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CLSC Dialogues, a China Landpower Studies Center production. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the U.S. Army War College, or any other agency of the U.S. government. I’m Jake Rinaldi, a defense analyst at the China Landpower Studies Center.
Jake Rinaldi:
In this episode, we’ll be discussing how Chinese leaders conceptualize protracted war.
Joining us is Dan Rice, the China political and military subject matter expert at Marine Corps University. He’s also the CEO of the geopolitical analysis firm Foreign Brief and president of Dongfeng LLC, his consulting company. Dan has published on Chinese strategy and the PLA with various think tanks, academic institutions, and U.S. Department of Defense China centers.
00:00:57:18 – 00:01:25:15
Rinaldi:
He recently published an article—completely in Chinese—with Taiwan’s National Defense University on countering dual-front threats in the maritime domain. We’ll be talking with Dan about research he presented at the 2024 Carlisle Conference on the PLA. His paper explored how the concept of protracted war—a war lasting months or years, consuming vast quantities of munitions, equipment, and lives—appears in Chinese publications from party, state, and military institutions.
00:01:25:18 – 00:01:30:00
Rinaldi:
Dan, welcome, and thank you for being here. Excited to see this paper published.
00:01:30:02 – 00:01:34:17
Dan Rice
Jake, thank you very much for having me. It’s always a pleasure talking with you—really looking forward to this.
00:01:34:19 – 00:01:46:28
Rinaldi:
Let’s start with a quick overview of the paper you wrote for our conference. What’s your central argument or the most interesting or surprising conclusion you reached?
00:01:47:00 – 00:02:13:26
Rice:
Yeah, absolutely. There’s a lot to unpack, but I think the big takeaway is that the way China officially discusses protracted war is slightly different from how we’ve been approaching it.
At the conference, we tried to define what protracted war is and where it fits in our framework. But the way they approach it—across the institutions you mentioned—looks more like a grand strategic framework than a purely military one.
00:02:13:26 – 00:02:54:29
Rice:
So instead of viewing it solely as a military concept, they’re incorporating Mao Zedong’s ideas about protracted war into various aspects of grand strategy.
It’s a bit of a conceptual tangle at first, but it offers insight into trends we see in the news or broader CCP strategic behavior.
00:02:55:02 – 00:03:22:14
Rice:
This is really a whole-of-government, whole-of-civilization type of fight. That was probably the biggest takeaway.
And then, of course, we focus a lot on the PLA—you at CLSC and me at MCU.
For the PLA specifically, one of the most interesting ideas came from a PLA-affiliated author who discussed not a protracted battle per se, but a protracted
process of war—emphasizing preparation, technology development, and gaining small edges in military-adjacent areas to build power.
00:04:24:15 – 00:04:49:06
Rice:
Those were some of the more interesting insights. Personally, I learned a lot from the research and appreciate CLSC for the opportunity to be part of the conference and dig into this topic.
00:04:49:08 – 00:05:12:27
Rinaldi:
Absolutely—a really interesting and well-written paper. Your use of the term "military tangential" really highlights a core theme: the idea of protracted war often appears in economic or national policy discussions rather than strictly military ones.
00:05:12:28 – 00:05:38:13
Rinaldi:
You did find some PLA Daily articles and other military writings, but why do you think the Chinese shy away from discussing protracted war in a military context?
Does it reflect confidence in their ability to win a quick, decisive war—or is it more about political constraints on media and scholarship?
00:05:38:15 – 00:05:42:18
Rinaldi:
That seems like a really important question.
00:05:42:21 – 00:06:21:25
Rice:
Yeah, and it’s a really interesting one. You kind of have to read the tea leaves, because they don’t say it explicitly.
But I’d guess it’s
not about confidence in winning a short, sharp war.
In fact, in talking with colleagues, we’re still trying to figure out if China has ever used the term “short and sharp war” to describe a conflict with the U.S.—and the answer is probably no.
00:06:21:25 – 00:07:01:14
Rice:
Many Chinese sources suggest the opposite: that a war with the U.S. wouldn’t be short. They often avoid the term “protracted,” but the implication is that it would be long.
That likely connects to history. Under Xi Jinping, there’s been a significant emphasis on studying party history and strategic thought. The CCP and PLA share very similar strategic roots.
