China’s September 2025 Military Parade: How PLA Ground Forces Are Adapting to Future Wars and Force Projection

Joshua Arostegui

China’s military parades are often viewed as a form of deterrence by giving Xi Jinping an opportunity to showcase the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) advanced weapons systems to the world and bring like-minded authoritarian leaders from partner states together in a show of unity against the Western-led international liberal order.¹ The extravagant events, however, also open a window into understanding Beijing’s expectation of how and where it will fight in the future. Despite the unveiling of several new weapons driven through Tiananmen Square during the 70-minute parade, most of them, like the YJ-20 hypersonic anti-ship missile and LY-1 shipborne laser air defense system, were designed to deter and defeat the United States and its allies in the air and maritime domains of the Indo-Pacific region.² Yet, the first formations of vehicles to cross in front of Xi and his guests, those belonging to the PLA Army (PLAA), PLA Air Force Airborne Corps (PLAAFAC), and PLA Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC), represented something different: an acknowledgement that future wars will be global and force projection needs to be accompanied by land-based firepower and protection.

Tanks: Prioritizing Protection and Mobility

As it did in the 2019 the People’s Republic of China (PRC) anniversary parade, the PLAA led the vehicle portion with its most capable main battle tanks (MBT). While the Type-99A MBT spearheaded the army’s columns in 2019, newly unveiled Type-99B main battle tanks from the 112th Combined Arms Brigade, 82nd Group Army, led the formation. Official Chinese media described the Type-99B as an upgrade from the Type-99A, with improved all-weather communications, firepower, and maneuver capabilities.³ Despite such noteworthy advances in heavy MBT technology, the new Type-100 fourth-generation medium tanks and accompanying Type-100 support vehicles that followed the Type-99B stole the show as they represented China’s next development in advanced deployable armored platforms.

Figure 1. The Type-100 tank followed by the Type-100 support vehicle make their debut at the September 3, 2025, military parade in Beijing
(Source: Zhao Lei, “First Model of Fourth-Generation Main Battle Tank Debuts at V-Day Parade, Xinhua, https://www.chinadailyasia.com/hk/article/619173.)

Designed for long-range rapid deployment, campaign target seizure, tactical deep assault, urban attack and defense operations, and joint fire guidance, the lighter Type-100 vehicles represent the army’s ability to push more powerful, yet sustainable, forces abroad.⁴ According to military affairs expert Fu Qianshao, while the Type-99B represents the latest in heavy armor firepower, the Type-100 vehicles were developed to work together through “informationized” and “intelligentized” interconnectivity. The tanks can use their 105mm main guns to strike targets while the support vehicles detect and destroy smaller mobile unarmored threats with a suite of sensors, mounted UAS, and 30mm main guns that appear capable of firing at a 90-degree angle.⁵ Additionally, both vehicles were designed to be more survivable by equipping the GL-6 active protection system (APS) with 360-degree quad-faced phased array radar and remote weapon stations to target drones and other airborne threats.⁶

Although the Type-100 vehicles present high-tech solutions to threats employed in Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Gaza, they also demonstrate the PLA’s objective to make ground forces more sustainable. A universal chassis, including a track system that appears to be the same as the in-service Type-15 light tanks, lowers maintenance costs and enables easier repair when deployed. The lighter design also allows for rapid response air and sea transport to crisis areas, making the Type-100 optimally suited for the PLAN Marine Corps, which also fields the Type-15 in small numbers.⁷ The vehicles’ advanced sensors and protective measures, however, will likely increase the production costs and negate the ease of battlefield repairs, potentially leaving these new platforms to suffer the same fate as the Russian T-14 Armata, with budget overruns, small production numbers, and technical problems.⁸

Amphibious Vehicles: Prioritizing Sustainability

China’s marines participated in the parade ground assault formation amphibious group, showcasing another universal chassis that demonstrates the move toward global mobility. While the PLAN Marine Corps drove the Type-05 series of amphibious vehicles in the 2019 parade, this year, they switched from tracked platforms to wheeled 8x8 platforms to introduce an upgrade to the Type-08 chassis found in both the PLAA and PLANMC.⁹ Chinese military expert Zhang Junshe claimed the new wheeled systems can reach approximately 100 kilometers per hour with a range of more than 500 kilometers, allowing them to transition from an initial amphibious landing to inland attack and exploitation. The parade formation included assault guns, infantry fighting vehicles (IFV), and self-propelled howitzer variants, but Zhang also claimed that command-and-control, armored-personnel-carrier (APC), information-support, and fire-support variants will be added.¹⁰ The addition of these systems, which already exist on the Type-08 chassis, will provide the army and marines with various modular multidomain force package options.

