The Growing Significance of China-Russia Defense Cooperation

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s two recent meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping, especially his visit to Beijing in May, reinforced US and allied concerns about the China-Russia relationship, especially the two countries’ growing security cooperation. In recent months, US officials have increasingly called attention to the support that China is providing to Russia’s defense industry, which has helped Russia to sustain its war effort in Ukraine. Russian arms sales and other forms of bilateral defense cooperation have strengthened China’s military capabilities, heightening the challenges US and allied defense planners face as they prepare for a potential armed conflict in the Indo-Pacific. If such an armed conflict were to occur, the potential support that Russia might provide to China is another factor that they must consider.

During Putin’s visit to Beijing, he and Xi portrayed themselves as defenders of global stability against pressure from the United States and its allies.¹  The China-Russia partnership has remained strong during the period since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which occurred less than three weeks after the two leaders declared that their countries’ friendship had “no limits.”² China has never officially endorsed the war, but it has offered Russia diplomatic support and a crucial economic lifeline. Amid its growing rivalry with the United States, it continues to view Russia as an important partner.

By posing simultaneous security challenges in the Indo-Pacific and Europe, respectively, China and Russia are placing increased strain on US defense strategy and presenting defense planners with difficult choices.³ Under current US force structure and doctrine, the United States would be hard-pressed to fight great-power wars against China and Russia at the same time.⁴ This raises difficult questions for policymakers, such as how much weaponry and ammunition the United States can provide to Ukraine without potentially jeopardizing its ability to defend Taiwan.⁵ Both China and Russia recognize that this situation, by stretching US attention and resources, potentially affords both of them some additional room to maneuver in their own regions.

Such considerations appear to have been an important motivation for Russia’s defense cooperation with China, which has significantly augmented the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Throughout the period of China’s military modernization, which began more than three decades ago, Russia has been China’s top foreign arms supplier. Since 1990, Russia has sold more than $38.5 billion worth of arms to China, accounting for 77 percent of China’s total arms imports during this period.⁶

These arms sales have been particularly important in strengthening China’s air, naval, anti-air, and anti-ship capabilities. In recent years, the S-400 air defense system and Su-35 fighter jets have been the most prominent items that Russia has sold to China.⁷ Both of these systems strengthened China’s ability to contest the airspace in the Indo-Pacific, increasing the difficulty that the United States would face in defending Taiwan.⁸ Russia is helping China to build a missile attack early warning system, and the two countries are engaged in the joint development of heavy-lift helicopters, conventional attack submarines, and missiles.⁹ The possibility that China could acquire Russia’s submarine quieting technology, either by imitation or direct transfer, is of particular concern. By helping to strengthen China’s military capabilities in ways that are particularly relevant to scenarios of armed conflict against US-led coalitions in the Indo-Pacific, Russia potentially distracts the United States and diverts its attention away from European security. This situation raises the possibility that in the event of aggression by either China or Russia, the other might act opportunistically to advance its own interests. 

China and Russia have also conducted joint military activities, including ground and naval exercises, of increasing frequency, intensity, and geographical scope.¹⁰ The two countries have conducted joint ground exercises since 2005, often within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and in many cases focusing on counterterrorism. China and Russia have conducted joint naval exercises since 2012, most of which have been held in the Western Pacific.

 The sensitive locations of some of these joint exercises suggest an intention to engage in political signaling. For example, joint naval exercises in the Yellow Sea may have been intended to express displeasure with US-South Korea joint naval exercises.¹¹ China and Russia have also conducted joint naval exercises in the East China Sea, where China has declared an air defense identification zone and has a maritime territorial dispute with Japan over the Senkaku Islands, as well as in the South China Sea, where China makes expansive claims in defiance of an international tribunal’s ruling. China and Russia have also participated in the other’s domestic military exercises and have conducted regular joint air patrols since 2019.¹²

Despite the increasing scope and scale of these exercises, they reflect the lack of interoperability between the Russian military and the PLA. For now, the two militaries lack the capability to conduct joint operations, a situation that is unlikely to change soon. Both countries view themselves as independent great powers and may therefore be unlikely to seek the kind of interoperability that US and allied militaries have established. 

China and Russia have refrained from establishing a formal military alliance, largely because they wish to avoid being drawn into the other’s conflicts. Nevertheless, the support that China and Russia provide each other in crises could potentially play an important role. Russia’s war in Ukraine serves as an ongoing test case of the support that China is willing to provide Russia. China insists that it has not provided Russia with weapons for the war in Ukraine.¹³ US officials agree that they have seen no evidence of China providing weapons or other forms of lethal assistance, aside from some shipments of gunpowder and other items.¹⁴

However, US officials have criticized China for providing dual-use items that Russia has employed on the battlefield, including semiconductors, drone components, sensors, earthmovers, and nitrocellulose, an ingredient in rocket propellent.¹⁵ In early May, before Putin’s visit to Beijing, the United States imposed sanctions on several Chinese companies that have supplied such items.¹⁶ In June, the United States imposed new financial sanctions on Russia, including an expansion of secondary sanctions that could be applied to any foreign financial institutions, including those in China, that might help Russia to finance its war effort.¹⁷ China appears to be walking a tightrope by providing Russia with as much assistance as possible without incurring heavy sanctions by Western countries.

