MAJ Brennan Deveraux and COL Michael Long
In this episode of CLSC Dialogues, Major Brennan Deveraux welcomes Colonel Michael Long, the new Director of the China Landpower Studies Center. After discussing COL Long’s thoughts on the new assignment, the conversation shifts to his recent experiences in Korea, offering listeners unique insights from the former Eighth Army G-5 Assistant Chief of Staff for Policy, Planning, and Strategy.
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Brennan Deveraux
Hello. You’re listening to CLSC Dialogues, a China Landpower Studies Center (CLSC) production. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests, and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m talking today to the new director of the China Landpower Study Center, Colonel Mike Long. Colonel Long. Welcome.
Michael Long
Hey, thank you Brennan. I appreciate you hosting this for the team, and it really means a lot.
Deveraux
So, Colonel Long, you’re coming from Korea as the Eighth Army G5. If I could just have you real quick introduce yourself [provide] a little bit about you, and kind of, how you’re coming into CLSC and what that means for the organization.
Long
Hey. Perfect. Yeah, I’m coming from the Pacific. Which makes sense why I’m here at CLSC, the China Landpower Studies Center. And, I’m a functional area 59, just like yourself, so [I’m] focused on strategy and policy, planning. I’m coming here from Eighth Army, I was the G5 there. So, assistant chief of staff for policy, planning, strategy, [and] also worked force management.
So it’s a great opportunity, and I learned a ton in the job.
Deveraux
Great. Well, welcome. I know you’ve already jumped in. So we got you here a couple of months ago. Finally getting you in to talk. Can you talk real quick just to make sure our listeners are caught up? CLSC. What it is and kind of your perspective on what your mission is going forward with the research organization.
Long
Yeah, absolutely. So, we’re a team of, there’s a total of six of us. There’s myself as the director. I’m more focused on blue. Blue across the Pacific. Heavy focus on Korea and Japan. We also have three civilians.
Deveraux
Just to clarify. When you say blue, you mean friendly forces?
Long
I sure do. Yeah. Great. Great point. So that’s really my understanding. My focus here is, you know, when you think of blue and, especially in the landpower perspective, we’re thinking of the Marines out there in mainly Japan and Hawaii. We’re thinking of USARPAC (US Army Pacific Command) and then all the supporting organizations as well as Eighth Army, USFK (US Forces-Korea) it’s portion as well as USFJ (US Forces-Japan) in Japan.
But our CLSC team, back to that, is myself as a director. And we have three civilians who are Chinese subject matter experts. So they have a detailed understanding of what I would call the red perspective, the China perspective. Across really at the strategic level, down to the operational and even the tactical level of understanding of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) specifically.
And our focus overall is really landpower. We are also lucky enough to have another colonel, Colonel Kyle Markram, who did a podcast with you earlier. He’s a foreign area officer. He served in China. He is also a [Chinese] speaker. And he just got to us from Taiwan. And then we have a visiting professor, also, Doctor Sheena Greitens, and she spends 50% of her time working with us and 50% of her time working for UT (University of Texas), where she does great work out there, has her own podcast, and is quite a prolific publisher.
Deveraux
Yeah, thanks. And I think it’s worth noting that while all of those researchers are looking at China, they all kind of have a little bit of a different lens. So I’ve worked with Brian Carlson, who I know looks at that China-Russia relationship, which is important. And then Jake Rinaldi, who recently went off to Rand, he looked a lot at that, China-North Korea relationship and North Korea’s impact in the region as well.
So when we say, “China experts,” it really goes beyond just, you know, the line I could draw around the country, it’s a regional problem, or a regional challenge, depending on how you view the world.
Long
Yeah, that’s a great point. And you know, our real focus is China and the landpower aspect. But we try to look at the entire INDO-PACOM AOR (US Indo-Pacific Command Area of Responsibility) and we have a focus across the board. But like you’re saying, all of our experts, they’re all you know, we have five Chinese speakers on the team. They really are looking at original source products from China and doing great work for us.
Deveraux
One of the things I heard in a brief one time is you can’t look at China without also looking at Korea. I’d be curious, since we have you coming directly from Eighth Army and looking at the Korea problem, if you’d be open to talk a little bit about the Korea problem set, some of the challenges, and just kind of what’s going [on] out there on the peninsula.
