Home : SSI Media : Recent Publications
Feb. 27, 2025

Assessing the Zeitenwende

— 5 —

A Zeitenwende for Germany’s Defense Industry

Sophia Besch
©2025 Sophia Besch

Download Full PDF

 

A Zeitenwende in German defense policy is inconceivable without a Zeitenwende for Germany’s defense industry.1 Such a paradigm shift must first and foremost include a sustained and predictable increase in spending levels, but it entails much more than defense budgets. Germany’s relationship with its defense industry needs to undergo a broader cultural transformation and Berlin must adopt a more strategic approach to defense-industrial policy at the national and European levels.

This chapter begins with a brief overview of the German defense-industrial ecosystem, highlighting the challenges a Zeitenwende in Germany’s defense industry would need to address. Then, the chapter analyzes what steps have been taken since Olaf Scholz’s 2022 announcement, identifying successes and shortcomings, and outlining parameters for the ongoing assessment of the current state of the Zeitenwende for Germany’s defense industry.

German Defense Industry—Financial, Political, Regulatory, and Cultural Challenges

After the end of the Cold War, Germany drastically cut defense expenditures, spending consistently below NATO’s 2 percent target in the decades that followed. Even Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 did not significantly change this trend, and a noticeable increase in expenditures only began in 2020.2 The post–Cold War spending cuts predictably reduced German defense-industrial production capacity.3 Nevertheless, the German defense industry remained significant, producing important capability products for the export market.4

In 2020, the German defense industry employed 55,500 highly skilled workers, and up to 135,000 individuals when including suppliers and service providers.5 Four German defense companies are listed on the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s most recent “Top 100” list of the largest arms-producing and military-services companies in the world: Rheinmetall, Germany’s largest manufacturer of tanks, combat vehicles, and artillery ammunition; defense electronics group Hensoldt; ThyssenKrupp AG; and the air-defense system supplier Diehl Group.6 Airbus Industrie, MBDA, and KNDS, three intra-European companies with German participation, are also on the list. The German defense-industrial base also includes around 1,350 medium-sized companies—each with up to 1,000 employees and an annual turnover of up to €300 million—which are often suppliers for other European manufacturers.7

Despite its economic value, a sense of ambivalence about the ethics of arms production—born out of the crimes Germany committed during World War II—has led to a fraught relationship between German politics, business, and society and Germany’s defense sector. The moral taboo associated with the sector has had very real effects on the strength and orientation of the German defense-industrial base.8 For example, in the finance sector, many German banks voluntarily cut all capital flows to the arms industry or refuse to finance companies that make money with domestically controversial weapons systems.9 Similarly, the memory of industrial cooperation under the Nazis led many German civilian companies to avoid associations with the defense sector.10 The unease between private and public civilian and defense actors has also resulted in defense players traditionally being isolated in Germany’s research and development ecosystem.11 And domestic skepticism of defense innovation has led to lengthy debates over adapting new battlefield technologies, such as combat drones.12

Most consequentially, Germany’s reluctance to formulate defense-industrial objectives and technology priorities, as well as Berlin’s refusal to treat the defense sector as a national security resource or engage the defense industry as a foreign policy tool, has prevented the pursuit of a defense-industrial strategy—both domestically and with allies and partners abroad. The lack of strategic defense-industrial thinking has extended to the European level, where German officials and defense firms have not engaged in the policy entrepreneurship necessary to shape the EU’s defense-industrial efforts over the past decade.13

A less obvious but no less perfidious effect of this lack of strategic focus and political attention on the defense sector has been the growth of excessive bureaucratic procedures. This ailment befalls most parts of the German public sector, but is amplified in those dealing with defense, including the agency in charge of military procurement and the defense ministry itself.14 Some bureaucratic obstacles are shared by most European defense firms, such as EU rules and regulations for public tenders, bespoke national requirements for military equipment and platforms, or the changing winds of political election cycles. Other hurdles are more specific to Germany, where any defense contract worth more than €25 million must be approved by the parliamentary budget committee. German parliamentarians also took nine months to approve the €100 billion special fund for the Bundeswehr.15 Finally, many of the Bundeswehr’s long-standing equipment challenges, even regarding low-tech kit such as helmets or rifles, are at least in part due to bureaucratic procurement hurdles.16

