Freezing Point: PLA Army Expeditionary Units Lack Readiness for Extreme and Hazardous Cold Weather

Introduction

In 2024, the US Department of Defense promulgated the latest edition of its Arctic Strategy, highlighting the need to enhance domain awareness and operational readiness to safeguard US and allied interests in the Arctic region.¹ The Arctic possesses vast resource potential, is geographically linked to the US homeland and allied territories, and is a strategic avenue for US force projection in the Indo-Pacific theater.² Consequently, the Arctic has emerged as a vital focus for US security efforts in recent years. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has also shifted its focus to the Arctic as a resource domain, commissioning its third icebreaker in 2023 and donning the self-invented title of “near-Arctic state (近北极国家).”³

The PRC’s 2020 Science of Military Strategy underlines the significance of the Arctic to the PRC’s expansion and how potential conflict in the region warrants the application of military power.⁴ Supporting People’s Liberation Army (PLA) literature suggests a growing emphasis on the development of Arctic capabilities within the force that is nested in the overarching PLA modernization effort. Although the PRC has made strides in establishing an Arctic presence through civil-military activities and its fielding of polar-capable aircraft and unmanned surface vessels, the development of an Arctic-capable ground force would cement China’s Arctic presence and complicate the threat landscape in the region. Such a development would contest the United States’ efforts to foster security and protect its national interests. This article serves to provide a baseline assessment of the PLA Army’s cold-weather capabilities and what these capabilities portend for a future conflict in the Arctic.⁵ As of 2024, the PLA Army fields Arctic-capable expeditionary units, but these units lack readiness to conduct operations in extreme and hazardous cold weather, indicated by a lack of training under such conditions and limitations in communications and equipment support.

PLA Air and Maritime Capabilities Designed for the Arctic

China’s polar aspirations are well-documented, stemming from its strategic interest in Arctic resources and serving as a key element of China’s global maritime strategy.⁶ With an explicit interest in the Arctic, the PLA is intent on protecting its interests, which warrants the use of military forces. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has tested polar-capable fixed-wing aircraft, and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has demonstrated the ability to operate within the Arctic, indicated by its most recent exercise with the Russian navy: Ocean 2024. Furthermore, the Chinese coast guard conducted its first combined patrol with its Russian counterpart in the Arctic Ocean in September 2024.⁷ Although the Arctic is dominated by the air and maritime domains, the PLA asserts that the army is fundamental to protecting national interests abroad.⁸ Using the army to protect PRC interests would likely include the application of ground forces to safeguard key infrastructure in the Arctic region.

PLA Ground Forces’ Relevance in the Arctic

The PLA’s objectives and commitment in the Arctic differ from those of the United States. Unlike the United States, China does not possess any territory in the Arctic it needs to protect, nor does China possess any formal alliance with Arctic nations. China’s application of ground forces in the region would likely be designed to enable commercial operations there. Thus, in concert with the PLAAF, PLAN, and coast guard, ground forces would play a key role in safeguarding China’s Belt and Road Initiative projects. China’s 2018 Arctic Policy (北极政策) emphasized the Arctic region is vital to its “Polar Silk Road” (冰上丝绸之路), wherein China and Russia began investing in a liquified natural gas project on the Yamal Peninsula in 2017.⁹ In 2022, China’s Wison New Energies began constructing an onshore power plant to facilitate its production line for Arctic liquified natural gas.¹⁰ Additionally, as of November 2024, China invested in the development of a deepwater port in the White Sea, as well as a railway traversing Siberia.¹¹ With a growing Chinese footprint in the Arctic and subarctic regions, an Arctic-capable ground force would provide the PLA with a land-force option to protect its vested interests on land, while enabling combat power projection and sustainment in other domains should conflict ensue.

Arctic Conditions: Understanding the Operational Environment

To understand current PLA Army capabilities and how they can be applied in an Arctic environment, it is important to delineate what criteria meets Arctic conditions. The US Army categorizes different temperatures, ranging from dry cold to hazardous cold (4°C to below -40°C).¹² Similarly, PRC sources denote different temperature ranges under Arctic conditions as being “extreme cold” (极寒, below -40°C), “bitter cold” (酷寒, -30°C to -39.9°C), “intense cold” (严寒, -20°C to -29.9°C), “major cold” (大寒, -10°C to -19.9°C), and “minor cold” (小寒, -5°C to -9.9°C), detailed in table 1.¹³ During winter months, unpredictable Arctic weather can range from intense cold to hazardous cold.

