• Content
  Front Matter 1—Introduction (Deni, Rathke) 2—Germany's National Security Strategy... (Henke) 3—Washington's Expecations... (Deni) 4—German Conventional Defense... (Matlé) 5—Germany's Defense Industry (Besch) 6—Energy Policy (Campbell, Bosch) 7—The End of Ostpolitik? (Stent) 8—The Institutional Dimension: NATO & EU (Rathke, Luetkefend) 9—China, Germany, and the US (Stumbaum, de Cet)
• Editors and Contributors

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The End of Ostpolitik?

Angela E. Stent
©2025 Angela E. Stent

Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s announcement of the Zeitenwende upended 50 years of German Ostpolitik, challenging the fundamental premises upon which German policy toward both Russia and the broader European security order were based. After the Soviet collapse, Germany pursued a Russia-first policy in the post-Soviet space, and its relations with Russia’s neighbors—including Ukraine—were determined by the primacy of ties with Russia post German reunification. Since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, relations with Russia have dramatically deteriorated, and Germany’s support for Ukraine in the Russia-Ukraine War has assumed priority in Berlin’s remaining ties with Moscow. But though the German government has remained committed to this new policy, German public opinion remains divided over the reversal of Ostpolitik, and recent elections in the eastern Länder indicate growing support for parties which favor discontinuing support for Ukraine and restoring ties with Russia. The Zeitenwende could be reversed, depending on the outcome of the war in Ukraine and on domestic political developments both in Germany and in the United States. This chapter will examine the historical evolution of German-Russian ties and provide a scorecard for the economic, energy, and political impacts of the Zeitenwende. It will discuss the Russian view of Germany’s new policies and examine how Germany has supported Ukraine since February 2022. This chapter concludes with the implications of the Zeitenwende for new leadership in Washington and Berlin, and for future US-German cooperation on Russia and Ukraine.

German-Russian Relations Prior to February 2022

For half a century, the Ostpolitik of Social Democratic Party of Germany Chancellor Willy Brandt, who was in office from 1969–74, framed German-Russian ties. Ostpolitik was based on two key pillars: Wandel durch Annäherung (change through rapprochement) and Wandel durch Handel (change through trade). Brandt’s priority was to improve ties between West and East Germany, and he understood this improvement could only be accomplished by dealing more productively with Moscow. The West German version of détente focused on improving relations with Moscow through dialogue and negotiations that produced positive changes in Soviet policy toward the German question. A central premise of Ostpolitik was the belief greater economic interdependence would improve political relations and would also moderate Soviet behavior. When the Federal Republic of Germany signed the first deal to import natural gas from the Soviet Union in 1970, nine years after the construction of the Berlin Wall, Brandt hoped energy interdependence would become the cornerstone of a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union.¹ Many Germans argue German unification represented the success of the idea economic and political engagement with the Kremlin would ultimately resolve the German question and reunite the country.

For three decades after German unification and the Soviet Union’s fall, the premises behind the original Ostpolitik persisted across the German political spectrum. Berlin was committed to engaging the new Russia and facilitating its transition to a postimperial, democratic market society, partly in gratitude to the Kremlin for allowing Germany to unite peacefully. Germany became Russia’s most important European partner, its advocate in Europe, and a key source of financial assistance, committed to integrating Russia into Western institutions. Germany was more willing than other countries, including the United States, to take seriously Russia’s grievances about the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia’s insistence it receive special consideration and respect because it had been a great power. Germany was so focused on improving its ties with Russia that it downplayed Eastern and Central European concerns about Russia’s future, potentially revanchist, ambitions. Germany viewed the entire region through a Russian lens.²

When Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000—the so-called German in the Kremlin who had spent six years as a midlevel KGB officer in Dresden—he appeared to be a promising partner.³ Putin’s September 2001 address to the Bundestag praised Russia’s historic ties to Germany. He sought closer partnership with Germany and Europe.⁴ Until the Ukraine crisis of 2013–14, Germany continued to explore as many avenues as possible to engage Russia, including the Partnership for Modernization and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s program of Annäherung durch Verflechtung (rapprochement through interdependence).⁵ By 2014, the fact that these attempts to influence Russia’s development in a positive direction had not moderated Putin’s increasingly aggressive ambitions at home and abroad was obvious. Russia was not building the institutions of a modern state or a modern market. It was run by a closed, corrupt, and opaque elite group of former intelligence officials operating within a highly personalistic system of rule. Yet, as Angela Merkel’s memoirs reveal, despite her critical attitude toward Putin and her understanding of how his authoritarian system worked, Merkel was careful not to pursue policies that might provoke the Kremlin during her 16 years as chancellor.⁶

Wandel durch Handel also failed. Putin’s Russia was determined to decouple economic relations from political ties. The Kremlin believed the German business community’s interest in profitable economic ties would survive deteriorating political relations, and the powerful German business lobby would pressure the political leadership not to push back against Russian actions.⁷

Nine days before Russia invaded Ukraine, Scholz traveled to Moscow. Scholz told Putin war was unthinkable and assured him Ukrainian NATO membership “is not an issue we will likely encounter while we are in office,” slyly asking Putin how long he planned to stay in office.⁸

The Zeitenwende Scorecard—Economic and Energy Ties

One of the most dramatic outcomes of the Zeitenwende was Germany weaning itself off Russian gas, which had supplied the country for decades and created economic and political leverage for the Kremlin. Before the war began in 2022, Germany imported 55 percent of its natural gas from Russia via pipeline.⁹ For decades, this gas transited through Ukraine, which occasionally led to interruptions of the gas flows because of disputes between Russia and Ukraine over contract terms. In 2005, at the end of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s term in office, Russia and Germany signed a deal for the construction of the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, which bypasses Ukraine under the Baltic Sea. As soon as he left office, Schröder became the chairman of the shareholders’ committee of Nord Stream AG, a lucrative and controversial position, after having previously called Putin a “flawless democrat.”¹⁰ The pipeline began operating in 2011. In 2015, a year after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and the imposition of US and European sanctions against Russia, Gazprom and several European companies signed a deal for the construction of Nord Stream 2, which would have increased Germany’s dependence on Russian gas.¹¹ The administrations of three US presidents—Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden—all opposed the pipeline.¹² After the war began, Germany began preparing to move away from the import of Russian gas, but Russia acted first to cut off supplies in August 2022. Also, in fall 2022, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline was severely damaged by a series of explosions. After an extensive investigation, this act of sabotage was determined to be the work of a small group of Ukrainians.¹³ But by then the German government had committed itself to finding alternative supplies.

Germany’s rapid transition away from Russian gas surprised many. The speedy construction of two large liquified natural gas terminals on the Baltic Sea to import alternative supplies—now 80 percent of liquified natural gas imports come from the United States—was hailed by Scholz as evidence of a “new German speed.”¹⁴ Germany could reconsider gas relations with Russia when the war ends, but given the current government’s commitment to moving away from dependence on hydrocarbons, the Russia-Ukraine War may well signal the beginning of the end of German-Russian gas ties.

For several decades, Germany was also one of Russia’s key economic partners. In 2021, Germany was Russia’s second-largest trading partner after China. The German Federal Statistical Office reported the two countries traded goods with a value of roughly €59.8 billion in 2021—34.1 percent more than in the previous year.¹⁵ German businesses were heavily invested in economic ties to Russia. Yet, after the war began, Germany joined its EU partners in imposing 15 packages of financial, technological, and industrial sanctions on Russian banks, firms, and individuals.¹⁶ Since then, Germany has remained an important trading partner for Russia but with a far lower total volume of trade compared to before February 2022. Economic and energy ties, which had for decades been a mainstay of German-Russian relations, no longer hold the fabric of that relationship together.

