Dennis J. Blasko
©2026 Dennis J. Blasko
CLSC Quick Takes offer expert analysis of select sources and provide timely insight in a succinct format rather than as formally cited academic products.
Discovery
In April 2026, Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Xi Jinping spoke at a training course for senior officers from the CMC, theaters, services, and CMC-affiliated units. The course laid out plans for “conducting ideological rectification and deepening political training at this new historical juncture” throughout the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Armed Police (PAP). This campaign, directly related to the removal of dozens of two- and three-star generals (theater leader and deputy theater leader grade billets) for various forms of corruption over the past several years, is now trickling down to leaders of lower organizational levels, including operational (combat) units at corps, division, deputy division (brigade) grade, and below.
In August 2026, the National Defense University’s Political College held a month-long training course for political cadre at the corps level to improve their ability to provide political training to the troops. Afterward, these political commissars and staff officers will return to their units where they will apply these new methods and content to training within their operational formations. The first step will probably be to instruct their subordinate political officers at the division grade and below on these new techniques, so they can then apply them in their units.
A week later, the Ministry of National Defense issued a “Code of Professional Ethics for Conscription Personnel” that applies to non–active-duty, uniformed local civilian government officials (cadre) who work in People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFD) below county level in townships, neighborhoods, and some colleges and commercial enterprises. Based on quotas sent down from higher headquarters, these local cadre recruit (conscript) young Chinese to serve in the active-duty PLA and PAP. The code focuses on their “moral development,” implements and deepens their ideological rectification and political training, and sets “high ethical standards.”
Analysis
It is unclear whether this ideological rectification and political training campaign will be included in the 20–30 percent of training time that units must already dedicate to political training, as required by regulations, or added on top of scheduled political training. Nonetheless, following the sacking of Generals Zhang Youxia and the younger, similarly experienced Liu Zhenli, for “grave violations of discipline and the law” in January, the Chinese military appears to be placing greater emphasis on political loyalty (to Xi Jinping) over professional expertise, couched in terms of the “CMC chairman responsibility system.”
The example of Major General Ding Laifu, one of nine PLA senior officers who were removed from their roles as deputies to the National People’s Congress (NPC) in February, illustrates the longer reach of this campaign. At the time, Ding was the commander of the 73rd Group Army (opposite Taiwan), a corps-level leadership billet. He had a very distinguished career, enlisting as a private in 1986, becoming an artillery officer, and advancing from platoon leader to commander at every echelon from company to group army (including both the 72nd and 73rd Group Armies). Ding was two grades below Army Commander General Li Qiaoming, who was among the nine officers removed from the NPC in February. The current status of both officers is unknown, yet both appeared to be successful, professional soldiers and role models in the PLA, much like Zhang and Liu.
The ideological rectification and political training campaign has now reached the lowest headquarters of grassroots PAFDs responsible for recruitment/conscription. These civilians wear military uniforms with unique insignia and patches that distinguish them from active-duty PLA and PAP personnel. Because they interface directly with young civilians in their recruitment work, they can be the targets of bribery to keep qualified personnel out of service or allow unqualified people into the forces. PAFD cadre are notoriously overworked, underpaid, and frequently subject to this form of “micro-corruption.”
Implications
In a July 2026 China Aerospace Studies Institute study on corruption in the PLA, Ding was the only major general in a command billet identified from among the 73 officers investigated, removed, speculated to be missing, or under investigation from 2022 to 2026. (Four other major generals in staff positions, not commanders, were identified in the report.) Unlike many of the recently relieved senior officers, his biography contains no record of his being directly responsible for large sums of money, land, equipment purchases, or promotions, which are frequently associated with the potential for graft.
The ideological rectification and political training campaign underway is reaching operational units and apparently targeting lower-level unit leaders and those who recruit new personnel. Following the announcement of Zhang and Liu’s removal, the consensus among some foreign analysts was that the ongoing purges of senior officers did not adversely affect the immediate operational readiness of the forces. This short-term readiness level may persist for the remainder of this year’s training cycle, as long as the PLA does not face an unexpected incident, mistake, or miscalculation. However, if operational unit leadership begins to be thinned out (and not permanently replaced) to the same extent as the CMC, theater, and services have been, longer-term readiness, planning, and decision making will suffer. Removing lower-level operational leaders also reduces the pool of future senior leaders available for assignment.
Strategic Message
Is Xi using these actions to introduce a new layer of younger leadership devoted to only him before next year’s 100th anniversary of the founding of the PLA and during the 21st National Chinese Communist Party Congress? The increasing emphasis on political loyalty does not yet appear to have forced the PLA to change its training tempo. For the next few months, the forces can likely operate on autopilot unless they encounter severe turbulence; however, operations cannot continue indefinitely without a full slate of national-level and theater leaders.
Outside observers do not have insight into the discussions underway among Xi and his senior military advisers about replacing the senior officers who have been removed, nor can they know what the junior officers in the units tasked to do the fighting are discussing. The further down the chain the removals are felt, the more likely unit morale will suffer, especially if the leaders were respected by those they led.
According to official media reports, all is well. However, has recruiting been affected? Are young Chinese willing to volunteer to make the military their career when so many senior officers are exposed publicly for such offenses? Do young leaders (officers and noncommissioned officers) know what is expected of them? Will the ideological rectification and political training campaign produce combat unit leaders who can function loyally, but also rapidly and independently under changing battlefield conditions—or will they play it safe and defer to higher echelons to make difficult decisions?
The degree of turmoil underway in the PLA leadership suggests that Xi and the senior Party leadership are in no hurry to test the force in combat, unless compelled by external events. This unhurried, multiyear path of leadership reform is consistent with the even longer, multi-decade “three-step development strategy” to transform the PLA into a world-class force by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China.
Analysis Sources: “深化政治整训 坚定理想信念——习主席在全军高级干部培训班开班式上的重要讲话在全军引发热烈反响” [Deepening Political Retraining and Strengthening Ideals and Convictions—Chairman Xi’s Important Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the Training Course for High-Ranking Officers Sparks Enthusiastic Response Across the Entire Military], China Military Online, April 12, 2026, https://www.81.mil.cn/jwtt/16454567.html.
“全军首期提升政治干部组教施教能力培训班结业” [First-Ever Army-Wide Training Course to Enhance Political Cadres’ Ability to Organize and Deliver Instruction Concludes], China Military Online, August 4, 2026, http://www.81.cn/szb_223187/szbxq/index.html?paperName=jfjb&paperDate=2026-08-04&paperNumber=02&articleid=983897.
“全国人民代表大会常务委员会公告〔十四届〕第十六号” [Public Notice of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (14th NPC) No. 16], Ministry of National Defense, February 26, 2026, http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/yw_214049/16444725.html.
Margaret Kuntz, Corruption in the People’s Liberation Army, US Air Force China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI), July 2026, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Other-Topics/2026-07-13%20PLA%20Corruption.pdf.
Keywords: PLA, PAP, PAFD, Central Military Commission, ideological rectification, political training, Xi Jinping, People’s Republic of China, Chinese Communist Party
Dennis J. Blasko
Dennis J. Blasko (lieutenant colonel, US Army, retired) is a former military intelligence officer and foreign area officer specializing in China. He is an independent analyst and author of The Chinese Army Today (Routledge, 2012).
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