Long
Absolutely. So I served in Korea, in Eighth Army under two CG (commanding generals). The most recent one was Lieutenant General Chris LaNeve, who, his hats in the ring to take on as the vice chief of staff. So he was a great leader to work with, and he really described Korea as the strategic high ground. And I think that’s a good way to kind of think about where Korea is and what it’s what exist. You know, it sits next to a, it’s really in a dangerous neighborhood.
It’s got three authoritarian neighbors, with China, North Korea, and Russia. It also is right next to a key ally, Japan. And then not too far away from Taiwan. So regionally, it’s located in a unique position. And the Army’s very lucky to have that, to be positioned on that strategic key terrain.
Deveraux
I think two things are really interesting about that, that a lot of people don’t think about. First, Russia, a lot of us, when we think about Russia, we very much look at Western Europe, Russia and NATO. But to your point, Russia, not only extends all the way out there, but [it] has been very involved in Asian politics, Asian conflict, for a long time, historically.
And the second point, you say Japan as the ally and yes, it is, but, Korea and Japan actually have a pretty unique historical relationship that I know kind of creates an interesting challenge when we talk about working with Korea and Japan as kind of a, a trilateral relationship.
Long
You’re 100% right. You know, there still are some historic issues from that time. You know, I think it was about 1910 until the end of, until the end of World War II, where Korea was essentially colonized by the Japanese Empire. And there was atrocities committed. Absolutely. And so, there are people who are still alive today who were part of that.
And so, for good reason, there’s some concerns there. But since 2014, you know, the dates we, where we see this, large air defense weapon system called the THAAD (Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense) come in and massive overreaction by China, that was, that really hit South Korea hard. You really see across the South Korean population, the population turn and really, you know, go from a population that has a lot of animosity towards Japan to a lot of animosity towards China.
So if you look at it today, you know, it’s something like 80% of the people still have negative feelings about China. And almost all of the young people today are actually very pro Japan. They like anime. They like, all of the Japanese aspects.
Deveraux
Everyone likes anime. No, that’s real interesting. So I had a chance to go to Korea a handful years ago. Definitely not as long or as important of a task. I more helped move some cargo. But I was there long enough to get my cool little ribbon. And I couldn’t help but think, I was up fairly north and South Korea, up at Camp Casey, and I couldn’t help but think about the historical aspect of actually fighting on the peninsula and looking at the terrain and the mountains and just imagining what it would be to actually have a big land conflict, on the peninsula [of] Korea.
Could you talk a little bit about how you guys think about or how, when you were there, you thought about the terrain and what that really means for a potential conflict in that area?
Long
Absolutely. And, you know, in the Korean War, the terrain and the climate was really an adversary. The coldest battle Americans ever fought was their Chosin, you know, their reports that the temperature dropped to -30, -40 degrees. Absolutely brutal. But it’s a very mountainous terrain, both North and South Korea. And when we think mountainous, we got to think Afghanistan, West Virginia, super-duper mountains everywhere.
It also has a very cold temperatures. It’s a peninsula. But in reality, at least while the armistice is going on, which is the stalemate from the Korean War that we have now, South Korea really is a lot more like an island. And it has a lot of the same obstacles that an island nation like Japan does.
Really. The only way to get in and out of South Korea right now is by airplane or by sea. So SLOCs (Sea Lines of Communication), SPODs (Seaport of Debarkation), APODs (Aerial Port of Debarkation). These are incredibly important when we think about it.
Deveraux
Can you, real quick, for the listeners who aren’t as familiar with the language that is the Army, just break down those acronyms real quick you just dropped on us.
Long
Yeah. Thanks for catching me on that, I appreciate that. So we talk about SLOCs, Sea Lines of Communication, Air Lines of Communication. It’s essentially the routes we would take by sea to bring any type of people or equipment into the country. And then when we talk about the air, we’re talking about ports, airports, and [the] same for seaports.
And it’s, it’s really the island effect of it is quite noticeable when you’re there.
Deveraux
So I will embarrass myself a little bit. So I’ve been to some pretty cold places. I did four years at Fort Riley. I remember being very cold in my small tents or in my truck. But one of my coldest nights was loading a CONNEX in Korea to go home in the middle of the night. You’re, it’s deceptive how cold it got and how quickly it got. So, to your point, it is, it does have the potential to really throw a wrench in how we operate, especially coming out of the Global War on Terror, where, you know, we are much more used to fighting in the desert.
