• Content
  Front Matter 1—Introduction (Deni, Rathke) 2—Germany's National Security Strategy... (Henke) 3—Washington's Expecations... (Deni) 4—German Conventional Defense... (Matlé) 5—Germany's Defense Industry (Besch) 6—Energy Policy (Campbell, Bosch) 7—The End of Ostpolitik? (Stent) 8—The Institutional Dimension: NATO & EU (Rathke, Luetkefend) 9—China, Germany, and the US (Stumbaum, de Cet)
• Editors and Contributors

— 8 —

The Institutional Dimension: NATO, the EU, and Multinational Cooperation

Jeffrey D. Rathke and Theresa Luetkefend
©2025 Jeffrey D. Rathke and Theresa Luetkefend

Introduction

Shortly after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s February 27, 2024, Zeitenwende speech, a long-neglected vocabulary reentered the German public discourse: national and collective defense (landesverteidigung and bündnisverteidigung). In subsequent speeches and through Germany’s first defense guidelines, published in 2023, the chancellor and his government emphasized national and collective defense must once again become the Bundeswehr’s core task—which had not been the case since the end of the Cold War.¹

The term, which treats national and alliance defense as inseparable, underscores German defense policy is rooted in its integration within the north Atlantic alliance and in the context of the EU. The success of Germany’s Zeitenwende policy must therefore be judged by its role in these institutions and the contributions the policy has made to them since.

This chapter examines Germany’s contributions to NATO since February 2022, focusing on the country’s financial commitments, its role within NATO’s force structure, and its procurement efforts. Next, the chapter explores Germany’s involvement in the EU’s defense policy and other multinational initiatives at the European level.

Regardless of the channel through which German defense efforts are routed, the fundamental question of whether the efforts are ambitious and urgent enough to address the foreseeable threats remains. A sustained approach by Germany and its European allies and partners would have the potential to restore a sustainable equilibrium over time to address this gap. This approach is recognized rhetorically in German government positions, but the progress has thus far been insufficient to meet the medium- and long-term force and capability needs that derive from the European threat environment.

Germany’s Zeitenwende in NATO

Defense spending is a key indicator of allies’ commitments to NATO and is therefore an important measure of Germany’s Zeitenwende policy within NATO. In 2024, Germany reached the NATO spending target of 2 percent of gross domestic product to great fanfare at home and in the alliance: At last, Europe’s largest economy was fulfilling the commitment it had made in 2014 after the first Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Increasingly, though, Germany seems to be pursuing an outdated target that is inadequate for the more threatening environment in Europe. Since February 2022, many NATO allies have moved beyond the 2 percent goal and are seeking significantly higher contributions.² When the agreement was made in 2014, it was a political benchmark for holding allies accountable, intended to demonstrate “the political resolve of individual allies to contribute to NATO’s common defence efforts.”³ At the time, the guideline was not based on member states’ actual spending needs for effective armed forces and deterrence of Russian aggression, nor is it today.

In his Zeitenwende statement, Chancellor Scholz emphasized meeting the 2 percent goal was both about fulfilling promises to allies and in the interest of German security. Germany’s defense spending levels since the speech have primarily been driven by a desire both to appease allies and to make up for a decades-long underinvestment in the Bundeswehr. Over the past three years, Germany has avoided engaging in an honest debate about the real cost of ensuring the country’s national security as well as that of its allies. Instead, Germany has adapted the budget to meet international expectations. Federal Minister of Defence Boris Pistorius has argued forcefully German defense spending should not stop at the 2 percent threshold and should quickly rise beyond it.⁴ At the time of this writing, most of Germany’s political parties have not yet published their election programs for the snap elections likely to take place in February 2025. But little evidence exists to suggest any party or coalition of parties will pledge to increase the defense budget significantly beyond the 2 percent target in the next government.

A Decade of Fitful Struggles to Increase Defense Spending

Although Germany’s defense spending still falls short of that which is needed for effective deterrence, achieving the 2 percent target remains a notable milestone in the country’s Zeitenwende. As Aylin Matlé describes in her essay, only in 2024 did Germany cross the threshold for the first time, spending 2.12 percent of its gross domestic product on defense (€90.5 billion).⁵

In 2024, for the first time, Germany also met the goal of spending more than 20 percent of the NATO-declared defense budget on major new equipment, including associated research and development. The NATO allies set this target to ensure a high scale and pace of modernization.⁶ Germany’s defense budget aims to allocate 50 percent to personnel, 30 percent to operations and maintenance, and 20 percent to equipment.⁷ For decades, Germany failed to meet the 20 percent target for new equipment, as it was the first area to be cut when the budget was low and funds were needed for personnel and operations costs.⁸ In 2024, Germany spent 28.75 percent (compared to 12.94 percent in 2014 and 18.04 in 2023), made possible by the special fund, which primarily supports “significant and complex multiyear equipment projects.”⁹ If Germany does not adopt a more sustainable approach, the country risks falling short of the target again once the special fund is depleted by the end of 2027.

