Brennan Deveraux and Dr. John Deni
In this episode of SSI Live, Major Brennan Deveraux interviews Dr. John Deni on his ongoing research concerning Europe’s potential involvement in a war in the Pacific. The conversation explores the challenges of coalition management and the unique contributions the United States could request from its European allies.
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John Deni
Hello and welcome to
SSI Live. You’ve long known the Strategic Studies Institute, or SSI, at the US Army War College, as the go-to location for issues related to national security and military strategy, with an emphasis on geostrategic analysis. SSI conducts strategic research and analysis to support the US Army War College curricula; assist and inform Army, DoD, and US government leadership; and serve as a bridge to the wider strategic community. Now, we are bringing you access to SSI analyses, scholars, and guests, through this, the
SSI Live podcast series. Thanks for joining us.
Brennan Deveraux
Welcome back to
SSI Live. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those are the guests and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m Brennan Deveraux, your guest host for the last time. And it’s only fitting that for my final guest, I welcome back the show’s regular host, Dr. John Deni, who just returned from his sabbatical.
Dr. Deni is a research professor of security studies at the US Army War College’s newly established Strategic Research and Assessments Department, formerly the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). He is also a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, a senior fellow at the NATO Defense College, and an adjunct professorial lecturer at American University School of International Service. Previously, John worked for eight years as a political advisor to senior US military commanders in Europe. He is a political scientist who received his doctorate from George Washington University.
For this conversation, will be exploring John’s ongoing work examining Europe’s potential role in a US-China conflict. John, thanks for coming on.
Deni
Brennan, my pleasure and thanks for hosting.
Deveraux
Well, thanks for letting me host for this last year. It’s actually been a really cool experience, I had the opportunity to talk to a lot of people. And I appreciate the trust you put in me to do that. So, we’ll go ahead and jump right in. So I had the chance to host for a year because you took a sabbatical. Can you tell us a little bit about why you decided to take a sabbatical, and a little bit of what you worked on while you were off?
Deni
Yeah, certainly Brennan. At the US Army War College, as at many, perhaps most, academic institutions, faculty have the ability to request or apply for a sabbatical, which is kind of an intellectual break, if you will, from the day-to-day duties of being a faculty member at whatever institution you’re a part of. And it gives you a chance to, gives a faculty member a chance to sink his or her teeth into a, typically into a larger research project that could unfold.
Let’s say the research could unfold over a period of many months. In contrast to the effort it takes to write a journal article, for example, or an op-ed, or a blog entry, which can typically be done in a much shorter time frame. To write, for example, a book, you usually need months, if not years, and that can be difficult to do for an academic with a standard teaching load.
And so here at the US Army War College, after, I think the regulation states six years of service, a faculty member can apply for.
Deveraux
And real quick, it’s not just writing the book, not something you can just do on nights and weekends. When you start talking about in your line of work, you’re doing intense research. You’re traveling. There’s a lot more to it than just some listeners might think of finding the time. It’s more than just finding the time.
Deni
You know? Yeah, that is true. The time, though, I must tell you, is kind of a, it’s the focal point. I mean, there’s certainly more to it than just researching and writing. You’re right. There’s, there’s the, a part of the research is the travel, right, necessary to get the information from archives or from interviews or from exercises that you need to write a book in the national security field.
Right. But you know, from the typical faculty members perspective, the issue really is one mostly of time. Having concentrated time to write a book. That is a rare thing in our world. And so, the opportunity to do that came, and I chose to pursue it. Of course, you’ve got to pitch a project. It’s not a right. But you’ve got the potential to have a sabbatical.
You apply for it. And so, I put together an application on this project that we’re going to discuss. And, and I was lucky enough to have the War college bless it. And so I had this academic year, ten months to work on this book project and attempt to complete it in that space of time.
Deveraux
That’s awesome. That’s a really neat opportunity. I’m excited to see what came out of it. And I did get a chance to see a little teaser article that that’s out and about. But if you could tell us a little bit about your pitch from what you thought the project was going to be, and then kind of how it’s developed over these last ten months?