Political Ties

Prior to the outbreak of the war, the German government was committed to maintaining a dialogue with Russia, however difficult the circumstances. After the war broke out, Scholz continued to talk to Putin, but since December 2022 their dialogue has lapsed.¹⁷ Scholz’s spokesman has said, “if the chancellor deems a time appropriate, he has no hesitation in having a telephone conversation with the Russian President. However, at the moment I see some reluctance when it comes to expectations of such a conversation and we have to wait a little longer.”¹⁸ High-level contacts with the Kremlin have been significantly pared back in the past two and a half years. Indeed, Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock has said talking to her counterpart Sergey Lavrov makes little sense because he lies all the time.¹⁹

But in November 2024, after a two-year hiatus, Scholz initiated a telephone call with Putin. During the hour-long conversation, Scholz subsequently claimed, no progress was made on discussing an end to the war, but “it was important to tell him (Putin) that he cannot count on support from Germany, Europe and many others in the world waning.”²⁰ Scholz was criticized for speaking to Putin as Russia continued bombing Ukraine. Some speculated the conversation was for domestic political reasons, after the collapse of Scholz’s government on November 6, 2024, and in the run-up to an election where many Germans were questioning continued support for Ukraine. Scholz called Volodymyr Zelensky before talking to Putin, but Zelensky criticized the call for opening a “Pandora’s box” that undermined Western efforts to isolate Putin.²¹

Before 2022, a large stakeholder community in Germany focused on Russia. The business community was prominent. All the major German political parties’ foundations had active offices inside Russia, and several cooperated with the ruling United Russia party. Those offices are all closed now. Civil-society contacts between Germany and Russia have formed an important part of the relationship since unification, and these contacts have continued—albeit in a different form. In the past, the Petersburg Dialogue, founded by Putin and Schröder in 2001, was a significant venue for German-Russian interaction—albeit with a major asymmetry. The Russian participants were in fact vetted by the Kremlin, whereas the German participants represented genuine civil society and a variety of political views. The dialogue was civil society versus “managed democracy.” This organization ceased its activities in 2022, but in 2024 German and Russian representatives met in Baku seeking to revive civil-society contacts.²² For now, Berlin has become the new Mecca for prominent diasporic Russian opposition figures—many of whom are at odds with each other—and the home of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, where experts from the former Carnegie Moscow Center and other institutions have moved.²³ In November 2024, the often fractious Russian opposition united to hold a mass demonstration in Berlin and marched to the Russian embassy to demand the war end and Putin go.²⁴

Nevertheless, significant parts of German society—particularly in the eastern Länder—retain a more favorable view of Russia and oppose the government’s support for Ukraine. In the fall 2024 Länder elections in Saxony, Thuringia, and Brandenburg, the far-right Alternative for Germany and the far-left Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance performed very well, edging out some mainstream parties. These populist parties ran on foreign policy platforms that stressed the need to stop supporting Ukraine and to mend relations with Russia. Even though these parties have no direct say in Berlin’s Russia policy, because the German Länder do not deal with foreign policy, the fact that these pro-Russian views did not hinder the parties’ election performance shows serious opposition in German society to the ruling coalition’s post-Zeitenwende policy of isolating Russia.

The Russian Response

One of Putin’s many miscalculations when Russia invaded Ukraine was not believing Germany would impose sanctions on Russia or seek to cut off its energy relationship, because the business community had too much invested in its profitable relations with Russia. Perhaps Putin believed former chancellor Schröder represented the mainstream of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, and Scholz would have a similar commitment to Ostpolitik. The Zeitenwende speech and Germany’s actions after February 2022 took the Kremlin by surprise. Russian officials and media figures have interpreted Germany’s actions by stressing Washington forced Berlin to adopt its new Russia policies, and Germany is a vassal of the United States. As Putin told a German journalist at the 2024 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, “It is strange that nobody in the current German leadership protects German interests. It’s clear that Germany does not have full sovereignty.”²⁵

Russian officials and commentators have increasingly criticized German policies, particularly Germany’s imposition of sanctions and its commitment to increase the strength of its military. Germany is described as the heir to the Nazi regime, with one television propagandist going as far as to say Germany’s anti-Russian stance is revenge for its defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad in 1942–43.²⁶ Germany is, according to the Kremlin, one of the key pillars in the Russophobic bloc of Western countries out to destroy Russia.

