This podcast argues that Russia’s Arctic land forces have been weakened by the Russia-Ukraine War and NATO’s northern expansion, creating a strategic window for Western militaries to bolster their Arctic capabilities. Unlike existing studies that focus on maritime operations and the Northern Sea Route, it integrates technical assessments of ground-based Arctic platforms with analysis of military-district reforms. Using a mixed methodology that incorporates equipment specifications, Russian government documents, media reports, and NATO strategic-response evaluations, this podcast constructs a comprehensive baseline understanding of Russia’s Arctic land-force potential and readiness. Policy and military practitioners will benefit from actionable insights into Arctic force-design shifts, equipment vulnerabilities, and strategic recommendations to exploit the temporary imbalance between NATO and Russian readiness.
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Stephanie Crider (Host)
Welcome to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.
I’m talking remotely with Troy J. Bouffard and Lester W. Grau, coauthors with Charles K. Bartles and Mathieu Boulègue of “Russian Arctic Land Forces and Defense Trends Redefined by NATO and Ukraine,” which was published in the Autumn 2025 issue of Parameters.
Bouffard (US Army, retired) has a master’s degree in Arctic policy and a PhD in Arctic defense and security from the University of Alaska Fairbanks, where he’s an assistant professor of Arctic security. He is the director of the University of Alaska Fairbanks Center for Arctic Security and Resilience and a research fellow with [the] United States Military Academy’s Modern War Institute.
Grau, lieutenant colonel (US Army, retired) specializes in Russian military studies and is a senior analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has a PhD from the University of Kansas in Russian and Central Asian history. He’s written numerous books and articles on tactical, operational, and geopolitical subjects.
I’m happy you’re here. Thank you for joining me, Troy and Les.
Lester W. Grau
Thank you.
Troy J. Bouffard
Thank you.
Host
Please give our listeners a brief recap of your article.
Bouffard
Well, we wrote this because there were significant baseline circumstances involving Russia’s Arctic interest in the defense side, especially with land forces. When Sweden and Finland joined NATO, it had a profound effect, I think, on the Kremlin, and we saw immediate reactions that were significant strategically. One of those was the fact that Russia, in previous years, had established a new military district for the Arctic.
It was the Northern Fleet District. It was a joint Arctic-type military district, which is strategically significant. They did this in 2014, and it remained provisional until 2021, when it became full equal status to the other four military districts. Then in 2024, they dissolved it immediately—right after Sweden and Finland joined NATO.
Grau
The indications are, however, they’re not giving up on the Arctic. As a matter of fact, since the article was written, the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade has disappeared and been replaced by the 71st [Guard] Motorized Rifle Order of Kutuzov Division in Pechenga, [Murmansk Oblast]. A division is larger than a brigade.
[Russia is] not as constrained as we would be in developing a new division in that the logistics structure of the brigade and the division are the same. It’s the [ground-combat] folks [being added]. However, what they already had [was] three brigades in a corps when this whole Ukrainian thing started and now, it looks like they’re going to have at least two divisions—the naval infantry division and this division up in the Arctic. So, when Ukraine comes to a halt, the emphasis on the Arctic is going [to] spring back quite [impressively].
Furthermore, they develop their kit specifically for the Arctic, and the Arctic conditions are so different than the rest of the world that you really need to purpose-build your equipment for the Arctic, rather than taking a piece that’s in existence and saying, “Well, let’s see how many things we can strap on this without increasing it by three tons.” It’s a very different thing. And, of course, the Navy is the major player in Arctic development / Arctic policy.
The Northern Sea Route is [has] certainly proven viable. The Chinese are [sailing] it all the time. The Russians are running oil and LNG (liquified natural gas) on it all the time. And, South Korea is going to have a test run in July on the Northern Sea Route to see if it’s viably convenient because if you’re China or South Korea and you’re trying to get stuff to your European customers, the Northern Sea Route cuts two weeks off of transit time, and you avoid the problems of piracy and getting through the Suez Canal and drone attacks out of Yemen and all the other problems that they’re having in that region.
