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Feb. 27, 2025

Assessing the Zeitenwende

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Introduction: Assessing the Zeitenwende

John R. Deni and Jeffrey D. Rathke

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On February 24, 2022, Russia unleashed a brutal escalation of what is now its 10-year war with Ukraine, which began in 2014 with the partial occupation of the Donets Basin and the illegal annexation of Crimea. The 2022 invasion expanded the war into Europe’s largest since World War II. Advancing on Ukraine along multiple axes, roughly 120,000 Russian troops poured across the border from the north, east, southeast, and south, wreaking death and destruction indiscriminately on military personnel and civilians.1

Russian troops entering Ukraine from Belarus aimed to surround the capital, seeking to decapitate the elected government in Kyiv quickly. Instead of fleeing, President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian armed forces resisted. When the United States offered Zelensky the opportunity to flee the capital, he reportedly responded: “I need ammunition, not a ride.”2

Despite intelligence reports from the United States and the United Kingdom indicating the Kremlin planned to conduct a massive attack on Ukraine, many Western governments and leaders were stunned by the invasion.3 The shock of the war prompted an immediate and unexpectedly strong reaction from many countries, especially Germany. On February 27, 2022, just three days after the initial invasion, Chancellor Olaf Scholz stood before the Bundestag and announced an unprecedented shift in German security policy (which he and the government have elaborated more fully in subsequent announcements and legislation).

Scholz began by calling the Russian attack on Ukraine a “watershed”—a Zeitenwende—in the history of Europe, pinning the blame for the “war of aggression in cold blood” squarely on Vladimir Putin.4 Scholz suggested many in Europe today only know of war through the stories passed on by parents or grandparents, and he acknowledged the stunned reaction of today’s German citizens to the horrors unfolding in Ukraine at Russian hands. Then, likening Russia’s invasion to the practices of the great powers of the nineteenth century, Scholz asked the fundamental question raised by Putin’s war—whether power is allowed to prevail over law. Put another way, does might make right? Scholz described the invasion as an attempt by Russia to destroy both an independent Ukraine and the European security order that was established by the 1975 Helsinki Accords and which undergirded peace on the continent for almost half a century.

This central theme—the challenge to the rules-based European security order—became the foundation upon which Scholz subsequently built a series of major policy changes. The first of these changes was Berlin’s willingness to provide weapons to Ukraine, a country clearly at war. Previously, Germany—like several other European countries—refused to provide weapons to what it called “crisis regions.” But Scholz argued Germany could do nothing less in this situation, given Putin’s aggression.

The second major policy shift was to penalize Russia for its aggression by cutting Russian banks and state businesses off from financing, preventing the export of cutting-edge technology to Russia, excluding Russian banks from the global money-transfer messaging system, and targeting sanctions against Putin, other Russian officials and oligarchs, and their investments in the EU. Although Scholz was careful to note the enduring importance of post–World War II reconciliation between Germany and Russia and the importance of diplomacy more broadly, he announced an end to naivete in German foreign policy and to “talking simply for the sake of talking.”5 Scholz’s pronouncement fundamentally altered a decades-long commitment to Ostpolitik and to the strategy of pursuing interdependence as a path toward peaceful coexistence.

The third major policy pronouncement that day centered on strengthening German and European defense. Scholz announced his government would create a special defense fund of €100 billion for defense investments and major procurements to augment diminished German military capabilities and capacity, and announced Germany would annually spend the equivalent of 2 percent of its gross domestic product on defense.6 In September 2014, Berlin committed to the so-called 2 percent goal at a NATO summit in Wales, but Germany had never been on track to achieve it. Now, Scholz characterized Germany’s increased defense spending as “a major national undertaking” to ensure a strong, effective Bundeswehr that could stand up to what he described as clear evidence of Putin’s desire to recreate a Russian empire. Scholz pointedly characterized this task as something a country of Germany’s size should be able to achieve.