Deni
Sure. Well, the project is about Europe’s role in a US China flight, probably over Taiwan, but I include other scenarios as well. And the reason why I chose to tackle that topic was that I saw in the literature on US-Chinese competition, strategic competition, or conflict over Taiwan, most experts in our country, most academics in North America, tend to pay very little attention to allies.
If they do, they address the Japanese, the Australians, allies in the Indo-Pacific. And of course, that makes sense, right? If they devote any attention at all to Europe, and Europe is largely disregarded, if they devote any attention to it, they sort of wave it off in nearly the same breath, because the argument is typically that Europe doesn’t have the capacity or the capability to do much of anything in the Indo-Pacific.
So why would we look at them to help us in what could be a big fight against the Chinese? Right. I just thought that was frankly inaccurate, and it underestimated the scale of the conflict that could be coming. And it’s breadth, right? I think of this as a potential conflict between the US and China as far more than just a military fight.
If something like this happened, it’s very likely to spread into the economic domain. It may even begin their effect. It will include the diplomatic realm, obviously, the information space, cyber, space, etc. multiple domains. Well beyond the question of whether or not Europe can deploy an aircraft carrier into the Indo-Pacific. So that’s why I chose to do it. And I’ve sort of tried to frame the project in, again, the sort of broad context of what could a potential conflict with China look like.
And then what kind of help would the US need in these various domains? And that’s really that’s probably the second half of the book. The first half of the book is more about how would we bring allies on board in this effort. How has the US in the past built coalitions to engage in diplomatic or military initiatives near and far from home?
And so those that’s really the broad framing and then the two specific halves of the book, if you will. And at the very end, I take those two halves of the book and try to kind of marry them. Okay. If this is what we need from Europe for this kind of a scenario, what do we pull from our toolkit of coalition building and coalition maintenance to make it happen so that we can successfully gain the resistance?
Deveraux
It’s really neat, and I would assume based on especially the comment about the maintenance, but based on your findings, a lot of the recommendations are going to be pre-conflict. What are we doing to try to build the capabilities, build the partnership, and maybe just help others understand that the problem isn’t isolated necessarily just to the Pacific?
Deni
Yeah, a lot of it is pre-conflict Brennan. And I think that’s where one of the major recommendations is that we should not, in the US, presume simultaneity. Okay. Simultaneity is this concept very popular right now in political science and national security circles regarding the potential for a simultaneous war between the US and China and between, let’s say, the West, broadly speaking, anchored by the US and Russia.
Okay. And the thinking, the sort of conventional wisdom right now is that simultaneity is likely to occur. But if it doesn’t, we need to plan for that, in any case. It’s a worst-case scenario, right? We should plan for it. I’m not saying we shouldn’t, but what it has led to in some cases is from a policymaking perspective, is an effort on the part of some and policymaking circles to essentially tell the Europeans, “Thanks, but no thanks. Even at this pre conflict stage, we don’t want your assistance in the Indo-Pacific. We want you to focus on the Russia challenge. We’ll worry about China. You stay focused on the Russia challenge in Europe.” And we’ve seen this emerge in open-source reporting. In fact, that was a major impetus to the project. When I began to see there was a news article, I want to say last spring or early summer regarding comments made by senior Department of Defense or Department of War officials to the United Kingdom regarding a deployment of an aircraft carrier, a British carrier group, to the Indo-Pacific.
And the opinion was expressed by the Americans at this meeting that, you know, we ought to consider bringing that carrier back and instead focusing on the Russians. As I said, I think simultaneity needs to be something that the Pentagon plans for. Right. Again, it’s worst-case scenario planning. That’s what the Pentagon needs to do. But to assume that all scenarios short of that are somehow impossible, that we shouldn’t plan for those as well, doesn’t make sense to me.
Okay, so it seems to me that it would be far more sensible for us to engage Europeans now in this topic. What would happen if the Chinese engaged in a blockade of Taiwan? What would happen if the Chinese began to show signs of a potential assault of Taiwan? How would they react if the US and China got into a shooting war?
These are conversations we need to be having with our closest allies now, so that we can call on them when the time is needed. The research that I’ve done on this project regarding coalition building, and here, I’m really standing on the shoulders of others. Right? It’s almost a meta analysis. So I do sort of a literature review, if you will, of what political scientists and historians have said about how we Americans build coalitions.