For Germany’s partners, the effects of Berlin’s ethical ambivalence vis- à-vis the defense sector and resultant lack of strategic thinking have perhaps been most visible in the context of Germany’s arms-export policy. For decades, Germany operated under the self-imposed rule of not exporting arms to active war zones (making an exception only in 2014, when it provided weapons to the Iraqi peshmerga).17 Parties on the left and center left continuously lobbied for more restrictive export rules, and domestic political mood shifts significantly impacted German policies. This dynamic led to Germany being perceived as unreliable among its European defense-capability partners and increasingly led large German defense firms to relocate their business abroad.18 In the months before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Chancellor Scholz’s Zeitenwende speech, the newly elected government of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, the Green Party of Germany, and the Free Democratic Party decided in its coalition agreement to restrict arms exports further, especially with regard to human rights, democracy, and rule-of-law concerns.19

Two Steps Forward . . .

The Russia-Ukraine War changed the trend lines of European defense spending. In the wake of the Russian invasion, European governments wanting to send military aid and strengthen their own defenses found themselves confronted with dwindling and aging stocks, minimal defense-industrial production capacity, and supply chain challenges. Since then, European governments have invested billions in military support to Ukraine and have undertaken important steps to ramp up defense-industrial production at national and intergovernmental levels, as well as through NATO and the EU.20 Military spending in Europe totaled $588 billion in 2023, an increase of 16 percent compared to the previous year, and 62 percent compared to 2014.21 This surge in demand—paralleled at the global level—is felt by European defense firms, which are recruiting at fast rates to deliver on near record-high procurement orders.22

In Germany, the special €100 billion defense fund allowed for rapid spending increases outside regular budgetary planning. With these increases, the German government is, for the first time, meeting NATO’s defense spending goal of 2 percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). In 2024, Germany’s defense spending (including the regular defense budget, the special fund, and a third budget line that funds purchases for third countries) accounted for 2.1 percent of its GDP.23

German arms exports hit a record high in 2023, when individual licenses issued for exporting military equipment were valued at €12.2 billion, with the majority going to Ukraine.24 In 2023, Rheinmetall’s chief executive officer was celebrating his firm’s best year for orders ever.25 An invigorated German defense industry is now recruiting workers from the German automobile industry, the country’s ailing flagship sector.26 Rheinmetall, which in 2023 completed its acquisition of Spanish ammunition firm Expal Systems, has also been leading the charge for greater cooperation with the Ukrainian defense sector—including by starting a joint tank-repair facility and production plant inside Ukraine.27

Mirroring the dramatic fiscal changes, a process of cultural and societal normalization of the German defense industry has begun. In 2024, a survey conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers Germany revealed nearly 70 percent of respondents supported expanding Germany’s defense capabilities.28 And though 53 percent of Germans considered private investors investing in arms companies morally reprehensible before the Russia-Ukraine War began, nearly two-thirds have since shifted their stance, stating they either deemed such investments acceptable or were reevaluating their previous views.29 Reflective of this changing sentiment, an increasing number of German civilian companies are now expanding into the sector of military equipment and services.30 When football club Borussia Dortmund signed a sponsorship deal with Rheinmetall, German media widely covered the deal as a further step for the defense industry out of the shadows and into the mainstream. Green Party of Germany Economy Minister and German Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck called the agreement “unusual,” but reflective of a “different, more threatening world.”31

. . . One Step Back

But despite these notable shifts, Berlin is still only beginning to think through and enact the Zeitenwende for its defense sector. For instance, in export policy, the coalition government has been working on a new arms-export law, initially expected in 2022, which has still not been published and is important for domestic producers and, crucially, for the future export potential of large-scale international projects with countries like France, Germany’s partner in the Future Combat Air System and Main Ground Combat System (MGCS). In fact, the initial momentum seems to have stalled.32 Germany did publish its first-ever National Security Strategy in June 2023, which states the government will continue to adhere to its restrictive baseline policy, considering human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in the importing country.33 But at the same time, the government also plans to consider alliance and security interests, the geostrategic situation, and the needs of enhanced European arms cooperation.