Russia has increased its disinformation activities in Germany since the Zeitenwende and actively spreads propaganda about the war to support the Russian narrative that the West started the war, and to turn the German population against its government, targeting susceptible German audiences.²⁷ A September 2024 FBI indictment of two Russian citizens on election interference charges included material showing how Russian psyops teams identified Germany as a particularly vulnerable target for Russian influence.²⁸ Russia is also suspected of conducting acts of sabotage on German soil aimed at preventing German support for Ukraine.²⁹ Additionally, Russia was suspected of involvement in the attempt to blow up a liquified natural gas pipeline under construction.³⁰ American intelligence agencies also discovered Russia was planning to assassinate the chief executive officer of Rheinmetall, a company producing artillery and military weapons for Ukraine, and the United States helped Germany foil the plot.³¹ The Kremlin is waiting for German public support for Ukraine to evaporate and for the government in Berlin to revert to its pre-2022 policy of engagement and dialogue with Russia.

Support for Ukraine

A key element of the Zeitenwende has been German government support for Ukraine. Germany leads Europe in the number of Ukrainian refugees it has accepted—1.14 million. Germany is the second-largest provider of economic assistance to Ukraine—more than €44 billion to date.³² It has also become a major supplier of weapons, overcoming its initial hesitance and postwar pacifist culture. Lingering concerns about the German invasion of the Soviet Union in World War II and the deaths that invasion caused have contributed to Berlin’s reluctance to be too forward leaning in weapons supplies, refusing to send its Taurus long-range cruise missiles to Kyiv (although similar systems—the SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles—have been provided by France and the United Kingdom, respectively) and refusing to allow Ukraine to use German weapons to strike inside Russia.³³ Germany has signed a bilateral security cooperation agreement with Ukraine, pledging to support the long-term development of Ukraine’s security sector, as well as providing for cybersecurity and intelligence support. But the agreement does not provide security guarantees for Ukraine.³⁴

In 2024, German society clearly became less comfortable with the war and the economic costs it has imposed.³⁵ In August 2024, Finance Minister Christian Lindner sent a letter to the Federal Ministry of Defence saying, as part of the ruling coalition’s plan to reduce spending, a moratorium on new military aid to Ukraine would be enforced. Military aid would no longer come from the German federal budget but from the interest from frozen Russian assets.³⁶

Critics who believe Germany has not done enough to help Ukraine point out Scholz has never said Ukraine should win the war, and his government has been too hesitant in its support, thereby undermining Ukraine’s ability to push back against Russia. They argue Scholz is too concerned about possible escalation from Russia, given Putin’s repeated threats to use nuclear weapons, and the German government has allowed itself to be intimidated by the Kremlin.³⁷

The German population, like the populations in the United States and many European countries, remains divided over assistance to Ukraine. An October 2024 poll showed 27 percent of the population wants military support to remain the same, 38 percent wants it to increase, and 31 percent wants it to decline.³⁸ The government struggles to chart a way forward that does not cost too much and that enables Ukraine to continue fighting without precipitating even more aggressive Russian actions that could threaten European security even more than Russian actions do now. In 2025, the situation may change as Ukraine becomes increasingly challenged on the battlefield, Germany selects a new chancellor, and the Trump administration seeks to end the war. If the United States cuts its support for Ukraine, that may well encourage those in Germany who are skeptical about assisting Kyiv.