Long
Yeah. It’s a, it’s a really astute point. And, you know, I think we got the perfect commander for Eighth Army. The new commander who just took over, Lieutenant General Hilbert from, he came from 11th Airborne Division right there in Alaska. So he is very familiar with mountains and very familiar with cold. And I think he’s the right guy to help, to help prepare those forces there.
Deveraux
And you made a point about the island. And we’ve talked about this before. Yes. And I get your point with it. That’s how we have to come in. But it’s really an island that we already have a really strong foothold on. So it’s not, if we were to go back to the Pacific campaign in World War II, where we’re capturing this island, we have this beachhead already.
Can you talk a little bit about the forces that are kind of already there in that, the footprint we have on the peninsula?
Long
Yeah, absolutely. So the National Defense Authorization Act, NDAA, it sets a floor of 28,500 forces. So that’s about what’s there. When we think of American forces, those forces are really divided.
Deveraux
Can I real quick, you said a floor. That means the minimum we will maintain, at least that? But we could surge well over if needed?
Long
Absolutely.
Deveraux
Okay.
Long
And, those forces are really divided. It’s mostly Army, but there is a decent amount of Air Force as well. So most of the Army is an Eighth Army, and that’s about 20,000 soldiers. And then Seventh Air Force at Osan, mostly at Osan Air Base. That’s about 6 or 7,000. And then there’s a very small contingent of Marines, Navy, and Space [Force].
Deveraux
So, as I joked, my experience in Korea was about 35 days, just long enough to get my ribbon. But I do remember looking at a, a hierarchy chart, an organizational chart. And it’s pretty complicated. So you just already started naming a couple organizations. Can you talk just a little bit about who’s out there, who’s in charge of who, who number two works for, all those kind of things.
To just put a little perspective on the complexity that is…
Long
I think the best way to think about it is who we have there, the four star we have. So right now, General Xavier Brunson, the four-star commander, he wears three, really three hats, commander hats. So he is the US Forces-Korea Commander, meaning he’s in charge of all American forces in Korea.
He’s in charge of the Combined Forces Command CFC. And in that, that’s really the bilateral relationship that’s designed to fight in the event of conflict with North Korea.
And then he also wears a third hat, that’s the United Nations Command Commander. That United Nations Command Commander, that responsibility comes from the vestigial responsibility from the Korean War. And so, when that was a United Nations action, you know, it still supports multiple UN Security Council resolutions. And it’s a series of 18 nations that are part of that. So those are the three key hats that he wears.
Deveraux
Not to put you on the spot to name them all. But what nations in general are we talking about? If you were to put a couple out there to kind of put it in perspective for someone looking at the peninsula.
Long
So if we look at right now the UN Command or the UN deputy commander, I believe he’s, I believe he’s Canadian. So they’re a key nation. Major General Winter, he’s going to be promoted to Lieutenant General Winters, Australian general, who’s about to take the deputy UN job from… he’s moving from USARPAC position over to there.
So they’re part of it. The most recent member that just joined here in the last few years is Germany. So quite a few nations. We see a lot of those NATO nations, as well as some of our five-eye partners.
Deveraux
I think the NATO aspect is really interesting because NATO, obviously a European alliance with a focus on that Western aspect of Europe. But as we look at really just how the United States military operates, allies and partners is our center of gravity. I’ve read strategic documents that suggest that. Right. So it’s interesting as we talk, not just Korea, but the Pacific as a whole, NATO’s potential role in there.
And I’m not going to ask you to, to really get into that, but just thinking about them already, kind of having, maybe not all of them, but a handful of key allies already kind of having a footprint, maybe an aspect of collective interest in the region, for what is as you’ve already said, a strategically important area, I think is really interesting when we look at how that might apply to a future great power war in the Pacific.
Long
Well, NATO, just like, just like many of our other allies and partners, they have significant interest in deterrence in the Korean Peninsula and all of really East Asia. Right. And so, they are, they’re committed to that, to that, responsibility. And they have, they were part of that all the way back in the 50s. And they’re still members of it, many of them still to this day.
Deveraux
So you talk about deterrence, and I think I opened it with, we can’t look at China without looking at Korea. The inverse is probably true, right? We’re not looking at Korea as an isolated, challenge. I know that they have for them a nation on its border that could potentially be a major threat if war were to break off.
And to your point, the war technically is ongoing, right? We’re just kind of at a pause. When we talk about deterrence in Korea, can you talk about, the potential extension, how that fits in with China or the greater region, versus an isolated problem on the peninsula?
