Michael Long
Discovery
North Korea rolled out the red carpet for Xi Jinping and his wife, Peng Liyuan, for the president’s first foreign trip of the year (and the first in seven years to North Korea). The first couple of China were met at the Pyongyang International Airport on June 8, 2026, by Kim Jong-Un and his wife, Ri Sol-ju. The two-day state visit coincided with the 65th anniversary of China and North Korea’s Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance—China’s only defense treaty.
The key topics of discussion were economics, security, transportation, and diplomacy. Kim reaffirmed North Korea’s support of the “One-China” principle with respect to Taiwan. Xi agreed to expand cooperation in trade, agriculture, and technology, which likely included opening the newly constructed bridge over the Yalu River that connects the two countries and resuming Chinese tourism. Both sides agreed to continue strategic communications and to increase future visits between high-level officials.
Xi’s accompanying diplomatic team included senior government officials of the People’s Republic of China (PRC): Cai Qi, director of the General Office of the Central Committee; Wang Yi, minister of foreign affairs; Liu Haixing, head of international liaison of the Central Committee; Tang Fangyu, director of policy research of the Central Committee; Admiral Dong Jun, minister of national defense; Zeng Shanjie, head of the National Development and Reform Committee; and Wang Wentao, minister of commerce. Senior cabinet members accompanied Kim.
Analysis
During the June 2026 trip, Xi hoped to rebuild post-pandemic ties with Kim, raise his global prestige as a geopolitical power broker, and present the PRC as a more stable alternative to the United States. The meeting came less than a month after Xi hosted the presidents of Russia and the United States in Beijing. In the last year, the leaders of eight American allied nations (Australia, Canada, Finland, France Germany, South Korea, Spain, and the United Kingdom) flew to Beijing to work with Xi.
Since Xi’s last visit to North Korea in 2019, relations between Beijing and Pyongyang have been distant. In 2020, COVID-19 border closures hampered trade and exchanges between the two neighbors. In previous meetings, Xi reiterated denuclearization as PRC policy. Starting in 2024, Kim began deploying soldiers to Russia to fight in the Russia-Ukraine War to curry favor with Putin, which materialized in aid and technological support. Xi also sought to wrest some of Putin’s influence with Kim, an alliance that appears to make the PRC uncomfortable.
Kim holds a stronger position than during previous state visits with Xi. In addition to the Kremlin’s support, US President Donald J. Trump has expressed interest in meeting with Kim. Finally, Kim oversees an ever-growing nuclear program. A week before Xi’s June 2026 arrival, Kim publicly toured his newest nuclear facility. A day before Xi’s arrival, Kim Yo-Jong, the leader’s sister, called North Korean nuclear disarmament an “anachronistic dream.”
Implications
Conspicuously absent from the June 2026 trip was any mention of North Korean denuclearization. China began backing away from the overt call for denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula for the first time earlier this year. In April, PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi met with Kim, and he did not include the term denuclearization in any official statements. The acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear state now appears to be the de facto position of the People’s Republic of China. With one less overlapping area of interest between the United States and China, Xi will not likely host another denuclearization meeting between Trump and Kim.
China has not sent a defense minister to Pyongyang since 2009. Beijing’s addition of Minister of National Defense Admiral Dong Jun to the June 2026 trip likely symbolizes its desire to work more closely with the Korean People’s Army.
Strategic Message
Both Xi and Kim focused on the geostrategic messages of their meeting. Xi hoped to project an image of himself as a stable geopolitical power broker in an increasingly unstable global landscape, with the PRC as a viable alternative to the current rules-based international order, which he views as rigged in favor of the United States.
Kim sought to raise his country’s global stature as a nuclear power, retain his leverage and support with Russia, and gain aid and influence with the PRC. From Kim’s perspective, he has become an important global actor. He has sent more than 14,000 North Korean troops to fight in Ukraine and hundreds of tons of ammunition and equipment. His space program launched a satellite into orbit. He met with the US president twice and hosted the Russian and Chinese presidents. Kim has accomplished these goals without sacrificing the North Korean nuclear program, which he sees as the most critical asset for regime survival. China’s renewed support—especially without a denuclearization caveat—puts Kim in an incredibly strong position for potential future negotiations with the United States.
Keywords: Xi Jinping, Kim Jong-Un, state visit, denuclearization, People’s Republic of China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Michael Long
Colonel Michael Long is the director of the Futures Research Group in the US Army War College Strategic Research and Assessment Department. He has served in the US Army for more than 30 years, most recently as the director of strategy, plans, and policy (G-5) for 8th Army in South Korea.
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