Ukraine’s War Effort in Mid-2026: International Opportunities and Domestic Challenges

Timothy K. Blauvelt

The State of the Conflict in Mid-2026

The circumstances of the Russia-Ukraine War—and even the nature of modern warfare itself—appear to transform with each passing year. In 2023–24, the war was one of grinding attrition reminiscent of World War I. By 2025, advances in drone technology and battlefield awareness systems had transformed the conflict, creating “kill zones” along the line of contact that rapidly rendered conventional military hardware largely ineffective. Ukraine’s position, however, remained tenuous as the Russian military continued to make slow but incremental gains in territory. The new US administration in early 2025 cut direct military aid to Ukraine and publicly rebuked its president, Volodymyr Zelensky, during a White House meeting, though the United States continued to share intelligence with Ukraine and allowed for the purchase of American weaponry financed by European partners.

Negotiations to end the war remained protracted, with Russian President Vladimir Putin holding to demands that Ukraine surrender all the contested Donbas region as a precondition for a ceasefire, as well as all the territory of the other districts of Ukraine that Russia claims to have annexed but that remain partially in Ukrainian hands. Brutal Russian attacks on Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure during the especially cold winter of 2025–26, the harshest for Ukrainians of the war so far, put a severe strain on a population that had already endured four years of conflict. Both sides seek ways to restore offensive maneuver to gain a decisive advantage. However, by late spring 2026, while the fighting on the front again seems deadlocked, there appears to be a consensus among expert observers that Ukraine is in a stronger military and geopolitical position than it was a year earlier, with its technology and war-fighting experience recognized as a newly in-demand commodity.

Russia’s Strategy and War Aims

Meanwhile, Russia continues its strategy of attrition, aiming to use its advantages in manpower and resources incrementally to wear down the Ukrainian military and exhaust its civilian population. The Russian leadership has dragged out negotiations to drain the patience and fracture the consensus among Western leaders, compelling them to seek a settlement on Russian terms. From the start of the war, Putin has insisted on regime change in Ukraine in the name of broadly defined “demilitarization” and “denazification,” to create a pliant buffer state that would reinforce Russia’s position as the dominant regional power. In the view of many analysts, the elimination of Ukraine as a sovereign state remains Putin’s ultimate war aim, in the words of former Ukrainian foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba, “to ‘destroy us as a state and erase us as a nation.’ ”¹

However, Ukraine’s relative success in asymmetrical warfare in the first half of 2026—enabled in part by the shutting down of Starlink connectivity to Russian units on the front line in February—has made it the worst year of the war for Russian forces since the second Ukrainian counteroffensive in 2023. Russian casualties for the first time appear to outpace replacements.² With the exorbitant cost in Russian battlefield casualties in return for negligible gains in territory and the continuing strain on Russia’s economy, there is a growing sense that time is no longer unequivocally on Russia’s side.³

It has become harder for Russia to leverage its traditionally strongest assets in population, equipment, and territory: Fearing the political and social consequences of a second mass mobilization, the Russian military faces increasing difficulties in reconstituting manpower losses; Russia’s vast reserves of armor and equipment, much of it left over from the Soviet period, have become irrelevant in the changed conditions of the modern battlefield in Ukraine; and Russia’s vast territorial expanse is rapidly transforming from a historically defensive advantage to a vulnerability with the need to defend against Ukraine’s growing long-range drone and missile strike capabilities. According to a survey by a Kremlin-linked public opinion agency in mid-May 2026, public anxiety in Russia about Ukrainian attacks is growing, with more respondents concerned more about strikes at home than they are about developments at the front.⁴ Putin appeared rattled following long-range Ukrainian drone strikes deep within Russia and threats to target Moscow that compelled the Russian authorities to abridge the now-annual May 9 Victory Day parade to a mere 45 minutes without the usual tanks and heavy equipment.⁵ Such long-range Ukrainian strikes make it harder for Moscow to maintain the illusion that the war has no consequences for the Russian urban middle class.

Given the potentially destabilizing consequences of strategic defeat in the war, for Putin, “escalation is not a choice, but a necessity,” in the words of a recent RUSI study.⁶ Facing the depletion of conventional forces and challenges to economic stability, Russian leadership has increasingly shifted to “grey zone” tactics to further its goals, including cyberattacks, sabotage of critical infrastructure, drone incursions into NATO airspace, nuclear saber rattling, and cognitive and ideological influence campaigns to spread narratives about the inevitability of Russian victory as means to weaken resolve in Ukraine and undermine cohesion and support for Ukraine in Europe and North America.