Long
Absolutely. Well I don’t, it’s very difficult to look at any of these problem-sets in isolation. Right. So even what we saw in the Korean War, like you alluded to, you know, the United States was part of that, you know, fought with multiple nations to include South Korea. But we fought against, not just North Korea, but also, the PRC (People’s Republic of China). And we fought against the Soviet Union, the Russians there.
So we’ve seen this playbook before. We’ve seen the confluence of these relationships in the past. But I think General Brunson’s really opening the aperture much wider, to look at how Korea can be, really the strategic high ground, operational high ground for deterrence against the PRC in a South China Sea or a Taiwan problem set.
Deveraux
Interesting and probably a little different than what the organization was brought up to do and created to do. So that’s a neat adaptation. I’m actually really curious, I read an article from one of the former CLSC authors, Jake Rinaldi, who’s now over at Rand, that talked about China’s potential involvement in North Korea and looked at different scenarios of why China would come in. We are, most of us, familiar with the historical example you just referenced. I remember, you know, the video of, you know, the Yalu River and stuff like that’s really fascinating.
But there’s probably some instances of potential cooperation that we could have with China as it relates to North Korea. Can you talk just a little bit about the relationship between those two countries? It’s not necessarily China and North Korea versus South Korea and the West. It’s a lot more fluid and dynamic than that.
Long
I agree with you on that. You know, I think there is concern, in potential, in those countries, sort of, you know, you hear the term “Dark Quad” thrown around when we look at a North Korea, a China, a Russia, and Iran. But I don’t think it’s as clean as, you know, the sort of an alliance of these four countries or, you know, we’re talking here about 2 or 3 of them.
I also don’t think that China has as much leverage on North Korea as a lot of, as a lot of people think, which, and I would argue that, China was surprised and is probably concerned why North Korea decided to send 13,000 soldiers to Ukraine to fight for the Russians. So I think that there is, there are relationships here, but they are not, they’re not as clean as we’d like to say.
Right. So they are, they are transactional and not based on ideals, right? These are authoritarian countries that come together only on transactional relationships, not like a NATO that’s looking for a singular sort of vision of peace.
Deveraux
I think it’s probably fair to say a lot of people were surprised that North Korea sent thousands of troops to Russia. I was. I was shocked and have done my best to kind of keep up on how that’s going. It’s hard to get good information coming out of Ukraine. It’s easy to get information, how truthful and relevant and biased it is. This is another thing, but I think that’s interesting.
Okay. So we talk about that relationship. And you provided kind of a look at it as a transactional construct. It’s not a league of super best friends. And most of them aren’t even in an alliance. I know there’s aspects of that and mutual partnerships and, maybe some security cooperation agreements. But if we look at the dynamic of one working with another. So example, that Russia coming into North Korea, Putin having that experience with Kim Jong Un very publicly and building that relationship, North Korea sending troops out to Russia, China, there. Does that have an impact on China’s relationship with those nations? Do you think there’s a potential that North Korea growing its relations outside of that very small sphere of influence in the Pacific could potentially damage that relationship or really just change the dynamics?
I know that North Korea is not a puppet state of China. To your point, they don’t have the leverage they probably wish they did. But I think that they are, probably at least in most scholarship, one of the more influential nations over North Korea. So I’d just be curious how you think that changes the dynamic of their relationship.
Long
Yeah, I think that China is potentially losing some of its leverage with North Korea. And I think that North Korea is growing its leverage outside. Right. Putin, we saw Putin go to North Korea as we discussed. And I think it’s gaining sort of a global clout, even if it’s amongst these authoritarian nations.
It’s also owed things. Right? So it’s in a transactional relationship. They’re providing thousands of troops. They’re providing equipment, they’re providing munitions. This is a quid pro quo. And, we should expect that Russia is going to repay them in-kind. And so that probably looks like, space technology, missile technology, nuclear technology, as well as, you know, Russia has good access to food and energy that it can bring in, which are both areas where North Korea has some insecurity problems.
What we’ve really seen in the northeast area, you know, along this I think it’s a 12-mile border between Russia and North Korea is their opening ground rail routes to increase the ability to sort of flow goods in and out. And I think that what we understand about the wealth of nations is that this increases the capabilities of all these countries.