Implications for the United States

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States and Germany have coordinated very closely on their policies toward both Russia and Ukraine. The United States and Germany have worked together on sanctions imposition, condemnation of Russian actions, and military and economic support for Ukraine. Germany played a key role in facilitating the August 2024 exchange of 16 American, European, and Russian prisoners by agreeing to free a Federal Security Service assassin, who was in a German prison, at the request of the United States.³⁹ Biden and Scholz have spent much of their respective presidency and chancellorship coordinating on the war in Ukraine. Germany has been the key European partner in this effort.

The future of transatlantic cooperation on Russia and Ukraine will depend on election results in the United States and Germany. As a candidate, President Trump vowed to end the war in 24 hours, although how he plans to accomplish this task is unclear. He will likely reexamine the current US policies of seeking to isolate Russia and providing US support for Ukraine as the war continues. Trump could also reevaluate the United States’ role in NATO and its strong ties to Germany. Similarly, if Germany has a new chancellor after February 2025, that person could also rethink both transatlantic ties and relations with Russia. Assuming Friedrich Merz becomes the next chancellor, then German support for Ukraine could strengthen. If a coalition government forms, and the Social Democratic Party of Germany were to have the Federal Foreign Office, then an interesting dynamic could develop. Some in the Social Democratic Party of Germany have supported Ukraine and advocated for a tough line toward Russia. Others, like former chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Social Democratic Party of Germany parliamentary leader Rolf Mützenich, remain wedded to the old Ostpolitik and want to end the war and restore ties with Moscow.⁴⁰ The current transatlantic cooperation has only worked as well as it has because the leaders in Washington and Berlin have agreed on the broad outlines and details of their policies.

So far, the Zeitenwende has reversed decades of German Ostpolitik. But this distancing from Russia could be reversed, depending on the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine War. Strong German voices will call for a resumption of engagement when hostilities cease, and the lure of the Russian market will not fade away. Centuries of Russian-German political, economic, and cultural engagement—often at the expense of Russia’s Western and eastern neighbors—have not been obliterated, and neither has German traditional skepticism about the United States in some quarters. Germany may have moved from Ostpolitik to “frostpolitik,” but whether a thaw could once again occur after the war has ended remains to be seen.⁴¹