Table 1. Cold-weather classifications
(Source: Joshua P. Bost et al., “Assured Mobility in the Arctic,” Military Review [January-February 2024]: 141–48)

For standardization, this article refers to the US Army’s cold-weather classifications in degrees Celsius. The PLA Army’s border-defense brigades (边防旅), subordinate to its Northern Theater Command Army, and the PLA Army’s border-defense regiments (边防团), subordinate to the Xinjiang and Tibet Military Districts (MDs) maintain a permanent presence in locations along China’s borders with Russia, North Korea, India, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Nepal, and Mongolia that routinely reach the threshold of hazardous cold (below -40°C/F) in winter. Moreover, select group armies (GAs) and divisions located on the northern and northwestern fringes of China regularly train in Arctic temperatures, but these units are limited to intense cold conditions where the temperature range is -20°C to -31.1°C.

PLA Army Border-Defense Brigades / Regiments: Hazardous Cold-Weather Patrols

The PLA Army’s northern border-defense brigades and Xinjiang and Tibet border-defense regiments maintain various company-sized facilities, and remote border-defense posts (哨所) subordinate to the company-sized facilities, that are geographically dispersed across China’s northern, western, and northeastern borders (figures 3 and 4). Such locations present harsh conditions, including high altitudes, mountainous terrain, and hazardous cold weather, which rigorously test these units’ survival capabilities.¹⁴ Many of these units routinely patrol their respective areas of responsibility, leveraging various over-the-snow mobility platforms such as skis, snowshoes, snowmobiles, and a cold-weather all-terrain vehicle, shown in figure 2.¹⁵ This vehicle is likely the same one that was fielded to the Tibet MD in 2021, capable of negotiating 35-degree gradients and carrying a payload of 1.5 tons. Other units, like those found in Xinjiang, conduct armed patrols on mules.¹⁶ Despite these traditional means, the same units are capable of maintaining infrastructure in some of the most austere parts of China. Table 2 and figure 1 capsulize the various border-defense posts under the PLA Army’s Northern Theater Command Army, Xinjiang MD, and Tibet MD, which routinely endure hazardous cold temperatures.

Table 2. Known border-defense posts and their locations
(Source: Created by author)

Figure 1. Known border-defense posts in locations that can reach hazardous cold in winter
(Source: Created by author)

Some units demonstrated their combat capability in the past, particularly during the 1962 Sino-Indian War, when China’s border-defense forces launched a “self-defense counterattack” against the Indian army in the disputed Aksai Chin region.¹⁷ In spite of this, these units are lightly equipped and are not designed to conduct warfighting operations in foreign territories without additional augmentation. Moreover, the PLA declares its border-defense forces to be “the nation’s first line of defense.”¹⁸ Thus, these units are not likely to be employed in an expeditionary role to conduct large-scale offensive operations. Nonetheless, border-defense brigades and regiments represent an available pool of army assets. These units are more likely to be employed in a defensive role such as key infrastructure protection in nonpermissive environments like the Arctic. In contrast to other PLA Army units, like GAs and divisions that are designed to be expeditionary, border-defense forces in the northern theater and in the Tibet and Xinjiang MDs are the only observed units capable of operating in hazardous cold weather.

Figure 2. A border-defense company in Mohe employs a cold-weather all-terrain vehicle
(Source: “陆军各部队冬季训练室外温度差已达到88°C” [Various Army Units Conduct Winter Training in Extreme Weather 88°C], accessed on December 19, 2024, https://www.chinanews.com.cn/m/mil/2019/01-14/8728476.shtml?f=qbapp)

Figure 3. Yuqitashi border patrol post by the Pamir Mountains in Xinjiang
(Source: “零下40度！齐膝雪中啃“雪饼” 只为守护中国红” [Sub 40 Degrees! Eating “Snow Cakes” in Knee-Deep Snow Just to Protect the Chinese Red], 中央电视台 [CCTV], January 23, 2020, https://v.cctv.com/2020/01/23/VIDEHldWbEqJ1AskLrP7Cfjv200123.shtml)

