• Content
  Front Matter 1—Introduction (Deni, Rathke) 2—Germany's National Security Strategy... (Henke) 3—Washington's Expecations... (Deni) 4—German Conventional Defense... (Matlé) 5—Germany's Defense Industry (Besch) 6—Energy Policy (Campbell, Bosch) 7—The End of Ostpolitik? (Stent) 8—The Institutional Dimension: NATO & EU (Rathke, Luetkefend) 9—China, Germany, and the US (Stumbaum, de Cet)
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German Conventional Defense Capabilities and Capacity

Aylin Matlé
©2025 Aylin Matlé

The renewed and large-scale Russian attack on Ukraine that started on February 24, 2022, necessitates a fundamental rethinking of Germany’s defense policy. Therefore, this chapter analyzes to what extent Germany’s defense approach, especially in the realm of conventional capabilities and capacities, has been adjusted, and analyzes whether speaking of a real turning point (Zeitenwende) is fitting three years after its announcement, or whether Berlin is still in the process of undergoing a fundamental transformation.

This chapter will first examine the changes in Germany’s conventional defense capabilities and capacities. Second, the chapter will assess whether and how the goals associated with the Zeitenwende in this particular issue area have been addressed and whether the goals are sustainable or not. Third, the chapter will scrutinize the implications of the findings in the first and second sections for Germany and the United States. Last, the chapter features a set of recommendations on how to move forward.

Germany’s Conventional Defense Capabilities Since the Zeitenwende

In the context of the Zeitenwende, a distinction ought to be made between capacity and capability in military terminology to assess adequately the current state of Germany’s defense posture at large. Capacity refers to the sheer size and quantity of forces, such as fleets, inventories, and overall force structure. It emphasizes (immediate) military readiness and strength, with a focus on current assets like ships, planes, and troops.¹ Capability, on the other hand, is about long-term innovation, training, and modernization.² It involves developing the technologies, personnel, and strategies needed for future strength and operational effectiveness. Capability emphasizes integrating elements like doctrine, training, leadership, and infrastructure to create a force capable of achieving specific goals under defined conditions.³

For all the above—in particular, the acquisition of capacities—monetary funds are needed. Thus, one important aspect to scrutinize is the development of Germany’s defense spending. Since 2022, Germany’s defense spending has seen significant increases as part of the Zeitenwende, reflecting a shift in the country’s approach to security affairs and military spending.

The centerpiece of the adjustment to Germany’s defense spending is a special fund (Sondervermögen) to modernize the German armed forces, which is worth €100 billion and which German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced in his famous Zeitenwende speech. In addition to serving the purpose of advancing the Bundeswehr’s equipment modernization, the special fund also serves the goal of achieving NATO’s 2 percent target. Back in 2014, all alliance members pledged to move closer to the goal of investing 2 percent of their respective gross domestic products in defense annually by 2024.⁴ Although Germany has increased its defense budget ever since, it has not yet met the NATO target in consecutive years. Consequently, great significance was attributed to the following statement Chancellor Scholz made in his Zeitenwende speech: “From now on, we [Germany] will invest more than 2 percent of our gross domestic product in our defense year after year.”⁵

With the aid of the special fund, Germany has been able to spend more on defense matters since 2022. Although the provision of additional funds was broadly welcomed in Germany and abroad, one must understand the current German government is stalling for time, as the regular defense budget has been more or less frozen at a fixed sum of about €50–53 billion through 2026. With the help of the Sondervermögen, Germany managed to reach the alliance’s 2 percent goal in 2024 for the first time since the pledge was made publicly. The German government will likely be able to continue hitting the mark through 2027. But, at the very latest, in 2028, the country will face a huge financing gap of about €30 billion per year, as the funds from the Sondervermögen will have been depleted.⁶ In consequence, the regular defense budget would need to be increased by well above €30 billion, or Germany would have to borrow money again to set up another Sondervermögen.⁷ But thus far, from where these funds are supposed to be drawn has not become clear. The special fund, in combination with a slightly increased regular defense budget, has partially fulfilled its dual purpose since its establishment.⁸ Several urgently needed investments have been initiated, including, among other items, 35 F-35 fighter jets, 18 Leopard 2A8 tanks, 50 Puma infantry fighting vehicles, six IRIS-T Surface Launched Missile surface-to-air air-defense systems, and 60 Chinook CH-47F helicopters.⁹