Finally, Scholz spoke about Germany’s energy security. For decades, Germany had viewed its energy trade with Russia as a pillar of east-west interdependence, incentivizing Russian adherence to the rules of the international order. To outsiders, Germany’s energy trade with Russia often looked more like mere dependence than interdependence, but in any case, this policy area formed a critical part of Ostpolitik and a change-through- trade approach that animated Berlin’s strategy toward Russia for decades. Now, Scholz completely upended that approach, committing Germany to ending its dependence on energy imports from “individual energy suppliers” (meaning primarily Russia), expanding long-term natural gas storage capacity, and rapidly constructing two new liquefied natural gas terminals.7

In sum, the changes in German strategy and policy Scholz announced on February 27, 2022, truly amounted to a sea change—a Zeitenwende. This is especially so because the changes were made by a federal chancellor of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, which has traditionally been more eager for positive relations with Russia and less willing to invest in hard security.8 At the time of this document’s publication, the Zeitenwende is three years old—sufficient time has passed to permit a realistic assessment of the Zeitenwende’s implementation. At the same time, Germany will hold national elections in February 2023, so now seems an opportune moment to examine the coalition government’s most important policy pronouncement, assess whether and how Scholz’s vision has been fulfilled, and ponder what shortcomings may remain and require further action.

Assessing the Zeitenwende has obvious utility for Germans. Additionally, assessing the Zeitenwende is important for Germany’s allies, especially the United States. For the last several decades, American leaders—regardless of party—have been remarkably consistent in their view the United States prefers to work side by side with allies in the world, and in their view European allies are foremost among the United States’ global partners.9 Allies bring capabilities, capacity, legitimacy, staying power, and expertise to nearly every international pursuit the United States engages in, regardless of issue area or geography.

Due to its economic and political power, Germany is arguably Washington’s most important ally in Europe. Despite cyclical ups and downs, Germany’s economy is the largest in Europe and possesses some of the most crucial advanced industries. Certainly, bureaucratic regulation, an aging workforce, and a lack of public infrastructure investment are major hurdles to higher levels of economic growth in Germany.10 At the same time, Germany remains the most roboticized economy in Europe and the third most roboticized economy in the world.11 Germany has the third-largest economy globally with a high degree of innovation—it ranks fifth, just behind South Korea, Japan, China, and the United States, in the number of patents issued per capita.12 And Germany has a robust manufacturing sector driven by a large number of dynamic small and medium-sized enterprises.

Given all these facts, the German economy remains the lynchpin of the economy of the EU, which is the top trade and investment partner for the United States. In 2022, US goods-and-services trade with the EU totaled $1.3 trillion; in comparison, US goods-and-services trade with China that same year totaled $758 billion.13 European companies directly support 4.7 million American jobs, with German companies accounting for roughly 900,000 of those; in contrast, Chinese companies directly support just under 200,000 US jobs.14

At the same time, even as the EU has grown in membership and power within the EU has become more diffuse, Germany remains first among equals in terms of its political power. From the euro-zone debt crisis 15 years ago, to the migration crisis of the mid-2010s, to the response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting recession, to the reaction to Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine, Berlin has been at the center of European efforts to manage and overcome the most significant challenges facing the continent. Despite the early collapse of the traffic-light coalition in late 2024 and the fiscal headwinds confronting Berlin, Germany appears likely to remain the dominant political power in Europe for the foreseeable future, even as it remains cautious in translating this strength into military might.

Given Germany’s importance within Europe and beyond, whether and how the most significant turn in German security policy achieves the country’s intended objectives is a matter of strategic importance for the United States. In particular, the Zeitenwende matters a great deal for whether and how Germany steps up its military strength and thereby bears an increasing degree of responsibility in deterring and defending against Russian aggression across Europe. The Zeitenwende also matters for how Germany uses its example and its diplomatic strength to generate stronger and more coherent actions among Europe’s NATO members and members of the EU. Clearly, the Zeitenwende has been wholeheartedly welcomed in Washington, but concerns are increasingly expressed about how Scholz’s government has followed up the chancellor’s words with deeds.15

The purpose of this report is to examine this subject in greater detail across an array of issue areas, both in Europe and beyond. To accomplish this purpose, the American-German Institute at Johns Hopkins University and the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute have brought together leading experts on both sides of the Atlantic to assess the Zeitenwende, to identify where and how it has succeeded, and to offer insights and recommendations on how to overcome remaining challenges. Our objective is to measure the Zeitenwende on its own terms and according to its own objectives.

In the first essay of this volume, Marina E. Henke examines the Zeitenwende in the context of Germany’s grand strategy. John R. Deni then approaches the Zeitenwende from the other side of the Atlantic, outlining Washington’s expectations for Berlin through the framework of the US National Defense Strategy and in the context of security challenges confronting both the United States and Germany in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

The third essay is the first of three at the heart of the report that examine the Zeitenwende in the context of specific issue areas. Aylin Matlé starts by taking a closer look at how the Zeitenwende has improved and strengthened the state of Germany’s conventional military capabilities and capacity. On a related point, Sophia Besch delves into Germany’s defense industry and examines what role the Zeitenwende has played in making that industry fit for purpose. Coauthors Loyle Campbell and Tim Bosch then provide insights into energy security and whether the Zeitenwende has truly left Germany and its neighbors better off.