Figure 4. Heaven Lake border-defense post located at Changbai Mountain in Jilin Province
(Source: “新春走军丨长白山天池：风雪边关的暖心哨所” [Spring Festival Visit to the Military Barracks | Changbai Mountain Heaven Lake: A Warmhearted Outpost in the Wind and Snow], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], January 18, 2022, http://www.81.cn/2022zt/2022-01/18/content_10124199.htm)

PLA Army GAs and Divisions Limited to Intense Cold-Weather Training

Analysis of recent PLA land-domain training indicates units within the PLA Army are likely capable of conducting operations limited to intense cold-weather conditions, where the temperature range is -20°C to -31.1°C. Based on official PRC media, these units reside in the 78th GA, the 81st GA, and the Xinjiang MD.¹⁹ Aside from the 81st GA, the units identified would be among the only expeditionary units in the PLA that are exposed to Arctic conditions as a result of their geographic locations. The 78th GA is the northernmost unit within the PLA Army, garrisoned in Heilongjiang, China’s northernmost province. Xinjiang, like Heilongjiang, can reach temperatures of hazardous cold, though there is a lack of evidence for unit training under such conditions in the past five to ten years.

In January 2024, units from the 78th GA and the Xinjiang MD conducted annual winter training at sites near their respective garrison locations (figure 5).²⁰ The training focused on developing specialized skills and building proficiency and readiness for operations in an “intense cold” weather environment. In the Xinjiang MD, Z-19, Z-20, and Mi-17 helicopters conducted flight training while a combined-arms regiment maneuvered with ZBD-04 infantry fighting vehicles across difficult terrain at the foot of Tianshan, in temperatures dropping below -20°C, pushing the vehicles “to their extreme.”²¹

Figure 5. ZBD-04 infantry fighting vehicles moving across a frozen field
(Source: “官兵们在严寒条件下掀起新年度训练热潮” [Soldiers Conduct Annual Training Under Intense Cold Conditions], 中央电视台 [CCTV], January 25, 2024, https://tv.cctv.com/2024/01/25/VIDERSEJcrZ3W4kMUOl0pbyO240125.shtml?spm=C53074552346.PTvqyZHZQjBN.0.0)

Three years prior, a Xinjiang MD combined-arms regiment demonstrated the application of fires and protection enablers to accomplish tactical objectives in an intense cold environment. Dismounted units created fighting positions in rocky terrain while engineers carried out countermobility operations, reconnaissance soldiers directed fires, and mechanized infantry units destroyed the enemy.²²

The annual winter training in January 2024 also encompassed the 78th GA’s 78th aviation brigade and the 78th special operations forces (SOF) brigade, in weather conditions comparable to those in Xinjiang. The 78th aviation brigade conducted Z-19 flight training, tested terrain for landing, and applied safety technology such as electrothermal deicing to preclude midair malfunctions (figure 7). The 78th SOF brigade trained in dismounted maneuvers using skis and snowshoes, bivouacking, reconnaissance, and marksmanship (figure 8).²³ Other elements of the 78th GA have also conducted tactical training at Changbai Mountain (长白山) in Jilin province, with a focus placed on developing combat and survival skills under intense cold-weather conditions.²⁴

Finally, in January 2024, the 81st GA was observed implementing tactical training elements such as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear training; key point seizure, and battlefield first aid in -30°C.²⁵ The January 2024 training represents the third training iteration organized by the 81st GA since 2021 (figure 6), during which heavy combined-arms brigades executed combined-arms live-fire exercises at a training site in the Saibei region.²⁶

Figure 6. 81st GA soldiers training with gas masks in -30°C
(Source: “中部战区陆军第81集团军某旅冰天雪地，练兵备战!” [A World of Ice and Snow for an 81st Group Army Brigade, Training Soldiers for Combat!], accessed on December 19, 2024, https://www.huaxia.com/c/2021/01/12/507351.shtml)

Arctic Operations: Potential Force Pool

Recent PLA Army training in intense cold weather provides insight into its combat-capable forces that can be employed in the Arctic. The 78th SOF brigade is light and can thus maneuver in difficult Arctic terrain with increased range, applying various options for over-the-snow mobility while dismounted. The 81st GA is subordinate to the PLA Central Theater Command, which has been the principal force pool for PLA military operations other than war.²⁷ This is likely because deploying forces from the Central Theater Command enables the PLA to maintain force posture in other theaters. Additionally, units from the central theater have expanded their capabilities to act as an expeditionary ground force, training for long-distance deployments with the PLA Navy’s amphibious ship fleet in exercises like Peace Unity-2024 exercise with Tanzania, held in July and August 2024.²⁸ Therefore, units from the central theater likely pose as a strategic ground-force option to deploy to the Arctic for key infrastructure protection or wartime operations.

