Joaquin Camarena
©2026 Joaquin Camarena
CLSC Quick Takes offer expert analysis of select sources and provide timely insight in a succinct format rather than as formally cited academic products.
Discovery
In early June 2026, China Live News released a video segment about the PLA Army’s (PLAA) 84th Army Aviation Brigade, Xinjiang Military District [新疆军区] (XJMD), live-fire exercise that involved at least one KVD-002 Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) conducting coordinated air strikes against static and moving targets jointly with Z-10 light attack helicopters and Z-20T assault helicopters. The drone and helicopters used laser designators to mark and launch 70mm rockets and KD-9 precision-guided munitions (PGMs) at airborne and ground targets, including mockups of high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and Patriot advanced capability (PAC-3) missile launchers. Several MI-171 transport helicopters also participated in the exercise, likely conducting training flights.
Analysis
The live-fire exercise indicates that the PLAA has developed doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for its aviation brigades to conduct coordinated suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) or destruction of enemy air defenses (DEAD) missions in the prelude to offensive or other operations. For example, the doctrine outlined TTPs for helicopter pilots to fly nap-of-the-earth (NOE) flight paths and evade radar until they were at or near targets and for Z-10 and Z-20T pilots to employ hunter-killer tactics to lase and guide KD-9s and other PGMs toward targets. The most important aspect of the doctrine and TTPs, however, is the guidance for SEAD and DEAD missions, which allows Z-10 and Z-20T pilots to coordinate among themselves and with the drone operators to locate and lase targets for destruction by sharing targeting information via datalink. Helicopter pilots and drone operators can also deconflict airspace and fly effectively without issues, an important capability for aviation brigades conducting SEAD and DEAD missions.
Figure 2. Z-10 light attack helicopters and Z-20T assault helicopters in flight after conducting a strike mission against HMMWV and PAC-3 missile launcher mockups
(Source: “[
新闻直播间]
陆军 多课目实弹射击演练 锤炼空中胜战本领” [Live News], [Army conducts multi-subject live-fire drills to hone air combat skills], CCTV, June 7, 2026,
https://tv.cctv.com/2026/06/07/VIDEd8gFS9hMbysxrBZzKZRK260607.shtml.)
Implications
The 84th Aviation Brigade’s exercise demonstrates the PLAA’s incorporation of lessons learned from the Gulf War, including how the US military conducted raids on radar and other air defense sites employing attack helicopters and other assets. One lesson the PLAA incorporated was how Task Force Normandy conducted the tactical mission to destroy two Iraqi radar stations, as well as the strategic implications of the operation. The PLA understands it will encounter an extensive integrated air defense system (IADS) in a future conflict, requiring ways to destroy or damage the network. The PLAA could deploy flights of Z-10s and Z-20Ts to destroy air defense sites, thereby creating gaps in the IADS perimeter that follow-on PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and PLA Navy air strikes could exploit against targets located deeper inside the country, including air defense sites or systems that would enhance the impact of the initial SEAD or DEAD air strikes to create additional gaps or degrade the ability of the IADS to locate and track aircraft.
Figure 3. A Z-20T assault helicopter launches a KD-9 air-to-ground missile toward a target during a live-fire exercise
(Source: “
新疆陆航组织实弹射击训练，直10、直20T轮番上阵，地面好多悍马靶车。” [Xinjiang Army aviation unit organized live-fire training, with Z-10 and Z-20T helicopters taking turns to strike several Hummer targets on the ground],
微博 [Weibo], May 29, 2026,
https://weibo.com/1240246333/R1ENLxCYC.)
Strategic Message
The live-fire exercise indicates the PLAA aviation brigades are developing the capabilities and skills to conduct complex SEAD and DEAD missions. One capability the PLAA aviation brigades would need is a robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability to plan missions through enhanced intelligence gathering. This ISR capability extends to the PLAA’s use of KVD-002s and other assets to collect intelligence and perform battle damage assessment of targets during air strikes. The Z-10 and Z-20T helicopter pilots would have to develop navigational skills to fly toward targets using NOE and other tactics to evade radar detection. This skill set would also include a pilot’s ability to fly over open water and other difficult-to-navigate environments, where spatial disorientation and the lack of reference points could present challenges. The PLAA would also have to develop an adequate electronic warfare (EW) capability to protect the Z-10s and Z-20Ts as they approach targets.
Additionally, this EW capability would be employed in an intelligence-gathering capacity to inform pilots and planners about the types of radars and SAM systems operating in the area. The PLAA could also rely on other EW assets, such as J-16D, Y-9G, and Y-9GL aircraft, to support aviation brigades during these missions. However, the PLAA and the PLAAF would need to develop this capability further to ensure successful coordination and planning for joint missions.
Analysis Source: “新闻直播间]陆军 多课目实弹射击演练 锤炼空中胜战本领” [Live News – Army Conducts Multi-Subject Live-Fire Drills to Hone Air Combat Skills], June 7, 2026, https://tv.cctv.com/2026/06/07/VIDEd8gFS9hMbysxrBZzKZRK260607.shtml.
Keywords: CLSC Quick Take, Joaquin Camarena, IADS, PLAA, precision strikes, PLAAF, Z-10, Z-20T, KD-9, Xinjiang Military District
Joaquin Camarena
Joaquin Camarena is a former United States Marine Corps intelligence analyst who runs Sino Talk, an entity devoted to monitoring the PLA’s developing capabilities. His main focuses are PLAN and PLANMC expeditionary capabilities and PLA modernization efforts.
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