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Feb. 27, 2025

Assessing the Zeitenwende

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Zeitenwende: China, Germany, and the United States

May-Britt U. Stumbaum and Sharon de Cet
©2025 May-Britt U. Stumbaum and Sharon de Cet

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Changes in Germany’s perception of the People’s Republic of China, its global role, and its policies had been underway for some time, but the Zeitenwende meant particularly two things for Germany’s China policy. First, Germany recognized China did not stand at Germany’s and the West’s sides in condemning and aiming to stop Russia, but rather, on the contrary, China turned out to be an active Russia-neutral actor that has been using the Russian invasion of Ukraine for its own goals. And second, Germany acknowledged its critical dependency on imports and vulnerable supply chains from China at a time of conflicting paradigms and an increasing weaponization of trade.

This chapter will unpack these key implications for Germany’s China policy, examining how the Russia-Ukraine War has exposed China’s collaboration with Russia in a way that challenges fundamental German interests, and examining how Germany has sought to respond through key strategies, political engagement, and policy changes. First, though, the chapter will explain how and why Germany’s perceptions of China were already undergoing a significant evolution before the Zeitenwende speech in February 2022. The chapter will also cast Germany’s China policy in a transatlantic context, outlining how Berlin has sought to keep lines of communication open to Washington on perceptions, strategies, and policies. Finally, the chapter ends with a brief set of recommendations for ensuring Germany and the United States remain on the same page vis-à-vis China—and Beijing’s increasingly adversarial activities and policies.

Changes in Germany’s China Policy Already Underway

Before the Zeitenwende, Germany’s initially very rosy outlook on China—having been China’s main trading partner by far within the EU—had been under strain for some time. Already in 2019, the influential Federation of German Industries created quite a stir by publishing a paper that called China a “partner and systemic competitor.”1 Persistent hurdles and stumbling blocks for German companies in the Chinese market, increasing legal pressures due to new legislation since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012 and 2013, and growing global competition led to a mounting wariness toward China’s policies and its market economy status.2 Comparable sentiments surfaced across Europe, leading to similar skepticism expressed in the European Commission’s Elements for a New EU Strategy on China in 2016 and its counterpart, the Council of the EU’s EU Strategy on China: Council Conclusions a few weeks later.3

The change in government in Germany in 2021 brought together the Green Party of Germany, the Free Democratic Party, and the Social Democratic Party of Germany in an ambitious triparty coalition agreement. The coalition partners agreed to develop a National Security Strategy (NSS) for the first time in the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as a China strategy. Even before taking office, Foreign Minister-designate Annalena Baerbock made clear she was eyeing a tougher stand on China.4

By the time Olaf Scholz delivered his Zeitenwende speech, many—yet not all—in Germany’s policy-making circles had become more critical of Beijing’s ever more assertive policies in trade, industrial policy, and politics alike. Beijing’s lack of condemnation of Russia’s invasion worked as a catalyst and made many decisionmakers in Berlin and beyond realize China did not share the same goals and values, with wide-reaching consequences for Germany’s wealth, welfare, and well-being. This realization came on top of German disillusionment with China over its mask diplomacy and other COVID-19–related policies, creating serious doubt in Germany about working with and depending on China.

China-Russia Relations in the German Eye

The Russia-Ukraine War shed light on the extent and nature of China-Russia relations and their impact on European and German interests, highlighting Beijing’s will to act as a lifeline for an increasingly isolated Russian Federation, both ideologically and materially, thereby actively prolonging a war in Europe.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has called attention to how trade dependencies can be weaponized in a warlike context, particularly with Russia leveraging its dominance in energy supplies as a tool of coercion against Europe and, specifically, Germany. Similarly, a conflict over Taiwan could dramatically impact critical supply chain trade for Europe, including semiconductors.5 Experiences with supply chain insecurities due to (politically decided) COVID-19 restrictions provided first and deep impressions of potential impacts. China may view Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a testing ground for Beijing’s plans to unify Taiwan with mainland China, particularly the potential for leveraging trade with Europe as a way of keeping Europeans neutral in any Indo-Pacific conflict.6