Although the list of initiated and planned acquisitions, of which the abovementioned capabilities are a part, appears impressive at first glance, one must assess whether these investments suffice to meet the promises Germany has made to NATO, including, but not limited to, the Lithuania brigade and Berlin’s pledged contributions to the NATO Force Model. The army chief of staff, Lieutenant General Alfons Mais, proclaimed in April 2023 Germany’s land forces cannot fulfill their NATO commitments, which he proved by pointing out a division that was promised to be fully battle ready in 2025 (Division 25) will not reach a battle-ready state by that time: “the army will not be able to hold its own in high-intensity combat and will also only be able to fulfill its obligations to NATO to a limited extent.”¹⁰ Fittingly, Division 25 seems to be on track to attain “Initial Operational Capability” by 2025, yet reaching the “Full Operational Capability” will most likely take another two years.¹¹

Attaining the operational readiness of a second division by 2027 is also currently unrealistic.¹² Compounding this rather bleak assessment is the fact that procurement projects will most likely not be finished by the time the funds of the Sondervermögen run dry. Without the certainty of an assured funding source, the German arms industry may not expand its production capacity to sustain the push by the Bundeswehr to close capability gaps.¹³

These developments and trends have a bearing on Germany’s readiness and impact NATO, too, as Germany is (supposed to be) a major contributor to the alliance’s deterrence and defense posture. In June 2022, NATO leaders gathered for a summit in Madrid and agreed, among other things, to establish a new NATO Force Model by 2023 that would significantly increase the number of troops on high alert to 300,000—a substantial increase from the 40,000 troops that make up the alliance’s precursor, the NATO Response Force. This move underscores NATO’s focus on defending every inch of its territory, requiring its forces to maintain a high level of combat readiness to respond to a conventional war.¹⁴ Germany agreed to put 35,000 troops, as well as more than 200 ships and aircraft, at the disposal of the NATO Force Model’s first and second tiers, under which troops must be ready in up to 10 and 30 days, respectively.¹⁵

As mentioned above, the first German division (Division 25) under the new force model will only have limited operational readiness by 2025, with particular deficiencies in antiaircraft defense capabilities and artillery, partly due to material that has been sent to Ukraine.¹⁶ Additionally, the introduction of a new digital radio system has been delayed from 2025 to 2027.¹⁷ Division 25 will be fully integrated into the NATO Force Model, with the Lithuania brigade as part of its structure. The brigade is expected to be fully operational by the end of 2027. Whether Germany can keep up with that timeline mainly depends on two factors. First, Lithuania will need to put the necessary infrastructure in place. Second, to equip the brigade fully, materiel will most likely have to be taken away from other active army units in Germany, which are already suffering from a lack of equipment.¹⁸

Whether and How the Goals Have Been Addressed

As outlined above, German efforts to strengthen the Bundeswehr as part of the Zeitenwende have met with only limited success so far. Yet, Berlin has made progress in terms of starting a long-overdue investment in the modernization of the armed forces across all service branches. More generally, Germany also adopted a more assertive security and defense policy with regard to supporting Ukraine in its fight against Russia. Over the last three years, Germany has become Ukraine’s second-largest supporter. Hence, to claim, overall, Germany has leveraged the Zeitenwende to advance its conventional defense capacity and capabilities in absolute terms is reasonable. But regarding what is necessary to turn Germany into a country with “war readiness,” as Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has proclaimed, the assessment is much more sobering.¹⁹

For starters, though Germany is finally meeting NATO’s 2 percent defense-spending benchmark in 2024, for the additional funds to create a palpable effect on the armed forces will take many more years, assuming funding will remain consistent.²⁰ Unfortunately, as outlined in the previous section, Germany likely does not have a sustainable and credible plan in place both to keep spending at current levels and to increase the funds available to the Federal Ministry of Defence.

In addition to the already overstrained armed forces, coupled with the slow process of replenishing necessary capacities, new demands from NATO are hitting Germany. Reportedly, 35–50 additional combat brigades will be necessary to fulfill the requirements of the alliance’s recently approved operations plans. Five or six of those additional brigades will most likely have to come from Germany, which will place additional strain on the country’s armed forces. The eight brigades the Bundeswehr currently has at its disposal, in addition to a ninth that is being established and a 10th that is supposed to be in place by 2031, suffer from insufficient equipment, personnel, and funding.²¹ An increased demand for troops compounds the potential the armed forces’ potency will be stretched thin, especially the German army. Current estimates of how many more soldiers will be needed to match NATO’s additional demands (minimum capability requirements) range from between 35,000 and 75,000, at a time when the number of active soldiers is shrinking.²²