So far, German arms exports are going predominantly to Ukraine.34 To scale up, and to fulfill Germany’s rather large requirements under the terms of NATO’s newly approved operations plans for the defense of allied territory, Berlin is also considering pursuing armament cooperation with countries outside NATO. In November 2023, the German defense ministry published new defense-policy guidelines, which state, although cooperation with NATO allies remains paramount, Germany is also looking to global partners, especially in the Indo-Pacific.35 The defense ministry has demonstrated interest in intensifying defense-industrial cooperation with Australia, India, Indonesia, and Japan.36 A new consensus appears to be emerging slowly but has not yet been translated into guidelines. Berlin pursuing a more strategic approach to armament cooperation with third countries, and eventually accompanying this shift with a new, clear policy framework, will be one indicator of the Zeitenwende truly taking hold.

Similarly, the process of cutting down excessive bureaucratic procedures in defense procurement is only beginning to change a red-tape culture that has grown over decades. In 2022, the Bundestag passed a law “to accelerate procurement measures for the Bundeswehr.”37 The law aims to allow authorities to award contracts more quickly by, inter alia, awarding several partial or specialized lots together and taking greater account of defense and security interests in advance of awarding a contract, speeding up review and appeal procedures, and lowering hurdles for small and medium-sized defense-technology enterprises to participate in Bundeswehr tenders. In recognition of the need to promote stronger cultural adaptation within government agencies through new leadership, in early 2023, the head of the procurement agency was replaced.38

Germany’s new 2023 defense-policy guidelines announced the defense planning process and procurement procedures, and the regulations that influence them, will be “will become part of the Zeitenwende.”39 The defense minister’s focus is on empowering individuals. The new guidelines state, “In addition to specialist knowledge and skills, the keys to a modern and effective procurement system are the willingness to take action and to assume responsibility, resolve, an error culture and a culture of learning.” Still, firms complain they struggle with hiring, since acquiring the required security checks and government clearances continues to take months, and the government has not done enough to mitigate overly bureaucratic EU tender and environmental, social, and governance rules.40

Multilateralizing the Zeitenwende

Germany has traditionally shown high levels of political support, for around but low levels of policy leadership, on European and EU defense initiatives. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War, the EU has launched a range of new defense-industrial programs, including projects to incentivize joint procurement, and published its first-ever defense-industrial strategy.41 So far, the EU’s efforts are not sufficiently resourced to influence significantly the procurement decisions of national governments, including Germany.42 Berlin continues to be careful not to support proposals that could be perceived as undermining NATO’s primacy and does not want to empower EU institutions at the expense of national decision-making authority. Germany’s participation in European Defence Fund projects is below average, it does not participate in the flagship EU capability project Multi Modular Patrol Corvette, it does not go through the European Defence Agency to procure ammunition jointly, and it has sought to control how its resources are spent in the European Peace Facility.43

Admittedly, Germany is engaged in two flagship capability development projects with its European partners: the MGCS future battle tank with France and the Future Combat Air System with France and Spain.44 Germany has also signed an agreement with France and Spain that would allow all three countries to sell jointly developed equipment without their partners’ explicit agreement, as long as partner components amounted to less than 20 percent of the total project.45 But even though Berlin continues to invest political capital in flagship European cooperative capability projects, Germany has a clear focus on solidifying transatlantic ties, exemplified by decisions to purchase the F-35 fighter jet and the Chinook heavy transport helicopter from the United States.46 Both the MGCS and the Future Combat Air System delivery dates have been pushed back significantly into the 2040s—or even the 2050s. Rheinmetall’s new main battle tank, Panther, is set up to serve as a “bridge” to the Franco-German tank, with the MGCS companies worried about the distraction this Rheinmetall tank brings.47

