PRC Strategic Adaptation in Africa

Introduction

The People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s expanding security footprint in Africa, marked by increased military cooperation and infrastructure investments, poses a significant challenge to US strategic interests. As outlined in the Department of Defense’s annual report to Congress, China is using its diplomatic and multilateral platforms to reinforce defense influence established through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).¹ The United States has begun to counter China’s policy maneuvers with competition in the economic space, through multilateral efforts like the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGI), alongside sustained military engagements such as exercises like African Lion, Justified Accord, and Cutlass Express. Critically, Beijing has taken note of increased US attention and is actively planning its next steps, including deepening security partnerships and technology transfers and leveraging new forms of investment as a less controversial means of expanding influence. Consequently, the United States must anticipate and outmaneuver Chinese developments to maintain its regional influence.

This article will first establish China’s BRI as a vehicle for expanding PRC defense influence in Africa. In the short- to medium-term, PRC defense influence is primarily aimed at securing China’s investments, whereas in the long term, deepening ties might facilitate the establishment of overseas military bases, as spelled out in Project 141.² It will then analyze Chinese responses to increased competition in Africa, with a focus on how PRC academic and policy communities are strategizing to outmaneuver the United States in Africa—an area of China-Africa relations that has yet to be thoroughly explored. Finally, the article will provide policy recommendations for US political and military leaders, emphasizing the importance of strategic competition with China while recognizing the agency of African officials, who often seek to balance and leverage relationships with both powers.

The sources examined in this analysis draw from several authoritative, government-affiliated think tanks that regularly produce research for China’s central government, policymakers, and military consumers. Institutions such as the China Institute of International Studies (which is affiliated with the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies are well-established entities that directly inform China’s foreign and security policy. As noted in a study from the National Defense University, “the influence of think tank scholars is more a function of their institutions. Unlike universities, government research institutes have formal channels to provide advice to policymakers and are more likely to have access to classified information.”³ By relying on these authoritative sources, this analysis offers a well-founded approximation of PRC perspectives on China’s strategic adaptation in Africa.

Securitization of the BRI

China’s BRI advances the country’s economic interests and strengthens its security and military relationships with African states, significantly shaping regional dynamics and posing long-term strategic challenges for the United States. Although the BRI is a complex program involving multiple actors with sometimes competing interests and incentives, its overarching goals still pose significant challenges to US strategic interests. By making vast investments in African infrastructure—spanning more than 10,000 kilometers of railways, nearly 100,000 kilometers of roads, and numerous ports—China aims to secure vital resources and control key trade routes, creating a framework for long-term strategic dominance.⁴ China’s approach includes increasing military cooperation through arms sales, training programs, technology transfers, and joint exercises, such as the recent Peace Unity-2024 with Tanzania and Mozambique. These activities enhance China’s foothold in regions like East Africa, potentially disrupting US interests and future naval operations.

In the short to medium term, China’s strategic aims in Africa are centered around safeguarding its investment projects and securing access to natural resources. China’s focus is clearly articulated by PRC researchers with strong ties to policy-making circles. Wang Hong, from the CASS, highlights that Chinese investment projects often face significant risks as a result of insecurity, such as “contract cancellation, payment default, payment delay, and property expropriation.”⁵

Additionally, Ma Hanzhi and Yang Xiaohua, from the China Institute of International Studies (which is affiliated with the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs), underscore the specific threats coup d’états pose to BRI projects. Ma and Yang argue, though military governments “have not adopted anti-China stances after coups,” the resulting “international sanctions” and the “deterioration of the local business environment” significantly impact China’s economic and trade cooperation.⁶ The authors emphasize “the new government after the coup often renegotiates contracts with partner countries for large international cooperation projects such as mineral resource development,” creating uncertainties that threaten corporate profits.⁷ For instance, Ma and Yang explain, following the 2023 coup in Niger, the China Gezhouba Group Corporation had to suspend the $800 million Kandadji hydroelectric power project, directly impacting China’s economic interests in Niger.⁸ These examples underscore the focus of China’s immediate goals in Africa: mitigating risks to BRI projects.

Access to natural resources is another strategic aim of China’s national security strategy in Africa. China imports significant amounts of oil, cobalt, electrolytic copper, iron ore, and timber from Africa.⁹ In 2017, 14.2 percent of China’s crude oil imports came from Africa, including 50.42 million tons from Angola alone.¹⁰ Cobalt is an essential input for the production of missiles, whereas iron is used to make steel, which is used in many military vehicles. The vulnerability of these supply chains is evident in instances like the 2021 coup in Guinea. According to Zhang Mengying, from the CASS, following the coup, China’s Simandou iron ore project was temporarily halted, necessitating new negotiations between China and Guinea before the project could resume in December 2022.¹¹ Ensuring the stability and security of these resource flows is vital for sustaining China’s economic growth and industrial output, driving its security cooperation with African states.