And it may come as a surprise to many, you know, the countries that join us in these endeavors, whether it’s the Korean War or the Vietnam War or very recently, Afghanistan, Iraq, or now Iran. Usually when countries join us in these efforts, our interests don’t perfectly align with theirs. In fact, the coalition that’s built is usually done through really skilled, focused and time intensive diplomacy.
And that’s a central argument of the book right now that that, that that real difficult spade work needs to occur now, not after the bullets start flying.
Deveraux
And I would be curious, and I would assume that when we start talking about building the potential contributions from these countries, the further we’re aligning interests, probably the more disparity we have in level of commitment they might bring to the fight. Right? So, it’s not necessarily everyone is going to send those aircraft carriers, but maybe a small company of electromagnetic specialists.
Right. You know, what is a contribution a country can do while still saving face for what could be an immediate problem? Because I thought it was really interesting you talked about how the US says, “hey, maybe keep focusing on the Russia problem.” But I can only imagine Poland or Lithuania is also thinking, “you know what, I have to keep at least an eye on this Russia problem.”
Deni
Yeah, that’s exactly right. I mean, the fact of the matter is, you know, the NATO alliance is now 32 member states. It is very difficult to get all 32 on the same page regarding perceptions. And I don’t make any claim in the book that or stake any expectation to the notion that the US will be able to convince, as you suggested, Poland to send elements of its navy, its air force to the Indo-Pacific.
Right? I mean, these countries in Europe are going to have different threat perception, and we cannot know what their threat perceptions might be at some future date. However, we can make some good, educated guesses about the countries that would be most likely to be willing or potentially willing to join us in some kind of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific.
And I go through this exercise in the book of sort of examining in each of these different capability areas that the allies have, whether it’s military capabilities. And there I kind of do a deep dive on what would we be the air domain or the land domain, etc. I look at their economic capabilities as well in terms of finance or industry, and then their diplomatic skill sets.
Right. And the diplomatic strengths around the world or their information strengths. You know, you might think of the UK with the BBC as having a broad reach in terms of information operations, potentially. The point is there needs to be diplomatic work done to figure out what does this constellation of allies and potential capabilities look like, depending upon or corresponding to the kind of scenario we might face.
And so, it really is a detailed effort, and this is what I undertake in the book, to try to map all of this. Right. If there’s a certain kind of scenario that we’re involved in with China over Taiwan, let’s say a blockade, well, they’re going to be certain kinds of things we might need assistance with. We might not need the full gamut of capabilities that Europeans have, you know, in the cupboard.
We want to instead make very targeted requests. And that’s where historically we’ve seen success when they part of American administrations going back decades, as I mentioned, the Korean War is actually one of the one of the case studies in my book in which I explain how Americans have built coalitions. And the result of that is a list of five best practices, if you will, for coalition construction, and then a separate list of five best practices for coalition maintenance.
Deveraux
That’s really interesting you use the Korean War as a case study. I concede, yes, it definitely was, you know, a demonstration of coalition building. But it’s also, it rhymes a little bit with the modern problem you’re looking at where the US very openly was still concerned about then the Soviet Union. But the, you know, the European problem.
Deni
Yeah, exactly. Right. And this is one of the most interesting parts of the analysis of this, what I call a literature review. But that sounds frankly kind of boring. But it’s really, it’s a look back through these case studies and how the Americans essentially succeeded in getting countries that you would think wouldn’t have a dog in some of these fights.
Right. The Korean War being a very good example of this. Right. Nonetheless, Americans convincing even European powers that this was vital for them to expend blood and treasure in a conflict in some initiative that we were leading halfway around the world. And so, there’s a yeah, there’s a strong body of evidence indicating that we’ve got a pretty good track record of this when we make the effort.
Right. And that is the key is diplomatic spade work, done in advance, and by the experts. That’s what we need to see happen here.
Deveraux
Yeah. And the “in advance” I think is key. I’m actually really curious as we talk about challenging diplomatic efforts, especially in advance, a lot of the narrative that I’ve seen for why it could be potentially dangerous for European assets to pull out is because it presents Russia and opportunity. If Russia is an opportunist to say, okay, if there was a time to try to capitalize, now is the time.