Deveraux
I think it’s worth noting that historically, at least for our perspective, for the past handful years, we categorize North Korea alongside, like, an Iran, as a “rogue nation” or a “disruptive actor.” You know, words like that. But as you start talking about having influence outside of your own border and outside of your sphere of influence and having technological advances that involve space, missiles that can travel across the globe.
And then the ultimate kicker and I know we have slight disagreements on this, but the ultimate kicker of that nuclear weapon, you stop getting called a disruptive actor and you start getting called a great power. Or at least you call yourself that, right? And with that comes, I would argue, responsibilities, but at a minimum, some prestige, some deference and things like that.
So I think that’s an interesting dynamic of that. Moving forward, as we look at the Indo-Pacific theater as a whole, and we start talking about those deterrence objectives that we referenced earlier. Can you talk a little bit about what makes you optimistic that deterrence efforts are going to hold in the region? And the flip side of that, are there things that you’re kind of pessimistic about coming out of that seat you were just in in Korea or just based on your studies of the region?
Long
Yeah, absolutely. So, let’s kind of look at from a larger time scale how we see North Korea’s behavior. And really they kind of move up and down in these cycles of threat and aggression. And right now they’re kind of in a peak. So, one of the things that makes me pessimistic is they’ve been in this peak cycle for quite a long time.
Right. So ,they’ve held at this for quite a long time. And they’re doing, we’ve seen not just the nuclear testing from a while back, but constant missile testing. There was one just earlier this week. I don’t know when this podcast will air, but I bet you there will be another one probably between now and then.
And what that concerns me about the potential of miscalculation, overreaction. You know, escalation, unintended consequences. And so that’s what makes me pessimistic. I think those are the most likely causes of potential conflict.
Deveraux
When you’re talking about miscalculation. Who do you think’s on that receiving end of that miscalculation? I would assume, like a Japan.
Long
Yeah. So it could be I think South Korea, Korea’s the most likely, but I think it’s Japan possibly as well as we’ve seen, you know, missile test over parts of, of Japan into, you know, the East Sea or the, Sea of Japan, as the Japanese call it. I think that it could be either one of those nations that sort of reacts and potentially causes an overreaction. And we see sort of an escalation of unintended consequences.
Deveraux
And I think one thing that’s worth mentioning about the center of gravity of allies and partners, and historically, this has been an aspect of, an ally and partner can also bring you into a conflict. They’re not just there to help you when you’re in one. So that miscalculation, to your point, could really spiral out of control.
Hopefully that’s, you know, not the case. But if I can shift it to a more positive note, you didn’t get to the optimistic aspect yet. So, if you could talk a little bit, what makes you optimistic about deterrence in a region?
Long
So, you know, we have seen a lot of actions which I, which are negative actions by North Korea militarily along the border. They’ve blown up bridges they’ve dug tank ditches. They’ve laid more mines, they’ve built towers. And on one hand, this is bad, right? This is a, this is anathema to a country, to two countries that we would hope could normalize relations and become real members of the international community. On the other hand, all these actions are defensive in nature.
So North Korea is taking defensive actions. So, from my perspective, I would say an initial assessment is that seems like an attack is unlikely if you’re preparing for defenses.
Deveraux
So optimistic might not be the best word. Optimistic for deterrence, but not necessarily for peace and harmony in the region.
Long
I think we’re a long way from that. I’m sorry to say.
Deveraux
Well, no, it’s fine, I think, the question was, you know, hey, is the glass half empty or the glass half full? And your response was, the glass has water in it, let’s make do. Which is great, in an aspect of that.
Real quick. Specifically to your position, I know we talked about, you know, the four-star general and all of his hats and the responsibilities and the complexity of that organizational chart. Can you deep dive just a little bit into your specific organization? Eight Army, you said was responsible for a large preponderance of the force over there. What is that role?
You know, it’s I know it’s a unique organization compared to some of the other military or Army forces across the globe. Can you just talk a little bit about, you know, what it is, what its purpose is and kind of that unique flavor?
Long
Absolutely. And I think this is especially apropos, as you know, most of our Army listeners who, if they’re going to Korea, are going to work either in Eighth Army or for one of the subordinate commands of Eighth Army. And so, let’s kind of think about what Eighth Army’s responsibility is. So first off, it’s a field army.
It’s America’s only field army. Field armies are designed to command and control multiple corps in sustained land combat. Right. As you know from looking at the wire diagram, there’s, America has four corps, and none of those corps are in Korea. So, what is it doing if it’s not in charge of that? And a lot of its actions are there, from another role that the Eighth Army commander wears, which are, as he’s the commander of Army forces, the ARFOR commander.
