to take it is likely to fall into the narrative trap, allowing Iran to compare current US operations to colonial history.
Tunbs and Abū Mūsā (Nazeat Islands)
The islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abū Mūsā sit at the north end of the Strait of Hormuz. In 1971, Iran seized them from the newly established United Arab Emirates (UAE). For the United States, capturing these islands would be easier than capturing Kharg Island and have less immediate risk, as they are farther from the Iranian coast and smaller. They are not known for their importance to Iran’s oil industry, which also means they are unlikely to have a tangible and immediate benefit in ceasefire negotiations. On the other hand, the United States could return them to the UAE and push a narrative of liberation. Doing so would also serve as tangible proof that Iran lost the war and mitigate some of the challenges of having to maintain a long-term US presence. However, any attempt to trade them back to Iran, and in doing so, recognize Iranian control of them, runs the risk of creating tension between the United States and the UAE.
The third rationale—intending to hold seized territory post-conflict—is particularly applicable to these islands. The distance of these islands from the Iranian mainland mitigates some of the tactical challenges and limits Iran’s options in the event of a US operation. As Iran has demonstrated, military positions on the islands can interdict maritime traffic transiting the strait and would place the United States and its partners in a position to close the north approach to the strait to Iranian traffic.
While taking the islands by themselves will degrade Iran’s ability to operate in the strait (Iran relies on military assets and basing on the islands to support its operations), despite their position, taking the islands by themselves will not reopen the strait because Iran maintains a degree of redundancy. North of Abū Mūsā and the Tunbs sit Sirri and Faror, while southeast of them sit the Larak, Qeshm, and Hormuz island group. As long as these islands remain in Iranian hands, Iran’s capacity may be diminished, but it will still be able to hold maritime traffic in the strait at some degree of risk.
Larak, Qeshm, and Hormuz Islands
Sitting together as a group just outside of the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, the islands of Larak, Qeshm, and Hormuz are the three most consequential islands in the strait. Larak Island is now the checkpoint by which all vessels transiting the strait must pass and divert into the narrow waters between Larak and Qeshem—the largest of the islands discussed in this article. It has an area of over 550 square miles, a significant civilian population, and large and critical Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) facilities. Any US force holding these islands would find itself under bombardment from land-based systems and susceptible to attacks by maritime infiltration. Despite the difficulty of taking and holding this island group, it would have the most significant impact on Iran as it is the keystone by which Iran maintains its closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
If successful, a US operation here would effectively open the entire southern area of the Strait of Hormuz to commercial and military transit. It would also allow the United States to interdict any Iranian attempts to transit the Strait. Finally, it would effectively put the United States in an island-based blockading position around Bandar Abbas, Iran’s primary military and container port. It would also cut off Iran’s further outlying positions, such as the Nazeat islands, from their support, making them vulnerable to raids or seizure.
The Maximalist Option
There is one additional option—opening the Strait of Hormuz by taking the islands off Bandar Abbas and the Nazeat Islands. This approach is undeniably the most difficult option and runs the highest risks strategically and tactically. However, the critical leverage Iran employed in the latter period of Operation Epic Fury and in its current negotiations is its ability to control the Strait of Hormuz. This more maximalist operation would negate that control and leave Iran substantially weakened.
This option naturally aggregates the risks of operations on the islands off Bandar Abbas and the Nazeat island group. It is also a more complex option, requiring the ability to support multiple amphibious, airborne, and air assault operations simultaneously. The complexity and simultaneity means it will require more personnel, equipment, and resources than merely the sum of those necessitated by the more limited operations. Despite the significant risks and complexities, this option has the greatest potential to alter the strategic landscape in the Persian Gulf region substantially—to the detriment of Iran.
Conclusion
Should diplomacy fail, seizing some or all of the critical islands of the Persian Gulf from Iran offers a possible path forward. Regardless of which island is taken, there remains an inherent risk. Not all the islands, however, offer the same strategic benefits or carry the same risks. For example, Kharg Island stands out for its limited strategic benefits and significant risks. Whereas Abū Mūsā and the Tunbs offer ways to mitigate long-term strategic risk but limit short-term gains, the islands off Bandar Abbas present numerous challenges—but offer potentially the largest immediate strategic payoff. The maximalist option for seizing multiple island groups is the riskiest option but also offers the greatest opportunity to alter the strategic landscape in Persian Gulf and break much of Iran’s power. Given the differences in the risks and opportunities of each option, the question of suitability to the desired strategic end is paramount in the selection of which island or group of islands to take, and each presents noteworthy differences that should not be ignored in this regard.
Keywords: Iran, Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Epic Fury, Middle East
Jacob Stoil
Dr. Jacob Stoil is the research professor of Middle East security at the United States Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, chair of applied history at the West Point Modern War Institute, and a trustee of the United States Commission on Military History. He serves as assistant director of the Second World War Research Group (North America). He holds a doctorate of philosophy from Oxford and a master of arts degree from King’s College London.
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