Against this backdrop of rising troop-level demands, the issue of declining personnel numbers is particularly pressing. After a dip in 2016 and 2017, the number of active-duty personnel has been on the rise for some years, reaching a peak in 2020 with 183,777 soldiers.²³ Since then, numbers have been in decline once more, reaching a tentative low in 2024 with around 181,000.²⁴ At the same time, the German armed forces are aiming for an active troop level of 203,300 by 2031, which they currently stands do not seem likely to reach due to various reasons. For one, applicant numbers have been in decline; second, of those who have decided to join the armed forces, the dropout rate is currently at 27 percent within the first six months; and third, even if the Bundeswehr could attract more personnel, the funds to employ additional soldiers to reach the target of 203,300 are currently lacking.²⁵ Hence, unsurprisingly, the debate about whether to reinstall compulsory military service, which was halted in 2011, has gained momentum, underscored by a recently adopted official duty law. According to the new legislation, young men will be required to complete a questionnaire upon turning 18, providing information about their willingness and ability to participate in military conscription. For women, this process will remain voluntary, in accordance with the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, which mandates the obligation be only for men. A subset of willing and capable men will be invited to undergo mustering, with around 5,000 individuals being recruited. Current capacity limitations prevent accommodating more than 5,000 additional conscripts. But whether this newly introduced system will suffice to alleviate the Bundeswehr’s personnel troubles is far from certain.²⁶

Implications for the German-US Relationship

Although the progress Germany has made since February 2022 is welcomed by Washington and in line with American expectations vis-à-vis Germany, the hurdles ahead cast doubt on whether a sustainable Zeitenwende has taken place.

Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and its 2014 attack on the Donets Basin, followed by the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, have so far hindered the United States from significantly reducing its security presence in Europe, and thus in Germany. In fact, since February 2022, the Biden administration has greatly expanded US support for European security to aid Ukraine’s defense and bolster NATO’s deterrence and defense posture.²⁷ But the Russia-Ukraine War has highlighted the persistent dependence of European NATO members, including Germany, on US military support. Despite numerous warnings about potential US disengagement from the continent, Germany, like many other European NATO countries, has not taken sufficient steps to secure its own defense and continues to rely heavily on the United States for both nuclear and conventional deterrence.

In this context, German policymakers should appreciate several core assumptions. First, one may reasonably expect a majority in both major US political parties, though advocating for more balanced burden sharing, still recognizes the importance of US involvement in European security.²⁸ Second, if Europe addresses calls for greater burden sharing, it can help ensure Washington maintains at least part of its security commitments. By reducing the US burden of keeping conventional forces in Europe, Germany may encourage Washington to maintain the nuclear umbrella European NATO members are unable to replace in the near to midterm future. In short, Germany must take a more proactive role in safeguarding its security—both for its own defense and to incentivize continued US engagement in European affairs. This requirement holds true regardless of who occupies the White House after 2025.²⁹

Recommendations: How to Move Forward

The following recommendations aim to encourage decisionmakers in Washington to maintain US engagement in Europe, while also advancing Germany’s security interests. First and foremost, Germany must fulfill its commitment to spending at least 2 percent of its gross domestic product on defense. As the wealthiest European country, Germany is likely to face stronger demands for increased defense spending from Washington as well as European capitals—especially with a second Trump administration taking office in January 2025. Therefore, Germany must develop a concrete plan to allocate at least 2 percent of its gross domestic product to defense. Germany must recognize defense spending is not an end in itself but is necessary to address critical defense needs, which are in line with the threat assessment at which Germany arrives with its allies.

More broadly, Germany, alongside other European allies, must prepare to take on responsibilities the United States currently shoulders in Europe, particularly in terms of strategic enablers such as airlift; reconnaissance; air-to-air refueling; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems; and air-defense systems. Germany should advocate for greater use of the “Framework Nation Concept” to acquire these essential capabilities with some of its European allies.³⁰ The European Long Range Strike Approach is one step in the right direction, as Germany, alongside France, Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, pledged to engineer a ground-launched cruise missile with a reach of about 1,000 to 2,000 kilometers.³¹ Furthermore, the UK-Germany Trinity House Agreement on Defence, which Berlin and London reached in October 2024, adds another layer of Europeanizing NATO, as both countries have agreed to, among other things, contribute more effectively to the provision of security in Europe by cooperating more closely in the realm of ground forces.³²

Additionally, European NATO members, especially Germany, must fulfill their commitments to strengthening NATO’s eastern flank, particularly in Lithuania. Germany must ensure the planned Lithuania brigade becomes fully operational as quickly as possible. Although the brigade is expected to enter service in 2025, it may not reach full operational strength until 2027.³³ To bridge this gap, Germany should consider assigning an additional Germany-based brigade to defend Lithuania.³⁴ Furthermore, Berlin should encourage Canada and the United Kingdom to transition from a rotational troop presence in the Baltic states to the permanent stationing of brigades in Estonia and Latvia. This transition would enhance NATO’s deterrence and defense posture against Russia. Increasing multinational troop deployments from battalion to brigade levels in each Baltic state would also reduce NATO’s response time in the event of an attack.³⁵ All these steps could demonstrate to the United States that Germany, together with its European allies, is serious about its commitment to transatlantic security and conventional defense. Against this backdrop, even a Trump-led government could be more inclined not to withdraw US engagement from and with European security fully and completely.

