Joaquin Camarena
©2026 Joaquin Camarena
CLSC Quick Takes offer expert analysis of select sources and provide timely insight in a succinct format rather than as formally cited academic products.
Discovery
In early May 2026, China’s National Defense and Military Channel’s Noon National Defense Military Affairs broadcast on CCTV released a segment showing the air defense element of the PLA Army’s (PLAA) 16th Heavy Combined Arms Regiment, 6th Combined Arms Division, Xinjiang Military District [新疆军区] (XJMD) conducting a live-fire exercise. The exercise involved a PGZ-09 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (SPAAG) battery and an HN-6B MANPADS platoon in the regiment’s firepower battalion, tracking and intercepting target drones launched to simulate cruise missiles. The segment noted that the PGZ-09s used new 35mm ammunition that has significantly improved lethality, muzzle velocity, and range compared to other projectiles used, such as the advanced hit efficiency and destruction (AHEAD) round. Additionally, the SPAAG lacked the muzzle-mounted electromagnetic induction coil and brake mounted on the end of its barrels, indicating that the PGZ-09s were likely firing either 35mm armor-piercing discarding sabot (APDS) rounds or another type of new ammunition.
Figure 1. PGZ-09 firing toward target drones during live-fire exercise
(Source: “[
正午国防军事]
全要素实弹射击演练 锤炼部队全天候防空作战能力” [Noon National Defense Affairs],
正午国防军事 [CCTV-Military Channel Noon National Defense Affairs Comprehensive live-fire drill hones the troops’ all-weather air defense combat capabilities], May 12, 2026,
https://tv.cctv.com/2026/05/12/VIDEE5qPZhHQNK3iXih7iwTd260512.shtml.)
Analysis
The new 35mm round demonstrates that the PLA Army (PLAA) is equipping its ground-based air defense units with the capability to destroy improvised cruise missiles, such as the joint direct attack munition long range (JDAM-LR). Additionally, the round illustrates how the PLAA will adapt its weapon systems to destroy new threats effectively. The PLAA developed the latest round because of new kits that turn unguided, general-purpose bombs into low-cost, precision-guided munitions (PGMs) that are harder to intercept using AHEAD and other 35mm projectiles. The rounds the PGZ-09s currently use cannot penetrate the thick casings of the JDAMs, as they were designed to intercept aircraft, drones, and missiles with thinner fuselages. Additionally, the rounds would have difficulty intercepting the PGMs because the PGMs can be launched beyond their maximum range. However, the new round (such as the APDS), could intercept the JDAMs and similar PGMs using kinetic force to penetrate the casing and destroy the munition. This round shows how the PLAA is adapting its current platforms to confront new threats. The PGZ-09 was developed as a short-range air defense (SHORAD) system to intercept helicopters, drones, and PGMs. The threats, however, have expanded to include extended-range PGMs that would be harder for the PGZ-09 to intercept. The new round, however, now enables the PGZ-09 to intercept air threats targeting ground units during a conflict. Additionally, the round provides the SPAAG and other air defense systems with an enhanced capability to destroy ground targets, such as infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and other thinly armored or unarmored vehicles.
Implications
The PLAA developed the new round for use with the PGZ-09 and PG-99 35mm anti-aircraft guns and other SHORAD systems to counter new air threats fielded by the US and other militaries. The PLAA will likely integrate the round into air defense units that use the PG-99 to intercept munitions (such as the JDAM-LR). The PG-99, however, would have to be slaved to a radar to enable the weapon to engage the target accurately. The round could also be adapted to provide 25mm SHORAD systems for air defense battalions (such as the PGL-625, the PGZ-04A, and the PG-87) with similar capabilities as their counterparts at the brigade level. These systems could be used in conjunction with the HQ-17 and the HQ-17A surface-to-air missile systems to intercept threats targeting other units within PLA brigades. The systems, however, would need to be modernized with active electronically scanned array radars or with the ability to use the information to engage targets. The battalions would also be required to receive intelligence on threats from other radars and units that comprise the tactical-level air defense network.
Figure 2. PLAA soldier loading 35mm rounds into a PGZ-09
(Source: “【
域见 |
大漠砺“
箭，呼啸长空！】
近日，
新疆军区某部防空分队挺进荒漠深处开展实战化演练，
锤炼官兵精准打击和快速反应能力。（
刘相廷、尚硕、吉饯、田晓丰、鲁豫” [“Regional View | sharpening “arrows” in the vast desert, soaring with a roar through the vast sky”]. Recently, a certain Xinjiang Military District air defense unit advanced deep into the desert to conduct realistic combat drills to hone the troops’ precision strike and quick reaction capabilities. Liu Xiangting et al.,
百度贴吧 [Baidu Tieba], May 27, 2026,
https://mbd.baidu.com/newspage/data/dtlandingsuper?nid=dt_4849925158195523319.)
Strategic Message
The new round and other air defense systems indicate that the PLAA has developed an integrated air defense system (IADS) at the tactical and operational levels to destroy a range of threats that could endanger ground units. The PLAA recently adopted the new round, along with the HQ-16F, the HQ-13, the OW5-A10, and other air defense systems, to enable its air defense battalions and brigades to combat emerging battlefield threats. Previously, PLAA air defense units operated individually and were able to conduct coordinated tactical anti-air operations. The new threats posed by the JDAM-LR and similar long-range PGMs mean that these units will be unable to engage them at safe distances. However, the systems would require enhanced capability to detect threats more effectively at longer ranges.
The PLAA had to develop an IADS to overcome these challenges and other obstacles (such as adequate datalinks) that would prevent them from effectively engaging targets. For example, an air defense unit’s radars would be able to detect the JDAM-LR and other PGMs and relay this information to the PG-99 or PGZ-09–equipped batteries for potential engagement. This information would also be enriched by data from other radars or units that detected the PGMs as they flew toward the targets. The batteries would receive this information via datalinks that enable them to communicate effectively with one another and with adjacent and higher-level units. Additionally, the datalinks would be hardened to resist jamming and other forms of electronic warfare, enabling the units to send and receive information about air threats. This information-sharing capability would extend to air defense battalions equipped with the new round, as well as other systems, so they can intercept the PGMs without assistance from other brigades or higher units.
Analysis Source: “[正午国防军事]全要素实弹射击演练 锤炼部队全天候防空作战能力” [Noon National Defense Affairs], 正午国防军事 [CCTV-Military Channel Noon National Defense Affairs Comprehensive live-fire drill hones the troops’ all-weather air defense combat capabilities], May 12, 2026, https://tv.cctv.com/2026/05/12/VIDEE5qPZhHQNK3iXih7iwTd260512.shtml.
Keywords: CLSC Quick Take, Joaquin Camarena, PGZ-09, AHEAD, APDS, Xinjiang, integrated air defense system, IADS, SHORAD, PLAA
Joaquin Camarena
Joaquin Camarena is a former United States Marine Corps intelligence analyst who runs Sino Talk, an entity devoted to monitoring the PLA’s developing capabilities. His main focuses are PLAN and PLANMC expeditionary capabilities and PLA modernization efforts.
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