The report then turns to bilateral, multilateral, and regional relationships. Angela E. Stent kicks off this group of three essays by unpacking the nature of Germany’s evolving relationship with Russia. Coauthors Jeffrey D. Rathke and Theresa Luetkefend examine how the Zeitenwende has affected Germany’s role in NATO and the EU, the two premier European institutions. Finally, looking beyond Europe, May-Britt U. Stumbaum and Sharon de Cet cast their gaze toward the Indo-Pacific to determine whether and how the Zeitenwende has impacted Germany’s approach to the China challenge.

 
 

Endnotes

  1. Jim Garamone, “Ukrainians Continue Resistance as Russia Funnels More Troops into the Country,” U.S. Department of Defense, February 28, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2948909/ukrainians-continue-resistance-as-russia-funnels-more-troops-into-the-country/. Return to text.
  2. Sharon Braithwaite, “Zelensky Refuses US Offer to Evacuate, Saying ‘I Need Ammunition, Not a Ride’,” CNN, February 26, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/02/26/europe/ukraine-zelensky-evacuation-intl/index.html. Return to text.
  3. Shane Harris et al., “Road to War: U.S. Struggled to Convince Allies, and Zelensky, of Risk of Invasion,” The Washington Post, August 16, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/interactive/2022/ukraine-road-to-war/. Return to text.
  4. Olaf Scholz, “Policy Statement by Olaf Scholz, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Member of the German Bundestag” (speech, Berlin, DE, February 27, 2022), https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/policy-statement-by-olaf-scholz-chancellor-of-the-federal-republic-of-germany-and-member-of-the-german-bundestag-27-february-2022-in-berlin-2008378. Return to text.
  5. Scholz, “Policy Statement.” Return to text.
  6. Scholz, “Policy Statement.” Return to text.
  7. Scholz, “Policy Statement.” Return to text.
  8. Bernhard Blumenau, “Breaking with Convention? Zeitenwende and the Traditional Pillars of German Foreign Policy,” International Affairs 98, no. 6 (November 2022): 1895–913. Return to text.
  9. For example, see The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (The White House, December 2017), 2, 4, 26, 37, 45, 46, and 48; and The White House, National Security Strategy (The White House, May 2010), 3, 41, and 42. Return to text.
  10. Kevin Fletcher et al., “Germany’s Real Challenges Are Aging, Underinvestment, and Too Much Red Tape,” International Monetary Fund, March 27, 2024, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/03/27/germanys-real-challenges-are-aging-underinvestment-and-too-much-red-tape. Return to text.
  11. “Global Robotics Race: Korea, Singapore and Germany in the Lead,” International Federation of Robotics, January 10, 2024, https://ifr.org/ifr-press-releases/news/global-robotics-race-korea-singapore-and-germany-in-the-lead. Return to text.
  12. “Annual Patent Applications per Million People,” Our World in Data, updated May 20, 2024, https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/patent-applications-per-million?tab=table. Return to text.
  13. “Countries & Regions,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, n.d., accessed on August 20, 2024, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions. Return to text.
  14. Daniel S. Hamilton and Joseph P. Quinlan, The Transatlantic Economy 2020 (Foreign Policy Institute, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, 2020); and Thilo Hanemann et al., “Vanishing Act: The Shrinking Footprint of Chinese Companies in the US,” Rhodium Group, September 7, 2023, https://rhg.com/research/vanishing-act-the-shrinking-footprint-of-chinese-companies-in-the-us/. Return to text.
  15. Fareed Zakaria, “Germany’s Unlikely Success Story Is an Inspiration in Dark Times,” The Washington Post, September 1, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/09/01/scholz-germany-success-story-europe/; and Sophia Besch and Liana Fix, “Don’t Let Zeitenwende Get Derailed,” War on the Rocks, November 21, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/11/dont-let-zeitenwende-get-derailed/. Return to text.
 
Thumbnail Photo Credit

Jürgen Matern, Reischstag Building Seen from the West Before Sunset (Wikimedia Commons, Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike License), https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Reichstag_building_Berlin_view_from_west_before_sunset.jpg.

Assessing the Zeitenwende