Although achieving the 2 percent benchmark is commendable compared to the political neglect prior to February 2022, any spending beyond this level is heavily contested, as Matlé points out, with the government’s draft 2025 budget only containing an increase of €1.2 billion to €53 billion.¹⁰ The draft budget was in limbo following the collapse of the government, and a 2025 budget will now be finalized only after the elections. The budget may provide the next government with an opportunity to commit to more ambitious growth in the regular defense budget as early as 2025; nevertheless, the first four to five months of the year will pass without clear spending priorities, leaving little time to implement any new agenda. In the longer term, starting in 2028, when the sondervermögen will be fully depleted, the regular defense budget will need to increase to €80 billion per year or a follow-on off-budget fund will need to be created to ensure an adequate level of resources.¹¹ None of the mainstream political parties are addressing in detail how Germany could approach this problem. Finding an additional €25–30 billion annually in just a few years will clearly be a significant challenge.

Germany’s Role in the New NATO Force Model

Another factor by which to assess Germany’s contributions to NATO since Zeitenwende is forces. The reemergence of Russia as an aggressive adversary and the prospect of large-scale combat affecting NATO directly has catalyzed reform. At the 2022 Madrid summit, the NATO allies agreed on an updated NATO Force Model to be implemented in 2025 that contained significant changes to the allied armed forces.¹²

NATO has shifted its focus from crisis management, a priority in the post–Cold War years, to a structure centered on deterrence and defense, aiming to ensure large forces can be deployed quickly and with high readiness.¹³ Instead of the rotational principle of the soon-to-be-replaced NATO Response Force, member states will now permanently assign forces to one of three regions in Europe: the Arctic and north Atlantic, the Baltic region and Central Europe, and Southeastern Europe. The NATO Force Model will organize forces into three tiers of readiness, and a new quick reaction force—the Allied Reaction Force, which will be replacing the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force—will support them.¹⁴ NATO’s new operations plans outline the requirements for these regions, detailing the number and types of equipment and units NATO requires from each of its members.¹⁵

As Matlé describes in her essay, this significant reform will place new demands on NATO allies, including Germany, which would presumably require the growth of the Bundeswehr from its current force strength of 180,000 beyond even the current target of 203,000.¹⁶

The German government has acknowledged personnel shortages, which are growing worse, make this challenge particularly difficult.¹⁷ The government has prepared notable draft laws to address these challenges. But with the November 2024 collapse of the government, when and if the draft laws will pass the Bundestag is unclear.¹⁸

These measures would be a start, but they do not appear adequate to address the increasing requirements Germany will have to meet to fill in the NATO Force Model. According to media reports on internal Federal Ministry of Defence deliberations, the requirement for NATO-wide land forces, for example, will rise from 82 combat brigades in 2021 to 131. The Bundeswehr would have to reckon with an increase of five or six German combat brigades assigned to NATO, using the formula in which Germany provides roughly 10 percent of NATO capabilities, as Matlé demonstrates.¹⁹ This increase would be in addition to Germany’s current eight combat brigades.²⁰ Five brigades would represent an additional 25,000 army personnel above the current 61,000 strength of the German Army.²¹ This increase likely would require a further rise in the Bundeswehr’s target strength above the already-unrealistic 203,000. Thus, on their current trajectory, the ability of the German government and the Bundeswehr to deliver such a considerable increase in their contribution to the NATO Force Model is doubtful.

Brigade in Lithuania

One notable effort that sets Germany apart from other NATO members is its commitment to stationing a combat brigade in Lithuania permanently. In December 2023, Germany declared it would station 4,800 soldiers and 200 civilian Bundeswehr employees in Lithuania, marking the first time in the history of the Federal Republic the German armed forces would be stationed abroad without a set end date. The brigade will consist of three major combat units: the 122 Mechanised Infantry Battalion from Oberviechtach, Bavaria; the 203 Tank Battalion from Augustdorf, North Rhine-Westphalia; and the NATO enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group Lithuania. These will be supported by combat and support elements, such as medical service and logistics, military police, and communication and information system teams. The brigade will become operational in 2025, with full operating capability expected by 2027.²²

