Jacob Stoil
©2026 Jacob Stoil
Iran has officially suspended the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) it signed with the United States just over a month ago. The MOU began to fall apart as soon as Iran resumed its strikes on civilian ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Since then, the United States has restarted strikes on Iran, and Iran has again launched attacks on countries throughout the region. In all regards, it might appear that this winter’s conflict has returned, with one notable exception—the conspicuous absence of Israel. Iran has not attacked Israel, nor has Israel joined in the US-led strikes. This critical difference demonstrates that while the fight may appear the same, the underlying dynamics and rationales have fundamentally changed, and this change explains why, for now, Israel remains untouched.
In April 2024, Iran changed the rules of conflict in the Middle East by firing missiles and attack drones directly at Israel. Prior to this escalation, Iran attacked Israel through proxies, and Israel attacked Iran through covert action. Since April 2024, there have been three periods of direct combat between the United States and Iran, and while they appear similar, each has had slightly different objectives. The first of these was the so-called 12-Day War. The primary combatants in that war, which began in June 2025, were Israel and Iran, with limited US offensive involvement at the end through Operation Midnight Hammer. The lead-up to the war included multiple instances of Iranian attacks against Israel and limited Israeli retaliation. By spring 2025, Israel had concluded that Iran was rapidly approaching the production of a nuclear weapon. Israel attacked Iran to retard the Iranian program and degrade Iran’s ability to strike Israel. The war was limited in scope and scale and aimed at reducing the threat posed by Iran. Iran, for its part, made a calculated choice to keep its response limited to heavy attacks against Israel and little escalation elsewhere in the region. Iran’s strategy centered on taking the blows and then returning to reconstitute during the US-led negotiations and ceasefire. In other words, the United States and Iran both chose to keep the war highly limited in its objectives and its conduct.
By early 2026, it had become clear that the Iran negotiations were not going to lead to any significant changes in Iranian behavior, and the United States and Israel launched a joint campaign against Iran with broader objectives than the previous strikes. Initial US statements appeared to suggest that the war might bring about the fall of the Iranian regime or, at the very least, the end of the Iranian nuclear program and the threat Iranian strike capabilities posed to the Middle East. Iran responded with wide-ranging operations, attacking both neutral and US-aligned countries throughout the Middle East to put pressure on the United States to declare a ceasefire and enter negotiations. As the fighting continued, reports began to surface of a potential difference in objectives between the United States and Israel, with Israel allegedly intending to pursue a more maximalist goal of regime change. In contrast, at least according to many reports, the United States was interested in a negotiated settlement. The United States signed such a settlement with Iran in the form of the MOU, and Iran perceived itself as victorious.
Iran’s violation of the MOU requirement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and its continued attacks on civilian merchant shipping led to the current conflict. The United States resumed limited strikes against Iran to protect civilian ships under threat and deter further Iranian violations while degrading Iran’s capabilities to continue to attack civilian commerce. Iran again escalated by attacking countries throughout the Middle East, but not Israel. At its core, the current fight is about the Strait of Hormuz. The United States began its strikes because of the situation in the Strait, and there is little evidence that it has returned to a stance of pushing for regime change or an end to Iranian strike capabilities. Involving Israel would radically change this dynamic. If Iran were to strike Israel and bring it into the war, it would risk moving the war from a highly limited conflict over access to the Strait of Hormuz to a more existential one. While Iran weathered the storm this winter, it would be loath to repeat an experience and again risk the stability of the regime.
For its part, Israel has grown tired from almost three years of continuous war. It is in the middle of a multipart domestic political crisis and in the lead-up to contentious elections. Many Israelis, greatly disappointed in the MOU signed between the United States and Iran, question whether the sacrifices they had endured in the conflicts with Iran were worth it. It adds to a narrative of inconclusive wars that incorporates Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen, and now Iran. The domestic factors in Israel and the mood of its populace create significant pressure on the Israeli leadership not to bring the country back into the fight unless it is sure it will achieve a major strategic win—in other words, achieve a maximalist objective. Under the current strategic calculus, Iran would wish to avoid this conclusion.
Iran’s stance and strategic calculus could change. By killing US service personnel, Iran risks the escalation it has tried to avoid. The United States, in its response, may become more maximalist in its operations. At that point, Iran could try to raise the overall cost of the conflict by attacking Israel and, at the same time, capitalize on Israel’s political unpopularity in critical quarters in the United States. In a similar vein, if the United States strikes continue and show no signs of abating, if economic pressure and political pressure fail to force the United States back to the table on Iran’s terms, Iran may again choose to expand the war by involving Israel. This would bring the conflict into a new and fourth phase—one in which the limited conflict over the Strait of Hormuz may be subsumed into the longer ongoing war between Israel and Iran. Until then, even as the conflict continues to expand and escalate, the quiet in Israel remains the dog that did not bark, a silence indicating a general desire to keep the conflict limited in its aims if not its means.
Keywords: Middle East security, US-Iran strikes, Strait of Hormuz, Iran-Israel conflict, Iran strategy
Jacob Stoil
Dr. Jacob Stoil is the research professor of Middle East security at the United States Army War College Strategic Research and Assessment Department, chair of applied history at the West Point Modern War Institute, and a trustee of the United States Commission on Military History. He serves as assistant director of the Second World War Research Group (North America) and holds a doctor of philosophy degree from Oxford University and a master of arts degree from King’s College London.
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