Ukraine’s Tech Boom

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s innovations in hybrid asymmetrical warfare are beginning to get noticed. Domestic drone production accelerated out of necessity following delays in the deliveries of artillery shells to Ukraine in late 2023 and early 2024.⁷ With a pre-existing industrial infrastructure and a tech-savvy start-up ecosystem to draw on, Ukrainian tech companies have quickly and cheaply scaled up drone and guided munitions production. They adapted the Russian innovation of lightweight fiber-optic first-person drones that spool out hair-thin cables that are impossible to jam—producing them more cheaply and rapidly and doubling and tripling their range.⁸ The Ukrainians have also made advances in long-range drones and ballistic missiles, often incorporating AI, allowing them to strike airfields, oil refineries, and military logistical targets deep inside Russia. Most crucially, Ukraine is increasingly producing these weapon systems domestically and with locally sourced components, while its Russian adversary relies on parts from China, Iran, or imported from other countries through evading sanctions.⁹ Even more crucially, Ukraine has developed its “Delta” battlefield transparency network that integrates its weapons and sensor systems into a unified platform that provides a real-time view of the operational environment, an innovation the US military has yet to achieve according to the testimony of Secretary of the Army Dan Driscoll to the Senate Armed Services Committee in May 2026.¹⁰

The war with Iran has provided a stark demonstration of the challenges of asymmetrical warfare using cheaply produced systems, bringing to the fore Ukraine’s effectiveness in both producing and countering them. As Polish Foreign Minister Władysław Sikorski stated at the PISM (Polish Institute of International Affairs) Strategic Ark conference in May 2026, “Until a year or two ago, we imagined it was us who were training Ukrainians. Now, it’s we who need to take lessons from them cause they know modern war, there’s no substitute for practical experience.”¹¹ On the same days, the United States and Ukraine signed a memorandum establishing joint ventures and a technology transfer initiative between Ukrainian and American companies. This initiative will circumvent a Ukrainian ban on the export of weaponry enacted at the start of the full-scale war in 2022, and it comes on the heels of the US Justice Department’s lifting of a 1997 American ban on weapons imports from Ukraine. Ukraine negotiated agreements with several dozen countries to sell Ukrainian-produced drones and expertise. Ukraine’s “Delta” platform has inspired the launch of “Operation Jailbreak” at Fort Carson, Colorado, which brings together several dozen US tech firms to encourage cooperation and the sharing of intellectual property to develop an analogous integrated system.¹² International sales of such systems and know-how could raise significant resources to aid the war effort and provide further investment in developing Ukrainian defense industries, making Ukraine a potential supplier of security internationally rather than merely a desperate consumer.

Ukraine’s Domestic Challenges

At home in Ukraine, aside from the situation at the front and the continuing Russian attacks on urban centers and civilian infrastructure, Ukrainians have recently been fixated on an evolving corruption scandal that has increasingly entangled the defense sector and the country’s top leadership, an ongoing drama that raises the specter of Ukraine’s long historical association with corruption that could undermine the international authority it has struggled so hard to achieve.

A long-running tension between the country’s leadership and the anti-corruption bodies, primarily the investigative agency National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and its prosecutorial counterpart the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor (SAP), which was created in 2014 as a precondition for aid by the United States, the EU, and the IMF. NABU investigations into fraud in military procurement forced the resignation of Ukraine’s Defense Minister in 2023.¹³ The tensions between these agencies and the Ukrainian presidential administration came to a head in the summer of 2025 when “Operation Midas” brought accusations against several figures close to the entourage of Zelensky, including a former vice prime minister, the minister of energy, and the minister of justice, involving corruption in Energoatom, the state agency overseeing Ukraine’s nuclear facilities.¹⁴ In late July 2025, following a raid on NABU offices by the State Security Service and Office of the General Prosecutor under opaque pretexts, allies of Zelensky passed a draft bill in the Ukrainian legislature, the Verkhovna Rada, defanging the NABU and the SAP by subordinating them to the Office of the General Prosecutor, a bill that Zelensky signed into law on the same day.¹⁵ This action provoked sharp criticism from some of Ukraine’s European partners and mass protests in Ukrainian cities, the only such large-scale anti-government demonstrations since the start of the full-scale war in 2022. Zelensky was compelled to back down, signing a new law restoring the autonomy of the anti-corruption agencies.¹⁶

The investigations resumed, leading to a raid in November 2025 on the residence of Andriy Yermak, the head of the Office of the President, until then Zelensky’s right-hand and one of the most powerful figures in the Ukrainian leadership. Yermak subsequently resigned and was formally removed from his positions in the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian military and of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine.¹⁷

In April and May 2026, transcripts and recordings of telephone conversations came to light relating to a NABU investigation into the laundering of $10.5 million, apparently obtained through the Energoatom embezzlement scheme, through the construction of elite residences in a high-end neighborhood outside of Kyiv.¹⁸ The scheme was headed by Timur Mindich, a now-sanctioned former close business associate of both Zelensky and Yermak, currently on the run in Israel. The intercepts seemed to implicate Yermak directly, leading to his arrest and subsequent release on bail in mid-May on charges of money laundering, which his lawyers deny.¹⁹