Chinese scholars and policymakers explicitly link security and military cooperation with the need to protect PRC economic investments and access to natural resources. Zhang emphasizes, “improving the governance capacity of African countries is the key to solving Africa’s security and development issues.”¹² China’s internal security efforts include training African police forces, technology sharing, and UN peacekeeping operations. For example, China sold Huawei artificial intelligence surveillance, facial recognition, and biometric platforms to Uganda, which then used them to target political opposition groups.¹³ Tanzania has requested Chinese assistance to enhance social media control and cybertracking capabilities.¹⁴

Wang Hong, a researcher at CASS, provides a more revealing look at China’s intentions in internal security cooperation. He asserts trainings and technology transfers are for protecting Chinese nationals and are instrumental in extending China’s influence and constructing an “African security network” (非洲安全网络).¹⁵ Wang outlines a state-driven approach involving multiple government agencies, including the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council and the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, coordinating security personnel with consular protection and intelligence-sharing mechanisms to establish a pervasive security network in Africa. Wang’s policy characterization can be viewed as an effort to ensure Chinese investments and nationals are protected while also positioning China to have significant leverage and control over local security environments.

PRC Responses to Strategic Competition in Africa

China’s growing security and military presence in Africa has drawn increased scrutiny, a development that has not gone unnoticed by PRC academics and policymakers. Zhou Yuyuan, a scholar from the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, observes the United States and Western countries “are very vigilant about China’s security cooperation with African countries” and are “hyping up the security problems arising from China’s ports, information communications, mineral investment, joint exercises, and overseas logistics bases in Africa.”¹⁶ He highlights that Western countries—particularly the United States—“have begun not to ‘recognize’ China’s important contributions,” instead portraying China as a “predatory country” and promoting alternative initiatives.¹⁷ Zhou’s remarks reflect PRC awareness of growing geopolitical competition in Africa.

Scholars from the PRC go further, asserting that the United States seeks to contain China in Africa. Zhang Hongming, a researcher at CASS, contends the United States is encircling China on the continent.¹⁸ Zhang Jiaolong, from the China Institute of International Studies, even argues US food and agriculture assistance are part of a broader strategy to maintain American dominance and curb China’s growing influence in Africa.¹⁹ In response, Zhang Hongming advocates China must “strike outward” by deepening China-Africa military relations.²⁰ This approach, he suggests, could also “hinder [the United States’] Indo-Pacific strategy,” assisting China’s “situation closer to home.”²¹

These calls for deepening ties have been followed by greater PRC security and military engagement. China’s BRI partners in Africa have received substantial Chinese military assistance. Recent examples include the provision of PHL-11 multiple rocket launchers to Ghana; PTL-02 6x6 anti-tank guns to Zimbabwe; and Ziyan unmanned aerial system Blowfish micro-unmanned aerial vehicles to Nigeria for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions.²² Between 2017 and 2022, China offered $100 million in military aid to African nations. During the same period, China exported three times as many weapons to Sub-Saharan Africa as the United States. Although arms sales can safeguard Chinese investment projects, the sales also give China leverage in regional conflicts, influence over partner military operations, and relationship-building opportunities with senior political and military leaders, all of which present strategic risks to the United States and its allies.²³

China’s military exercises with African states are another area of military cooperation with strategic consequences for the United States and its allies. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s recent Peace Unity-2024 exercise with Tanzania and Mozambique reflects China’s push to strengthen trilateral military ties and establish a foothold in East Africa.²⁴ Deepening military ties could allow China to deploy naval and air assets in key locations to secure China’s Indian Ocean trade routes and critical resources like oil in the case of a future war. As noted in the 2020 edition of the Science of Military Strategy, China aims to “vigorously strengthen the construction of comprehensive long-sea support capabilities” and “improve the construction of naval bases” to safeguard its maritime trade.²⁵ New reporting on China’s Project 141 is further evidence of China’s long-term ambitions to establish overseas garrisons in countries including Tanzania, Mozambique, the United Arab Emirates, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon.²⁶ By extending influence from the northwestern Arabian Sea to the western Indian Ocean, China could force allies to divert naval forces from critical areas, undermining US strategic objectives in a future conflict.²⁷ Moreover, recent exercises with Russia in the region—especially the Mosi-2 maritime drill in February 2023—further highlight the broader context of authoritarian strategic alignment in Africa as well as China’s expanding role in East Africa.²⁸

Policy Recommendations

This article demonstrated Beijing is preparing to respond to increased attention and competition in Africa from the United States and its allies. In the short to medium term, Beijing plans to use security diplomacy to secure its investments and resources in Africa. In the long term, greater military cooperation might lead to PLA overseas garrisons, countering perceived Western containment and posing a threat to US strategic interests.²⁹