So, the Arctic is important. It’s at least 10 percent of the national annual wealth of Russia and is going to be more so. So, it’s viable, it’s there, and it’s only going to get bigger.
Bouffard
We had to write the article because there was such a decided shift from the direction Russia was going in the Arctic. They’re kind of flatlined in the Arctic right now because of Ukraine, but we know what they were doing before, where they were at, and we know when they do come back full steam, they’re going to make these, I think, developments that Les talked about.
But for now, with Sweden and Finland having joined NATO, Russia had a decided reaction to that by dissolving the military district and putting even more emphasis on the Baltics, which is the epicenter of strategic importance to Russia, for one fact—and I think it’s good for the listeners to just have a reminder—the Baltics are so important to Russia, more than anything else, because of St. Petersburg as a maritime port. This is their most important maritime access point in the entire planet. Out of all of their vast and major coastline, that is the most important place on the planet for them. And, if Russia lost maritime access just from that point around St. Petersburg, the effects are unimaginable. So, this is why it is the epicenter of importance to Russia.
So, when Finland and Sweden joined NATO, it had an obvious effect on Russia, and they pulled a lot of the development from the Arctic, in terms of strategic command and emphasis, to the Leningrad and Moscow Military District that was reestablished. And, we have yet to see how that’s all going to work out, but it was clear that something was changing and it wasn’t too difficult to understand how.
Host
Russia not being as focused on the Arctic—what did that create as far as opportunities go for America?
Bouffard
Russia has shown us that they are serious about their development of the new threat that’s going to consume us for the next many decades, which are hypersonic cruise missiles. They’ve already operationalized this. And these are air, land, and sea launched. They’ve done this in the Arctic not once, but twice—with two different missile systems. So, this is going to replace ballistic missiles that we’ve lived with for decades as the primary threat to North America with, you know, a new threat.
We have to redo everything in order to deal with hypersonic cruise missiles because they behave completely different than ballistic missiles. This is what has us really, I think, interested in what we need to do for future threats. The Arctic is part of that in those ways that Russia has demonstrated its development of hypersonic cruise missiles. This is going to grip the world for decades.
Host
Les, do you want to chime in?
Grau
Well, I was just thinking, if we are involved in the Arctic, all of the services have to be involved in the Arctic, including the Navy—especially the Navy—and the Navy is stretched right now. China has more ships than the US Navy, and the US Navy has no ice-class vessels. If you’re going to sail in the Arctic waters, you need ice-class vessels.
Russia has over 40 icebreakers. We have three—one permanently in the Great Lakes. Two of them are ancient; one of them we just bought—a used one—from Norway. You need to be able to function in that area. The Coast Guard is now buying icebreakers. They’re going to take a while to get out there.
China has three icebreakers. One of them in development is an atomic-powered icebreaker. And, they also have what they call research vessels, which are mini-icebreakers that are zipping all over the area. They’re not an Arctic power, although they like to claim that they’re going to be.
It’s not just an Army problem. It’s not just an Air Force problem. It’s a Navy problem, as well. And, it’s all three of them working together. There are some major challenges out there, and all of the services are trying to manage their budgets for where they consider their customer base is. And the Navy says, well, most of the [world’s] ships right now are down going through the Suez Canal or around the Horn of Africa.
The Northern Sea Route is viable. That’s proven, and it’s going to become increasingly so. And, I think we’re going to have to be involved by [having] all services in there in the region.
Host
The Northern Sea Route. As it becomes more viable for international shipping, how do you see the tension between Russia’s claims and the principle of freedom of navigation playing out, especially with interest from non-Arctic nations like China, and, I think, was it Les, you mentioned also South Korea?
