Joaquin Camarena and Anthony Costanzo
©2026 Joaquin Camarena and Anthony Costanzo
CLSC Quick Takes offer expert analysis of select sources and provide timely insight in a succinct format rather than as formally cited academic products.
Discovery
In early April 2026, China Military Online posted a video showing the PLA Army’s (PLAA) 35th Heavy Combined Arms Brigade (HCAB), 71st Group Army, Eastern Theater Command, conducting a “rear-echelon logistical support exercise.” The exercise involved the brigade’s maintenance personnel completing manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) drills to repair a ZTZ-96A main battle tank (MBT) under realistic battlefield conditions using various drones to transport equipment and spare parts. The recovery drills included hoisting a ZTZ-96A turret with a truck-mounted crane. However, the ZTZ-96A used in the training exercise had GL-6 active protection systems (APS) and deflector panels installed on the rear of its turret and two radar arrays mounted on the front of its turret between the storage baskets and grenade launchers. Additionally, the PLA repurposed the rear of the turret to store eight interceptor rounds for the APS.
Figure 1. A PLAA 35th HCAB Type-96A main battle tank equipped with a GL-6 active protection system
(Source: “ ‘
硬核’
开练！
直击后装保障演练现场” [“Hardcore” Training Begins! A First-Hand Look at the Rear-Echelon Logistics Support Exercise],
搜狐 [Sohu], April 3, 2026,
https://www.sohu.com/a/1005016615_120248510.)
Analysis
The ZTZ-96A tanks equipped with the GL-6 demonstrate that the PLAA has integrated lessons learned from observing certain phases of the Russia-Ukraine War by adding equipment to increase the protection of its armored vehicles. Ukraine has highlighted the limits of traditional armor and explosive reactive armor (ERA) against massed anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), first-person view (FPV) drones, and loitering munitions, pushing militaries toward installing layered, modular protection suites—APS, anti drone cages, and soft kill systems—rather than adding thicker armor. The PLAA continuously studies how the Ukrainian and Russian militaries conduct military operations during the conflict. A lesson the PLAA incorporated was how to protect older armored vehicles (such as the ZTZ-96A and the ZBD-04A), which would be more susceptible to loitering munitions and FPV drones used by the Taiwan and US militaries. Furthermore, the PLAA saw how T-90M and other Russian MBTs were susceptible to drones, loitering munitions, and anti-tank weapons (such as recoilless rifles, the NLAW, and the FGM-148 Javelin) and realized the ZTZ-96A would face similar dangers. The PLAA also saw how, during the early stages of the conflict, the Ukrainian and Russian militaries added anti-drone cages to tank turrets and other vehicles to enhance protection during the early stages of the conflict and incorporated that lesson. The PLAA concluded, however, that the combination of anti-drone cages and active defense measures (such as the GL-6 APS and laser systems) would provide the greatest protection for the ZTZ-96A tanks without significantly altering their weight.
Figure 2. A drone delivering supplies to personnel repairing a PLAA 35th HCAB Type-96A main battle tank equipped with a GL-6 active protection system
(Source: “ ‘
硬核’
开练！
直击后装保障演练现场” [“Hardcore” Training Begins! A First-Hand Look at the Rear-Echelon Logistics Support Exercise],
搜狐 [Sohu], April 3, 2026,
https://www.sohu.com/a/1005016615_120248510.)
Implications
The installation of the GL-6 APS on the ZTZ-96A MBT illustrates how the PLAA has adopted lessons from the Ukrainian conflict to enhance the survivability of armored vehicles in a potential invasion of Taiwan. The PLAA understands, from its focus on the early part of the Russia-Ukraine War, that any conflict surrounding Taiwan will be significantly different. For example, the PLA recognizes the necessity of swiftly concluding any conflict before the US military and other militaries can react. One lesson the PLA incorporated was how the Ukrainian and Russian militaries, during offensives conducted early in the conflict, countered FPV drones and anti-tank weapons to destroy MBTs. The PLA also focused on this phase because they understood that the opposing forces would use Taiwan’s terrain and geography to channel armor into ambushes or defensive lines. For instance, the Taiwan military would exploit natural and urban terrain to create single routes to ambush PLA units, resulting in large numbers of casualties or destruction of units. To mitigate these factors, the PLA would have to conduct operations rapidly to paralyze the Taiwan military’s ability to establish defensive lines that would be difficult to flank or overcome. Additionally, the PLA understands that a conflict over Taiwan would be different because the island’s geographic constraints (such as a lack of strategic depth and overland supply) would limit its ability to fight a protracted war, unlike Ukraine. This factor means the Taiwan military would start a conflict with the munitions and weapons already on the island before China blockaded it.
Strategic Message
The installation of the GL-6 on the ZTZ-96A tank shows how the PLA and its branches have conducted extensive studies of past foreign conflicts to inform their approach to fighting the next war and to meet their doctrinal requirements. For example, the PLA studied the US military’s combat operations during the Persian Gulf War and adopted and integrated the lessons learned into their war-fighting concepts (such as systems warfare). The lessons learned from the Russia-Ukraine War (such as the adoption of the GL-6 APS for the ZTZ-96A) highlight the latest example of this trend. The PLA recognized, however, that they would need to modify some of the lessons to better align with their war-fighting concepts. The anti-drone cages and GL-6 APS illustrate this concept as the PLA realized that a layered defense would significantly increase the survivability of armored vehicles with less advanced armor. Ukraine’s high rate of armored losses underscores that China cannot assume its modern MBTs will be available in sufficient numbers throughout a campaign against Taiwan, making low-cost survivability upgrades on legacy platforms appealing from both industrial and operational standpoints. Additionally, this layered defense approach allows the PLA to save money by using cheaper systems rather than developing new appliqué or ERA for older armored vehicles.
Analysis Source: “ ‘硬核’开练！直击后装保障演练现场” [“Hardcore” Training Begins! A First-Hand Look at the Rear-Echelon Logistics Support Exercise], 搜狐 [Sohu], April 3, 2026, https://www.sohu.com/a/1005016615_120248510.
Keywords: CLSC Quick Take, Joaquin Camarena, ZTZ-96A MBT, manned-unmanned teaming, active protection system, Eastern Theater Command, PLAA, PLA, Taiwan, Ukraine
Joaquin Camarena
Joaquin Camarena is a former United States Marine Corps intelligence analyst who runs Sino Talk, an entity devoted to monitoring the PLA’s developing capabilities. His main focuses are PLAN and PLANMC expeditionary capabilities and PLA modernization efforts.
Anthony Costanzo
Anthony Costanzo is a master of public policy candidate at the Yale Jackson School of Global Affairs and previously earned a bachelor of arts degree from Columbia University. He served five years in the United States Marine Corps, including assignments in China, Italy, and Haiti. He is also a cofounder of the Samuel B. Griffith Foundation for Chinese Military Studies, with additional work and volunteer experience in Ukraine.
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