The upgrades of the newer 8x8 armored vehicle over the Type-08 include a more powerful engine, an automatic transmission, improved suspension, and the addition of twin ducted water-jet propulsors at the rear that enable speeds of 8 to 10 kilometers per hour on the water.¹¹ Despite the amphibious capability of the vehicles, they are slower and less protected than the Type-05 tracked amphibious armored vehicle series, leaving them relatively unfit to serve as an initial landing force in a contested amphibious operation. Instead, the vehicles provide the PLAA and PLANMC with a universal chassis that is easy to deploy long distances via air, sea, rail, and road and maintain in remote locations as demonstrated at the Djibouti support base for several years.¹² The mobility of this new chassis is also suited for the complex terrain of potential crises areas in Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, where Beijing may need to protect its Belt and Road Initiative projects.

Airborne Vehicles: Prioritizing Lessons Learned

The PLAAF Airborne Corps (PLAAFAC) revealed major upgrades at the 2025 parade with new tracked air-droppable vehicles that appear to have greatly improved upon the ZBD03 IFV, a platform already obsolete when it appeared in the 2019 parade.¹³ Using another universal chassis, the new airborne vehicles at the parade included IFV, APC, and 120mm mortar-howitzer combination gun variants. According to Fu, the new airborne vehicles were developed in concert with the growth of China’s air combat forces, particularly the Y-20 heavy transport aircraft. He also noted that after being airdropped from a Y-20, these new vehicles allow PLAAFAC troops to transform from light infantry into armored forces upon landing.¹⁴

Prior to fielding these new vehicles, airborne forces relied on obsolete 107mm rocket launchers and mortars for ground fire support in light infantry units and the 30mm autocannon and rail-launched anti-tank guided missiles of the existing tracked and wheeled IFVs in mechanized units. While the new IFV variant still has a 30mm autocannon, the newly developed 120mm combination gun gives PLAAFAC troops the ability to strike targets out to 12 kilometers using multiple types of mortar and howitzer shells.¹⁵

Despite the clear increase in firepower, the advances in protection of the IFV and APC variants are the most recognizable improvement to the airborne force’s ability to project force. According to Fu, the load capacity of the Y-20 enabled the PLAAFAC to develop heavier combat vehicles with reactive armor, APS, and remote weapon stations. These capabilities provide airborne vehicles with protection levels nearing those of the new Type-100 series.¹⁶

Since China views airborne operations as the fastest and most flexible method of force projection for war and non-war military actions, the PLAAFAC has a rapid response requirement that demands its combat vehicles maintain a high level of readiness.¹⁷ Additionally, the PLA undoubtedly learned from Russia’s poor use of its BMD-4 airborne combat vehicle in the initial phases of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Within the first couple months, Ukrainian forces destroyed or captured dozens of the vehicles, leading to protection upgrades that took until 2024.¹⁸ The equipping of advanced APS and counter-drone systems indicates the airborne corps is attempting to ensure its armored vehicles do not suffer the same fate in future engagements.

Conclusion

The new combat vehicles were not the only surprises at the September 3, 2025, parade. The formation of the PLAA’s venerable PCH191 modular long-range rocket launcher displayed launchers mounted with 370mm 4-rocket pods and, for the first time, launchers mounted with 750mm single-missile pods capable of firing out to 500 kilometers.¹⁹ Additionally, the parade showcased several land-based unmanned systems, including wheeled, tracked, and quadruped robots designed to support ground forces in different environments and terrains. According to Chinese military expert Zhang Xuefeng, these new systems build on man-unmanned teaming concepts and can be equipped with varying payloads that provide reconnaissance, mine clearance, fire support, and other battlefield capabilities.²⁰ While some of the parade’s new technologies, especially the PCH191, demonstrate areas where China is already fielding advanced combat systems, its new unmanned systems are examples of how the PLA intends to gain an advantage in future battles.²¹

Figure 2. The PCH191 modular long-range rocket launcher debuts its 750mm close-range ballistic missile capability at the September 3, 2025, military parade in Beijing
(Source: Zhao Lei, “China Unveils New Military Weapon Systems during V-Day Parade,” China Daily, https://www.chinadailyasia.com/hk/article/619111#China-unveils-new-military-weapon-systems-during-V-Day-parade-2025-09-02.)