Debate in Brussels is ongoing over the direction the EU’s defense-industrial initiatives should take.48 Some member states see EU defense integration as a political objective, considering structural trends that pull the United States away from Europe and require Europeans to build up a more autonomous defense-industrial base. These member states advocate for prioritizing more equipment purchases from European firms. Other member states favor prioritizing generating capability as quickly as possible through third-country procurement, with some driven by the hope buying capabilities from the United States will help keep Washington engaged as Europe’s security guarantor. One indication of a German vision for European defense procurement is the European Sky Shield Initiative, a coalition Chancellor Scholz announced in August 2022 to procure air-defense systems jointly. Within the initiative, Berlin chose to promote American launchers over SAMP/T, a Franco-Italian system that operates in the same range. This move prompted criticism from Paris.49 Nevertheless, 21 countries have since joined the European Sky Shield Initiative, and several European partners are now procuring German systems through, or in alignment with, the European Sky Shield Initiative.50

Stumbling Blocks Ahead

The greatest failure of the Zeitenwende process so far has been the lack of long-term planning. Firms complain the German government lacks a clear idea of the path ahead, and Germany has failed to accompany the greater spending levels and societal openness to defense with a more strategic approach to defense-industrial policy and investment plans.51 Germany is not alone here. Numerous European countries provide scant direction regarding their long-term spending strategies.52 But for Germany, the consequences of a potential spending slowdown are particularly stark due to the peculiarities surrounding the €100 billion special fund for the armed forces. The special fund is strategically positioned outside German debt-brake regulations, ensuring it remains untouched during political budget negotiations. But this arrangement has enabled the government to postpone establishing measures to grow the regular defense budget and thus sustain spending once the special fund is depleted by the end of 2027.53 By mid-2024, Germany had spent €47.8 billion of the special fund, meaning just over half of the fund (€52.2 billion) is left.54 Moreover, nearly all this remainder has been committed and will be fully spent by the end of 2027.55 Germany’s commitment to spending 2 percent of its GDP on defense is safe only so long as the special fund can plug gaps.

Despite what the short-term nature of these defense investments might convey, key players in the government do not nurture hopes the threat from Russia will subside after the end of the Russia-Ukraine War. Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has called for a defense spending target of 3–3.5 percent of Germany’s GDP in light of a possible future Russian attack and has lobbied for Bundeswehr expenditures to be excluded from the German debt brake.56 Chancellor Scholz has also astutely described the industrial challenge at hand, noting “tanks, howitzers, helicopters, and air defense systems don’t just sit on a shelf somewhere. If nothing is ordered for years, then nothing will be produced.”57

But even those German politicians who understand the challenge have found themselves unable to get around domestic political restrictions on spending—the current government can find no consensus to loosen the debt brake, pass tax increases, or agree to spending cuts in other areas like social spending. This political trench warfare over budgets is taking place against the background of rapidly rising extreme right and far-left parties, a national economic model under pressure from the geopolitical imperative to mitigate its dependence on Russia and China at the same time, and a recent ruling by Germany’s federal constitutional court against the reallocation of unused debts. The recent collapse of the traffic-light government and, that same week, the election of US President Donald Trump appear to have opened some political space for a loosening of the debt brake for public investment.58 Green Party of Germany leader Robert Habeck has also proposed the option of another special fund for the Bundeswehr.59 But these proposals depend on electoral arithmetic, as the far-right and far-left parties may together achieve a blocking minority in the snap elections in February 2025.

At a defense planning level, the lack of long-term thinking about defense investment means Germany risks losing sight of investing in future technology objectives. At an industry level, the ongoing lack of long-term funding predictability is complicating investment decisions for companies and forcing firms to shoulder the risk associated with ramping up production. The consequences of firms anticipating a budgetary slowdown manifest in a decline in the acceleration of production facilities and defense labor forces, extending delivery times and straining supply chains, which collapse if orders are not placed promptly.60

The Way Ahead

In light of this analysis, identifying the parameters to assess the future success of the Zeitenwende for the German defense industry is not difficult. Berlin must commit to raising the regular defense budget gradually to avoid investments falling off a cliff when the special fund runs out. This commitment will allow industry to ramp up production and provide a strong signal to all firms, as well as Berlin’s allies, of Germany’s commitment to rebuilding the beleaguered Bundeswehr.