Endnotes

1. Mark Cancian, “Clash of Strategies: Capability or Capacity, Today or Tomorrow?,” Breaking Defense, October 26, 2017, https://breakingdefense.com/2017/10/clash-of-strategies-capability-or-capacity-today-or-tomorrow/; and Mackenzie Eaglen, “The Bias for Capability over Capacity Has Created a Brittle Force,” War on the Rocks, November 17, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/11/the-bias-for-capability-over-capacity-has-created-a-brittle-force/. Return to text.
2. Cancian, “Clash of Strategies.” Return to text.
3. European Parliament, CSDP Defence Capabilities Development (European Parliament, January 2020), 4; and Aaron C. Taliaferro et al., “What Is a Capability, and What Are the Components of Capability?,” in Defense Governance and Management (Institute for Defense Analyses, 2019), 6. Return to text.
4. “Wales Summit Declaration,” NATO, September 5, 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm. Return to text.
5. “Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz am 27. Februar 2022,” Bundesregierung, February 27, 2022, https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/suche/regierungserklaerung-von-bundeskanzler-olaf-scholz-am-27-februar-2022-2008356. Return to text.
6. Christian Mölling et al., “Verteidigung,” in Was kostet eine sichere, lebenswerte und nachhaltige Zukunft?, ed. Felix Heilmann et al. (Dezernat Zukunft, September 2024), 167. Return to text.
7. “Ampel-Etat “ ‘Truppe ‘größtenteils schockiert,’ ” ZDF Heute, July 7, 2024, https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/deutschland/bundeswehr-verband-haushalt-wuestner-wehretat-100.html. Return to text.
8. N.B.: In individual cases, distinguishing which acquisition should be attributed to which budget line and year is difficult, as some of them are multiannually financed. In addition, the funds are oftentimes drawn from the “Sondervermögen” first and later are supposed to be flowing from the regular defense budget. Return to text.
9. Guy Chazan and Sam Jones, “Will Germany Deliver on Its Grand Military Ambitions?,” Financial Times, February 15, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/51cf54ed-55df-4369-bdef-6f98be17d26c. Return to text.
10. Gabriel Rinaldi, “Germany Can’t Fulfill NATO Obligations, Says Army Chief in Leaked Memo,” Politico, April 11, 2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-nato-leaked-memo-defense-budget-boris-pistorius/. Return to text.
11. Kilian Neuwert and Pirmin Breninek, “Heeresdivision bis 2025: Großprojekt mit Hindernissen,” BR 24, January 18, 2024, https://www.br.de/nachrichten/bayern/heeresdivision-bis-2025-grossprojekt-mit-hindernissen,U1iJtRf. Return to text.
12. Christian Mölling and Torben Schütz, EDINA III: Preventing the Next War, Policy Brief No. 34 (German Council on Foreign Relations, November 2023), 9. Return to text.
13. Chazan and Jones, “Will Germany Deliver.” Return to text.
14. Max Bergmann and Otto Svendsen, Transforming European Defense: A New Focus on Integration (Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2023), 20. Return to text.
15. “NATO Force Model: Wie Deutschland sich ab 2025 in der NATO engagiert,” Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, July 9, 2024, https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/nato-force-model-wie-deutschland-sich-ab-2025-engagiert-5465714. Return to text.
16. André Uzulis and Björn Müller, “Die NATO am Scheideweg,” Loyal das Magazin, April 3, 2024, https://www.reservistenverband.de/magazin-loyal/die-nato-am-scheideweg/; and Neuwert and Breninek, “Heeresdivision bis 2025.” Return to text.
17. Frank Specht, “2027 statt 2025: Geplante Nato-Division der Bundeswehr muss länger auf Digitalfunk warten,” Handelsblatt, October 10, 2023, https://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/verteidigung-2027-statt-2025-geplante-nato-division-der-bundeswehr-muss-laenger-auf-digitalfunk-warten/29437818.html. Return to text.
18. Aylin Matlé, “The Future of the Zeitenwende: Scenario 3–Russia Masses Troops on the Latvian Border,” Internationale Politik Quarterly, January 18, 2024, https://ip-quarterly.com/en/future-zeitenwende-scenario-3-russia-masses-troops-latvian-border. Return to text.
19. Richard Connor, “German Defense Minister Calls for War Readiness by 2029,” DW, May 6, 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/german-defense-minister-calls-for-war-readiness-by-2029/a-69276059. Return to text.