Moreover, the Russia-China partnership extends beyond trade and into security, with both countries supporting each other in circumventing Western sanctions and strengthening their military cooperation.7 In the first 10 months of 2023, Russian imports from China “of what the U.S., EU, UK, and other partners of Ukraine have identified as priority battlefield goods reached $8.77 billion—only a 10% decline compared to the pre-sanctions period.” With all items critical for Russia’s military industry, imports were even higher ($22.23 billion).8 In November 2024, the EU’s High Representative and Vice President of the European Commission Josep Borrell called for sanctions against China. Ahead of a European Council meeting, he informed EU foreign ministers of IEMZ Kupol, a Russian drone company in Xinjiang, China, developing attack drones most likely for use in Ukraine with the help of Chinese specialists.9 This alignment challenges Germany’s economic ties with China, which is leveraging its market in a form of “predatory liberalism” that weaponizes the networks of interdependence created by globalization and raises the stakes for EU strategic autonomy.10 The China-Russia partnership signals, in fact, a shift toward greater geopolitical polarization, pressuring Germany and the EU to reassess their relationships. China’s support for Russia has complicated Germany’s ability to maintain economic engagement with China without appearing complicit. This alignment also amplifies concerns about overreliance on authoritarian regimes for critical goods and technologies, making strategic autonomy an urgent priority for the EU.

In sum, Beijing’s direct support for the Russian invasion and the two countries’ “no limits partnership” triggered significant shifts in Germany-China relations, spurring Germany and Europe to address quickly the assertiveness of Beijing, which until then they had only mildly acknowledged.11

Two Firsts: Germany’s National Security Strategy and China Strategy

The 2024 Munich Security Report highlights China and Russia as primary security challenges to Europe, detailing concerns such as geopolitical tensions, economic uncertainty, climate change, technological competition, and international cooperation, with a significant focus on China’s impact.12

A first manifestation of this shift in mindset regarding Beijing is also visible in Germany’s first-ever NSS, published in June 2023 as the war raged in Ukraine.13 The NSS explains Zeitenwende Germany through a security lens and states, “China is a partner, competitor and systemic rival,” noting, “the elements of rivalry and competition have increased in recent years,” and “China is trying in various ways to remould the existing rules-based international order . . . acting time and again counter to our interests and values.”14

The paradigm shift first made evident through the NSS was then expanded upon in Germany’s first-ever China strategy, published in July 2023.15 The China strategy reflects Berlin’s growing concerns about Beijing’s geopolitical ambitions, influence, and policies. Germany officially labels China a “systemic rival,” signaling a departure from Germany’s previous focus on cooperation and economic engagement, which characterized the approach of former chancellor Angela Merkel. After German Foreign Minister Baerbock’s visit to China, she explicitly underlined that China was becoming more rival than partner by getting more repressive internally, as well as aggressive externally, and by following its own rules at the expense of the international rules-based order.16

Despite this bold stance, the strategy is not aimed at decoupling from China, which remains crucial for Germany’s export-driven economy. Instead, Berlin aims to align Germany’s strategy with the EU’s “de-risking” approach, emphasizing the need to reduce economic vulnerabilities and dependencies, particularly in critical sectors like technology, raw materials, and energy.17 In short, the China strategy makes clear Germany’s priorities vis-à-vis China during the Zeitenwende: to reduce its economic dependencies while maintaining open channels for trade, dialogue, and cooperation on central themes like fighting climate change.

Trade

The threat posed by China has deeply influenced the practices of German businesses over the last three years.18 Over the course of 2024, German firms reduced their reliance on Chinese imports, with the percentage of manufacturers using Chinese inputs dropping from 46 percent in February 2022 to 37 percent in February 2024. Increasing political uncertainty, also driven by the Russia-Ukraine War, has spurred companies to diversify their supply chains, looking toward non-European alternatives. Furthermore, German businesses’ confidence in China has declined, with 9 percent of German companies either withdrawing or contemplating withdrawing from China, a figure that has more than doubled compared to the past four years.19 For the United States, this shift aligns with its strategic interest in reducing European reliance on China. Moreover, diversification of Germany’s imports may strengthen transatlantic trade ties.