In an armed conflict involving China, Russia might consider providing various forms of support.¹⁸ In the most likely scenario, Russia could serve as a strategic and support base for China.¹⁹ In this case, Russia could assist China in countering various measures that the United States could impose to place pressure on China’s economy.²⁰ Perhaps most importantly, Russia could provide China with additional energy resources, which could be especially useful if the US Navy were to restrict China’s access to seaborne oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) deliveries by blockading the Strait of Malacca. Russia might also conduct cyberattacks against US military logistics or infrastructure or provide additional weapons and technical assistance to support the PLA’s war effort.²¹

Less likely, but still conceivable, are certain scenarios in which China and Russia might engage in coordinated military action.²² Given the lack of interoperability between the two militaries, they would be unlikely to attempt joint operations. Instead, they would most likely engage in military action in separate sectors, fighting separately but for common purposes. In one scenario, the two countries might consider a coordinated intervention in Central Asia, though such an effort would most likely be for purposes of counterterrorism or regional stabilization and would not involve fighting against the United States.

Opinions differ on the role that Russia might play in a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in June, during which he and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un signed a defense pact pledging mutual military assistance in the event that either country is attacked, highlighted the increasingly close relationship that Russia and North Korea have built in recent months.²³ This relationship is a potential source of irritation for China, which may be concerned that it could encourage provocative actions by North Korea that could lead to a strengthened US military posture in the region.²⁴ According to one view, China would have little to gain from Russia’s involvement in an armed conflict on the peninsula and would prefer that it remain on the sidelines. In the view of some Russian analysts, however, China might wish to bring Russia’s powerful nuclear deterrent into play, along with its air defense and anti-ship systems, which might prevent US military forces from crossing the demilitarized zone into North Korea.²⁵ China’s participation in Russia’s large Vostok-2018 domestic exercises occurred at a time of tension on the peninsula and had relevance for scenarios there.²⁶

Scenarios involving Japan are of special concern. In recent years, Japan has revised its national security strategy and boosted its defense spending, driven partly by concerns about growing China-Russia defense cooperation.²⁷ In the event of any conflict involving both China and Japan, Russia could complicate matters for the US-Japan alliance. In a US-China war, as Oriana Skylar Mastro argues in a recent study, Russia could set up its own defensive air patrols in Northeast Asia, justifying such an action as homeland defense.²⁸ This would create sanctuaries for Chinese offensive power, distract Japanese forces, draw down Japanese resources, and prevent the United States from establishing air and naval superiority by denying it access to important positions. Such a step might complicate a potential intervention by Japanese forces to help defend Taiwan against a Chinese invasion. 

The China-Russia partnership, including bilateral defense cooperation, will require close attention from US intelligence officials and defense planners in the years ahead.²⁹ In the view of some analysts, the relationship is not as strong as China and Russia would like the West to think and could eventually fray as a result of diverging interests and world views.³⁰ Yet the level of cooperation that China and Russia have achieved in recent years has exceeded most observers’ expectations. Both separately and through their coordinated activities, which also include closer collaboration in a broader axis that includes Iran and North Korea, the two countries are likely to pose increasingly serious challenges to US defense strategy.³¹

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Brian G. Carlson

Brian G. Carlson is research professor of Indo-Pacific security studies at the Strategic Studies Institute. His research focuses primarily on the China-Russia relationship. He holds a PhD in international relations from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC. He speaks both Chinese and Russian.

Endnotes

1. Austin Ramzy, “Putin Casts Russia and China as Defenders of Stability,” Wall Street Journal (website), May 16, 2024, www.wsj.com/world/putin-beijing-visit-xi-support-3b0531c3. Return to text.
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4. U.S. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of The United States of America (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2018); and Hal Brands and Evan Braden Montgomery, “One War Is Not Enough: Strategy and Force Planning for Great-Power Competition,” Texas National Security Review 3, no. 2 (Spring 2020): 89. Return to text.
5. Elbridge Colby, “America Must Face Reality and Prioritise China over Europe,” Financial Times (website), May 23, 2024, www.ft.com/content/b423aa65-b9cb-4ba5-9c7d-f67dc289a18f. Return to text.
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8. Paul Schwartz, “Russia-China Defense Cooperation: New Developments,” Asan Forum (website), February 9, 2017, https://theasanforum.org/russia-china-defense-cooperation-new-developments/; and Timothy R. Heath, “How China’s New Russian Air Defense System Could Change Asia,” War on the Rocks (website), January 21, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/01/how-chinas-new-russian-air-defense-system-could-change-asia/. Return to text.
9. “Russia Helping China to Build Missile-Attack Warning System: Putin,” Reuters (website), October 3, 2019, www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN1WI20D/; and Hal Brands, “The New Autocratic Alliances,” Foreign Affairs (website), March 29, 2024, www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/new-autocratic-alliances. Return to text.
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16. Daphne Psaledakis, “US Issues Hundreds of Sanctions Targeting Russia, Takes Aim at Chinese Companies,” Reuters (website), May 1, 2024, www.reuters.com/world/us-issues-hundreds-sanctions-targeting-russia-takes-aim-chinese-companies-2024-05-01/. Return to text.
17. David E. Sanger et al., “US Expands Sanctions on Russia as G7 Leaders Gather,” New York Times (website), June 12, 2024, www.nytimes.com/2024/06/12/us/politics/us-russia-china-sanctions-g7.html. Return to text.
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29. Daniel Flatley, “US Spies See China, Russia Militaries Working Closer on Taiwan,” Bloomberg (website), May 2, 2024, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-05-02/us-spies-see-china-russia-militaries-working-closer-on-taiwan. Return to text.
30. Bobo Lo, “The Sino-Russian Partnership and Global Order,” China International Strategy Review 2 (2020). Return to text.
31. Brands, “New Autocratic Alliances”; Philip Zelikow, “Confronting Another Axis? History, Humility, and Wishful Thinking,” Strategist 7, no. 3 (Summer 2024): 80–99; and Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine, “The Axis of Upheaval,” Foreign Affairs (website), April 23, 2024, www.foreignaffairs.com/china/axis-upheaval-russia-iran-north-korea-taylor-fontaine. Return to text.

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