At the same time, additional money will not be sufficient to fix all the ills in Germany’s defense industry and procurement processes. Germany must speed up approval procedures for defense projects, make defense research and development projects available for civilian funding, and make financing more accessible for subject matter experts and start-ups at the national and European levels. It must formulate a more strategically coherent arms-export policy, as well as invest political capital proactively to shape the EU’s defense-industrial course, forge consensus with allies, and deconflict the EU with NATO. Many of these ideas are already under consideration in parts of the government.61 They need sustained political focus to be implemented successfully.

 
 

Endnotes

  1. “New Defence Policy Guidelines Call for Warfighting Capability of the Bundeswehr,” Federal Ministry of Defence, November 10, 2023, https://www.bmvg.de/en/news/new-defence-policy-guidelines-call-for-warfighting-5702800. Return to text.
  2. Klaus-Heiner Röhl et al., A New Era for the Defense Industry? Security Policy and Defense Capability After the Russian Invasion of Ukraine, IW-Policy Paper 1/2023 (German Economic Institute, February 2023). Return to text.
  3. Röhl et al., A New Era. Return to text.
  4. Till Bücker, “Wie die Rüstungsindustrie dasteht,” Tagesschau, February 3, 2023, https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/ruestungsindustrie-branche-waffen-101.html; and Pieter D. Wezeman et al., Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2022 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], March 2023). Return to text.
  5. Röhl et al., A New Era. Return to text.
  6. Based on 2022 revenue. “The SIPRI Top 100 Arms-Producing and Military Services Companies in the World, 2022,” SIPRI, December 2023, https://www.sipri.org/visualizations/2023/sipri-top-100-arms-producing-and-military-services-companies-world-2022. Return to text.
  7. Bücker, “Wie die Rüstungsindustrie dasteht.” Return to text.
  8. Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, “End the Silence over Germany’s Defense Industry,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 9, 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2017/11/end-the-silence-over-germanys-defense-industry?lang=en. Return to text.
  9. Christoph Betz, “Rüstungsfinanzierung: Banken im ESG-Dilemma,” KPMG Germany, March 4, 2024, https://klardenker.kpmg.de/financialservices-hub/ruestungsfinanzierung-banken-im-esg-dilemma/. Return to text.
  10. Arjun Neil Alim and Martin Arnold, “German Businesses Break with Postwar Taboo to Supply Defence Sector,” Financial Times, July 2, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/b19ea5ae-38a7-41ab-b2d8-2e694b06b5b1. Return to text.
  11. Christian Mölling and Torben Schütz, Defence Innovation: New Models and Procurement Implications. The German Case, Policy Paper #68 (French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs, May 2021). Return to text.
  12. “Keine Mehrheit für Antrag zum Auf bau einer Drohnenarmee,” German Bundestag, May 16, 2024, https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2024/kw20-de-drohnenarmee-1002392. Return to text.
  13. With the notable exception of German voices in the European Parliament. Andrew D. James, “Policy Entrepreneurship and Agenda Setting: Comparing and Contrasting the Origins of the European Research Programmes for Security and Defense,” in The Emergence of EU Defense Research Policy: From Innovation to Militarization, ed. Nikolaos Karampekios et al. (Springer, 2018). Return to text.
  14. Daniela Schwarzer, “Germany Should Listen to Draghi,” Financial Times, September 13, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/ac71e27d-d70b-48c2-8a04-21576bfac372. Return to text.
  15. “War in Ukraine Has Triggered a Boom in Europe’s Defence Industry,” The Economist, August 17, 2023, https://www.economist.com/business/2023/08/17/war-in-ukraine-has-triggered-a-boom-in-europes-defence-industry. Return to text.