But larger German corporations, though recognizing the challenges posed by geopolitical tensions, still prioritize the Chinese market for revenue growth and structural transformation. Notably, even if a scenario in which German businesses completely disengage from China is unlikely, companies like Volkswagen Group, BASF, and Siemens AG have adjusted their strategies to align with both global and local market dynamics, from a local-for-locals strategy by Volkswagen Group to selectively doubling down; for example, with Siemens AG’s massive investments in its sector “digital industries”—yet with varying rates of success.20 Nonetheless, these and other German business giants remain concerned about rising regulatory hurdles in China, the costs associated with increased geopolitical tension, and humanitarian concerns in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong.21 On top of these concerns, German businesses keep meeting severe Chinese competition in China and increasingly in their home markets.22

China-Germany trade statistics highlight the duality and complexity of Sino-German relations since the Zeitenwende speech. In 2023, figures showed Germany’s bilateral trade with China reached €253 billion, placing China in the lead as Germany’s largest trading partner. But in the first half of 2024, German trade with the United States overtook German trade with China, reflecting companies’ efforts to diversify supply chains.23 This change is symptomatic of the shifting dynamics following the release of the German China strategy.

Nonetheless, data on German companies with production facilities in China show those companies have been more likely to maintain or increase their reliance on Chinese imports compared to those without such facilities. Some of the larger corporations made headlines in 2024 by announcing the potential closing of German production facilities while keeping or even enlarging capacities in China.24 Although 41 percent of companies that source exclusively from external Chinese suppliers plan to reduce imports, only 31 percent of firms with their own Chinese production sites intend to do so. Furthermore, 14 percent of firms with facilities in China plan to increase imports, compared to just 8 percent of firms without production capabilities in the country.25 These figures highlight that the ties to China among companies with established operations there are much less influenced by the geopolitical context and the derisking strategy upon which Berlin has agreed.

Ambivalent Political Signals

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s trip to China in April 2024 was labeled a “realpolitik” approach in the face of rising global tensions. During the visit, Germany and China agreed to collaborate on autonomous and connected driving, which Germany hopes will facilitate the transfer of data and knowledge from Chinese to German carmakers and the emergence of international standardization.26 Scholz’s visit underscored his party’s intention, if not necessarily the intentions of his coalition partners, to keep economic ties with China warm. Indeed, starkly diverging views sometimes emerge within the government coalition in Berlin regarding the perception of the challenges China presents and the proper responses. Although the government overall remains committed to derisking, divergences are visible in industries such as auto manufacturing, which represents both national pride and an economic pillar for Germany. Germany’s resistance to EU duties on Chinese electric vehicles—after Chancellor Scholz had “strong-arm[ed]” the Green minister to vote “no” via his Richtlinienkompetenz (a tool for the federal chancellor to set the major direction for ministries)—shows a persistently divergent perception of challenges and proper responses among the coalition partners of the Social Democratic Party, the Free Democratic Party, and the Green Party of Germany.27

In economic terms, the Zeitenwende has shown it needs time to be implemented. Domestic and EU instruments represent a boost in driving German derisking vis-à-vis China, and Germany has used these instruments strategically. Domestically, a notable example is the use of Germany’s inbound investment review process, particularly in response to China-specific risks. For instance, in 2022 the coalition government swiftly blocked two Chinese attempts to acquire stakes in German semiconductor companies—reportedly with Scholz’s approval.28 These actions underscore the significant shift in Germany’s approach toward Chinese firms since 2016, when Chinese investments in German chip and robotics companies were more readily approved, such as in the case of the firm KUKA.29

Finally, at an EU level, the EU’s Economic Security Strategy, introduced in June 2023, includes outbound investment screening as a potential measure focused on derisking with Beijing. The proposed EU commissioner for economic security will be responsible for continuing discussions with member states on this issue. Germany, which recognized in its China strategy the possibility of addressing risks related to outbound investments, will need to address this issue in the next national elections.