To challenge China’s growing regional influence, the United States must push the PGI across the finish line, including mobilizing private capital and overcoming challenges among participating governments.³⁰ Increased attention should be paid to the PGI’s Lobito Corridor, which connects the DR Congo and Zambia through Angola’s Lobito port and Twigg Exploration and Mining’s graphite processing operations in Mozambique.³¹ The United States should also target low-cost, high-impact initiatives—such as enhancing governance capacity and public health—as China shifts toward less conspicuous investments (for example, green energy projects) to avoid international scrutiny.³² Where direct competition with China is unfeasible due to resource-allocation issues or political sensitivities, the United States should collaborate more closely with allies and partners in the region. For example, the United States can coordinate with Türkiye, which has been increasing economic and security cooperation with African states through new bilateral infrastructure agreements, counterterrorism exchanges, and maritime initiatives.³³

Additionally, the United States should enhance military and strategic partnerships with African nations. These partnerships would include more military training, such as the 2022 combined training between United States Special Operations Command Africa forces and the Tanzania Marine Special Forces.³⁴ The United States should also provide more free military assistance to African partners, like the 2022 provision of high-speed patrol boats to the Tanzanian Navy.³⁵ The United States can similarly increase professional military education (PME) opportunities for African military leaders. Strengthening relationships with strategically important countries such as Tanzania, Mozambique, and Kenya will help secure maritime routes and counteract Chinese influence as well as meet demands for security assistance from our African partners.

Recent positive developments underscore the effectiveness of the US strategic approach. From April 30 to May 3, 2024, United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) and the Tanzanian armed forces held a conference on intelligence work in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.³⁶ The conference focused on sharing “collective strategies to address common challenges across Africa” and was most welcomed by Tanzanian officials, including the Chief of Defense Intelligence Major General Mbaraka Mkeremy.³⁷ Similarly, US exercises, including Justified Accord 2024 and Cutlass Express 2024, involved East African partners collaborating to enhance joint force readiness, multinational interoperability, and maritime security.³⁸ These initiatives bolster partner military capabilities and support US strategic interests in the face of China’s growing influence in Africa.

Dr. Jake Rinaldi

Dr. Jake Rinaldi is a defense analyst in the China Landpower Studies Center within the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College. He holds a PhD and MPhil from the University of Cambridge.