  16. Franz-Stefan Gady, “German Defense Companies Could Be Europe’s Arsenal of Democracy,” Foreign Policy, July 6, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/07/06/germany-bundeswehr-defense-industry-zeitenwende-weapons-arms-exports-rheinmetall-leopard-tanks-drones/. Return to text.
  17. Lucie Béraud-Sudreau et al., Russia’s War Against Ukraine: A New Impetus for the Harmonisation of European Arms Export Policies?, Policy Paper #83 (French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs, July 2023). Return to text.
  18. Matthias Gebauer and Christoph Schult, “Großbritannien wirft Berlin mangelnde Bündnistreue vor,” Der Spiegel, February 19, 2019, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/ruestungsexporte-nach-saudi-arabien-brandbrief-aus-grossbritannien-an-deutschland-a-1253997.html; Anne-Marie Descôtes, Vom “German-free” zum gegenseitigen Vertrauen (Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, July 2019); and Sabine Kinkartz, “Tailwind for the German Arms Industry?,” Deutsche Welle, March 31, 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/rearmament-tailwind-for-the-german-arms-industry/a-68704891. Return to text.
  19. Social Democratic Party of Germany and Alliance 90/The Greens and the Free Democrats, Dare More Progress: Alliance for Freedom, Justice and Sustainability, Coalition Agreement 2021 – 2025 (Social Democratic Party of Germany and Alliance 90 / The Greens and the Free Democrats, 2021). Return to text.
  20. “EU Military Support to Ukraine,” European Commission, n.d., accessed on September 27, 2024, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/stronger-europe-world/eu-solidarity-ukraine/eu-assistance-ukraine/eu-military-support-ukraine_en. Return to text.
  21. Nan Tian et al., Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2023 (SIPRI, April 2024). Return to text.
  22. Sylvia Pfeifer et al., “Global Defence Groups Hiring at Fastest Rate in Decades amid Record Orders,” Financial Times, June 16, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/9625dbaa-5d36-4bee-8610-f16a b7ad6b1d?accessToken=zwAGGxGPoS54kdOWJduqXTZL7tOGEPFqt61rHQ.MEUCIFMzKZRd0I nwvfGraGexzpWwezHZJx-vxGGKkV_wm_7LAiEAwQ0Q6m3O3ulpiOPR_jmzpu6gYPTah4H4lAS adWTQSRw&sharetype=gift&token=a4861f42-ade9-41b1-8118-ebeb2d7070bf. Return to text.
  23. Guntram B. Wolff et al., Fit for War in Decades: Europe’s and Germany’s Slow Rearmament vis-à-vis Russia, Kiel Report no. 1 (Kiel Institute for the World Economy, September 2024), 40. Return to text.
  24. “Deutsche Rüstungsexporte auf Höchststand,” Tagesschau, January 4, 2024, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/bundesregierung-ruestungsexporte-100.html#:~:text=F%C3%BCr%20insgesamt%2012%2C2%20Milliarden,Jahr%20einen%20neuen%20Rekordwert%20erreicht. Return to text.
  25. “Triggered a Boom.” Return to text.
  26. Alim and Arnold, “German Businesses Break.” Return to text.
  27. “Rheinmetall und Ukraine starten Panzer-Reparaturbetrieb,” Tagesschau, June 11, 2024, https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/rheinmetall-ukraine-panzer-100.html. Return to text.
  28. “Die Deutschen wollen verteidigungsfähiger werden,” PwC Germany, February 13, 2024, https://www.pwc.de/de/pressemitteilungen/2024/die-deutschen-wollen-verteidigungsfaehiger-werden.html. Return to text.
  29. Ralph Wefer, “Ukraine-Krieg lässt Deutsche umdenken: Fast die Hälfte hinterfragt frühere Meinung zu Rüstungsinvestments,” Verivox, September 5, 2022, https://www.verivox.de/geldanlage/nachrichten/ukraine-krieg-laesst-deutsche-umdenken-fast-die-haelfte-hinterfragt-fruehere-meinung-zu-ruestungsinvestments-1119716/. Return to text.
  30. Alim and Arnold, “German Businesses Break.” Return to text.
  31. Giovanna Coi et al., “German Weapons-Maker Loses Champions League Final,” Politico, June 1, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/german-weapons-maker-rheinmetall-borussia-dortmund-champions-league-final/. Return to text.
  32. Linus Höller, “German Weapons Exports Reached Record High in 2023,” Defense News, January 2, 2024, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2024/01/02/german-weapons-exports-reached-record-high-in-2023/. Return to text.