In Korea, it’s called the ARFOR-K commander. And he’s got a lot of Title-10 responsibilities from that. And so that’s, that’s a big hat that he wears. So now we know he’s the field army commander, the Eighth Army commander, he is the ARFOR commander, but he’s also got four other hats that he wears, and I think it’s worth kind of talking about this a little bit.
He is the senior commander for all Army garrisons across Korea. So that’s a pretty big responsibility to be in charge of every one of those specific garrisons.
He is the United Nations Command ground component commander as well, so that he is in charge of all ground operations for that United Nations command, we talked about that.
And those four roles that he has. He does have the help of his staff, and he’s got a pretty robust three-star staff that helps him with those.
But he actually has two other roles that his staff really isn’t a big part of those. And that’s, he’s the chief of staff for the Combined Forces Command, and he’s the deputy commander for the CGCC. That’s the combined ground component command, which is a fancy way to say the land component commander for all ground operations if there were to be conflict with North Korea.
So those are six pretty big hats, you know. So, I think my job’s pretty busy day to day. But I will say that the Eighth Army commander has a significantly difficult job. In addition to that, I think if you look at span of control of Eighth Army, it’s pretty difficult. There’s about 20 major subordinate commands. And of those about, of those two of them are reserve commands.
Deveraux
Reserve command in Korea?
Long
That’s exactly right.
Deveraux
[I’m] used to reserve back in the United States because you’re doing the citizen soldier. How does it work in Korea?
Long
Yeah, so there’s two reserve commands in Korea. There’s an O-6 and an O-5 reserve command. And they do. They work just like in America. One week a month, one weekend a month, two weeks a year. They have their AT (annual training) there as well. About 30% of them are, live in Korea day to day.
Deveraux
So yeah, that was going to be my question. That seems like potentially a really long commute for those just coming in for that one weekend.
Long
Yeah. So, more than a third of them live, and I think I’ve heard, read like about 40%, live in Korea. Also, several live in Japan or Guam. Some do commute from the West Coast. I think when I was there, the commander of the 658th Regional Support Group, I think he was coming in from CONUS (continental United States).
So for his drill. So, so pretty big commute for him, but, it’s, it’s pretty important to have those forces because that’s what we can grow. That’s what Eighth Army can grow into, with, in the event of a conflict.
Deveraux
Yeah, when they grow, not just with the reserve elements, but there’s a unique aspect of how we work with the Korean military, as well, right? And how they integrate into that force.
Long
Absolutely. So I think when we think of integration, I think Korea is the pinnacle example of how to work best with an alliance. So, 2nd ID (infantry division), 2ID, they are America’s only combined division. So they have Koreans as well as Americans in that division in additionally, what I think you’re kind of getting to is the role of KATUSAs, which stands for Korean augmentees to the United States Army. And that’s a series of, I think, 3 to 4000, Koreans who, when they do their conscription, their 18-month duty, they go through Korean basic training, the KATUSA Academy run by America, they’re at Camp Humphreys, and then we farm them out to all of the Eighth Army forces there on Peninsula.
Deveraux
I heard that division is second to none. They tell me that all the time when I hang out with them.
Long
Absolutely.
Deveraux
So, you said most people who are going to start their transition over to Korea are going to be in Eighth Army. And as we look at that next batch of soldiers preparing, probably a large chunk of them for a one-year rotation, some may be on the accompanied going longer, and I know that they’re making changes for that now, to take on that Korea mission. Any advice for those army officers, in particular those captains to colonels that are heading to the peninsula this summer to help them be successful with this mission?
Long
Absolutely. I would say to do three things. The first thing I would say is read the book This Kind of War. It’s a book about the Korean War, but it really looks at the interwar period between the Korean War and World War II. It’s a time when the United States is putting a lot more focus on the Air Force and the Navy. It’s times where there’s discipline and training issues across the force. And, I think a lot of people would see many of those problem-sets mirrored today where we say, “hey, a conflict in the Pacific is going to be an Air Force and Navy problem, not necessarily an Army problem. So let’s take some resources from them.”