This commitment represents a substantial increase in Germany’s presence on NATO’s eastern flank and the country’s overall contribution to NATO forces. Currently, 800 German soldiers are deployed in Lithuania, some of which are part of the enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group, which Germany has led for the past six years. Others are part of the Forward Command Element of the enhanced Vigilance Activities brigade. The enhanced Vigilance Activities brigade, stationed in Germany, has been active since September 2022.²³

Germany’s commitment to stationing a permanent brigade also sets the country apart from the other nations currently serving as framework nations for the enhanced Forward Presence efforts on NATO’s eastern flank—especially, the United Kingdom in Estonia and Canada in Latvia. Canada announced it would build a Canada-led, combat-capable, multinational enhanced Forward Presence brigade consisting of 2,200 persistently deployed Canadian Armed Forces members and supporting elements by 2026.²⁴ In addition to the enhanced Forward Presence Battle Group Estonia, the United Kingdom will hold an army brigade at high readiness for rapid deployment to the Baltic region.²⁵ Germany’s decision to deploy this brigade is the clearest manifestation of the country’s commitment to its eastern allies since the Zeitenwende speech. Unlike other reforms and changes, this one sees Germany taking the lead—potentially setting an example for others in the future.

Slowly Making Up for Decades-Long Underinvestment

Another area where Germany’s Zeitenwende still has to show its full potential is meeting NATO’s capability requirements, defined during the NATO defense planning process. Germany has in previous years failed to meet its assigned capability target packages, leading to gaps in NATO defense planning.²⁶ Nevertheless, in recent years, Germany has procured capabilities that will clearly contribute to the alliance’s interest in a few notable areas.

One example is Germany’s long-overdue decision to modernize the country’s aging fleet of Panavia Tornado aircraft. In 2022, Germany committed to buying 35 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II fighter jets from the United States, one of the major procurements financed through the special fund. The F-35s will replace the Tornado dual-capable aircraft, which has long been one of the country’s central contributions to NATO’s nuclear burden sharing. This procurement decision sent a strong message to NATO, signaling renewed commitment to the alliance’s nuclear deterrence strategy after years of uncertainty and internal debate about the Tornados’ future and the role of nuclear deterrence, which lacked broad political and public support.²⁷

Another area where Germany is catching up is anti-submarine warfare. With the help of the special fund, Germany will increase its Boeing P-8A Poseidon aircraft fleet from five to 12, addressing a long-standing capability gap and helping the country meet both NATO and EU commitments in this area.²⁸

Despite these steps, Germany still has much ground to cover. The frugality of the past decades left the armed forces underresourced and unable to fulfill the new requirements for European defense. The efforts since 2022 have put Germany on a new trajectory but have not been enough to redress the imbalance. The major expenditures resulting from the Zeitenwende have focused on land and air systems, but even in these areas, expenditures are projected in most cases to restore the Bundeswehr’s equipment stocks over the span of decades, as documented by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy report Fit for War in Decades. The study finds at its current procurement pace, Germany would need almost a century to return to its 2004 levels of military armament.²⁹ So far, expenditures have served to redress some of the gaps in stocks of existing systems but have not adapted to innovation on the battlefield—a major blind spot when one considers the role unmanned systems have played in the Russia-Ukraine War. The European gaps in strategic enablers are even more significant than those in combat platforms, with the result Europe’s dependency on American capabilities is even more pronounced, and the magnitude of action to rectify the imbalance correspondingly greater.³⁰

New Initiatives to Achieve Multinational Critical Mass

Berlin has sought alternatives that can elevate strategic focus and fill priority capabilities while capturing economies of scale. A prime example is the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), which was outlined by Chancellor Scholz’s Prague speech in August 2022.³¹ The German effort to procure elements of a multilayered air and missile defense system was described by Scholz as having been designed “in such a way that our European neighbors can be involved if desired.”³² The initiative was formalized with a letter of intent signed at NATO headquarters by defense ministers of 10 allies in October 2022; since then, 21 European countries have joined.³³ Germany’s plans for its own air and missile defense have been significant, with €10 billion from the country’s special defense fund dedicated to the short-range Skyranger 30, the medium-range IRIS-T, the long-range Patriot, and the highest-layer Arrow 3 systems.³⁴ The first three systems, which meet national and NATO requirements, will strengthen NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defence system. Developed jointly by Boeing and Israel Aerospace Industries, the Arrow 3 system, which is not interoperable with the Integrated Air and Missile Defence system, will be a German national acquisition in the immediate future.³⁵