Security

Raging war in Europe and beyond—and a global pandemic—highlighted in German discourse the interlinkage of the economy and supply chains with national security. Recognizing this link represented a major shift for a country that only a decade prior had seen President Horst Köhler resign after he received heavy criticism for pointing out the role of the German navy in protecting shipping lanes for the benefit of German welfare and prosperity.30

The Indo-Pacific region stands as the world’s most economically dynamic area and is central to the great-power rivalry between the United States and China and their like-minded countries. The COVID-19 pandemic made clear to the German leadership any destabilization in this region would severely impact Germany’s economic interests.

The German government’s 2020 Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific marked a pivotal acknowledgment of Germany’s interdependence with China, while emphasizing the need for supply chain diversification.31 These guidelines highlighted the Indo-Pacific’s position as home to some of the world’s fastest-growing economies and laid the groundwork for a more balanced German engagement in the region. Beyond economic goals, this diversification is part of a broader strategic approach where Germany positions itself in systemic competition with authoritarian states, particularly China, and seeks to forge stronger, value-based partnerships throughout the Indo-Pacific. Notably, the guidelines—published in 2020—never put an emphasis on China as a rival.

In the Indo-Pacific, Berlin pursued the Zeitenwende priorities through a focused reinforcement of the existing rules-based international order. Germany’s recent foreign diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific region thereby reflects an enhanced understanding of the Indo-Pacific’s significance for Germany’s national interests and security. This diplomacy includes a greater focus on Chinese actions in the region and maritime security concerns: Germany has shown its strongest ever military presence in the region.32 Some examples include the deployment of the German frigate FGS Bayern, visiting Singapore for 16 days (December 20, 2021 to January 5, 2022) during the first Indo-Pacific deployment (August 2021 to February 2022); and the “Rapid Pacific” Deployment of the German Air Force on August 15, 2022, underlining the Luftwaffe’s capacity—and will—to reach Singapore within 24 hours while a war was raging in Europe.33 After the German army visited the region in 2023, the Luftwaffe and the German navy joined forces for the Indo-Pacific Deployment 2024 (May to December 2024), also going under the mottos of Pacific Skies 24 and Pacific Waves 24.34 While the Luftwaffe went around the world in a joint operation with French and Spanish allies, the German navy frigate FGS Baden-Württemberg and combat supply ship FGS Frankfurt am Main were deployed in the Pacific and Indian Oceans in one of the most complex operations ever undertaken by the German navy, transiting the Taiwan Strait for the first time in 22 years.35 Both forces met and collaborated in the US-led biennial Rim of the Pacific exercises, the world’s largest naval exercise, in which 29 nations took part in 2024.36 German Minister of Defense Boris Pistorius underlined, at his speech at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu (before the German naval deployment headed off to Rim of the Pacific and the Taiwan Strait): “Germany therefore has a vital interest in maintaining and supporting stability, prosperity, cooperation and freedom in the Indo-Pacific.”37

In this sense, military diplomacy is key to both Germany’s and the EU’s economic de-risking strategies, and is completely in line with the Zeitenwende. These deployments support the European and national goals of reducing overreliance on China by strengthening bilateral ties with Indo-Pacific nations and like-minded allies in the region, ensuring supply chain diversification, and securing trade routes. By not directly mentioning China in its guidelines but putting the emphasis on upholding the international rules-based order, Germany de facto recognizes China as a rival while minimizing the exacerbation of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific.

German-US Relations: Transatlantic Challenges and Synergies

One year after the release of the NSS, Foreign Minister Baerbock reiterated how Germany’s strong commitment to NATO and NATO’s Strategic Concept are central to its security posture.38 By aligning itself firmly with the Euro-Atlantic alliance, Germany reaffirms its role as a defender of democratic values, human rights, and the post–World War II international order. This alignment also opens opportunities for deeper cooperation with the United States, particularly in areas such as securing critical infrastructure and strengthening the economic and security partnership in the Indo-Pacific against China.

The shift in Germany’s vision toward China, the renaissance of Berlin’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific, and the effort Berlin has put into investing in European and international security are evidence of the unprecedented political consensus that made the Zeitenwende possible. Nonetheless, more than two years into its implementation, one must acknowledge a sentiment of fatigue amongst some of Germany’s European allies, who hoped the Zeitenwende would be a sort of panacea which would have brought a quick end to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

But one must also recognize, in terms of defense, Minister Pistorius has prioritized modernizing military capabilities, boosting troop numbers, and enhancing NATO commitments, including deploying forces to Lithuania—all while also keeping the promise of maintaining a military presence in the Indo-Pacific regularly, with each of the three services (air force, navy, and army) deploying to the region every two to three years.

