In this episode, Henry Sokolski discusses how proportionality can serve as a concrete tool for winning wars and maintaining alliances and defines the roles the Lieber Code, the Geneva Conventions, precision weapons, and public narratives play in warfare.
Keywords: proportionality, civilian infrastructure, nuclear targeting, military strategy, international law
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Stephanie Crider (Host)
Welcome to
Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests, and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.
Henry Sokolski is joining me remotely today. Sokolski is the author of “A Case for Military Proportionality: Disabling Nuclear Plants,” which was published in the Autumn 2025 issue of
Parameters.
He is the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and has worked in the Pentagon as the deputy for nonproliferation policy, as a consultant to the National Intelligence Council, as a member of the CIA's Senior Advisory Group, and as a senate military and legislative aide. He is also the author and editor of numerous volumes on strategic weapons proliferation issues.
Welcome back, Henry.
Henry Sokolski
[It is] good to be back. Thank you for having me.
Host
In your article, you argue that proportionality should not just be viewed as an abstract legal or moral constraint but as a concrete tool for winning wars. How does a commander distinguish between a strike that is legally permissible under the Lieber Code—which focuses on military necessity and protecting civilians, among other things—but is strategically self-defeating in the long run?
Sokolski
Well, first of all, who is Mr. [Francis] Lieber? Well, he advised President [Abraham] Lincoln, and he wanted to have a code that was more civilized than the European military codes—particularly on the question of, you guessed it, slavery. But along the way, he wanted to make sure that other things were attended to, like the unnecessary harassment and abuse of civilians and the things critical to civilian life.
The Lieber Code basically became international law later. So, this guy is very important to understanding the law of war. Now, in there, he made this effort to protect civilians and civilian objects. However, he knew that commanders would do what they would do, and he gave them a get out of jail card, if you will, a free pass. Well, if they think it’s militarily essential to hit something that might cause a lot of harm to civilians or the objects they need to survive, it’s okay. It becomes extremely subjective.
So, I don’t think there’s any problem for someone to do something legal under the Lieber Code. They’re given wide swath, as long as they can claim (or insist) that they had to do it. However, the distinction would be not so much between the Lieber Code and what makes sense but, rather, simply trying to understand what victory requires in the way of military operation.
In this case, I think most military experienced hands can tell the difference between achieving the objective by avoiding aggravating the locals, if you will—by killing innocents unnecessarily and destroying civil objects that are not critical to winning the military objective—or achieving it and not. And, those military hands can actually see someone misbehaving and discipline them and say, “Stop doing that.”
I think that it’s much more along those lines than some kind of legal determination. So, for example, if you destroy a dam or you spew radioactivity on the field that you have to march over, you’re marching slower, it gets in the way of what you need to do. And of course, it harms the civilians that are, you know, underneath the water or exposed to radiation.
If you want to repatriate quickly and restore services, destroying something would make far less sense than temporarily disabling it. If you want lines of communication to be wide open, you don’t want to annoy and anger the locals so much that they become active enemies. All of these points were understood by generals as far across the spectrum from [German Field Marshal Erwin] Rommel, who [served the Nazis], to [General Dwight D.] Eisenhower. And so, it’s not as though this isn’t available historically to any sound commander who’s doing his studies properly.
How shall I put it? This may be art, but you can tell what art is and [it] isn’t as subjective as the Lieber Code, which says, “Well, whatever it is, if you claim it was necessary, you’ve got legal cover.”
This is not a legal concept. This is a military operational concept. And, I think leadership is found in generals who command those beneath them to pay attention to being efficient and achieving their military goals, and that requires a due respect and due regard to sensible proportionality.
Host
You also mentioned that modern precision weapons allow for disabling nuclear plants without releasing radiation. Does the existence of this technology make civilian infrastructure more likely to be targeted? And if it does, does that create a more dangerous, permissive environment for military planners?
Sokolski
You’re going to be firing at more things when you have precision, precisely because you can disable without physically obliterating the target. Now, when you get sloppy (or you get impatient and you run out of your precision munitions and just start lobbing things to flatten the entire facility), that’s no longer precise. It can’t be said that, “Well, the precision led to non-precision and, therefore, you shouldn’t try to be precise.”