Capabilities are leaving the West. The US focus is elsewhere. I’d be curious, and maybe you don’t address it in the book, but I’d be curious on thoughts on engaging diplomatically early on with Russia, similarly to with allies, to say, you know, hey, what does a conflict with China between the United States and China mean to Russia?
Deni
I don’t spend too much time in the book addressing the question of how the US would attempt to sideline the Russians in any US-China conflict, it’s more focused on how do we build the coalition of our friends, frankly. Nonetheless, what you’ve described is absolutely critical, right? I think we would expect and we would hope and expect a future administration and its European allies to try to deter the Russians from doing anything to assist the Chinese, similar in the way that we are now seeing the US and its European allies trying to deter China from assisting Russia in its war in Ukraine with, as we know, limited success.
But I want to get out one of the other topics that you raised in that that last question, and that is don’t we need if there is a conflict between the US and China and the Americans begin pulling out even more capability from Europe in order to deal with the Chinese challenge, wouldn’t we expect the Europeans to be timid about devoting too much of their own capacity and capabilities in Europe in order to maintain deterrence with the Russians, or, worst case scenario, push back against Russian adventurism while the US is engaged against China.
I think there’s something to that clearly. In the analysis in the book, you know, when I take a look at, for example, the military capabilities that Europeans might have to offer, tactical air and land power is one of those that I address in the book specifically, noting or concluding, that this is not an area where the US should expect to find European assistance forthcoming.
It’s not an area we should be asking for their help for two reasons. One, I think tactical air and tactical land power. For the most part. There may be some exceptions, but for the most part, less useful in an Indo-Pacific conflict with China over Taiwan, but more importantly, far more useful in a European effort to defend and against and push back and kind of Russian adventurism.
So, I totally agree with you that we need to be very careful about what we would ask the Europeans for, given the potential for a Russian challenge.
Deveraux
No, that makes sense. And to your point, they’re very different types of conflict where we’re quick to say war, but a war in the Pacific and a war in Europe, probably very different capabilities needed, especially early on, to really set the conditions for that conflict.
Deni
And you’re seeing that that analysis coming out now publicly in the form of some of the press releases. Just in the last week over Americans previewing for their NATO allies what’s to come here in in just a few weeks and early June, regarding what the US may or may not include in the American contribution to the NATO force model.
Right. And there have been press reports about the US holding back, specifically strategic air power, strategic airlift, and some naval assets for planning purposes against the Russians that would instead be needed over in the Indo-Pacific. And so the point is, the Americans are appear to be going through the hard work of analyzing what do we really need to potentially pull out of Europe or potentially not offer to Europe if there’s a conflict in the European theater while we keep our eye on China?
So I think that that hard analysis work continues to occur.
Deveraux
Yeah, I think we see it in some modernization efforts as well in the force looking at how we’re thinking about what that next war could be and then potentially retooling what makes up the force. Not an overhaul by any means, but we’re definitely seeing some, some major shifts. So, the book, you’re back, I got the email today said, “hey, I’m back, team, let’s let me get back in the fight.”
Is the book complete? We’re you able to get the draft done in that ten-month period?
Deni
To my chagrin, Brennan, no, I was not. It’s been quite an effort, frankly. I have written as of, I think, the end of last week, close to 70,000 words. So over ten months, that’s not a bad rate of writing and research. And, you know, that’s when you think about that. Divide that by ten months. It’s almost one article every month.
So that’s I feel good about what I have produced. But yeah, I think I’m not quite done. I’m probably at about the 80 or 90% mark. I had when I was pitching this project that publishers. I told them I would be complete with it in the summer of 2026. And I think I’m still on target for that.
But yeah, the book will continue to unfold here as I return to normal duties after this ten-month sabbatical ended just yesterday.
Deveraux
Well, I hope to see that soon. Do you have a publisher locked in?
Deni
I am in conversations with publishers now, and I’m not yet prepared to say where it will land, but I’m confident it will be published. That’s the good news. And yeah, we’ll have to TBD (to be determined) that’ll be announced later, I believe.
Deveraux
Okay. That’s fair. And then timeline obviously will be TBD as well.