The combined-arms regiments found in Xinjiang routinely conduct cold-weather training in high-altitude, mountainous terrain. Furthermore, the smaller size of these units in comparison to a typical PLA Army combined-arms brigade likely eases mobility and their deployment to restricted terrain, as found in the Arctic region. Notably, many of these units have begun routine out-of-area deployments to augment the border-defense units posted in the Aksai Chin region, gaining crucial experience in deploying to an austere environment.²⁹

Lastly, the employment of helicopters in intense cold-weather training instantiates the opportunity for PLA ground forces to leverage aviation enablers during Arctic operations. However, the PLA Army’s lack of nearby support facilities, such as hangars and maintenance bays, will likely constrain the forward deployment of helicopters to the Arctic.

Based on observed training, expeditionary PLA Army units have demonstrated maneuver, fires, and limited protection capabilities in intense cold weather. Despite their demonstrated capabilities, these units also exhibit critical limitations in communications and equipment support that cast doubt on their overall ability to conduct sustained operations in the Arctic domain.

Figure 7. Z-19s testing terrain for landing
Source: (“严寒淬战力” [Intense Cold Tempers Combat Capabilities], 中央电视台 [CCTV], January 25, 2024, https://tv.cctv.com/2024/01/25/VIDE6rQpngNzH7bxpBv1ZkPM240125.shtml?spm=C53074552346.PTvqyZHZQjBN.0.0)

Capability Limitations: Intense Cold

Although the PLA Army currently fields units that can operate in Arctic temperatures, the units lack sufficient enablers to conduct sustained operations, such as communications and equipment support. In 2021, the 78th GA trained in establishing and maintaining mobile command posts in -30°C. Despite communication support soldiers establishing a command-and-control link, communication with distant brigades was ultimately degraded in the “intense cold” environment.³⁰

In 2023, researchers at the PLA Army Military Transportation Academy outlined significant equipment limitations in intense cold weather. In intense cold-weather conditions, the efficiency of fuel and fluids and the life cycle of parts are diminished. Weapon systems are less accurate, and the operation, daily maintenance, recovery, and management of combat-damaged equipment is more difficult.³¹ According to the researchers, lubricants currently used by units across the PLA have a condensation point of approximately -30°C, which will cause combat equipment to malfunction in intense cold-weather conditions.³² Although countermeasures like cold-resistant materials were proposed for equipment malfunctions, such measures are inherently theoretical and have likely not produced any improvements for the PLA’s ground equipment.

Figure 8. 78th SOF brigade soldiers moving through a forest on skis
(Source: “严寒淬战力” [Intense Cold Tempers Combat Capabilities], 中央电视台 [CCTV], January 25, 2024, https://tv.cctv.com/2024/01/25/VIDE6rQpngNzH7bxpBv1ZkPM240125.shtml?spm=C53074552346.PTvqyZHZQjBN.0.0)

Conclusion

In recent years, the Arctic has increasingly become a flash point for competition between the United States, Russia, and China. Such competition has prompted the United States’ new Arctic strategy, which calls for an operationally ready Arctic force. Likewise, the PLA has also trained units within the force to be Arctic capable and ready. As the US Army is poised to release a technical publication on Arctic and extreme cold-weather operations, whether the PLA Army is developing or currently possesses a similar publication is unknown. Regardless, the PLA Army’s border-defense brigades and regiments are permanently stationed at locations within China that reach hazardous cold conditions, necessitating their ability to survive there. These units are combat-capable; however, their lack of expeditionary mission likely precludes them from deploying outside PRC borders. Even so, these units are well suited for key infrastructure protection in nonpermissive environments.

Units within the PLA Army’s 78th GA, 81st GA, and Xinjiang MD routinely train to conduct mission-essential tasks under Arctic conditions that encompass intense cold weather. Further research is required on the capability levels of these units across each warfighting function. Although maneuver units are likely equipped to shoot and move in intense cold, their ability to conduct operations in harsher conditions such as extreme and hazardous cold weather remains an operational gap, given a lack of training in environments that encompass such conditions. Moreover, current limitations in an intense cold environment like communications and equipment support make sustained operations less tenable. Sustained operations also hinge on the availability of regional infrastructure. Without the establishment of support facilities in the Arctic, the PLA Army will lack the resources needed to maintain a presence there. Further research is required on PRC projects in the Arctic and the potential dual-use civilian facilities that could serve military applications like engineering, logistics, and communications support. The PLA Army’s reconnaissance-strike-complex effectiveness in the Arctic domain is also unknown. Additional research is needed on the PLA’s Arctic sensor network and how this network enables PLA ground fires capabilities at all echelons.

