Assessing the Effectiveness of US Army Campaigning in the Indo-Pacific

Applying the military instrument of power is essential to deterrence and assurance in the Indo-Pacific. This essay explores the underappreciated application of Landpower in this critical region and assesses the effects of a few activities that assure allies and partners and deter the People’s Republic of China. The discreet examples in this short article hopefully provide a better foundation for understanding military dynamics in the region and allow for better future assessments of integrated deterrence efforts. Societies, countries, and governments are situated on land. Manufacturing, industry, and economies start on land and move outward into air, sea, and space. Similarly, all military activities and resources launch from land—the underpinning precursor to all sources of power, especially in the military realm. Each day, the US Army conducts activities in the land domain with a desire to integrate with allies and partners and support the establishment of a military deterrence baseline that keeps the Indo-Pacific at peace.

The US Army first became an expeditionary force in the Indo-Pacific in the late nineteenth century due to the Spanish-American War. Between 1898 and 1936, the Army established ground forces in Hawaii, the Philippines, and Alaska.¹ The Army also had experience deploying regiments to China and Russia. The Army’s wide-ranging operational history in the region spans the entire spectrum of conflict—from counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to all-out war in World War II, the Vietnam War, and the Korean War. In the Indo-Pacific, US Army Pacific is the senior Army command and the inheritor of this legacy. Today, seven of the 10 largest armies in the world are in the Indo-Pacific, as is more than half the world’s population and the United States’ preeminent competitor: China.² The centrality of Army leaders in the region makes army-to-army ties incredibly important to defending the region. The role of US Army Pacific as an enduring and stabilizing presence for US interests and international security in the Indo-Pacific is not new and has never been more crucial.

Studying a few of the myriad campaign activities the US Army conducts in the region exemplifies how friends and potential foes perceive the use of Landpower. Many US Army activities are bundled into the US Army Pacific–led, interstate Operation Pathways. This nearly yearlong part of US Army Pacific’s campaign plan allows army units and trainers to participate in land-based training exercises with partner nations in their respective countries. Participating countries include Australia, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. Established in 2014, the ongoing operation has iterated as security priorities have shifted. At its inception, Operation Pathways was geared toward short-term, small-unit deployments that coordinated training across partner nations. In 2019, the exercise evolved into longer rotations with increased troop participation—from battalion-sized units to brigade-sized units. The changes, including a name change from Pacific Pathways to Operation Pathways, were predicated on a vision of creating interior lines of coordinated forces, logistics lines, communications conduits, and staging areas that draw allies and partners closer together.³

This change marked a shift in US Army Pacific and partner strategies, from focusing on Landpower to focusing on all domains. Moreover, iterative agreements between US Army Pacific and partner nations about land and resource access, information sharing, logistical support, and security assistance further strengthen coalitions by integrating partners more closely into the overall US deterrence strategy. The agreements assure allies and partners and deny the People’s Liberation Army potentially easy military wins in the complex strategic environment of the Indo-Pacific. These outcomes are signaled because Operation Pathways, which is at its core multinational across the breadth of its activities, shapes how a coalition may respond to aggression. The operation demonstrates an increasing determination to be unified among the partnered armies while also integrating with large-scale, combined joint exercises that further amplify, deter, and assure effects across the domains.

An example of this unity is Super Garuda Shield, a combined army and joint exercise between US Army Pacific and six other nations that involves more than 4,000 servicemembers. Initially regarded as the cornerstone of collaboration between the National Army of Indonesia and US Army Pacific, the exercise was significantly expanded in 2022 to include Australia, France, Japan, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and many international observers.⁴ Although Super Garuda Shield started in 2007, the People’s Republic of China media services did not report on the exercise until 2022, coinciding with the exercise’s broadening. The Chinese media portrays Super Garuda Shield as a means for the United States to maintain its regional and global dominance by enlisting regional partners to participate.⁵ Upon closer analysis of the People’s Republic of China’s media framing, we can see how Super Garuda Shield strengthens US deterrence of Chinese aggression while bolstering the security assurances of participating nations.