Furthermore, the German government is wisely trying to ensure channels of communication with the United States are good on both sides of the American political spectrum. Although many EU countries have had tight ties with the Biden administration, European relations with a Trump-centered Republican Party were lukewarm at best.

The United States will remain a crucial partner for the implementation of the Zeitenwende in the context of Germany’s approach to China and the broader Indo-Pacific region. German politicians have been working hard to build contacts with Republicans in Congress and state-level governments, as well as with influential conservatives in the business arena, to ensure derisking will proceed both under economic and security terms, independent of who will be in power in 2025. This work was exemplified by German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock’s 2023 visit to Texas, where she met with governor and strong Trump supporter Greg Abbott.39 Underlining their commitment to transatlantic relations and democratic processes, German Chancellor Scholz and Foreign Minister Baerbock both congratulated Donald Trump on winning the election and stressed the importance of cooperation.40 Five days later, German Chancellor Scholz called the newly elected US president, Donald Trump, to congratulate him in person and discuss the German-American relationship and current geopolitical challenges.41

Outlook and Recommendations

Although the implementation of the Zeitenwende has encountered challenges and mixed reactions, particularly from some of Germany’s historical European allies, it remains a crucial turning point in Germany’s defense and foreign policy. The German government has made notable progress in strengthening its military capabilities and bolstering its NATO commitments, all while carefully navigating its relationship with the United States as a key partner in European security.

With a view to relations with Beijing, Germany still presents a mixed picture, with large companies staying the course and small-to-medium-sized enterprises actively engaging in derisking. Although the three parties under the former traffic-light coalition show differing signals in how to deal with China, an overall cautious approach has taken root, as China is increasingly viewed as having goals and ambitions that run counter to German interests and values.

Despite the differences in views toward China evident on both sides of the Atlantic, the United States needs to keep Germany—as a key actor within the EU—informed and involved about how Washington thinks about and engages with China. This approach is particularly important regarding high-tech initiatives and the rule of law—that is, peace, stability, respect for international law, and freedom of navigation—in contested areas like the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

Germany needs to become more realistic in how it seeks to influence China and about the necessity of working in collaboration with the EU, EU partners, and the United States, be it in public or behind closed doors. Despite differences in views among Germany’s leading political parties and major stakeholders like industry, continuously improving coordination and seeking increasing convergence on dealing with China are important.

Additionally, Germany needs to drive capacity building actively in terms of strategic thinking (and acting) regarding China within the German government and among European partners. This activity should include in-depth discussions with Washington and the EU on the consequences of an actual takeover of Taiwan by China as well as conversations on a potential miliary conflict over Taiwan, hybrid attacks that could lead to a takeover without a military conflict, Chinese buildup of military capacities, Chinese data-gathering efforts, and other Chinese initiatives that have wide-ranging implications for German and European interests.

 
 