The ESSI is not an air defense architecture (which remains a NATO task); the ESSI’s principal benefit is procurement, allowing countries the opportunity to join larger acquisitions and reduce unit costs. The ESSI does not establish new requirements or provide financial incentives to European states, as reflected in the modest number of countries that have signed acquisition deals under the ESSI. Austria, Denmark, and Hungary have committed to acquiring the short-range Skyranger 30 produced by Germany’s Rheinmetall. Latvia, Estonia, and Slovenia have signed deals to acquire the IRIS-T medium-range system produced by Germany’s Diehl Defence. In January 2024, the NATO Support and Procurement Agency announced a €5.6 billion contract to acquire 1,000 Patriot missiles that will be used by Germany, the Netherlands, Romania, and Spain. The missiles will be produced in Germany by a joint venture between Raytheon (which developed the Patriot system) and the German MBDA.³⁶ The ESSI’s scope and its focus on US- and German-made systems caused tension with France, whose SAMP/T long-range missile defense system was not included in the ESSI.³⁷

Germany avoided this friction in the other major multinational initiative the country has launched since the Russian invasion of Ukraine: the European Long-Range Strike Approach. This consortium, which includes Germany, France, Italy, and Poland, will develop and produce ground-based, long-range, precision-strike weapons with a range beyond 500 kilometers and perhaps as far as 2,000 kilometers, a key gap in European nations’ capabilities that has been demonstrated by the Russia-Ukraine War.³⁸ The United Kingdom and Sweden also announced their intent to join the group, demonstrating the potential for Europe’s defense technological leaders to collaborate on a high-profile project for a critical capability.³⁹ No information is available on the magnitude of European investment, the timeline, or the quantity of missiles the purchasers intend to acquire, though French Defense Minister Sebastien Lecornu indicated a proposal for the weapon might be available by the end of 2024.⁴⁰ Assessing the significance of the European Long-Range Strike Approach is difficult without this information, but the approach has the potential to be a significant contribution to European capabilities, even if it might not be fielded much before the end of the decade.

Germany’s Zeitenwende in the EU

The Zeitenwende has also affected Germany’s approach to the work of the EU, which has played an important role in Europe’s adaptation to the threats and challenges of the current era. The EU has been crucial in the response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and to addressing a stronger and more assertive Chinese policy. The EU has imposed sanctions on the Russian government and financial sector, frozen Russian assets in Europe, taken steps to transfer the earnings to Ukraine, and imposed export restrictions on advanced technologies—to say nothing of EU assistance to the Ukrainian government. Vis-à-vis China, the EU has brought new scrutiny to investment screening and created instruments the organization can use against countries employing economic coercion. In this respect, the EU plays a central part in Germany’s response to a changing and more challenging international situation, which Scholz has referred to as Germany’s “framework for action.”⁴¹ The chancellor has emphasized the broader security role of the EU to safeguard Europe’s “security, its independence, and its stability also in the face of challenges from without.”⁴²

The EU Takes a Back Seat to Berlin’s National and NATO Efforts

Chancellor Scholz’s efforts to strengthen German and European defense have prioritized NATO and multinational initiatives over the EU. In one respect, this prioritization reflects the result of the debate that lasted nearly 30 years within the transatlantic community about the desirability of developing the potential for an independent European defense policy and structures to support it. Germany and most other EU members that are also members of NATO prioritized the defense relationship with the United States and NATO and opposed an EU defense role that could lead to cumbersome, expensive, lowest-common-denominator projects that deliver less than the sum of their parts, dissipate energy relative to NATO, and potentially duplicate NATO’s command structure or programs. The remaining options were a series of voluntary initiatives within an EU framework (such as Permanent Structured Cooperation), a focus on capabilities that were not in competition with NATO initiatives, and a cautious approach to EU attempts to bring financial leverage to multinational cooperation projects through the European Defence Fund. The chancellor identified a headline commitment to provide the core troops for the EU rapid deployment force in 2025. Beyond this commitment, Scholz has called, more modestly, for improved compatibility in European defense structures within an EU framework as a way to strengthen NATO.⁴³ The end effect is the Zeitenwende has led to no systemically meaningful efforts at the EU level to reverse the major negative trends in European defense.