  33. German Federal Government, Robust. Resilient. Sustainable. Integrated Security for Germany: National Security Strategy (German Federal Government, June 2023). Return to text.
  34. Höller, “German Weapons Exports.” Return to text.
  35. “New Defence Policy Guidelines.” Return to text.
  36. Ben Schreer, “Germany’s New Defence-Policy Guidelines,” International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), November 14, 2023, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2023/11/germanys-new-defence-policy-guidelines/; “Milliardenschweres U-Boot-Projekt mit Indien geplant,” Tagesschau, June 7, 2023, https://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/asien/indien-pistorius-100.html; and Matthias Gebauer, “Pistorius stellt Indonesien zwei A400-Militär flieger in Aussicht,” Der Spiegel, June 5, 2023, https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/indonesien-boris-pistorius-stellt-zwei-a400-militaerflieger-in-aussicht-a-83679755-bbbd-491f-afdf-f38de7fa7c4c. Return to text.
  37. “Bundestag beschleunigt Beschaffungswesen bei der Bundeswehr,” German Bundestag, July 7, 2022, https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2022/kw27-de-bundeswehrbeschaffungsbeschleunigung-900544. Return to text.
  38. “Neue Chefin für Bundeswehr-Beschaffung,” Tagesschau, March 29, 2023, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/bundeswehr-beschaffungsamt-lehnigk-emden-101.html. Return to text.
  39. “New Defence Policy Guidelines.” Return to text.
  40. “The Defense Industry: Disruptions and Challenges for Germany and Europe,” German Council on Foreign Relations, April 11, 2024, https://dgap.org/de/media/16032. Return to text.
  41. “EDIS: Our Common Defence Industrial Strategy,” European Commission, n.d., accessed on September 27, 2024, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en. Return to text.
  42. Max Bergmann and Sophia Besch, “Why European Defense Still Depends on America,” Foreign Affairs, March 7, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/why-european-defense-still-depends-america. Return to text.
  43. Jana Puglierin, Germany’s Perception of the EU Defence Industrial “Toolbox”, Armament Industry European Research Group Comment #91 (French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs, January 2024); and Giorgio Leali, “EU’s Breton Accuses Germany of Going ‘Solo’ on Ukraine Aid,” Politico, January 15, 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-thierry-breton-germany-ukraine-war-aid/. Return to text.
  44. Tim Martin, “Future European Tank to Be Built by 4-Party French and German Industry Venture,” Breaking Defense, April 29, 2024, https://breakingdefense.com/2024/04/future-european-tank-to-be-built-by-4-party-french-and-german-industry-venture/; and “Future Combat Air System (FCAS),” Airbus, n.d., accessed on September 27, 2024, https://www.airbus.com/en/products-services/defence/future-combat-air-system-fcas. Return to text.
  45. Bastian Giegerich, “Germany’s National Security Strategy Previews Change in Arms-Export Policy,” IISS, June 30, 2023, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2023/06/germanys-national-security-strategy-previews-change-in-arms-export-policy/. Return to text.
  46. Sabine Siebold, “Exclusive: Germany Looking into Buying Eight Additional F-35 Jets,” Reuters, June 7, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/germany-looking-into-buying-eight-additional-lockheed-f-35-jets-source-says-2024-06-07/; and Gareth Jennings, “Update – IMH 2024: Germany Places First Contract for Chinook Buy, Sets Out Plans for Entry into Service,” Janes, February 28, 2024, https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/defence/update-imh-2024-germany-places-first-contract-for-chinook-buy-sets-out-plans-for-entry-into-service. Return to text.