The development of a series of multiservice universal chassis for China’s ground forces is another area where the PLA is leading from the front. The army and marine corps already have several years of experience equipping the CSK-series high-mobility chassis and Type-08 8x8 variants in their brigades.²² However, like the airborne corps, the other services’ lighter and most transportable vehicles lacked protection and adequate firepower to ensure success in future combat abroad. The new land systems that passed in review for Xi and his guests demonstrate the PLA’s objective to create a ground force that can defend the mainland and deploy abroad to protect its growing global interests, even if the dispatched personnel lost three months during their peak training season to learn how to drive or march in parade formations.

Joshua Arostegui
Joshua Arostegui is the chair of China Studies and research director of the China Landpower Studies Center at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. His primary research topics include Chinese strategic Landpower, People’s Liberation Army joint operations, and Indo-Pacific security affairs. Arostegui is also a chief warrant officer 5 in the US Navy Reserve, where he serves as a flag adviser in the information warfare community.

Acknowledgments: Thanks to Dennis Blasko for his review and insights.

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Endnotes

1. Xiao Tianling [肖天亮], ed., 战略学 [Science of Military Strategy] (National Defense University Press, 2020), 136; and Helen Davidson, “Military Reveals and Bold Messaging: Five Key Takeaways from China’s Big Parade,” The Guardian, September 3, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/sep/03/military-reveals-and-bold-messaging-five-key-takeaways-from-chinas-big-parade. China’s use of military parades as a form of deterrence has appeared in various editions of the Science of Military Strategy dating back to 2001. Return to text.
2. David Rising, “China’s Military Parade Reveals New Hypersonic Missiles, Drone Submarines ICBMs,” AP News, September 3, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/china-military-parade-weapons-missiles-drones-submarine-efd398d9b3198bb63b505151162312cf. Return to text.
3. Fan Yongqiang et al. [樊永强], “铁流滚滚，向着胜利的方向——国庆70周年阅兵装备方队受阅侧记” [Towards Victory: A Side Note on the Equipment Parade for the 70th Anniversary of National Day], 新华网 [Xinhua], October 2, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-10/02/c_1125068959.htm; and Mei Shixiong and Wang Hui [梅世雄、王慧], “地面突击方队：“陆战之王”尽显攻坚突破强大战力” [Ground Assault Formation: “King of Land Warfare” Demonstrates Its Powerful Combat Capability in Breaking through Difficulties], 新华网 [Xinhua], September 3, 2025, http://www.news.cn/20250903/80ef7098508e439ca91a95197bfafa98/c.html. The 112th Combined Arms Brigade, previously a division, was the PLA’s first motorized, mechanized, and digitized unit. Return to text.
4. “Ground Assault Formation: ‘King of Land Warfare’ Demonstrates its Powerful Combat Capability in Breaking through Difficulties.” Return to text.
5. Liu Xuanzun et al., “PLA’s Type 100 New-Generation Tank Makes Debut with High-Level Informatization,” Global Times, September 3, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202509/1342492.shtml. Return to text.
6. Amber Wang, “New Tank Shows China Adapting to Drone-Era Battlefield and Landing Operations: Analyst,” SCMP, August 26, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3323231/new-tank-shows-china-adapting-drone-era-battlefield-and-landing-operations-analyst; and Zhao Lei, “First Model of Fourth-Generation Main Battles Tank Debuts at V-Day Parade,” China Daily, September 3, 2025, https://www.chinadailyasia.com/hk/article/619173. Return to text.
7. Gabriel Dominguez et al., “PLANMC May Be Re-Equipping for Combined Arms, Multidomain Operations,” Janes, June 2, 2021, https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/planmc-may-be-re-equipping-for-combined-arms-multidomain-operations. Return to text.
8. Steve Balestrieri, “Russia’s T-14 Armata ‘Super’ Tank Is a Giant Waste of Steel,” National Security Journal, September 3, 2025, https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/russias-t-14-armata-super-tank-is-a-giant-waste-of-steel/. Return to text.