Endnotes

  1. Federation of German Industries, Partner and Systemic Competitor – How Do We Deal with China’s State-Controlled Economy? (Federation of German Industries, January 2019). Return to text.
  2. Federation of German Industries, BDI Position on the Issue of China’s Market Economy Status (Federation of German Industries, July 27, 2016). Return to text.
  3. European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Elements for a New EU Strategy on China, Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council no. JOIN(2016) 30 final (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, June 22, 2016); and Council of the EU, EU Strategy on China: Council Conclusions 18 July 2016, document no. 11252/16 (Council of the EU, July 18, 2016). Return to text.
  4. Nik Martin, “Baerbock’s Comments on China Met with Unease,” Deutsche Welle, December 4, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/china-uneasy-over-incoming-german-ministers-threat-to-curb-imports/a-60016727. Return to text.
  5. For details on potential disruption of trade and production, see Charlie Vest et al., “The Global Economic Disruptions from a Taiwan Conflict,” Rhodium Group, December 14, 2022, https://rhg.com/research/taiwan-economic-disruptions/. Return to text.
  6. For example, see Gabriel Dominguez, “China ‘Learning Lessons’ from Ukraine Invasion, NATO Chief Says in Tokyo,” Japan Times, February 1, 2023, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/02/01/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-nato-ties-analysis/; Gabriel Dominguez, “Is Taiwan the Next Ukraine? It’s More Complicated,” Japan Times, February 19, 2023, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/02/19/asia-pacific/ukraine-war-anniversary-taiwan-comparison/; and Carol Mang, “Taiwanese March in Solidarity with Ukraine as Russian Invasion Seen as Wake-Up Call for Island,” South China Morning Post, March 14, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/video/world/3170399/taiwanese-march-solidarity-ukraine-russian-invasion-seen-wake-call-island. Return to text.
  7. Kelly Ng and Yi Ma, “How Is China Supporting Russia After It Was Sanctioned for Ukraine War?,” BBC News, May 17, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/60571253. Return to text.
  8. Olena Bilousova et al., Challenges of Export Controls Enforcement: How Russia Continues to Import Components for Its Military Production (Yermak-McFaul International Working Group on Russian Sanctions and Kyiv School of Economics Institute, January 2024); Jake Rooke, “Special Report: China’s Strategic Complicity and the Hidden Engine Behind Russia’s War Effort,” NATO Association of Canada, October 17, 2024, https://natoassociation.ca/special-report-chinas-strategic-complicity-and-the-hidden-engine-behind-russias-war-effort/; and “Chinese Exports Fuel Russia’s ‘War Machine’ in Ukraine, Blinken Says,” France24, September 28, 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20240928-blinken-questions-china-peace-push-over-russia-help. Return to text.
  9. “Exclusive: Russia Has Secret War Drones Project in China, Intel Sources Say,” Reuters, September 25, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/russia-has-secret-war-drones-project-china-intel-sources-say-2024-09-25/; and Thomas Gutschker, “Eu erwägt Sanktionen gegen China,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, November 15, 2024, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/wegen-waffen-fuer-russland-eu-erwaegt-sanktionen-gegen-china-110113352.html. Return to text.
  10. Victor D. Cha, “Collective Resilience: Deterring China’s Weaponization of Economic Interdependence,” International Security 48, no. 1 (Summer 2023): 91–124. Return to text.
  11. Anushka Saxena, “75 Years of China-Russia Relations: Indeed a ‘No Limits’ Partnership,” ISDP Voices (blog), May 27, 2024, https://www.isdp.eu/75-years-of-china-russia-relations-indeed-a-no-limits-partnership/. Return to text.
  12. Tobias Bunde et al., eds., Munich Security Report 2024: Lose-Lose? (Munich Security Conference, February 2024). Return to text.
  13. Federal Government of Germany, Robust. Resilient. Sustainable. Integrated Security for Germany: National Security Strategy (Federal Government of Germany, June 2023). Return to text.
  14. Federal Government of Germany, National Security Strategy, 12, 23. Return to text.
  15. Federal Government of Germany, Strategy on China of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany (Federal Government of Germany, July 13, 2023). Return to text.