We just saw Secretary of War Hegseth talk about discipline standards and training issues inside of the Army. And I think that there’s a lot to learn, that when we think this kind of war won’t happen again. I think Fehrenbach has a lot to offer us on other ways to think about
Deveraux
And those soldiers who show up to Korea in the summer, they’re going to hit the ground running pretty quick. I know that there’s some pretty significant exercises that the military conducts out there to demonstrate capabilities, build that integration, and then to promote deterrence.
Long
100% correct. So there’s two large exercises that are conducted annually, and the one in the fall, which is what most soldiers arriving in the summer, that’s the first thing that they’ll really do. It is a President of Korea, President of the Republic of Korea, POTROK. It is at his level exercise. There’s no equivalency in the United States where a military exercise brings in the president for at least a week of a two-week exercise.
And he’s a key part of it. This is across their entire military structure, as well as all of the US military that is there. It’s quite significant. And it’s, it’s a pretty good opportunity for new arriving soldiers to learn their job and learn what they’ll do in the event of conflict in Korea.
Deveraux
They’re going to learn it fast.
Long
That’s exactly right. And then there’s a second one that they do in the spring. And that works really well because most of our American soldiers transition in the summer. Most of the Korean soldiers, they PCS (permanent change of station, move) in the winter. So all of the new Koreans in their job, they’ll get an opportunity in the early spring to go through another.
This will be a national level exercise. This one doesn’t necessarily involve their president, though.
Deveraux
Okay. I actually, I read This Kind of War a handful of years ago. Great read. I know you’re actually a big reader beyond, just prepping for, you know, an assignment. Can you talk a little bit about what you’re reading now? What’s that big stand out or what’s occupying your attention?
Long
Yeah, I don’t, I read some. I like to listen on audiobooks. The last book I actually read was Exterminating ISIS. It’s a memoir about a field artillery officer’s role in Iraq. And then, you know, how he lived with some of the responses that happened after.
Deveraux
I heard that was really good.
Long
It is. But in addition to that, what I’m listening to right now is actually it’s a book by Sorkin. It’s from, it’s called 1929. It’s about the stock market crash that occurred. And, you know, a lot of the, a lot of people will see a contributing factor of World War II was the stock market crash. He sees, Sorkin as sort of, showing the stock market crash of 1929 as an allegory of where we are today.
And so could that, could a potential change in markets affect a potential war? I think that’s an interesting way to look at the problem set. He doesn’t go quite into the war but really gives a very good overview of the crash. And I’m not quite done with the book, but from what I’ve read, I like it so far.
How about yourself? What are you reading Brennan? I know you’re a big reader.
Deveraux
So I just picked up a book called Red Cloud at Dawn. It is the examination of the Soviet Union’s push to get the nuclear bomb, and to get it in a unique way and much faster than the United States expected they could. I’m looking at going to graduate school after my time here at the War College.
And I’m trying to get those dissertation ideas flowing. The early Cold War I just find fascinating, and it’s neat because everyone was so afraid of keeping secrets and, you know, being called a communist, that they wrote everything down. So there’s just so much you can pull and get these records on.
So, I’ve just started it, so not weighing in yet either way. But regardless of how it’s written, it’s just a fascinating time as we look back at nuclear politics. Especially as we’re looking forward again, and, you know, nuclear weapons are back on the menu. You know, people are having the conversation again about what a nuclear war could mean.
So, sir, I’d love to just thank you for the time. This is really good. I look forward to your flavor of the CLSC and what you bring to the organization.
Long
Absolutely. And the last two things I’d like to say for anybody heading to Korea or just listening to this podcast is feel free to reach out to us. So, we’re at CLSC@ArmyWarCollege.edu. And so if you’re heading to Korea and you want the Eighth Army strategy that was written by a great team in the G5, I’m happy to share that with you.
Happy to get you on some DISTROs and connect you to people, as well as get you on the CLSC DISTRO. So, I think that’s a really good opportunity that I’d like anyone out there to reach out so we can we can help bring it to the fold. And, Brennan, thank you so much for giving me the opportunity to kind of talk about CLSC, talk about my experiences in Korea.
Deveraux
Thank you. So yeah, listeners, you can learn more about the China Landpower Studies Center on the website that Colonel long just gave as well as the SSI website. We’ll get you there where you’ll find great resources. You can reach out whether you’re going to Korea, or you want to look at other problem sets. SSI covers a lot of great topics, and the researchers are here to support.
For more Army War College podcasts, please check out Conversations on Strategy, Decisive Point, SSI Live, and A Better Peace.