The report by former Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi on the future of the EU highlights, among other problems, the fragmentation of the defense industry and the lack of collaborative industrial projects on major arms systems within the EU.⁴⁴ As Sophia Besch illustrates in this report’s chapter on the defense industry, Germany lags other EU member states in its participation in European Defence Fund projects, and, in general, Chancellor Scholz has cautioned against “overestimat[ing]” the EU’s role.⁴⁵ This lag reflects Berlin’s traditional approach to European security and, especially, the concern about EU defense measures wasting scarce resources by duplicating NATO efforts. Actions by the EU in areas that would not duplicate NATO—for example, by using EU budgetary resources to incentivize the development of multinational defense projects (which presumably would have lower costs than separate national programs) or, more ambitiously, by creating a single market for defense and unlocking efficiencies by promoting joint procurement—could bring benefits to Germany and Europe as a whole. Berlin has been cautious toward steps in this direction. For example, the German government chose not to participate in the arrangement for the procurement of 155-millimeter ammunition through the European Defence Agency, instead pursuing this approach as a national effort while allowing other partners to join Germany’s contracts.⁴⁶

But Germany’s domestic political skepticism toward EU spending and the opposition of the country’s political mainstream and the public to joint borrowing at the EU level mean the resources behind the EU facilitation efforts will remain limited.⁴⁷ Berlin will be more flexible on multinational arrangements that carry fewer bureaucratic constraints and bring together like-minded, capable nations for specific purposes. This flexibility is unlikely to change, even if a different governing coalition takes office in Berlin after the 2025 national elections. Efficiencies, but not financial leverage, appear to be the maximum Berlin’s current trajectory will promote at the EU level through 2029 absent a further shock.

The Sputtering Franco-German Engine

Germany’s most important political relationship in Europe is with France, but the former’s skepticism toward institutionalized defense cooperation at the EU level is echoed by the difficulties in Franco-German defense cooperation. The target dates are long for the flagship projects, such as the sixth-generation Future Combat Air System (notional delivery date of 2040) and the Main Ground Combat System (expected delivery at the end of the 2030s).⁴⁸

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Scholz and the German government have taken pains to demonstrate ongoing commitment to the defense partnership with France, beginning with the chancellor’s statement in his Zeitenwende speech that “it is so important . . . that we build the next generation of combat aircraft and tanks here in Europe together with European partners, and particularly France.”⁴⁹ These major defense projects compensate partially for the absence of a shared political agenda for Europe with France.

The merits of Future Combat Air System and Main Ground Combat System aside, as strategic approaches to the future challenges of the battlespace, the delivery of these systems is so far in the future, it plays little role in shaping the current political-military landscape in addressing the threats for which NATO, the EU, and European countries must prepare.

The long timelines, significant resources, and industrial rivalries at stake create fertile ground for mutual suspicions, especially in both countries’ legislatures. Opposition parties in France are skeptical of both systems.⁵⁰ Leadership-level disconnects have slowed progress, and the longer-term political trajectories in both countries magnify uncertainty. German political figures fear a Marine Le Pen presidency after 2027; the French far right mistrusts Germany.

Conclusion

German Federal Minister of Defence Pistorius has set the goal of making the Bundeswehr combat capable by 2029.⁵¹ This chapter concludes based on Germany’s contributions to NATO and European defense, serious reasons abound to doubt Germany’s ability to meet both this target and broader NATO goals. The Zeitenwende’s objective to recapitalize the Bundeswehr and redirect it toward its core task of national and collective defense has increased commitments and the pace of defense investment, but, so far, this objective represents an acceleration rather than a paradigm shift.

Germany’s default setting on security policy remains transatlantic and NATO focused. These circumstances represent an opportunity for the United States to deepen alliance coordination and promote strengthened burden sharing within organizations of which the United States is a member. A new German government in 2025 will recognize the need for sustained effort to raise resource commitments and may respond well to NATO-wide initiatives to increase defense investment for the long term. By the same token, Berlin will be wary of indications the United States might seek to diminish its commitment to European security and will seek to channel US engagement into multilateral arrangements like NATO that provide predictable planning cycles for major capability development.