  16. Jim Pollard, “China Becoming More Rival than Partner: Germany’s Baerbock,” Asia Financial, April 20, 2023, https://www.asiafinancial.com/china-becoming-more-rival-than-partner-german-baerbock. Return to text.
  17. Ursula von der Leyen, “Speech by President von der Leyen on EU-China relations to the Mercator Institute for China Studies and the European Policy Centre” (speech, Mercator Institute, Brussels, BE, March 30, 2023), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_23_2063. For an assessment of different countries’ derisking policies, including Germany specifically, see Patrik Andersson et al., National Perspectives on Europe’s De-Risking from China (Swedish National China Centre, June 2024), 62. Return to text.
  18. Andreas Baur and Lisandra Flach, Zeitenwende in German-Chinese Trade Relations? Evidence from German Firms, EconPol Policy Brief no. 57 (CESifo GmbH, April 2024), 1–11. Return to text.
  19. “Business Confidence Survey,” AHK Greater China, accessed January 15, 2024, https://china.ahk.de/publications/business-confidence-survey. Return to text.
  20. “40 Years of Volkswagen in China: Group Accelerates Its Realignment with ‘In China, for China’ Strategy,” Volkswagen Group, November 4, 2024, https://www.volkswagen-group.com/en/articles/40-years-of-volkswagen-in-china-group-accelerates-its-realignment-with-in-china-for-china-strategy-18322; Wilfried Eckl-Dorna, “BASF Sees Growth in China, Cuts European Costs by €1 Billion,” Bloomberg, February 23, 2024, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-02-23/basf-sees-growth-in-china-cuts-european-costs-by-1-billion; Pamela Barbaglia, “Siemens Is Case Study in China De-Risking Dilemma,” Reuters, October 5, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/breakingviews/siemens-is-case-study-china-de-risking-dilemma-2023-10-04; Mark Simon Wolf, “Befindet sich Siemens in einem China-Dilemma? ‘Für markführende Unternehmen wird es schwierig,’ ” Merkur, October 4, 2024, https://www.merkur.de/wirtschaft/befindet-sich-siemens-in-einem-china-dilemma-fuer-marktfuehrende-unternehmen-wird-es-schwierig-zr-93335466.html; and Bernd Ziesemer, “Die kluge China-Strategie von Siemens,” Capital, June 19, 2023, https://www.capital.de/wirtschaft-politik/die-kluge-china-strategie-von-siemens-33570820.html. Return to text.
  21. Jens Fey and Stefanie Wettberg, “BASF to Divest Shares in Its Two Joint Ventures in Korla, China,” BASF, February 9, 2024, https://www.basf.com/global/en/media/news-releases/2024/02/p-24-125. Return to text.
  22. Jürgen Matthes and Edgar Schmitz, Konkurrenzdruck aus China für deutsche Firmen, IW-Report no. 30 (German Economic Institute, June 11, 2024). Return to text.
  23. In the first six months of 2024, Europe’s largest economy did some €127 billion worth of trade with the United States compared to just under €122 billion with China. For instance, see “US Is Germany’s Leading Trade Partner in 2024,” German Trade and Invest, August 10, 2024, https://www.gtai.de/en/invest/business-location-germany/business-climate/us-is-germany-s-leading-trade-partner-in-2024-1809964. Return to text.
  24. Olaf Zinke, “BASF baut Produktion in Deutschland ab – Chemiekonzern investiert in China,” Agrarheute, June 3, 2024, https://www.agrarheute.com/management/agribusiness/basf-koennte-deutschland-verlassen-chemiekonzern-nennt-gruende-621333; and “Lage schlimmer als gedacht: VW-Boss Blume nennt Konzern ‘Sanierungsfall,’ ” Focus Online, December 4, 2024, https://www.focus.de/finanzen/news/vw-krise-im-ticker-w-chef-haelt-an-schliessung-von-fabriken-fest-an-die-neuen-realitaeten-anpassen_id_260281988.html. Return to text.
  25. “Business Confidence Survey,” accessed January 15, 2024. Return to text.
  26. German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action and German Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport, “Germany and China Sign Memorandum of Understanding on Dialogue and Cooperation in the Field of Automated and Connected Driving,” joint press release, April 16, 2024, https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2024/04/20240416-germany-and-china-sign-memorandum-of-understanding-on-dialogue-and-cooperation-in-the-field-of-automated-and-connected-driving.html. Return to text.
  27. Hans von der Burchard and Koen Verhelst, “Scholz Forces German ‘No’ Vote in Chinese EV Duty Saga,” Politico, October 3, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/olaf-scholz-germany-vote-chinese-electric-vehicle-duties/. Return to text.