Deni
Yeah. Although, you know, having gone through this now a couple of times, I expect it will probably be out early 2027. My, my, I’ve been really making a concerted effort to, with the publishers to ensure that they can meet that timeline, given what we know about what Chinese leadership has told the military regarding potential conflicts over Taiwan, and so that the timing of the book is very important.
I wanted to come out, of course, before there’s any kind of conflict or crisis.
Deveraux
Yeah, you’ll get a lot more readers pre the milestone of 2027 than you will post. Right. But we can get a quick glimpse. I did see you guys posted an article. You and your intern. Can you talk a little bit about some of the things you decided to share in the article? Obviously not, you know, the book’s analysis, but a couple of the highlights.
Deni
Yeah, I can tell you, you know, I’ve had the pleasure over the past couple of years of working with a number of very talented undergraduate research interns. Last summer, one of those students from the College of William and Mary Alexander Lekarev, helped me to sort of kick this project off, doing some preliminary research. And then over the course of the fall, the two of us continued to massage this preliminary product that we created that’s kind of an elevator pitch or a, you know, a very short version of the book in which we lay out the arguments that I’ve been talking to you about, that in fact, a fight with China is going to be if there is one, it’s going to be massive that we will need. We Americans will need all the help we can get, not simply from allies in the Indo-Pacific, but from allies around the world.
And the Europeans are, in fact, in a place we should be looking. And we suggest in the in, in this, in this piece at
Breaking Defense that the Europeans could contribute in terms of military forces. We specifically look at the role that attack submarines might play the merchant marine forces that Europe has, as well as mine hunting and mine clearing.
And then, of course, we look at the economic realm as well, especially European defense industry, but also the ability of Europeans to help us finance our debt. We’re likely to have to increase defense spending significantly in the event of a major war with China, and that will require some kind of debt financing. And we could use Europeans help there.
We also look at European information operations capabilities. I mentioned the BBC earlier. But the French through France 24 and the Germans through Deutsche Bela also have worldwide information presence and could be very helpful in terms of setting the record straight and counteracting or pushing back against Chinese and or Russian disinformation. And then, of course, we look at the role that the EU might play, especially in the economic realm, but also in the diplomatic realm, when it comes to leveraging the collective power that Europe has also.
Deveraux
That’s really good. One of the things I love to think about as a planner, when I go and I start getting a little more tactical and drawing my arrows on maps and, you know, blue boxes here and there is that the enemy always gets a vote. And I’d be curious if you thought about and I know it’s not necessarily the root of your analysis, but if you thought about China’s efforts or thoughts on how the America could build a coalition.
I know when we started talking about missile deployments into Asia, China was very quick to do its best to kind of counter the Western narrative to deter these potential coalitions. So I’d be curious if you took China into account at all, as they extend off into Europe to see if they can’t kind of keep the West limited in what they bring to power?
Deni
Yeah, definitely, Brennan. That’s a great question. I devote a lot of attention, actually, to the role that China will play in trying to spoil any American coalition building effort. Of course, the first and most obvious one is Chinese efforts in the UN to thwart any kind of United Nations Security Council effort. Right. And this is, this could potentially be critical.
One of the five variables I mentioned earlier, there were five variables very, very important for coalition building, is legitimacy and the greatest source of legitimacy for international initiatives, whether they’re in the military realm, diplomatic or economic, whatever, is the UN. At least in European eyes and largely in the eyes of many countries around the world. The Chinese, of course, hold a veto there until we can expect the UN Security Council to do probably nothing right to authorize no military action.
But the Chinese also hold some economic leverage over the Europeans. Right. In terms of the market access that that the Europeans have in China. And we should expect the Chinese to use that to try to dissuade Europeans from doing anything vis a vis China. But, you know, my sense is we made much we in the US made much the same argument regarding Europeans and Russia prior to 2014 and 2022, the dates of the two separate Russian invasions of Ukraine, in which we argued, “oh, well, the Russian control over Europe’s energy means Europe is not going to be a player.”
And then we see what happened, right? Who could have guessed in 2013 that Europeans would be able and willing to cut themselves off for the most part of Russian gas and oil? They’re not. They’re completely. But for the most part, that’s happened. Nobody foresaw that. Right. And so we can’t really stake an accurate claim of analysis with any with 100% certainty that Europe will be constrained by these Chinese efforts.