Endnotes

1. “Defence Policy Guidelines 2023,” Federal Ministry of Defence, accessed on November 30, 2024, https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/5702190/edabed114d7856c8aa71ad666cbce8b3/download-defence-policy-guidelines-2023-data.pdf; and Olaf Scholz, “Rede von Bundeskanzler Scholz bei der Bundeswehrtagung ‘Zeitenwende Gestalten,’ ” Die Bundesregierung, November 10, 2023, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/rede-von-bundeskanzler-scholz-bei-der-bundeswehrtagung-zeitenwende-gestalten-am-10-november-2023-in-berlin-2236184. Return to text.
2. Miles Herszenhorn and Laura Kayali, “2 Percent on Defense? That Is So Last Year,” Politico, July 11, 2024, https://www.politico.com/news/2024/07/11/2-percent-on-defense-nato-00167567. Return to text.
3. The pledge built on a commitment to have already met this 2 percent guideline in 2006. “Defence Expenditures and NATO’s 2% Guideline,” NATO, updated June 18, 2024, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm; and Anthony Reuben, “How Much Do NATO Members Spend on Defence?,” BBC News, July 10, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-44717074. Return to text.
4. “Boris Pistorius Will Zwei-Prozent-Ziel übertreffen,” Zeit Online, August 1, 2024, https://www .zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2024-08/bundesverteidigungsminister-boris-pistorius-zwei-prozent-ziel-nato-bundeswehr. Return to text.
5. NATO, “Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2024),” news release, June 17, 2024, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2024/6/pdf/240617-def-exp-2024-en.pdf. Return to text.
6. “NATO’s 2% Guideline”; and NATO, “NATO Countries.” Return to text.
7. NATO tracks allies’ expenditures in a fourth category—infrastructure—but those costs, which are the smallest, amount to single-digit percentages of overall spending. NATO, “NATO Countries”; and Christian Mölling and Thorben Schütz, “Zeitenwende in der Verteidigungspolitik,” Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, 2022, https://dgap.org/de/forschung/publikationen/zeitenwende-der-verteidigungspolitik. Return to text.
8. Mölling and Schütz, “Zeitenwende.” Return to text.
9. “Sondervermögen Bundeswehr: Investitionen in Unsere Freiheit,” Bundesministerium der Finanzen, March 16, 2022, https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Pressemitteilungen/Finanzpolitik/2022/03/2022-03-16-sondervermoegen-bundeswehr.html. Return to text.
10. In addition, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development will receive €1 billion less in development aid. “Boris Pistorius Kritisiert Fehlende Milliarden im Wehretat,“Zeit Online, July 8, 2024, https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2024-07/bundeshaushalt-boris-pistorius-verteidigung-ruestungsausgaben-svenja-schulze; and Thomas Wiegold, “Verteidigungshaushalt 2025 Folgende: Die Zahlen,” Augen Geradeaus! (blog), July 15, 2024, https://augengeradeaus.net/2024/07/verteidigungshaushalt-2025-folgende-die-zahlen/. Return to text.
11. “Pressekonferenz von Bundeskanzler Scholz Beim Gipfeltreffen der NATO,” Bundesregierung, July 12, 2024, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/aktuelles/pk-von-kanzler-bei-nato-gipfel-2298692. Return to text.
12. John Deni, The New NATO Force Model: Ready for Launch? (NATO Defense College, May 2024); and Amina Vieth and Jörg Fleischer, “NATO Force Model: Wie Deutschland Sich ab 2025 in der Allianz Engagiert,” Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, July 9, 2024, https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/nato-force-model-wie-deutschland-sich-ab-2025-engagiert-5465714. Return to text.
13. Deni, New NATO Force Model. Return to text.
14. Deni, New NATO Force Model; Vieth and Fleischer, “NATO Force Model”; Florian Manthey, “Drehscheibe Deutschland: Logistik für NATO und EU,” Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, October 11, 2022, https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/drehscheibe-deutschland-transport-und-logistik-nato-und-eu-5505038; and Nele Loorents, NATO’s Regional Defence Plans, Washington Summit Series No. 5 (International Centre for Defence and Security, July 2024). Return to text.
15. Deni, New NATO Force Model. Return to text.
16. “Wie Gross ist die Bundeswehr?” Bundeswehr, October 31, 2024, https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/ueber-die-bundeswehr/zahlen-daten-fakten/personalzahlen-bundeswehr. Return to text.
17. Martin Greive and Frank Specht, “Welche Rolle Deutschland Künftig in der NATO Spielen Kann,” Handelsblatt, July 9, 2024, https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/verteidigung-welche-rolle-deutschland-kuenftig-in-der-nato-spielen-kann/100050300.html; and Philipp Kohlhöfer, “NATO: Mehr Soldaten Nötig,” Deutscher Bundeswehrverband, July 8, 2024, https://www.dbwv.de/aktuelle-themen/blickpunkt/beitrag/nato-mehr-soldaten-noetig. Return to text.
