Recent Publications

Strategic Insights: Better Late Than Never
October 23, 2018 — Author: Dr M Chris MasonSeventeen years ago this November, in a conference room in the Pentagon, I explained that, in whatever form it took, the new Government of Afghanistan would require some sort of provincial or territorial forces under Afghan Army command to augment the regular national army, which the interagency working group was tasked with... MORE

Cover for Strategic Insights: Better Late Than Never

Still Soldiers and Scholars? An Analysis of Army Officer Testing
December 15, 2017 — Authors: Dr Steven J. Condly, Dr Arthur T Coumbe, LTC William L SkimmyhornView the Executive Summary Still Soldiers and Scholars? sheds light on a neglected aspect of talent management, namely, officer accessions testing and evaluation. It does so by tracing the history of officer testing since 1900, identifying and analyzing key developments in... MORE

Armed Robotic Systems Emergence: Weapons Systems Life Cycles Analysis and New Strategic Realities
November 14, 2017 — Author: Dr Robert J BunkerView the Executive Summary Armed robotic systems—drones and droids—now emerging on the battlefield portend new strategic realities not only for U.S. forces but also for our allies and future potential belligerents. Numerous questions of immediate warfighting importance come to mind with the fielding of these drones and... MORE

What Should the U.S. Army Learn From History? Recovery From a Strategy Deficit
July 26, 2017 — Author: Dr Colin S GrayView the Executive Summary Does history repeat itself? This monograph clearly answers “no,” firmly. However, it does not argue that an absence of repetition in the sense of analogy means that history can have no utility for the soldier today. This monograph argues for a “historical parallelism,” in place of shaky or false... MORE

Ends, Means, Ideology, and Pride: Why the Axis Lost and What We Can Learn from Its Defeat
July 13, 2017 — Author: Dr Jeffrey RecordView the Executive Summary The author examines the Axis defeat in World War II and concludes that the two main causes were resource inferiority (after 1941) and strategic incompetence—i.e., pursuit of imperial ambitions beyond the reach of its actual power. Until 1941 Axis military fortunes thrived, but the addition in that... MORE

Transforming the Force: The 11th Air Assault Division (Test) from 1963 to 1965
June 27, 2017 — Author: Brigadier General Thomas C. GravesView the Executive Summary This monograph will answer the question: Can the U.S. Army apply to the current “prototype brigade” the lessons that were learned during the development and experimentation of the 11th Air Assault Division (Test)? Having established that the criteria of DTLOMS is a valuable tool... MORE

Old and New Insurgency Forms
March 15, 2016 — Author: Dr Robert J BunkerView the Executive Summary This monograph creates a proposed insurgency typology divided into legacy, contemporary, and emergent and potential insurgency forms, and provides strategic implications for U.S. defense policy as they relate to each of these forms. The typology clusters, insurgency forms identified, and their... MORE

What’s Old is New — Kennan, Putin, and the Russian Competitive Viewpoint
November 30, 2015 — Lieutenant Colonel Michael A. AdelbergU.S. foreign policy experts in 1948 would be familiar with modern Russia. George F. Kennan or President Harry Truman would immediately recognize modern Russian behavior. Nationalist rhetoric, economic brinksmanship, the cult of personality, and aggressive shows of force? All old. Therefore, it is worth... MORE

Breaking the Bathsheba Syndrome: Building a Performance Evaluation System that Promotes Mission Command
October 26, 2015 — Author: COL Curtis D TaylorView the Executive Summary In 2014, the National Defense Authorization Act directed the Department of Defense to reconsider the way the Army evaluates and selects leaders. This call for reform came after repeated surveys from the Center for Army Leadership suggested widespread dissatisfaction with the current approach... MORE

The Strategic Lessons Unlearned from Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan: Why the ANSF Will Not Hold, and the Implications for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan
June 25, 2015 — Author: Dr M Chris Mason View the Executive SummaryThe wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan were lost before they began, not on the battlefields, where the United States won every tactical engagement, but at the strategic level of war. In each case, the U.S. Government attempted to create a Western-style democracy in countries which were decades... MORE

Gold, Blood, and Power: Finance and War Through the Ages
May 29, 2015 — Author: Mr James Lacey View the Executive SummaryThis monograph presents a survey of the crucial link between state (national) power and finance from the ancient era through to the present day. Cicero once said that the true sinew of war was “endless streams of money.” His observation remains as accurate today as it was when Rome first began... MORE

Strategy Education Across the Professional Military Education Enterprise
May 18, 2015 — Colonel John C. Valledor We can find plenty to read and study on the subject of leadership; in fact, there is a veritable mountain of studies, essays, and books explaining how to build leaders. Not so if one wants to build (or become) a strategist.General John Galvin1Emerging Realities and the Education of Strategists. Since the horrific... MORE