I mean it’s a little bit too much, but there is a problem, and that is—in “new generation warfare,” coined by our Russian friends that we are backing into understanding we’re going to have to wage—you’re going to be firing more munitions at more objects, civilian objects, in the future. And, it’s all the more reason to pay closer attention to the dividing line between precision strikes that disable temporarily—or, you know, maybe disable permanently—and things that physically obliterate and release hazardous forces.
You want to draw that line, and you want to discipline anybody who goes over it because once you get into the habit of being reckless and indiscriminate, you lose the good order and discipline of the troops. And when you lose that, you lose. No matter what your weapons are or how good your plans are, you will not prevail.
Host
Your article highlights a friction point where 174 nations have ratified Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, but the United States has not. What does Protocol I say, and how does this legal discrepancy jeopardize military cohesion and joint operations during an active conflict with a peer adversary like Russia?
Sokolski
We had a game in which Russia starts taking potshots at NATO reactors, not just Ukrainian ones. And at some point, there’s a mild release of radiation because they cause a loss-of-coolant accident and some radiation is vented. And, there’s quite a lot of confusion in the game as to how much radiation [is leaked] and what the effects are. And, let’s just say the fog of war doesn’t get any better when you hit one of these things, and it starts releasing some radiation. Panic ensues, [among] the locals. Whereas the United States says, “Well, you know, we signed this thing, but we didn’t ratify it. You folks in NATO ratified it. And, of course, you’re closer to the radiation. So, your interpretation of what we ought to do about this, whether it’s a clear violation of international law, and whether we should respond by firing in kind or doing something, quote unquote proportionate against the Russians, we have a different view than you.”
Well, how does that work? Well, you spend a lot of time debating about what to do, and the operations get paused or hung up, [while you] figure out what to do next. You want the momentum of campaign, if you will, not be interrupted by legal debates or moral debates or debates about how you feel or how comfortable you are with the radiation levels that are confusing. So, it would be better if we were reading from a similar sheet. That would be the point. And, I think that Protocol I doesn’t prohibit hitting reactors, but it has a presumption against doing so.
I think that presumption against doing so is not quite as clear in the [
US Law of War Manual], which says, “[We’d], like to [follow this presumption] but, of course, you’re free if you have to, to go ahead and possibly hit one of these things and release dangerous forces—if it’s necessary.”
Going back to the Lieber Code, that’s a little too sophisticated for clarity. You know, in military affairs, much as in politics, a certain amount of, I wouldn’t say simplicity, but clarity, is required for success. [America’s legal position on proportionality] is lawyer sophisticated, if you will, and I think it’s not helped.
Host
One of your primary recommendations is for the Pentagon to share more public narratives regarding infrastructure protection. How do you answer critics who argue that making these tear sheets public would provide a roadmap for adversaries to more effectively sabotage US utilities?
Sokolski
Well, first, let’s understand what a tear sheet is. A tear sheet isn’t to get everything that’s classified out in the public. It’s where you tear the sheet between truly sensitive information and information that you can share with the public, and you ought to. We have used secrecy to try to solve the problem—and it’s an increasing one—of the vulnerability of critical civilian objects and say nothing of military bases.
And, that will not work. When I’m conducting a study for the government, I’ll be discreet, you see. And there’s my tear sheet. I didn’t tell you exactly which agency. And, this is about resilience of advanced economies, electrical supply systems, in war, and how different countries go about either paying attention to making them resilient or don’t.
Now, when I first proposed this, the agency contract officer said, “Well, how can you do a study on this? It’s all classified. Why even propose this?”
I said, “Well, first of all, I think a lot isn’t classified, but let’s just assume that you’re right. If I discover I can’t write and contract with other people to talk about this in any fashion in an unclassified way, that is a major finding, and I think it’s quite disturbing.”
She said, “Well, how’s that?”