18. “Neuer Wehrdienst,” Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, November 29, 2024, https://www.bmvg.de/de/neuer-wehrdienst. Return to text.
19. Thorsten Jungholt, “NATO Fordert 49 Weitere Kampftruppen-Brigaden,” Die Welt, October 6, 2024, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article253847236/Absicherung-gegen-Russland-Nato-fordert-49-weitere-Kampftruppen-Brigaden.html. Return to text.
20. Thomas Wiegold et al., hosts, Sicherheitshalber, podcast, episode 87, “Ist Rüstung Bei Uns Extra-Teuer (und Wenn Ja, Warum)? NATO-Brigaden: Wunsch vs. Wirklichkeit,” Sicherheitspod, October 19, 2024, https://sicherheitspod.de/2024/10/19/folge-87-ist-rustung-bei-uns-extra-teuer-und-wenn-ja-warum-nato-brigaden-wunsch-vs-wirklichkeit/. Return to text.
21. “Wie Groß Ist die Bundeswehr?,” Bundeswehr, n.d., accessed on January 6, 2025, https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/ueber-die-bundeswehr/zahlen-daten-fakten/personalzahlen-bundeswehr. Return to text.
22. “Bundeswehr in Litauen: In Großen Schritten zur Deutschen Kampf brigade,” Bundeswehr, n.d., accessed on October 20, 2024, https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/aktuelles/meldungen/bundeswehr-litauen-grosse-schritte-deutsche-kampfbrigade. Return to text.
23. “Bundeswehr in Litauen.” Return to text.
24. “Operation REASSURANCE,” Government of Canada, updated August 13, 2024, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-reassurance.html; “Roadmap – Scaling the EFP Latvia Battle Group to Brigade,” Government of Canada, updated July 11, 2023, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2023/07/roadmap---scaling-the-efp-latvia-battle-group-to-brigade.html; and “Bundeswehr in Litauen.” Return to text.
25. Ministry of Defence and John Healey, “Britain Bolsters NATO’s Eastern Flank with New Pact with Estonia and New Cooperation on Missile Defence,” His Majesty’s Government, October 17, 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/britain-bolsters-natos-eastern-flank-with-new-pact-with-estonia-and-new-cooperation-on-missile-defence. Return to text.
26. Mölling and Schütz, “Zeitenwende”; and Martin Konertz, “The Challenge Ahead for Germany’s Armed Forces,” European Security and Defence, April 23, 2024, https://euro-sd.com/2024/04/articles/37547/the-challenge-ahead-for-germanys-armed-forces/. Return to text.
27. Sebastian Sprenger, “Germany Clinches $8 Billion Purchase of 35 F-35 Aircraft from the US,” Defense News, December 14, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/12/14/germany-clinches-8-billion-purchase-of-35-f-35-aircraft-from-the-us/; Frank Kuhn, “Making Nuclear Sharing Credible Again: What the F-35A Means for NATO,” War on the Rocks, September 14, 2023, https://warontherocks.com/2023/09/making-nuclear-sharing-credible-again-what-the-f-35a-means-for-nato/; and Tobias Bunde, “Germany and the Future of NATO Nuclear Sharing,” War on the Rocks, August 25, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/08/the-risks-of-an-incremental-german-exit-from-natos-nuclear-sharing-arrangement/. Return to text.
28. Alexander Luck, “Does ‘Zeitenwende’ Represent a Flash in the Pan or a Renewal for the German Military?,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, June 27, 2022, https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/06/does-zeitenwende-represent-a-flash-in-the-pan-or-renewal-for-the-german-military/. Return to text.
29. Guntram Wolff et al., Fit for War in Decades: Europe’s and Germany’s Slow Rearmament vis-à-vis Russia (Kiel Institute for the World Economy, September 2024). Return to text.
30. Camille Grand, “Defending Europe with Less America,” European Council on Foreign Relations, July 3, 2024, https://ecfr.eu/publication/defending-europe-with-less-america/. Return to text.
31. Olaf Scholz, “Speech by Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz at the Charles University in Prague” (speech, Charles University, Prague, CZ, August 29, 2022), https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/federal-government/scholz-speech-prague-charles-university-2080752. Return to text.
32. Scholz, “Speech.” Return to text.
33. “14 NATO Allies and Finland Agree to Boost European Air Defence Capabilities,” NATO, October 13, 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_208103.htm; and German Defense Ministry, “European Sky Shield – die Initiative im Überblick,” n.d., accessed on October 5, 2024, https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/european-sky-shield-die-initiative-im-ueberblick-5511066. Return to text.