The People’s Daily, the official media platform of the Chinese Communist Party, first reported on Super Garuda Shield in August 2022, one week after the inaugural expanded exercise. The People’s Daily reported “record participation” and how “extensive, combat-like exercises” reflect the American push to integrate military efforts across regions and boost deterrence capabilities. Chinese analysts viewed the US effort as a “threat to regional stability.”⁶ Yet, the fact that the Chinese Communist Party’s media platform did not report on Super Garuda Shield until 2022 suggests the exercise is now impacting foreign policy objectives, based on the Chinese Communist Party’s perception of Super Garuda Shield’s utility and meaning. Subtle rhetorical hints such as “record participation,” describing the combat exercises as “extensive” and a “display of US military might” that “strengthen[s] alliances” indicate an impression of increased resolve to resist Chinese provocations. The People’s Daily perceived this expanded exercise as another example of US “dominance seeking” behavior.⁷

Looking a little deeper into the effect of Super Garuda Shield, Guo Xiaobing, the director of the Arms Control Research Center at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, noted Super Garuda Shield aligns with the “aggressive” push of the Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States. Guo stated the US posture is shifting from preparedness to “cross-regional coordinated combat.” As he characterized them, the “extensive and intense drills” significantly impact regional stability.⁸ The changes to Super Garuda Shield appear to have impressed upon Chinese analysts, the People’s Liberation Army, and the Chinese Communist Party how the scale of coordination and capabilities posed by the United States and its allies contributed to an enhanced regional perception of US resolve. Although not an exact science, the changes in the frequency, rhetoric, and context of the reporting can provide critical insights into how the Chinese Communist Party is deterred by military activities in the land domain.

Indonesian reactions to hosting Super Garuda Shield in 2023 showed positive sentiment tied to the US partnership. Teuku Rezasyah, a lecturer at the School of International Relations at Bandung-based Padjadjaran University, said Indonesia had demonstrated a tendency to support the United States during the American-Chinese rivalry. Rezasyah noted how Indonesia is open to cooperating with China economically and in other ways but “[refuses] to enter into a deeper level of cooperation with China since it is a worrying phenomenon.”⁹ For example, Indonesia used to invite China to participate in Super Garuda Shield but has since rescinded the invitation over growing concerns related to the Chinese Communist Party and People’s Liberation Army’s activity in the region.

The US Army is explicitly instrumental in demonstrating the value Indonesians can glean from a defense partnership, as the design of the Super Garuda Shield exercise is heavily weighted by all domain operations that have effects in the land domain and the Indonesian Army remains the dominant arm of the Indonesian National Armed Forces. Soleman B. Ponto of Indonesia’s Strategic Intelligence Agency notes most of the nations participating in Super Garuda Shield are US allies and strategic partners, which lumps Indonesia into the same camp. According to Ponto, “all military training is a form of diplomacy. Indonesia is attempting to convey to the world, through the Super Garuda Shield, that the country still has military allies.”¹⁰ For the United States, the exercise is an opportunity to demonstrate commitment to and assurance of Indonesian security and appears to be achieving this effect.

Another large-scale display of US military strength and the bonds of allyship is the exercise Balikatan in the Philippines.¹¹ This joint and combined exercise is held on the heels of the army-to-army exercise Salaknib. In 2024, Salaknib saw the first deployment of the US Army’s Typhon weapons system, which can launch SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles—making good on the requirement for the Army to create a ring of fires.¹² This operational deployment was discussed and welcomed by Philippine authorities and media and noticed in an unwelcome way by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China.¹³ Notably, the Philippines wants to purchase the Typhon missile system, which is an important milestone as the country shifts from a counterinsurgency focus to a focus on territorial defense.¹⁴