  28. Andreas Rinke and Miranda Murray, “Germany Blocks Chinese Stake in Two Chipmakers over Security Concerns,” Reuters, November 9, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/markets/deals/germany-block-chinese-takeover-semiconductor-firm-ers-electronic-handelsblatt-2022-11-09/. Return to text.
  29. Cynthia Wrage and Jakob Kullik, “After Kuka – Germany’s Lessons Learned from Chinese Takeovers,” China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe, July 21, 2022, https://chinaobservers.eu/after-kuka-germanys-lessons-learned-from-chinese-takeovers/. Return to text.
  30. Oana Lungescu, “Why Did German President Horst Koehler Resign?,” BBC News, June 1, 2010, https://www.bbc.com/news/10207180. Return to text.
  31. Federal Government of Germany, Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific: Germany – Europe – Asia: Shaping the 21st Century Together (Federal Government of Germany, August 2020). Return to text.
  32. “The National Security Strategy: First Expert Meeting at the Bendlerblock,” Federal Ministry of Defence, July 8, 2022, https://www.bmvg.de/en/news/national-security-policy-first-expert-meeting-5490976. Return to text.
  33. Shogo Akagawa, “German Air Force Shows It Can Be in Asia in a Day,” Nikkei Asia, August 16, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/German-Air-Force-shows-it-can-be-in-Asia-in-a-day. Return to text.
  34. “Pacific Skies 24 – One Deployment, Five Exercises,” Bundeswehr, n.d., accessed on October 4, 2024, (page discontinued); and “Pacific Waves: Indo-Pazifik Deployment 2024 vor RIMPAC,” Europäische Sicherheit & Technik, July 10, 2024, https://esut.de/2024/07/meldungen/51508/pacific-waves-indo-pazifik-deployment-2024-vor-rimpac-von-einem-kraftakt-gegenseitigem-verstaendnis-und-wahrnehmung/. Return to text.
  35. German Embassy in Singapore, “Indo-Pacific Deployment 2024 (IPD24) – Port Call in Singapore,” press release, September 12, 2024, https://singapur.diplo.de/sg-en/2675430-2675430. Return to text.
  36. “RIMPAC 2024: Departure for the World’s Largest Naval Exercise,” Bundeswehr, July 10, 2024, https://www.bundeswehr.de/en/organization/navy/news/rimpac-2024-departure-world-s-largest-naval-exercise-5816742. Return to text.
  37. Boris Pistorius, “Partner für den Frieden: Pistorius am Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies,” Bundesminesterium der Verteidigung, July 31, 2024, https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/pistorius-asia-pacific-center-for-security-studies-5828586. Return to text.
  38. Annalena Baerbock, “Speech by Foreign Minister Baerbock at the Conference ‘The National Security Strategy One Year On,’ ” Federal Foreign Office, July 1, 2024, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/national-security-strategy/2665416. Return to text.
  39. Jörg Blank, “Wie Baerbock auf die US-Republikaner zugeht,” ZDFheute, September 13, 2023, https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/deutschland/baerbock-usa-besuch-texas-republikaner-demokraten-wahl-100.html; and “Baerbock Begins US Trip by Meeting with Texas Governor,” Deutsche Welle, September 13, 2023, https://www.dw.com/en/baerbock-begins-us-trip-by-meeting-with-texas-governor/a-66795304. Return to text.
  40. Annalena Baerbock, “Statement by Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock on the US Elections, upon Returning from Her Trip to Ukraine on 6 November 2024,” Federal Foreign Office, November 6, 2024, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/2683368-2683368; and Bundesregierung, “Bundeskanzler Scholz gratuliert dem designierten Präsidenten der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, Herrn Donald Trump,” press release no. 277, November 6, 2024, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/bundeskanzler-scholz-gratuliert-dem-designierten-praesidenten-der-vereinigten-staaten-von-amerika-herrn-donald-trump-2318914. Return to text.
  41. Bundesregierung, “Bundeskanzler Scholz telefoniert mit dem neu gewählten Präsidenten der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, Donald Trump,” press release no. 284, November 11, 2024, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/bundeskanzler-scholz-telefoniert-mit-dem-neu-gewaehlten-praesidenten-der-vereinigten-staaten-von-amerika-donald-trump-2319576. Return to text.
 
Thumbnail Photo Credit

N509FZ, Hall of Supreme Harmony and Mid L-R Gates, November 27, 2024 (Wikimedia Commons, Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License), https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hall_of_Supreme_Harmony_and_Mid_L-R_gates_(20241127120000).jpg.

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