34. “Grossauftrag für Mobile Flugabwehr: Rheinmetall Liefert der Bundeswehr den Skyranger 30 auf Boxer-Basis – Auftragswert Fast 600 Mio EU,” Rheinmetall, February 26, 2024, https://www .rheinmetall.com/de/media/news-watch/news/2024/02/2024-02-27-bundeswehr-erhaelt-skyranger-30-mobiles-flugabwehrsystem; Gerhard Heiming, “Luftwaffe Achieves IOC with IRIS-T SLM Air Defence System,” European Security & Defence, September 6, 2024, https://euro-sd.com/2024/09/major-news/40238/luftwaffe-ioc-with-iris-t-slm/; “Germany – Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhanced Missiles,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, August 15, 2024, https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/germany-patriot-advanced-capability-3-missile-segment-enhancement; and Seth Frantzman, “Israel Finalizes Arrow 3 Deal with Germany, Aims for Late 2025 Delivery,” Breaking Defense, November 27, 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/11/israel-finalizes-arrow-3-deal-with-germany-aims-for-late-2025-delivery/. Return to text.
35. Lydia Wachs, “Russian Missiles and the European Sky Shield Initiative,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 3, 2023, https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2023C45/. Return to text.
36. Anna Desmarais, “How Sky Shield, Europe’s Proposed Iron Dome, Would Work and Why It’s Becoming Controversial,” Euronews, July 28, 2024, https://www.euronews.com/next/2024/07/28/how-sky-shield-europes-proposed-iron-dome-would-work-and-why-its-becoming-controversial. Return to text.
37. “European Countries Are Banding Together on Missile Defence,” The Economist, July 25, 2024, https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/07/25/european-countries-are-banding-together-on-missile-defence. Return to text.
38. Lee Ferran, “Let It Go (Long): France Joins Germany, Italy, and Poland in New ELSA Long-Range Missile Project,” Breaking Defense, July 12, 2024, https://breakingdefense.com/2024/07/let-it-go-long-france-joins-germany-italy-and-poland-in-new-elsa-long-range-missile-project/. Return to text.
39. Nick Alipour, “UK and Germany Want to Put Security Relations ‘on a New Footing,’ ” EurActiv, July 24, 2024, https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/uk-and-germany-want-to-put-security-relations-on-a-new-footing/; and Timothy Wright, “Europe’s Missile Renaissance,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, November 25, 2024, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/11/europes-missile-renaissance/. Return to text.
40. Sabine Siebold and John Irish, “Four European Nations Agree to Jointly Develop Long-Range Cruise Missiles,” Reuters, July 11, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/four-european-nations-agree-jointly-develop-long-range-cruise-missiles-2024-07-11/. Return to text.
41. Olaf Scholz, “Policy Statement by Olaf Scholz,Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and a Member of the German Bundestag, 27 February 2022 in Berlin,” Bundesregirung, February 27, 2022, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/policy-statement-by-olaf-scholz-chancellor-of-the-federal-republic-of-germany-and-member-of-the-german-bundestag-27-february-2022-in-berlin-2008378. Return to text.
42. Scholz, “Speech.” Return to text.
43. Scholz, “Speech.” Return to text.
44. Mario Draghi, The Future of European Competitiveness, Part A: A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe (European Commission, September 2024); and Mario Draghi, “Presentation of the Report on the Future of European Competitiveness” (speech, European Parliament, Strasbourg, FR, September 17, 2024), https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/fcbc7ada-213b-4679-83f7-69a4c2127a25_en?filename=Address%20by%20Mario%20Draghi%20at%20the%20Presentation%20of%20the%20report%20on%20the%20future%20of%20European%20competitiveness.pdf. Return to text.
45. Jana Puglierin, Germany’s Perception of the EU Defence Industrial “Toolbox” (Armament Industry European Research Group, January 2024). Return to text.
46. Puglierin, Germany’s Perception. Return to text.
47. Giovanna Faggionato and Hans von der Burchard, “Germany’s Lindner Rejects Draghi’s Common Borrowing Proposal,” Politico, September 9, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/germanys-lindner-rejects-draghis-common-borrowing-proposal/. Return to text.
48. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 19. Bericht des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung zu Rüstungsangelegenheiten – Teil 1 (Bundeswehr, April 2024), https://www.bmvg.de/resource/blob/5820310/c30ac0f6b6437838720d9d7e1298f6a8/19-ruestungsbericht-teil-1-data.pdf. Return to text.
49. Scholz, “Policy Statement.” Return to text.
50. Laura Kayali, “On Defense, French Lawmakers Don’t Want to Be Wedded to Germany,” Politico, December 14, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/lead-french-mp-france-should-look-beyond-germany-on-defense/. Return to text.
51. “Pistorius Mahnt Kriegstüchtigkeit bis 2029 an,” Spiegel Online, June 5, 2024, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/boris-pistorius-mahnt-kriegstuechtigkeit-bis-2029-an-a-063d1ce1-6dda-453e-bd33-1acf9be2558a. Return to text.

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