  47. Johanna Möhring, Troubled Twins: The FCAS and MGCS Weapon Systems and Franco-German Co-operation (French Institute of International Relations, December 2023); “How Germany Is Learning to Overcome Neglect to Project Strength and Resolve,” European Defence Agency, n.d., accessed on September 27, 2024, https://eda.europa.eu/webzine/issue24/cover-story/how-germany-is-learning-to-overcome-neglect-to-project-strength-and-resolve; and Karsten-Dirk Hinzmann, “ ‘Der Smart Tank rollt herein’: Pistorius lässt den Panzer des nächsten Jahrhunderts bauen,” Frankfurter Rundschau, March 26, 2024, https://www.fr.de/politik/pistorius-frankreich-koalition-panzer-reform-ukraine-krieg-putin-bundeswehr-nato-92909883.html. Return to text.
  48. Sophia Besch, “Understanding the EU’s New Defense Industrial Strategy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 8, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2024/03/understanding-the-eus-new-defense-industrial-strategy?lang=en. Return to text.
  49. “European Countries Are Banding Together on Missile Defence,” The Economist, July 25, 2024, https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/07/25/european-countries-are-banding-together-on-missile-defence. Return to text.
  50. “European Countries”; and Tom Waldwyn, “National Defence Industry: From an Enabler of Turkiye’s Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy to a Bridge Between Turkiye and Europe,” IISS (website), May 1, 2024, https://www.iiss.org/research/defence-and-military-analysis/national-defence-industry--from-an-enabler-of-turkiyes-pursuit-of-strategic-autonomy-to-a-bridge-between-turkiye-and-europe/. Return to text.
  51. “Defense Industry: Disruptions.” Return to text.
  52. “Triggered a Boom.” Return to text.
  53. Christian Mölling and Torben Schütz, “Germany’s Defense Budget 2024: The Planned Increase Is Not Yet Enough,” German Council on Foreign Relations, July 19, 2023, https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/germanys-defense-budget-2024. Return to text.
  54. Wolff et al., Fit for War. Return to text.
  55. Corinna Budras et al., “99.999.691.000 Euro sind schon weg,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 9, 2024, https://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/mehr-wirtschaft/bundeswehr-sondervermoegen-reicht-nicht-wie-geht-es-fuer-deutschland-weiter-19641487.html. Return to text.
  56. Tim Aßmann and Kilian Neuwert, “Pistorius in München: ‘Nicht die Zeit, um sich die Realität schönzureden,’ ” Tagesschau), February 18, 2024, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/bundeswehr-sicherheitskonferenz-100.html; “Fraktionen bewerten Verteidigungsetat unterschiedlich,” German Bundestag (website), September 2023, https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2023/kw36-de-verteidigung-957754; and “Pistorius will Verteidigungsausgaben von Schuldenbremse ausnehmen,” Handelsblatt, May 8, 2024, https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/bundeswehr-pistorius-will-verteidigungsausgaben-von-schuldenbremse-ausnehmen/100037248.html. Return to text.
  57. Kinkartz, “German Arms Industry.” Return to text.
  58. Sarah Frühauf, “Was steckt hinter Merz’s Schuldenbremsee-Vorstoß?,” Tagesschau, November 15, 2024, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/schuldenbremse-debatte-102.html. Return to text.
  59. “Habeck will Sondervermögen für Bundeswehr noch vor Neuwahl beschließen,” Zeit Online, November 10, 2024, https://www.zeit.de/politik /deutschland/2024-11/habeck-bundeswehr-sondervermoegen-vor-neuwahlen. Return to text.
  60. “How Germany Is Learning”; and Roman Tyborski, “Rheinmetall-Chef warnt vor Scheitern der Zeitenwende,” Handelsblatt, May 3, 2024, https://www.handelsblatt.com/unternehmen/industrie/ruestungsindustrie-rheinmetall-chef-warnt-vor-scheitern-der-zeitenwende/100036758.html. Return to text.
  61. “Neue Förderpläne für die Rüstungsindustrie,” Tagesschau, August 8, 2024, https://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/regierung-ruestungsindustrie-100.html. Return to text.
 
Thumbnail Photo Credit

Daniel Cole, Ammunition [Image 2 of 4], May 22, 2016, DVIDS, link.

Assessing the Zeitenwende