00:07:01:14 – 00:07:27:00
Rice:
So it’s partly about using party history—particularly Mao Zedong Thought—to frame modern challenges. There are probably a number of reasons for this approach.
00:07:27:02 – 00:08:06:01
Rice:
One possibility is that Xi used protracted war discourse to consolidate ideological leadership before securing his third term.
A group of authors from CITIC—China International Trust Investment Corporation—even tried to redefine protracted war in economic terms.
00:08:06:07 – 00:08:49:04
Rice:
They published that book in 2016—right around the time the 14th Five-Year Plan was coming into focus.
So the concept of protracted war became a sort of thought-leadership tool aligned with Xi’s emphasis on party history and long-term planning. It helped lay the ideological groundwork for that Five-Year Plan, which coincided with Xi’s third term.
00:08:49:07 – 00:09:23:11
Rice:
So really, it’s a way of consolidating party strategy and thought under Xi.
They’re using these older, not-always-successful models to address modern challenges—and to support Xi’s vision for China’s future.
00:09:23:11 – 00:09:44:27
Rice:
That thinking also informs how they approach different domains, including the military—but always as part of a broader, more strategic framework.
00:09:44:29 – 00:10:17:11
Rinaldi:
Very interesting. At the conference, there was a lot of discussion about China’s so-called “gray zone” tactics—low-level confrontation strategies.
Some participants even argued that we’re already in a protracted competition with China.
Do you think that’s a useful analytical lens?
Rice:
Yeah, fantastic. I think “protracted competition” is actually a pretty apt way to describe it. And I incorporated this into the paper that you guys are publishing. I did the due diligence of buying that CITIC Press book and reading through it—though it’s not from the PLA; it’s more of an economic strategy book. But what I found fascinating was its descriptions of globalization and, in particular, its take on the Thucydides Trap with the U.S., framed under protracted war theory. It emphasized the need to avoid an existential battle with the U.S.
And that’s a core idea of protracted war: many small, decisive engagements instead of one large, existential battle. The way to avoid that kind of decisive conflict is through gray zone or coercive activities that fall below the threshold of open war. If the strategy is to gradually accumulate favorable, small-scale victories to shift the balance of power, then these quasi-war operations—what I’d call coercive activities or PLA operations—are key tools.
That’s how you start to shift the balance without engaging in a full-scale, existential fight—or what some might call the Thucydides Trap: a large-scale war with the current hegemon. So when we say “protracted competition,” I think that’s a fair description. Their writings reflect that, across different levers of comprehensive national power.
They also talk more broadly—not always directly tied to protracted war—about using coercion to gain advantage. And, quick plug: we’re standing up a
Journal of PLA Studies at MQ. One of the first articles will be a comprehensive look at operationalizing PLA coercive activities.
There’s a broad spectrum across PLA services and fields where they envision applying pressure—whether it’s to deter or compel adversaries—to shape international conditions for China’s rise. So stay tuned for that.
Rinaldi:
That sounds very, very interesting. Important work. A lot of what we’re discussing is how Mao’s writings are being resurrected—whether for political mobilization or analytical framing of U.S.-China competition, or even just China’s broader regional goals. So I wonder: to what extent does this modern framing signal a shift in how China approaches global competition or national security?
And how much of it is really a departure from historical PRC policies and rhetoric in these areas?
Rice:
Yeah, excellent questions. And I think there are a couple layers to each of them.
First, I wouldn’t necessarily say it’s a shift. Earlier we talked about the political backdrop to this resurgence in discussion of protracted war. I’d say it’s more of a refocus—or maybe a doubling down—on how China has traditionally approached both grand strategy and military conflict.
Mao’s
On Protracted War came out of the Chinese Civil War and the Second Sino-Japanese War—what we’d call the beginning of WWII. But it was also invoked during the Korean War, though not as successfully. At one point, someone in the CCP even asked Mao to write an update—
On Protracted War 2.0, so to speak.
So it’s not just a one-off historical moment. The CCP has revisited protracted war multiple times. And with Xi Jinping leaning more toward the “red” than the “expert,” he’s drawn back to older, tried-and-sometimes-true strategies. So I wouldn’t call it a major shift. But the rhetoric surrounding it does suggest a more aggressive way of framing international problems.
Now, folks listening might say, “China’s always aggressive,” or maybe, “No, they’re not.” But if you’re looking through a red lens, what you’ll see is the persistent duality of internal versus external. Protracted war addresses both.
