Rick Gunnell
CLSC Quick Takes offer expert analysis of select sources and provide timely insight in a succinct format rather than as formally cited academic products.
Discovery
On May 7, 2026, Xinhua News Agency announced that former Ministers of National Defense and Central Military Commission (CMC) members General Wei Fenghe (魏凤和) and General Li Shangfu (李尚福) were found guilty of accepting bribes (受贿). General Li was also identified as offering bribes (行贿). Both the verdict’s public announcement and the specificity about bribery are significant.
Analysis
Since Xi Jinping took power, there have been countless incidents where general officers have been accused of corruption, but without such public verdicts. For reference, the last time a PLA general officer was publicly convicted of bribery occurred in 2019, namely former CMC Member and Joint Staff Department Chief Fang Fenghui (房峰辉).
Based on a dataset of 63 former People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers suspected of corruption, 14 percent were never publicly acknowledged as such by official Chinese Communist Party (CCP), People’s Republic of China (PRC), or PLA sources. These officers were rumored to be part of Xi’s corruption drive by outside analysts and non-credible sources, offering a possible warning about the true extent of the 2026 mass purges in the PLA.
Before addressing the remaining officers, it is important first to describe the PLA’s legal process for most corruption cases: (1) The CMC’s Discipline Inspection Commission (DI-C) (纪律检查委员会) announces an initial investigation (调查); (2) the case is sent to the PLA Military Procuratorate (解放军军事检察院) for handling (处理) and criminal investigation (侦查); and (3) the case is tried and convicted in the PLA Military Court (军事法院). At some point in this legal process, often in conjunction with a CCP or PRC meeting, the individual will also be expelled from the CCP (开除党籍). Most cases are transferred from the CMC DI-C to the PLA Military Procuratorate within two to three months. Limited data show that the PLA Military Court can prosecute cases in as little as six months to as long as a year or more. As with Generals Wei and Li, the entire legal process can take about two and a half years.
Public verdicts are rare. About 85 percent of PLA officers who face official corruption inquiries never receive a public verdict. Instead, ~44 percent receive a public, official CMC DI-C corruption announcement, and an overwhelming ~90 percent receive a public, official PLA Military Procuratorate announcement. What happens to these officers is largely unknown. Most were likely found guilty and received prison sentences or house arrest. While death sentences are issued, they are largely with reprieve. The real punishment—both the individual and their family members become personae non gratae in Chinese society.
Implications
The sole remaining general officer on the Central Military Commission, Zhang Shengmin (张升民), is the CMC’s DI-C Secretary; and, both the PLA Military Procuratorate and PLA Military Court are subordinate to the CMC’s Politics and Law Commission (政法委员会), signifying that the CCP and CMC direct these matters at the highest levels. Using both an officially disseminated public verdict and the term “bribery” is not a coincidence.
Historically, when “bribery” is mentioned, it can be further detailed as “embezzlement” (贪污) or having obtained huge amounts of property from unexplained sources (巨额财产来源不明). The bribery’s “circumstances can be extremely grave” (情节极为严重), “sums can be exceptionally large” (数额特别巨大), and “impact can be exceedingly pernicious” (影响极其恶劣). There are legitimate reasons why the PLA continues to have a real bribery problem. In 2018, the PLA announced that it had ceased more than 100,000 for-profit programs in recruiting college-educated personnel, personnel training, barracks construction, transportation, equipment repair, and real estate rentals, among others. Further, in 2019, the Central Theater Command Army’s Discipline Inspection Commission found that the highest risks to clean government are in project construction, petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) supply, and materiel procurement.
With such direct language, rumors that Xi is removing threats to his personal power lose much of their teeth. Questions on PLA corruption should focus less on Xi and more about where these bribes are heading and why. Bribery in the PLA likely falls into two key categories: (1) offering or receiving bribes to obtain a promotion and (2) receiving bribes in the defense procurement and weapons development process.
Precedence exists for the first category, including direct mentions of officers who “bribed high-ranking military officials” (行贿军方高层) ostensibly for a promotion. For the second category, there could be a natural link between the corruption issues at China National Nuclear Corporation and General Wei Fenghe, who spent most of his career in the PLA Rocket Force. Further, General Li was first a deputy and then the director of the PLA’s Equipment Development Department (EDD), the lead PLA organization that works with China’s defense industrial complex and PLA equipment modernization. Theoretically, if a state-owned defense manufacturer wanted to ensure that it won a large PLA contract or needed a senior PLA officer to approve key equipment that was behind schedule, it would go to a senior EDD officer. The EDD seems to recognize this issue, releasing a document titled “Professional Ethics and Behavioral Norms for the Armed Forces’ Equipment Sector” (《军队装备领域职业道德行为规范》) in December 2025. The document requires that equipment procurement be “fair” (公平) and that equipment evaluation be “objectively impartial” (客观公正). Notably, recently indicted CMC Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia (张又侠) also led this organization. Further credibility should be given to this argument if he is also publicly convicted of “bribes.”
Strategic Message
While headlines on palace intrigue will never subside, it is important to focus on what the CCP-controlled press is saying to its own citizens and soldiers. While some CCP and PLA propaganda lacks substance, this announcement appears deliberate. The CCP is telling its people and soldiers, in their own language, that the PLA cannot become a world-class force if actual corruption at its current (likely massive and systemic) scale continues.
Analysis Source: “魏凤和案、李尚福案一审宣判” [Verdicts Handed Down in the Cases of Wei Fenghe and Li Shangfu], 新华社 [Xinhua News Agency], May 7, 2026, https://web.archive.org/web/20260507104048/https://www.news.cn/20260507/d68c97ec93444f62afb67f849c084bf3/c.html.
Keywords: General Wei Fenghe, General Li Shangfu, bribery, corruption, People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Central Military Commission (CMC), Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Rick Gunnell
Rick Gunnell is a research professor of China military studies at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. His research focuses on the PLA “land domain’s” people, organizations, and activities.
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