20. Jana Puglierin, “Turning Point or Turning Back: German Defence Policy After Zeitenwende,” European Council on Foreign Relations, March 19, 2024, https://ecfr.eu/article/turning-point-or-turning-back-german-defence-policy-after-zeitenwende/. Return to text.
21. Thorsten Jungholt, “NATO fordert 49 weitere Kampftruppen-Brigaden,” WELT, October 6, 2024, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article253847236/Absicherung-gegen-Russland-Nato-fordert-49-weitere-Kampftruppen-Brigaden.html. Return to text.
22. “Bundeswehr braucht wegen neuer NATO-Planungen etwa 35.000 Soldaten zusätzlich,” Focus Online, October 12, 2024, https://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/vorsitzender-des-verteidigungsausschusses-bundeswehr-braucht-wegen-neuer-nato-planungen-etwa-35-000-soldaten-zusaetzlich_id_260387726.html; and Sabine Siebold, “Germany Needs 75,000 More Troops as NATO Eyes Russia Threat, Spiegel Reports,” Reuters, June 7, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-needs-75000-extra-troops-nato-braces-russia-threat-reports-spiegel-2024-06-07/. Return to text.
23. German Bundestag, Information from the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, Annual Report 2020 (62nd Report) (German Bundestag, February 2021). Return to text.
24. “Personalzahlen der Bundeswehr,” Bundeswehr, updated October 31, 2024, https://www.bundeswehr.de/de/ueber-die-bundeswehr/zahlen-daten-fakten/personalzahlen-bundeswehr. Return to text.
25. T. Wiegold, “Blick auf die Bundeswehr-Personallage: Weniger Bewerber, ein Viertel Abbrecher – und zu wenig Geld,” Augen Geradeaus, September 10, 2024, https://augengeradeaus.net/2024/09/blick-auf-die-bundeswehr-personallage-weniger-bewerber-ein-viertel-abbrecher-und-zu-wenig-geld/. Return to text.
26. Tim Aßmann, “Wie der ‘Neue Wehrdienst’ aussehen soll,” Tagesschau, November 6, 2024, https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/wehrdienst-bundeswehr-reform-100.html. Return to text.
27. Jonathan Masters and Will Merrow, “How Much U.S. Aid Is Going to Ukraine?,” Council on Foreign Relations, updated September 27, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-aid-has-us-sent-ukraine-here-are-six-charts; and Jim Garamone, “Biden Announces Changes in U.S. Force Posture in Europe,” U.S. Department of Defense, June 29, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3078087/biden-announces-changes-in-us-force-posture-in-europe/. Return to text.
28. Dominik Tolksdorf, Transatlantic Cooperation on Ukraine, German Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief No. 37 (German Council on Foreign Relations, December 2023). Return to text.
29. Aylin Matlé, Burden Sharing Revisited, German Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief No. 4 (German Council on Foreign Relations, March 2024). Return to text.
30. Matlé, Burden Sharing Revisited. Return to text.
31. Jonas Olsson, “Swedish Defense Minister: ELSA Long-Range Strike Development Driven by Ukraine Lessons,” Breaking Defense, October 30, 2024, https://breakingdefense.com/2024/10/swedish-defense-minister-elsa-long-range-strike-development-lesson-from-ukraine/. Return to text.
32. “Agreement on Defence Co-operation Between the Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Federal Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany,” Ministry of Defence, October 23, 2024, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-germany-trinity-house-agreement-on-defence/agreement-on-defence-co-operation-between-the-ministry-of-defence-of-the-united-kingdom-of-great-britain-and-northern-ireland-and-the-federal-ministry. Return to text.
33. “Bundeswehrbrigade für Litauen: Verteidigungsminister unterzeichnet Roadmap,” Bundesministerium der Verteidigung), December 18, 2023, https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/bundeswehrbrigade-litauen-minister-unterzeichnet-roadmap-5718672; and Matlé, “Future of the Zeitenwende.” Return to text.
34. Matlé, “Future of the Zeitenwende.” Return to text.
35. Matlé, Burden Sharing Revisited. Return to text.

Thumbnail Photo Credit

US Europe photo by Specialist Markus Rauchenberger, German Army Leopard 2A6 Tank, October 25, 2012 (Wikimedia Commons, Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License), https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:German_Army_Leopard_2A6_tank_in_Oct._2012.jpg.