The United States and the Philippines conduct Balikatan as part of the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty; 2024 marked the exercise’s 39th year.¹⁵ Chinese state media and the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China uniformly criticized the exercise, claiming the exercise is provocative and a component of US hegemonic strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. They assert the exercise exacerbated regional tensions under the guise of defense. This observation likely means the Chinese Communist Party is concerned about the challenge to China’s illegitimate territorial claims in the Philippine Sea and their aspirations to control Taiwan by force, if necessary. China Military Online contends the “exercise deserves high attention from all countries in the region.” The need for high attention stems from the increased scale of troops participating in the exercise and the presence of observers from over a dozen countries. Balikatan 2023 saw nearly double the number of participants from the previous year.¹⁶

In addition to land-based, long-range fires, a principal focus of the exercise is practicing the mobile deployment of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 missile systems, the Avenger air-defense missile system, and additional high- and low-altitude air-defense capabilities. China Military Online perceived this weapons-based interoperability focus as the United States’ commitment to improving the quality, volume, and placement of military infrastructure in the Philippines. Chinese security analysts view the increased scale and depth of Balikatan as yet another tool in implementing the US strategy of integrated deterrence. More scathingly, the analysts characterize the US military as deceptive and insidious: “Under the guise of joint exercises, the US is forming cliques in the Asia-Pacific region and pushing for the Indo-Pacific Strategy, which will only create regional divisions . . . [and] destroy peace.”¹⁷ Fiery rhetoric and increased media attention covering Balikatan in state-sponsored outlets give the impression of rising concern regarding US posture among Chinese security experts. Looking broadly across the effectiveness of Super Garuda Shield, Salaknib, and Balikatan, multilateral military exercises appear to have increased assurance and deterrence.

Operation Pathways also enables other lines of US military campaigning. Much like how army-centric exercises pose a twofold advantage of assurance and deterrence, weapons transfers and defense trade deals offer similar benefits. Although India is not formally a US ally, the deepening relationship between the two states—especially in the last 15 years—marks a budding security relationship with great potential. Bilateral defense trade increased from less than $1 billion in 2008 to $18 billion in 2019 and shows no signs of slowing down. The Observer Research Foundation (an independent think tank based in Delhi, India) reports on the growing defense relations enthusiastically. The armament deals are transforming “US-India defence trade from a traditional ‘buyer-seller’ dynamic to one of co-production and co-development.”¹⁸ One of the first steps in this process was the signing of the recent Security of Supply Arrangement.¹⁹ Noting the growth of the defense relationship is dependent on the long-term divestment of Russian military equipment (and therefore residual economic ties), this partnership-centric approach is bearing fruit. The relationship is unlike the typical transactional approach of free-market arms sales, demonstrating mutually perceived value tied to deepening India-US cooperation. Moreover, the approach introduces strategy into an otherwise transactional state-to-state activity.

A 2020 publication in SP’s Aviation, an Indian aviation news media outlet, underscores the strategic value of inducting American-manufactured AH-64E Apache attack helicopters into the Indian forces. As escalating border tensions with China pose an increasing security threat, the helicopters will provide “a significant boost to the capability” of India.²⁰ Although India is still quite far from becoming a treaty ally, as Indian defense analyst Ajai Shukla notes, the partnership represents another positive strategic component of an already strong military partnership.²¹

These few examples show how US allies and partners are bonding together to strengthen deterrence in ways that were unheard of a few years ago. The continued rise of China and the Chinese Communist Party’s vision of the future is pulling the free world together. Landpower plays a vital role in the region because of the outsized impact the region’s armies have on their political systems and the hard work of the US Army throughout the region. This focus on the Army’s work does not underplay all the ongoing interservice and intraservice work. It highlights how the US Army’s work across the domains and war-fighting functions is of significant consequence.

Acknowledgments: The authors would like to thank the Asian Studies Detachment for its collaboration in conducting research for this essay.

Richard D. Butler

Colonel Richard D. Butler is the director of the China Landpower Studies Center at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.

Jimmy Bell

Mr. Jimmy Bell is a master’s student studying international security and intelligence analysis at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver.