Ultimately, the PLA Army’s inability to operate in extreme and hazardous cold poses both a strategic and an operational challenge. The force’s effectiveness is constrained during winter months, which may coincide with the need to conduct sea-control missions in warmer weather. With a lack of year-round readiness, the PLA leaves itself vulnerable to exploitation in winter months and forfeits the ability to apply landpower to support and enable maritime operations in spring and summer months. Thus, while the PRC will continue to compete with the United States and its partners and allies in the Arctic, fighting and winning an Arctic conflict is likely not feasible for the PLA in the near term.

Jake Vartanian

Jake Vartanian is a military analyst at the US Army War College China Landpower Studies Center. His primary research topics include People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Army operational and tactical capabilities, PLA joint operations, and Chinese strategic landpower.

Endnotes

1. US Department of Defense (DoD), 2024 Arctic Strategy (DoD, July 22, 2024). Return to text.
2. DoD, 2024 Arctic Strategy. Return to text.
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4. Xiao Tianliang [肖天亮], ed., Science of Military Strategy [战略学], National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社], 2020, 164. Return to text.
5. This article adopts a specific focus on the Arctic region. Though this article does not address the Antarctic, the analysis presented can be applied to that region. Return to text.
6. Jenna Higgins, “Ice Dragon: China’s Antarctic Strategy,” Modern War Institute, May 31, 2024, https://mwi.westpoint.edu/ice-dragon-chinas-antarctic-strategy/. Return to text.
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8. http://www.81.cn/lj/2016-03/29/content_6981043.htm. Return to text.
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15. The nomenclature, quantity fielded, and variants of the cold-weather all-terrain vehicle are all unknown. Return to text.
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18. Kang Zikan 康子湛 “边防部队出行更快了” [Deployment of Border Defense Units has Gotten Faster], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], February 14, 2018, http://www.81.cn/gfbmap/content/2018-02/14/content_199652.htm. Return to text.
19. “严寒淬战力” [Intense Cold Tempers Combat Capabilities], 中央电视台 [CCTV], January 25, 2024, https://tv.cctv.com/2024/01/25/VIDE6rQpngNzH7bxpBv1ZkPM240125.shtml?spm=C53074552346.PTvqyZHZQjBN.0.0. Return to text.
20. “官兵们在严寒条件下掀起新年度训练热潮” [Soldiers Conduct Annual Training Under Intense Cold Conditions], 中央电视台 [CCTV], January 25, 2024, https://tv.cctv.com/2024/01/25/VIDERSEJcrZ3W4kMUOl0pbyO240125.shtml?spm=C53074552346.PTvqyZHZQjBN.0.0. Return to text.
21. “Soldiers Conduct Annual Training.” Return to text.
22. Li Sanhong 李三红 “冰雪严寒练犹酣-新疆军区某团实战化演练影像” [Training in the Intense Cold and Snow: Realistic-Combat Training Images of a Regiment in the Xinjiang Military District], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], January 19, 2021, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2021-01/19/content_280857.htm. Return to text.
23. “Soldiers Conduct Annual Training.” Return to text.
24. Wu Liang, Tao Li 吴亮 桃李“对接未来战场 打造”钢铁战士”——记第78集团军某合成旅官兵冬训” [Foring Iron Soldiers for the Future Battlefield- Documenting Winter Training of a Combined Arms Brigade of the 78th Group Army], China News, January 25, 2019, http://military.china.com.cn/2019-01/25/content_74405732.htm; Zhang Peng 张鹏 “全军和民兵预备役部队新年度超燃开训!” [The Entire Military and Reserve Force Commence New Annual Training!], accessed on December 19, 2024, http://www.gfjyw.com.cn/show-61-8027-1.html; “寒冬热“练”丨雪野战严寒 行军练打仗” [Cold Winter Training: Intense Cold Field Training, Marching to Practice for Combat], accessed on December 19, 2024, https://news.qq.com/rain/a/20240116A02QY200; “第78集团军进入临战状态 