Grau
We’ve had one freedom of navigation [test] sailing on the Northern Sea Route, and that was what—10 years ago? 14 years ago?—[when] a French naval supply vessel went across from Europe to the Pacific without coordinating previously with the Russians. They did not go back [that way]. They went the long way home and went [by] the Suez route to get home, but that hasn’t been the only challenge I know of [to] freedom of navigation in the Arctic. The Russians have since come up with a structure for passage on the Arctic [Northern Sea Route]—icebreakers, aid stations, aerial support, satellite support, all sorts of things on this—but they’ve also come up with a set of rules which are not freedom of navigation.
There’s a great deal of legal question[s] on who really owns what piece of the Arctic. You’ve got to have rules of navigation, et cetera, to come [sail] up there. You don’t want to go wandering through the Arctic waters without a pilot. And, quite frankly, nobody knows what the Arctic bottoms look like better than the Russians because they’ve spent decade upon decade upon decade charting these things, where nobody else has.
This is an area that all the nations are going to have to work together. We haven’t seen a freedom of navigation [test voyage] since then. I don’t expect to see one. The Coast Guard took their icebreaker up to the North Pole, but they clearly skirted getting into any part of the Northern Sea Route in doing so. It’s one of those areas in the future that all the nations are going to have to get together on. As the Northern Sea Route becomes a reality, it could be shortened, and if some of the plans that Russia was talking to Norway and Finland about come into fruition, that route could be shortened even quicker with rail offload. You don’t have to go all the way around Norway and down to Rotterdam to offload. This could really become a trade advantage for Europe and European customers, but these are all areas that are going to have to be worked out by governments over the coming years.
And I know Troy dabbles in this area more than I do, and good on you, Troy.
Bouffard
The Northern Sea Route is becoming reality, as Les mentioned, and Southeast Asia, led by China, is investing heavily in this. There’s a lot of evidence. And they stand to gain, you know, as the world’s largest collective economy, from using the Northern Sea Route. And, they’re studying this. And they’re testing it in many ways that are further indications this is the real deal.
And, it’s important for everyone to understand, for the Northern Sea Route, what the United States and many other nations are concerned about is freedom of navigation based on Russian laws and regulations that are conflicting with normal international norms and principles out of the UN [United Nations] Conventional Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). So, whereas most nations establish a baseline that officially, sort of, sets a boundary along a coastline, out from there to about 12 nautical miles is what’s known as territorial waters.
And generally, nations more or less control the surface waters, water column, seabed, and below, under those circumstances, right? Those boundaries are global. UNCLOS helps to manage this. And beyond that, you’re supposed to allow innocent passage and freedom of navigation. Well, Russia is taking that—because of UNCLOS Article 234, which has special consideration for sea ice—and extended that exact type of total control all the way out to 200 nautical miles (what’s known as the exclusive economic zone.)
So naturally, the United States has a huge problem with this. Controlling access to waters, surface waters, all the way out to 200 nautical miles is quite the stretch and not based off of norms. Even though Canada has a similar situation with its archipelago. And considering those internal waters, that’s a very practical situation where they’re following norms. It’s not safe to go through the Northwest Passage. Those waters in that Canadian claim are very realistic. Russia’s just aren’t. You know? And they’re feeling the pressure, too, because, you know, things are changing in the North, and they want to establish this control over surface-water access through the entire Northwest Passage out to 200 nautical miles, as customary law, as soon as possible.
And that’s the great contest, I think, in the world is should Russia have that amount of control over access to surface waters like that? We’re a solid no on that. So, we’re hoping, you know, again, our article contributed a little bit to that understanding.
Host
Maybe this isn’t a fair question to you all. I know you don’t have a crystal ball, but with Russia occupied elsewhere, can we scramble—us, Europe, whoever else—to reshape what things look like in the Arctic? Do you think we can do it fast enough?