The intercepts also contained conversations between Mindich and then–Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov regarding equipment contracts and state financing for the drone-producing start-up Fire Point, which produces the “Flamingo” long-range cruise missile, in which Mindich apparently held ownership shares.²⁰ Umerov, now secretary of the Ukrainian Security and Defense Council and Ukraine’s chief negotiator with the US special envoys, has denied any wrongdoing. He had earlier been summoned to the Verkhovna Rada regarding defense procurement concerns and had tussled with the leadership of the Defense Procurement Agency, set up in 2023 to bring transparency to a sphere long notorious for corruption in Ukraine.²¹

Conclusions

The ongoing conflict in Iran has stalled US efforts as an intermediary in ceasefire negotiations, and the rise in oil prices has brought Russia at least short-term benefits. At the same time, the Ukrainian leadership has adroitly used the crisis to show off its strengths in technologically based asymmetrical warfare. The ability to domestically produce cost-effective, modern weapons and control systems at scale for use in the war with Russia and at the same time for sale abroad has brought Ukraine a newfound sense of authority and agency on the international stage.

Ukraine, however, continues to face a range of challenges. While Ukrainian forces may for the first time in years be gaining back more territory than they lose, Russia still occupies some 20 percent of the country. The Russians also learn from their mistakes and have shown the ability to adapt and innovate. Ukraine remains highly dependent on US intelligence and anti-ballistic missile systems and supplies, and the military has never maintained air superiority. Moreover, while the Ukrainians have introduced far-reaching changes to military leadership structures and procurement procedures, there remains considerable pushback from entrenched vested interests within the Ukrainian elite power structure.

The latest high-profile corruption allegations have threatened to impinge on Ukraine’s aura of success in innovation and production. Although Zelensky himself has not been subject to investigation, the fact that important figures in his entourage and the defense apparatus, many of whom Zelensky personally brought to power, have been implicated has unnerved Western partners and given Russian-led narratives fodder to challenge the legitimacy of the Ukrainian cause. At home in Ukraine, the scandals have not caused surprise but rather a growing sense of frustration with the moral vacuity of those in leadership positions who appear cynically to enrich themselves at a moment of a national existential crisis, when so many have sacrificed so much. At the same time, there is a sense at home and abroad that this period also presents a crucial opportunity for Ukraine to demonstrate that its institutions can finally surmount the post-Soviet traditions of corruption and self-dealing to impose real accountability and create a society worthy of the sacrifices its people are making in its name, and that its sovereignty deserves continued international support.

Keywords: Ukraine, Russia-Ukraine War, asymmetric warfare, drones, battlefield transparency, offensive maneuver, unmanned arial vehicles (UAVs), innovation cycle

Timothy K. Blauvelt
Timothy Blauvelt holds a PhD in political science from the University at Buffalo. He was based in Eurasia for nearly a quarter century, serving as professor of Soviet and post-Soviet studies at Ilia State University in Georgia and as regional director for the South Caucasus for American Councils for International Education. In May 2026, he became the research professor of Russia and Eurasia studies at the Army War College. He has published numerous peer-reviewed articles and book chapters and several coedited volumes, including Georgia After Stalin: Nationalism and Soviet Power (Routledge, 2016), The Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic of 1918 (Routledge, 2021), and Reconsidering the Political in Soviet History (Routledge, forthcoming 2027). His monograph, Clientelism and Nationality in an Early Soviet Fiefdom: The Trials of Nestor Lakoba (Routledge, 2021), has also been published in translation in Georgian and Russian.