Endnotes

1. U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2023 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 19, 2023), 157. Return to text.
2. Devvrat Pandey, “Leaked Pentagon Documents Give Insight into China’s Secret ‘Project 141,’ ” India Today (website), April 28, 2023, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/leaked-pentagon-documents-give-insight-into-chinas-secret-project-141-2366074-2023-04-28. Return to text.
3. Joel Wuthnow, Elliot Shuwei Ji, and Oscar Gilroy, A Methodology for Evaluating Chinese Academic Publications (Washington, DC: National Defense University Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, August 4, 2021). Return to text.
4. Zhang Mengying, “非洲安全与中非高质量共建‘一带一路’ ” [African Security and the Joint and High-Quality Development of the ‘One Belt and One Road’ Initiative between China and Africa], Journal of Shaanxi Normal University 52, no. 2 (2023): 154. Return to text.
5. Wang Hong, “非洲安全新挑战及其对中非合作的影响” [New Security Challenges in Africa and Their Impact on China-Africa Cooperation], China International Studies (September 2018): 41. Return to text.
6. Ma Hanzhi, “非洲政变与中非合作” [Coups d’État and China-Africa Cooperation], Overseas Investment and Export Credits 1 (2024): 41. Return to text.
7. Ma, “Coups d’État,” 42. Return to text.
8. Ma, “Coups d’État,” 42. Return to text.
9. Wang, “New Security Challenges,” 40. Return to text.
10. Wang, “New Security Challenges,” 40. Return to text.
11. Zhang, “African Security,” 151. Return to text.
12. Zhang, “African Security,” 151. Return to text.
13. Bulelani Jili, “A Technological Fix: The Adoption of Chinese Public Security Systems,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (website), January 20, 2023, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/01/20/a-technological-fix-the-adoption-of-chinese-public-security-systems/. Return to text.
14. Asterius Banzi, “Tanzania Seeks Chinese Help in Social Media,” The EastAfrican (website), August 1, 2017, https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/tanzania-seeks-chinese-help-in-social-media--1370738. Return to text.
15. Wang, “New Security Challenges,” 41. Return to text.
16. Zhou Yuyuan, “大变局时代中非合作的新征程与新思考” [The New Journey and New Thinking of China-Africa Cooperation in the Era of Great Changes], Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Interpret: China (website), May 6, 2023, https://interpret.csis.org/translations/the-new-journey-and-new-thinking-of-china-africa-cooperation-in-the-era-of-great-changes/. Return to text.
17. Zhou, “New Journey.” Return to text.
18. Zhang Hongming, “中国在非洲经略大国关系的战略构想” [A Strategic Vision for China’s Management of Great Power Relations in Africa], CSIS Interpret: China (website), November 1, 2018, https://interpret.csis.org/translations/a-strategic-vision-for-chinas-management-of-great-power-relations-in-africa/. Return to text.
19. Zhang Jiaolong, “拜登政府对非粮食安全合作” [The Biden Administration’s Food Security Cooperation with Africa], CSIS Interpret: China (website), March 20, 2024, https://interpret.csis.org/translations/the-biden-administrations-food-security-cooperation-with-africa/. Return to text.
20. Zhang, “Strategic Vision.” Return to text.
21. Zhang, “Strategic Vision.” Return to text.
22. “China Delivers PLH-11 Multiple Rocket Launchers to Ghana,” Army Recognition Group (website), January 3, 2024, https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2024/china-delivers-plh-11-multiple-rocket-launchers-to-ghana; “Zimbabwe Receives Chinese PTL-02 6x6 Assault Gun Tank Destroyer Armored Vehicle,” Army Recognition Group (website), December 18, 2023, https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/army-news/2023/zimbabwe-receives-chinese-ptl-02-6x6-assault-gun-tank-destroyer-armored-vehicle; and Ekene Lionel, “Nigerian Army Operating Chinese-Made Ziyan UAS Blowfish,” Military Africa (website), July 19, 2023, https://www.military.africa/2023/07/nigerian-army-operating-chinese-made-ziyan-uas-blowfish/. Return to text.
23. Jake Rinaldi, “China–North Korea Arms Trade from the Perspective of Chinese Scholars,” Asia Policy 19, no. 2 (2024): 187–207. Return to text.
24. Jevans Nyabiage, “China’s Drills with Tanzania and Mozambique Show ‘Blended Approach’ to Military Diplomacy,” South China Morning Post (website), August 4, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3272891/chinas-drills-tanzania-and-mozambique-show-blended-approach-military-diplomacy. Return to text.
25. “In Their Own Words: 2020 Science of Military Strategy,” Air University (website), January 26, 2022, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2913216/in-their-own-words-2020-science-of-military-strategy/. Return to text.
26. Pandey, “Leaked Pentagon Documents.” Return to text.
27. Connor Donahue and Travis Dolney, “East Africa’s Role in the People’s Republic of China’s Naval Strategy: Contesting Sea Control in the Indian Ocean,” in Decisive Decade: PRC Global Strategy and the PLA as a Pacing Challenge – 2023 PLA Conference – Updated and Expanded, ed. George R. Shatzer and Joshua M. Arostegui (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2024): 37–46, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/966/. Return to text.
28. Robert E. Hamilton, The Dragon and the Bear in Africa: Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute, November 9, 2023). Return to text.
29. Zhou, “New Journey.” Return to text.
30. Michael Lipin, “US Boosts Funds for Infrastructure Program for Developing Nations above $30 Billion,” Voice of America (website), October 17, 2023, https://www.voanews.com/a/us-boosts-funds-for-infrastructure-program-for-developing-nations-above-30-billion/7314946.html. Return to text.
31. White House, FACT SHEET: President Biden and Prime Minister Modi Host Leaders on the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (Washington, DC: White House, September 9, 2023). Return to text.
32. This strategy was referenced in an earlier iteration of Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment. White House, FACT SHEET: President Biden and G7 Leaders Launch Build Back Better World (B3W) Partnership (Washington, DC: White House, June 12, 2021). Return to text.
33. Teresa Nogueira Pinto, “Turkey’s Push for Influence in Africa Is Working,” Geopolitical Intelligence Services (website), April 9, 2024, https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/turkey-influence-africa/. Return to text.
34. “U.S. Africa Command Special Operations Forces Train alongside Tanzanian Partners,” United States Africa Command (website), November 21, 2022, https://www.africom.mil/article/34917/us-africa-command-special-operations-forces-train-alongside-tanzanian-partners. Return to text.
35. “U.S. Donates High-Speed Patrol Boats to Tanzania,” United States Africa Command (website), December 16, 2022, https://www.africom.mil/article/35054/us-donates-high-speed-patrol-boats-to-tanzania. Return to text.
36. “U.S. and Tanzania Co-Host Military Intelligence Conference,” United States Africa Command (website), May 9, 2024, https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/35471/us-and-tanzania-co-host-military-intelligence-conference. Return to text.
37. “U.S. and Tanzania.” Return to text.
38. “U.S. Africa Command Spearheads Multinational Military Exercises to Boost Global Security and Cooperation,” US Embassy in Tanzania (website), April 4, 2024, https://tz.usembassy.gov/u-s-africa-command-spearheads-multinational-military-exercises-to-boost-global-security-and-cooperation/. Return to text.

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