Grau
We don’t have icebreakers. We don’t have ice-class [hulls]. It’s a little tough to do [anything in the Arctic without] that. And you don’t want to do this—even in the summer. If you’ve got a good icebreaker escort, you can go [sail] safely without an ice-class vessel during the summer months. I think one of the other things is, as we’re learning from Ukraine, drones are shifting what militaries can and cannot do and how they operate.
And drones [have] certainly always played a role in the Russian Arctic, but that was a rather constrained role. That role is developing and, I think, is going to become very much involved. Just to give you an example, the Soviet ground forces have a new branch for the military, a branch being something like armor, infantry, artillery. These are land and air drone managers.
And, this whole drone technology is going to play a major role in the development of the Arctic and how militaries function in this region. There [are] some real challenges that are coming out of the current conflict, and when this conflict comes to an end, the problems aren’t gonna go away. They’ve just been brought to the forefront, and there they shall remain until addressed properly.
Bouffard
With their stunningly poor performance in Ukraine, we can expect when they come back, they’re gonna retool everything—doctrine and equipment. Their equipment didn’t work. It’s the first time we’ve seen large-scale combat operations [with] Russian military equipment being used against NATO (a lot of different NATO-related equipment), and it didn’t do well.
So, you can expect Russia to retool their entire military and, as Les has taught me, you know, it’s going to take four and five years alone just to rebuild their officer corps because officers run everything in the military. They don’t have an NCO corps. So, we’re taking that time, and then what Russia had accomplished in the Arctic, which surpassed the West. You know, in terms of large-scale combat operations and what we consider military superiority based on multidomain, precision-enabled combined arms warfare, when you’re really good at that versus your competitors, you’re probably gonna win.
And we saw a moment there—a little time, briefly—when Russia was superior to the United States, largely because the land forces (why we wrote this article, specifically) as part of combined arms of warfare. Total military, Russian military, had surpassed us, and that gave a larger operational capability of Russia’s Arctic forces than we had. Now, that doesn’t exist right now. Those land forces had since gone and deployed to Ukraine and been absolutely decimated. But what we do know now is that as that happened, there was a moment Russia was superior in many ways. We now have a decent window of opportunity to close that gap, and it’s got everyone’s attention.
We [have] got a lot of work to do, and I know the French authorities have reached out to Les to ask, “What should we expect from Russia?”
The Arctic is becoming more and more important on a daily basis.
Grau
I do think one thing is [that] there are two countries who know how to fight and survive [during]drone combat, and you have a lot of spectator / supporting nations who are trying to gain this experience. But, we don’t have the experience and the experienced personnel who have survived drone attack[s] in our armed forces, and this is something that we’re going to have to play catch-up ball on.
This is one of the challenges that’s going to be facing us, not only in the Arctic, but throughout the spectrum.
Host
Well, I knew this was going to happen. We’re running out of time. So, if we missed anything [or] if you have any concluding thoughts, now’s the time.
Bouffard
Russian land forces in the Arctic was the focus of our article. Land forces are often not thought of during a lot of strategic assessments and plans. What Ukraine taught us, besides the fact that drones are here to stay, and we have got to, you know, understand that and build that into our strategies and operations, is that where a lot of people thought maneuver was dead—I’ve literally seen articles, you know, with that title—at the end of the day, what always holds true is in order to win any battle, you have to take and hold land. And that’s land forces, right? So, paying attention to land forces and not forgetting them and all the, you know, incredible importance of power of maritime and air forces is necessary.
And Ukraine really taught us that.
Grau
If you want to be able to function militarily in the Arctic, you have to be in the Arctic. You have to train in the Arctic. You can’t have your Arctic force, as small as it is, deployed in Borneo and places like this, which it has been. We have done some things, but we need to get there.
Host
Thank you both very much. I’ve been looking forward to this chat, and you did not disappoint.
Listeners, you can read the genesis article at press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 55, issue 3. For more Army War College podcasts, check out Conversations on Strategy, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.