When applied to international policy, it suggests a kind of existential struggle against a major external force. So yes—it comes off as more aggressive externally. But internally, too, it signals something.
Invoking protracted war means something to the domestic audience as well. And that’s where the duality really shows. While it may trigger concern or resistance among regional players—especially after they published that terminology in party meeting minutes—they quickly scrubbed it from the record.
You can still find it through secondary sources if you dig deep, but they realized, “Oh wow, this comes across as aggressive.” So yes, it might rattle China’s neighbors—but domestically, too, the idea of protracted war carries weight. It’s not exactly friendly.
So overall, the tone is a little more grim, a little more tense. But definitely worthwhile to study further—especially as we see how this rhetoric gets tested internationally.
They’ll sometimes roll out terms like
protracted war, see how they land, and if they’re too aggressive, they pull them back. So we’ll see how it plays out. But if you try to take a neutral stance on this, it gets even more interesting.
00:19:43:11 – 00:19:58:24
Rice:
We over here—you at CLSC, me at MSI—and our colleagues in the other DoD China centers are really starting to dive into this problem at the same time that China is starting to talk and dive into it as well.
00:19:58:26 – 00:20:24:22
Rinaldi:
Absolutely. I think that’s kind of where I’d like to finish up, too—with a final question. How do you anticipate
protracted war continuing to play a role in your research, particularly? But also, how do you see it evolving in our field? As China subject matter experts, what analytical problem sets should we be looking at related to protracted war?
00:20:24:25 – 00:20:51:22
Rice:
Sure. So first and foremost, I think like we just mentioned—nothing is ever really all that new—but this is certainly an interesting time to be relooking at the issue and recontextualizing what it means. That’s true both for us on the blue side, as well as for China.
00:20:51:24 – 00:21:19:24
Rice:
It will absolutely play a role in research, because I think what we can glean from the current situation is that both sides understand this would not be ideal. Protracted war is not good for anyone. If we were to engage in it, the outcomes would be significant—honestly, world-altering.
00:21:19:24 – 00:22:07:23
Rice:
So as we look at the reconstruction of
protracted war into, as you’ve suggested,
protracted competition, what are the military implications for us? I think we’re already starting to see some of those bubbling up—strong pushes on both sides into smart systems, drones, and AI-enabled systems. What the PLA would call the “intelligentization” of warfare. That pursuit of a military edge in technology is mirrored by our own reexamination of the defense industrial base, trying to spin it back up to speed.
00:22:07:26 – 00:22:45:11
Rice:
China may be a bit deeper into that game—although there are all sorts of variables affecting it—but their focus on building out those capabilities clearly plays into this concept of protracted competition. I think that’s something we’ll need to understand in greater and greater detail, especially as we approach some of the big milestone years ahead.
00:22:45:17 – 00:23:07:26
Rice:
Right—and not to name them specifically—but if you know, you know. So I think those moments are going to be very important. And one thing I took away from the recent conference was our effort to figure out what
protracted war even means.
00:23:07:26 – 00:23:41:23
Rice:
One answer someone gave was, “Thirty days—that’s protracted war.” And I was like, really? Desert Storm took a little longer than that, right? Depends on if you’re talking about the Air-Land campaign or the broader conflict. It’s about 32 days, give or take. So when we look at this concept, we need to take a more holistic view of what it means—and what it means for the Department of Defense as we prepare for a protracted competition.
00:23:41:25 – 00:24:01:21
Rice:
And I think if we do that—if we really lean into that kind of thinking—it’ll help us move into the future more prepared, no matter the outcome. It’s always better to be overprepared than caught unawares.
00:24:01:23 – 00:24:07:24
Rinaldi:
Absolutely. Super insightful. Dan, thank you so much for your time today. I really appreciate it.
00:24:07:26 – 00:24:09:26
Rice:
Thank you, Jake. It’s been a pleasure.
00:24:09:29 – 00:24:23:25
Rinaldi:
Listeners, you can learn more about the China Landpower Studies Center at ssi.armywarcollege.edu/CLSC—that’s the abbreviation for the China Landpower Studies Center.
Keywords: China, PLA, Taiwan, maritime domain, protracted war, technology development, global competition, national security, historical PRC policies, Xi Jinping, Mao Zedong