Endnotes

1. Angela Stent, From Embargo to Ostpolitik: The Political Economy of West German-Soviet Relations, 1955–1980 (Cambridge University Press, 1981). Return to text.
2. Sabine Fischer, Die Chauvinistische Bedrohung: Russlands Krieg und Europas Antworten (Ullstein, 2023), 221. Return to text.
3. Alexander Rahr, Wladimir Putin: Der “Deutsche” im Kreml (Universitas Verlag, 2000). Return to text.
4. Vladimir Putin, “Speech in the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany” (speech, Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin, DE, September 25, 2001), http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/21340. Return to text.
5. “ ‘The German-Russian Modernization Partnership’ - Federal Foreign Minister Westerwelle and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in the FAZ,” Auswärtiges Amt, May 31, 2010, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/100531-bm-faz/232468; and Jörg Schneider, “Die EU-Russlandpolitik,” Europa 58, no. 6 (November 2006). Return to text.
6. Angela Merkel, Freedom: Memoirs 1954–2021 (St. Martin’s Press, 2024). Return to text.
7. Angela Stent, “Germany and Russia: Farewell to Ostpolitik?,” Survival 64, no. 5 (October–November 2022): 27–38. Return to text.
8. Constanze Stelzenmüller, “Scholz Holds His Ground in Putin’s Den,” Brookings Institution, February 16, 2022, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/16/scholz-holds-his-ground-in-putins-den/. Return to text.
9. Janice C. Eberly et al., “How Did Germany Fare Without Russian Gas?,” Brookings Institution, October 26, 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-did-germany-fare-without-russian-gas/. Return to text.
10. Oliver Pieper, “Putin and Schröder: A Controversial Friendship,” Deutsche Welle, August 8, 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/putin-and-schr%C3%B6der-a-special-german-russian-friendship/a-55219973. Return to text.
11. Christoph Hasselbach, “Chronologie Nord Stream: das Gas, die Politik und der Krieg,” Deutsche Welle, August 15, 2024, https://www.dw.com/de/nord-stream-das-gas-die-politik-und-der-krieg/a-69951942. Return to text.
12. Anca Gurzu and Joseph J. Schatz, “Great Northern Gas War,” Politico, February 10, 2016, https://www.politico.eu/article/the-great-northern-gas-war-nordstream-pipeline-gazprom-putin-ukraine-russia/. Return to text.
13. Gurzu and Schatz, “Great Northern Gas War.” Return to text.
14. Benjamin Tallis, “The End of the Zeitenwende: Reflections After Two Years of Action Group Zeitenwende,” German Council on Foreign Relations, August 30, 2024, https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/end-zeitenwende; and “The United States Remained the Largest Liquefied Natural Gas Supplier to Europe in 2023,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, February 29, 2024, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61483. Return to text.
15. Statistisches Bundesamt, “Facts on Trade with Russia,” press release no. N 010, February 24, 2022, https://www.destatis.de/EN/Press/2022/02/PE22_N010_51.html. Return to text.
16. “EU Sanctions Against Russia Explained,” Council of the EU, updated December 16, 2024, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions-against-russia/sanctions-against-russia-explained/. Return to text.
17. Philip Rißling and Benno Rougk, “Olaf Scholz zum Anschlag auf Tesla: ‘Das war ein terroristischer Akt,’ ” Märkische Allgemein, March 27, 2024, https://www.maz-online.de/lokales/brandenburg-havel/bundeskanzler-olaf-scholz-im-maz-interview-oder-tesla-putin-wagenknecht-wahl-in-brandenburg-NUQF3Q3OLJCHRNFULM4AQVOQA4.html. Return to text.
18. Oliver Towfigh Nia, “German Chancellor Open to Talks with Putin: Spokesperson,” Anadolu Agency, September 9, 2024, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/german-chancellor-open-to-talks-with-putin-spokesperson/3325506. Return to text.
19. “German Foreign Minister Snubs UN Security Council to Avoid Russian Foreign Minister’s ‘Deceitful Performance,’ ” Yahoo News, April 25, 2023, https://www.yahoo.com/news/german-foreign-minister-snubs-un-195900588.html. Return to text.
20. Thomas Escritt, “Germany’s Scholz Defends Call to Putin Ahead of Snap Elections,” Reuters, November 17, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putins-views-ukraine-war-havent-changed-germanys-scholz-says-2024-11-17/. Return to text.
21. “Germany’s Scholz Holds First Official Call with Ukraine’s Zelenskiy Since Putin Talk,” Reuters, November 29, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germanys-scholz-holds-first-official-call-with-ukraines-zelenskiy-since-putin-2024-11-29/. Return to text.
22. Ingo Malcher, “Die Baku-Connection,” Die Zeit, no. 44/2024, October 16, 2024, https://www.zeit.de/2024/44/petersburger-dialog-deutsch-russisch-gespraechsforum-kreml. Return to text.