I said, “Well, think about it. What’s being targeted in the case of an electrical supply system and, you know, gas lines, communication nodes, ports, etc., are essentially civilian utilities. Now, [is the secrecy worth it] if you can’t let the civilians that use those civilian utilities know what they’re in for and what’s expected of them if something happens to these utilities and you wait until war and when they’re hit to say, ‘Well, by the way, you should have, you know, 20 gallons of water in your basement so you won’t be, you know, upset about losing your water.’ ”
So, if you look at other cultures, if you go to Europe, you go to the Finns, you go to the Swedes, if you talk to the Japanese or even the Taiwanese, they are talking about these things. There was a major conference—and they even called it “civil defense”—that the Swedes [recently] held in Great Britain.
If they can talk about it, maybe we should follow their model. Alternatively, when I talked many years ago (when I started this project) to my Israeli and South Korean friends, they initially said, “Well, we can’t talk about it. It’s too sensitive.”
I said, “Good luck. If you can’t start talking about it, you [won’t] have the population properly attuned to be part of the solution when the problem occurs.”
Now, in fairness, I think [US] industry and the Pentagon [are] doing a much better job, in part because Congress is pushing for this adjustment in what’s made public. Essentially, we’re going to have to have something, I would call it a “critical civilian infrastructure protection program.” They used to call it civil defense, but that had to do with atomic or nuclear attacks we had. People were, you know, building bomb shelters and very extreme stuff. I think we can do this without spooking the public. I do know that if we don’t try, we’re going to be in much, much more trouble than if we do.
Host
You cited the 2017 bombing of Syria’s Sadd al-Furat dam as a failure of guidance. In a military emergency, where a commander feels a strike is vital, what specific institutional changes, beyond education, can prevent high-stakes, no-strike lists from being bypassed?
Sokolski
I think the short answer is promotion. If people don’t get promoted for doing the right thing, they won’t do the right thing as much. If they are, by gosh, by golly, you watch. Everyone will pay attention, and there’ll be a full course at the National Defense University on the subject, and people will want to get high grades. It’s that simple.
Military leadership is not that different from leadership in general. You have to set an example and an expectation and reward good behavior and penalize bad behavior. When you do that, I am sure things will clear up very quickly.
Host
Do you have any concluding thoughts?
Sokolski
First, we need to understand [that] the future face of warfare is more like what’s going on in Ukraine and, arguably, in portions of Western Europe, where civilian shopping centers [and] rail lines [are not safe]; [pipes] for gas, cables for electricity, cables for communication get cut under the water; [and] hospitals are hit with the cyberattacks and ransomed millions of dollars to get back online is going to be more likely.
And, in fact, there’s going to be a lot of first, gray warfare, and then, you know, it could be punctuated by, yes, “We are the ones who did that. What are you going to do about it?”
If that’s the future face of warfare, and I think it is, we need to get ready. And, we need to understand that the idea that, oh, well, we can deter that with nuclear weapons and the threat of, you know, taking out large, important concentrations of capital—military or demographic or industrial—is not going to fly, literally.
People won’t believe [it], and it won’t be credible. And if you do it, good luck in figuring out how that episode ends. You’re going to have to figure out how to not only protect your own critical infrastructure, but how to attack, [or] threaten to attack, theirs in a way that might be plausibly deniable in some cases, or if not plausibly deniable, is one that limits the amount of harm to the population, whose hearts and minds you need to win to win the campaign you’re engaged in.
Now, if you don’t pay attention to that, good luck. We’re going to be tested by the new modes of warfare precisely in this field of battle. So, I don’t think being extremely naive about not ever harming the public in war is going to serve [anyone], and [I don’t think] being morally indignant, demanding some clear, bright legal barrier [to prevent] ever harming a hair of civilians is going to work anymore [than] being cynical and saying, “Well, we’ll just say whatever we [need to] about it,” which would be, “Well, we follow all the rules, and we haven’t violated anything.” And [then], just do whatever we want.
That’s the way Putin runs and operates. You do not want to follow that model. You want to have moral distinction and military brilliance that shines against that dark lie.
Host
I always enjoy speaking with you, Henry. Thank you for making time to talk with me today.
Sokolski
I enjoyed it as well. Thank you.
Host
Listeners, you can read the genesis article at
press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters. Look for volume 55, issue 3. For more Army War College podcasts, check out
Conversations on Strategy,
SSI Live,
CLSC Dialogues, and
A Better Peace.