投入严寒-2017实兵演练” [The 78th Group Army Enters a High State of Readiness to Enter the Exercise Intense Cold-2017], accessed on December 19, 2024, https://news.sina.cn/2017-11-23/detail-i; “解放军第16军某旅进入中朝界山长白山训练” [The PLA’s 16th Group Army Enters the China-North Korea Border to Conduct Training at Changbai Mountain], 人民网 [People.cn], January 9, 2015, http://military.people.com.cn/n/2015/0109/c172467-26358302-5.html; “中国陆军四个合成营长白山腹地进行对抗演” [Four Army Combined Arms Battalions Conduct Training at Changbaishan], accessed on December 19, 2014, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/china/2016-02-24/doc-ifxprucu3175230.shtml; and “陆军第16集团军某摩步团加强实战化训练记” [Documenting Training of 16th Group Army Motorized Regiment], accessed on December 19, 2024, http://military.cctv.com/2016/10/07/ARTI2zAEfOLKQV9TSbxHhBNq161007.shtml. The 78th Group Army (GA) was previously designated the 16th GA, which some of the referenced training includes. Although the composition of both units differs since the 2017 People’s Liberation Army restructuring, many of the same units that comprised the 16th GA now make up the 78th GA. Return to text.
25. Hu Guangqu胡光曲 “开练！零下30°C极限战斗体能” [Commence Training! Combat Fitness in -30°C Cold], accessed on December 20, 2024, https://www.huaxia.com/c/2024/01/31/1877202.shtml. Return to text.
26. Saibei (塞北) refers to the area in and around Inner Mongolia. A number of locations in this region are known for their harsh climates. “中部战区陆军第81集团军某旅冰天雪地，练兵备战!” [A World of Ice and Snow for an 81st Group Army Brigade, Training Soldiers for Combat!], accessed on December 19, 2024, https://www.huaxia.com/c/2021/01/12/507351.shtml; and Zhang Danpeng 张丹峰 “全军各部队牢记习主席嘱托——抓住练兵时机 刻苦开展训练” [Military Forces Remember the Entrustment of President Xi-- Seizing the Opportunity for Rigorous Training], 人民网 [People.cn], December 11, 2022, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2022-12/11/nw.D110000renmrb_20221211_1-06.htm. Return to text.
27. Wang Xinjuan, “Chinese Peacekeeping Force to South Sudan (Wau) Launches Yearly Rotation,” China Military Online, December 5, 2022, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/ARMEDFORCES/CentralTheaterCommand/News_209132/16199087.html; Li Jiayao, “16th Chinese Peacekeeping Engineer Contingent to Sudan Returns Home,” China Military Online, August 5, 2021, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/ARMEDFORCES/CentralTheaterCommand/News_209132/16017662.html; Li Jiayao, “15th Chinese Peacekeeping Force to South Sudan (Wau) Passes UN Equipment Inspection,” China Military Online, January 20, 2025, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/SIDEBAR/WeRecommend/16365429.html; and Chen Zhuo, “Z-20 Helicopters Airdrop Relief Supplies in Henan,” China Military Online, July 24, 2021, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/ARMEDFORCES/CentralTheaterCommand/News_209132/16012955.html. Return to text.
28. Jake Vartanian, “Peace and Unity: China’s Growing Military Footprint in Tanzania,” Strategic Studies Institute, October 9, 2024, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Display/Article/3930357/peace-and-unity-chinas-growing-military-footprint-in-tanzania/. Return to text.
29. Blasko, “Baseline Assessment.” Return to text.
30. Yang Guilang, Niu Hui 杨贵良 牛辉, “第七十八集团军科学提升严寒条件下训练保障水平” [The 78th Group Army Scientifically Improves Training Support Levels Under Intense Cold Conditions], accessed on December 20, 2024, http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/wzll/lj/4878502.html. Return to text.
31. Zhang Dapeng [张大鹏], Wang Fengzhong [王凤忠], Xie Xinpeng [谢鑫鹏], “严寒条件下装备保障问题研究” [Research on the Problems with Equipment Support Under Intense Cold Conditions], 陆军军事交通学院 [Army Transportation University], (January 2023): 135–37. Return to text.
32. Zhang Dapeng et al., “Problems with Equipment.” Return to text.

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