Endnotes

1. 1. Chris Brown, “Trump Offered Putin a Tactical Victory in Ukraine. It Wasn’t Enough,” CBC News, December 4, 2025, https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/trump-putin-envoy-talks-9.7001841.
2. 2. Reuben Johnson, “For 5 Straight Months, Russia Has Lost More Soldiers Than It Can Replace—Ukraine Is Now Retaking Ground,” National Security Journal, May 11, 2026, https://nationalsecurityjournal.org/for-5-straight-months-russia-has-lost-more-soldiers-than-it-can-replace-ukraine-is-now-retaking-ground/.
3. 3. David French, “Time is Not on Russia’s Side,” The New York Times, February 26, 2026, https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/26/opinion/russia-ukraine-drone-war.html.
4. 4. Tim Zadorozhnyy, “For First Time Since 2022, Russians Worry More About Strikes at Home Than Front Line, Poll Shows,” The Kyiv Independent, May 16, 2026, https://kyivindependent.com/russians-worry-more-about-strikes-at-home-than-front-line-poll-shows/.
5. 5. Maksym Beznosiuk and William Dixon, “Putin’s Parade Projected Weakness but He Is Now More Dangerous Than Ever,” Ukraine Alert (blog), May 14, 2026, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/putins-parade-projected-weakness-but-he-is-now-more-dangerous-than-ever/.
6. 6. William Dixon and Maksym Beznosiuk, “Russia Is Losing – Time for Putin’s 2026 Hybrid Escalation,” RUSI, December 19, 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russia-losing-time-putins-2026-hybrid-escalation.
7. 7. Leo Chiu, “Ukraine to Produce More Drones to Offset Artillery Shortage,” Kyiv Post, December 19, 2023, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/25694.
8. 8. “Ukrainian Fiber-Optic Drones Reach Strike Range of over 40 Kilometers – Fedorov,” UKRINFORM, July 22, 2025, https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/4017356-ukrainian-fiberoptic-drones-reach-strike-range-of-over-40-kilometers-fedorov.html.
9. 9. Alisa Orlova, “Ukraine Cuts Reliance on Chinese Drone Components,” Kyiv Post, March 11, 2026, https://www.kyivpost.com/post/71701.
10. 10. Eve Sampson, “Ukraine’s Battlefield Integration Surpasses US Military’s, Army Secretary Says,” Military Times, May 12, 2026, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/05/13/ukraines-battlefield-integration-surpasses-us-militarys-army-secretary-says/.
11. 11. Kate from Kharkiv (@BohuslavskaKate), “SIKORSKI: I see few NATO officers here, they may not like what I’m about to say. Until year or two ago, we imagined it was us who were training Ukrainians. Now, it’s we who need to take lessons from them cause they know modern war, there's no substitute for practical experience.” X, May 16, 2026,

    SIKORSKI: I see few NATO officers here, they may not like what I'm about to say. Until year or two ago, we imagined it was us who were training Ukrainians. Now, it's we who need to take lessons from them cause they know modern war, there's no substitute for practical experience. pic.twitter.com/6l3QuiYmpz

    — Kate from Kharkiv (@BohuslavskaKate) May 16, 2026

    .
12. 12. Erin O’Brien, “US Army Kicks Off ‘Right to Integrate” Hackathon, Techtonic, May 11, 2026, https://www.tectonicdefense.com/us-army-kicks-off-right-to-integrate-hackathon/.
13. 13. Max Hunder and Tom Balmforth, “Ukraine’s Defence Minister Resigns in Wartime Shakeup,” Reuters, September 4, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-defence-minister-submits-resignation-letter-2023-09-04/.
14. 14. Sasha Vakulina, “Operation ‘Midas’: All You Need to Know About Anti-Corruption Investigation in Ukraine,” Euronews, November 15, 2025, https://www.euronews.com/2025/11/15/operation-midas-all-you-need-to-know-about-anti-corruption-investigation-in-ukraine.
15. 15. Vitaly Shevchenko, “Protests in Ukraine as Zelensky Signs Bill Targeting Anti-Corruption Bodies, BBC, July 23, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c9w19pl84r8o.
16. 16. Veronika Melkozerova, “Zelenskyy Signs Law Restoring Power to Anti-Corruption Bodies,” POLITICO, July 31, 2025, https://www.politico.eu/article/ukrainian-parliament-returns-independence-state-watchdogs-volodymyr-zelenskyy-anti-corruption-bill/.
17. 17. Paul Kirby and Jaroslav Lukiv, “Zelensky’s Top Adviser Resigns After Anti-Corruption Raid on His Home,” BBC, November 28, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckg9nd2wddno.
18. 18. Anastasiia Lapatina, “Ukraine’s Energy Corruption Scandal Just Got Much Worse,” Lawfare, May 13, 2026, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/ukraine-s-energy-corruption-scandal-just-got-much-worse.
19. 19. Pavel Polityuk and Dan Peleschuk, “Zelenskiy’s Ex-Top Aide Arrested as Ukraine Graft Probe Widens,” Reuters, May 14, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines-anti-corruption-court-places-zelenskiys-former-chief-staff-yermak-under-2026-05-14/.
20. 20. Oleg Sukhov and Kollen Post, “Explainer: What’s the Corruption Controversy Around Drone Maker Fire Point?,” The Kyiv Independent, May 8, 2026, https://kyivindependent.com/explainer-whats-the-corruption-controversy-around-drone-maker-fire-point-and-what-should-be-done/.
21. 21. “7 prikladiv prikhovuvannya informatsyiyi pro zakupivki ta postachannya zbroyi Minoborony Umerova, Ukrayinska Pravda, June 13, 2025, https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2025/06/13/7516803/.

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