23. “Russia Eurasia Center,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, n.d., accessed on December 4, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia?lang=en. Return to text.
24. “Putin Opponents March to Russian Embassy in Berlin, Condemn War,” Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, November 17, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/navalny-march-berlin-ukraine-war-putin-opposition/33205444.html. Return to text.
25. “Meeting with Heads of International News Agencies,” President of Russia, June 5, 2024, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/74223. Return to text.
26. Ukraine War Video Report (r/ UkraineWarVideoReport), “On his show tonight, Dmitry Kiselyov says that European countries are backing Ukraine against Russia because they want revenge for the battles of Poltava (1709), Borodino (1812), and Stalingrad (1942-3) . . . ,” Reddit Ukraine War Report (website), 2022, https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/wt6q3d/on_his_show_tonight_dmitry_kiselyov_says_that/. Return to text.
27. “Disinformation Related to the Russian War of Aggression Against Ukraine,” Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community, n.d., https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/schwerpunkte/EN/disinformation/disinformation-related-to-the-russian-war-of-aggression-against-ukraine.html. Return to text.
28. Jakob Hanke Vela, “FBI Dossier Reveals Putin’s Secret Psychological Warfare in Europe,” Politico, September 5, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/fbi-dossier-reveals-russian-psy-ops-disinformation-campaign-election-europe/. Return to text.
29. Andrey Sychev and Alexander Ratz, “Germany Arrests Two for Alleged Military Sabotage Plot on Behalf of Russia,” Reuters, April 18, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-arrests-two-alleged-military-sabotage-plot-behalf-russia-2024-04-18/. Return to text.
30. Laura Hülsemann, “German Prosecutors Launch Probe into Suspected Sabotage of LNG Pipeline,” Politico, January 5, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/investigation-suspected-sabotage-lng-pipeline-germany-gasunie/. Return to text.
31. “Russia Tried to Assassinate CEO of Arms Firm Sending Weapons to Ukraine, Reports Say,” Reuters, July 11, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-tried-assassinate-ceo-arms-firm-sending-weapons-ukraine-cnn-reports-2024-07-11/. Return to text.
32. “Germany Continues to Stand with Ukraine – the Third Anniversary of Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion,” Auswärtiges Amt, February 24, 2025, https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/laenderinformationen/ukraine-node/ukraine-solidarity-2513994. Return to text.
33. Abbey Fenbert, “Scholz Meets Zelensky, Says Germany Will Not Let Kyiv Use Its Weapons on Russian Soil,” Kyiv Independent, September 23, 2024, https://kyivindependent.com/scholz-meets-zelensky-says-germany-will-not-let-kyiv-use-its-weapons-on-russian-soil/. Return to text.
34. Agreement on Security Cooperation and Long-Term Support Between the Federal Republic of Germany and Ukraine, Ger.-Ukr., February 16, 2024. Return to text.
35. Stefan Meister, “Germany and Russia’s War of Aggression Against Ukraine: The Third Year,” German Council on Foreign Relations, April 22, 2024, https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/germany-and-russias-war-aggression-against-ukraine-third-year. Return to text.
36. Giovanna Coi, “Germany to Halt New Ukraine Military Aid: Report,” Politico, August 17, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-halt-new-ukraine-military-aid-report-war-russia/. Return to text.
37. Tallis, “End of the Zeitenwende.” Return to text.
38. “Politbarometer Oktober 2024,” Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, updated October 18, 2024, https://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Umfragen/Politbarometer/Archiv/Politbarometer_2024/Oktober_2024/. Return to text.
39. Bojan Pancevski, “How Germany Enabled a Historic Prisoner Swap with Russia,” The Wall Street Journal, August 2, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/how-germany-enabled-a-historic-hostage-swap-with-russia-c22c8aac. Return to text.
40. Wolfgang Münchau, “The German SPD’s Foolish Attachment to Putin’s Russia,” New Statesman, April 3, 2024, https://www.newstatesman.com/comment/2024/04/germany-spd-foolish-attachment-to-putin-russia. Return to text.
41. Tuomas Forsberg, “From Ostpolitik to ‘Frostpolitik’? Merkel, Putin and German Foreign Policy Towards Russia,” International Affairs 92, no. 1 (January 2016): 21–42. Return to text.

Thumbnail Photo Credit

AwOc, Hybrid Flag of Russia and Germany, April 6, 2009 (Wikimedia Commons, Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License), https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flag_of_Russia_and_Germany.svg.