9. “两栖突击车方队：背水善攻坚 刀锋永向前” [“Amphibious Assault Vehicle Team: With Our Backs against the Wall, We Will Forge ahead with Our Swords”], 新华网 [Xinhua], October 1, 2019, https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2019-10/01/content_5435656.htm. Return to text.
10. Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Displays Three Types of Wheeled Combat Vehicles for Amphibious Landing Operations,” Global Times, September 3, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202509/1342519.shtml. Return to text.
11. “China’s New ZTL-19 Armored Vehicle with 105mm Gun Enhances Army Firepower and Mobility,” Army Recognition, May 27, 2025, https://armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2025/chinas-new-ztl-19-armored-vehicle-with-105mm-gun-enhances-army-firepower-and-mobility. Return to text.
12. “中国人民解放军驻吉布提保障基地开展实战化训练” [“The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Carried Out Combat Training at Its Support Base in Djibouti”], 央视网 [CCTV], January 9, 2022, link. Return to text.
13. “习近平在视察空降兵军时强调 全面加强练兵备战 提高空降作战能力 努力建设一支强大的现代化空降兵部队” [“Xi Jinping, While Inspecting the Airborne Forces, Stressed the Importance of Comprehensively Strengthening Training and Combat Readiness, Improving Airborne Combat Capabilities, and Striving to Build a Strong, Modernized Airborne Force”], 央视网 [CCTV], November 5, 2024, https://tv.cctv.com/2024/11/05/VIDEAfuWOWajEzmJNASst90D241105.shtml; and Li Yun and Jiang Long [黎云、蒋龙], “空降兵战车方队：首次编入陆上作战模块受阅” [“Airborne Vehicle Formation: First Time Incorporated into the Land Combat Module for Review”], 新华网 [Xinhua], October 1, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-10/01/c_1125063112.htm. Return to text.
14. Li Xuanzun et al., “China’s New-Generation Airborne Combat Vehicles Unveiled, ‘To Make Paratroopers Armored Forces with Y-20 Aircraft Airdrop,’ ” Global Times, September 3, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202509/1342496.shtml. Return to text.
15. “PLL-05 (Type 05) Chinese 120mm Self-Propelled Mortar,” TRADOC ODIN, August 13, 2024, https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/Type_05_(PLL-05)_Chinese_120mm_Self-Propelled_Mortar_Howitzer_(SPMH). The 120mm mortar-howitzer on the new airborne vehicle uses the same cannon system as the PLL05 and other PLAA combination gun variants. Return to text.
16. Li Xuanzun et al., “Aircraft Airdrop.” Return to text.
17. Xiao Tianling, Science of Military Strategy, 376–77. Return to text.
18. Dylan Malyasov, “Eight Russian Newst Airborne IFVs Fell into the Hands of Ukrainian Soldiers,” March 16, 2022, https://defence-blog.com/eight-russian-newest-airborne-ifvs-fell-into-the-hands-of-ukrainian-soldiers/; and Sam Cranny-Evans, “Kurganmashzavod Delivers BMD-4M and BMP-3 Upgraded for War in Ukraine,” EDR Online, May 20, 2024, https://www.edrmagazine.eu/kurganmashzavod-delivers-bmd-4m-and-bmp-3-upgraded-for-war-in-ukraine. Return to text.
19. Joshua Arostegui, The PCH191 Modular Long-Range Rocket Launcher: Reshaping the PLA Army’s Role in a Cross-Strait Campaign, CMSI China Maritime Reports, no. 32 (US Naval War College, 2023), https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/32; and Liu Xuanzun, “Two Variants of Type 191 Modularized Rocket Artillery Appear at Military Parade; Expert Highlights Long Range, High Accuracy, Strong Firepwer, Low Cost,” Global Times, September 3, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202509/1342497.shtml. Return to text.
20. Liu Xuanzun et al., “China’s Land-Based Unmanned Combat Systems Unveiled at V-Day Parade, to Support Amphibious Landing, Urban Warfare: Expert,” Global Times, September 3, 2025, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202509/1342520.shtml. Return to text.
21. Chris Buckley and Agnes Chang, “China’s Latest Missiles, Drones and Submarines, Up Close,” The New York Times, September 3, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/09/03/world/asia/china-military-parade-weapons.html. Return to text.
22. Joshua Arostegui, “An Introduction to China’s High-Mobility Combined Arms Battalion Concept,” Infantry, no. 3 (Fall 2020); Joshua Arostegui, “PLA Army and Marine Corps Amphibious Brigades in a Post-Reform Military,” in Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan,” ed. Joel Wuthnow et al. (National Defense University Press, 2022), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Other-Publications/Books/Crossing-the-Strait/. Return to text.