Endnotes

1. David M. Finkelstein, “The US Army and the Pacific: Legacies and Challenges,” Parameters 50, no. 3 (Autumn 2020), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol50/iss3/11/. Return to text.
2. “USINDOPACOM Area of Responsibility,” U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, updated August 2024, https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/USPACOM-Area-of-Responsibility/. Return to text.
3. Todd South, “These New Units Take Center Stage in Massive Pacific Exercise,” Army Times, August 3, 2023, https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2023/08/03/these-new-units-take-center-stage-in-massive-pacific-exercise/. Return to text.
4. Joseph Clark, “Super Garuda Shield: U.S., Partners Train in Indo-Pacific,” U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), September 12, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3523152/super-garuda-shield-us-partners-train-in-indo-pacific/. Return to text.
5. Li Jiabao 李嘉宝, “主导多场军演 打造军事同盟 美国搅局亚太包藏祸心” [The United States leads multiple military exercises to build military alliances and has evil intentions in disrupting the Asia-Pacific region], 人民日报海外版 [People’s Daily Overseas Edition], August 25, 2022, http://news.china.com.cn/2022-08/25/content_78389388.htm. Return to text.
6. Li Jiabao, “United States Leads Multiple.” Return to text.
7. Li Jiabao, “United States Leads Multiple.” Return to text.
8. Li Jiabao, “United States Leads Multiple.” Return to text.
9. Gusty da Costa, “Indonesia, US Hold Super Garuda Shield Amidst Growing Concern on China Military Rise,” Indonesia Business Post, August 5, 2022, https://indonesiabusinesspost.com/insider/indonesia-us-hold-super-garuda-shield-amidst-growing-concern-on-china-military-rise/. Return to text.
10. da Costa, “Indonesia, US Hold.” Return to text.
11. “Philippine, US Forces Advancing Territorial Defense, Rapid Infiltration Capabilities at Balikatan,” United States Indo-Pacific Command, May 3, 2024, https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3765358/philippine-us-forces-advancing-territorial-defense-rapid-infiltration-capabilit/. Return to text.
12. Carol V. Evans, “Providing Stability and Deterrence: The US Army in INDOPACOM,” Parameters 51, no. 1 (Spring 2021), https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol51/iss1/5/. Return to text.
13. Bryant Macale, “Analysts: US Missile Deployment Expected to Assist Philippines in Its Territorial Defense,” Benar News, April 23, 2024, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/philippine/us-deploys-mrc-missile-system-in-philippines-04232024123647.html; and “China Resolutely Opposes US’ Deployment of Mid-Range Missile System in Asia-Pacific Region in Bid to Seek Unilateral Military Advantage: Chinese FM,” Global Times, April 18, 2024, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202404/1310867.shtml. Return to text.
14. “The Philippines’ Purchase of Typhon Mid-Range Missile System Will Escalate Regional Tensions: Defense Spokesperson,” Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, November 29, 2024, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/TopStories/16355094.html. Return to text.
15. “China Resolutely Opposes.” Return to text.
16. “Be Wary of ‘Shoulder to Shoulder’ Turning into ‘Picking Sides,’” China Military Online, April 14, 2023, http://www.81.cn/ChinaMilitary/BILINGUAL/16217114.html; and “China Resolutely Opposes.” Return to text.
17. “Be Wary”; and “China Resolutely Opposes.” Return to text.
18. Kashish Parpiani, India-US Defence Trade Continuity Under Trump, Observer Research Foundation Issue Brief No. 376 (Observer Research Foundation, July 2020). Return to text.
19. “DOD, India Ministry of Defence Enter into Security of Supply Arrangement,” DoD, August 22, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3880791/dod-india-ministry-of-defence-enter-into-security-of-supply-arrangement. Return to text.
20. B. K. Pandey, “Combat Helicopters with the Indian Armed Forces,” SP’s Aviation, September 2020, https://www.sps-aviation.com/story/?id=2820&h=Combat-Helicopters-with-the-Indian-Armed-Forces. Return to text.
21. Ajai Shukla, “Atmanirbharta Complicates India-US Arms Deals,” Rediff, February 17, 2024, https://www.rediff.com/news/column/ajai-shukla-indias-atmanirbharta-complicates-india-us-arms-deals/20240217.htm. Return to text