I have no doubt China will try, but we don’t yet know the circumstances of that future crisis or conflict. And so we can’t rule out the fact that Europeans may indeed be willing to join us in some capacity.
Deveraux
No, I think that’s really good. But it’s also important. And I think you hit on a head that it’s an effort and it’s a battle. But China is going to be in that conversation. And they if they want to win whatever their objectives are as well they should. Right. And America gains power from these big alliances where China doesn’t necessarily have that.
So I just think that’s an interesting dynamic to think about. When we think about, it’s not just us convincing Poland to send us something. It’s also there, you know, there’s a bug in their ear that’s not just Russia’s on your doorstep. It’s China whispering Russia’s on your doorstep and it’s China maybe whispering to someone else. “Oh, I would hate it if the supply of X slowed to your region” or something like that.
It just changes the dynamic of this, you know, people-to-people conversation as you talk about, you know, a world leader talking to another world leader, not only is that world leader having to look at his domestic population, but he has some other external powers kind of weighing on him. I’m thinking like a gangster movie, right? “I sure hate it if your shop would get damaged, but you know, I’m here to offer some protection in case it doesn’t.” It’s just an interesting dynamic of the conversation.
Deni
Yeah, Brennan, you’re exactly right. This is one of the, it’s kind of a double-edged sword, actually. You know, the Chinese are far more integrated into the world economy today than the Russians were prior to their invasion of Ukraine. Right. China is the top trading partner for over 100 countries around the world. And so we should expect that they’re going to realize some power from those kind of economic ties.
That kind of in some cases is an economic dependency, right? But at the same time, that opens up avenues of leverage, that embeddedness of the Chinese in the global economy opens up opportunities to deter and dissuade the Chinese from crisis or conflict. And so, I see it really as a double-edged sword.
Deveraux
No, that’s a good point. I would love to share with you. And I’d be curious. And I’ve said it to a couple, a couple of the guests as we’ve kind of foreshadowed upcoming project. But you’re tracking here at the War College we’ve been working on a future China War book as well, with a very different lens, focusing on the China lens.
But the European chapter ended up turning out really well by Daryl Driver and Joel Hilson. It’s called “Excluded from the Equation: How China can Keep Europe out of the [War]. I’d be very curious to kind of see, you know, you’re two big analyzes kind of clash there to see where there’s overlap. Kind of where you guys talked about the same thing, some of the same challenges. Or even just looked at the problem completely different. And I’d have no issues sending you over their chapter. It’s in copy-edit right now. It’ll be published hopefully later this year. But really contrasts exactly what you’re talking about, which is the US has got to get Europe in there. And Daryl Driver and Joel Hilson are like, here’s exactly how China can keep Europe from joining the fight.
So I think it’s just your spot on that it’s a, it’s an important conversation, and it’s one we need to have before there’s a conflict. And I’m glad that it’s being had. I’m glad it’s being had in numerous different ways. I think it’ll be a really good conversation. Having spent a lot of time on that project, I’m looking forward to seeing your book when it comes out.
Deni
Well, Brennan, I’m hoping to actually cite that work. I think my…
Deveraux
Which I would be all for.
Deni
I’m sure you would. I’m very aware of the expertise of Daryl and Joel. They’re great colleagues and fellow NATO geeks, as I am. And so, yeah, I was hoping to rope their work into my own analysis. Two more of the shoulders that I hope to stand on in this. And I’m aware, of course, of your work on that, that broader project.
Deveraux
Which I think is going to be really good and I definitely will share it with you. And then I said, I’m going to read yours as soon as it comes out to see kind of how we looked at the problem differently, because I know we both talked about this when you were beginning your sabbatical.
And I’m actually going to shift us over. I said at the beginning, this was going to be my last session as the guest host. Unless you need me. I’m still in the wings and I’m not going far. But do you want to talk about the future of SSI live? I know if those listeners haven’t heard yet, we have transitioned. Our organization is now SRAD, not SSI.
I don’t know if you’re changing the name. This one’s still going to launch as SSI Live. And then I know you have to finish that book, but are you going to be able to have time to bring in some guests and kind of jump back in where you were before you took your sabbatical?
Deni
Yeah. Brennan, I’ll tell you, that’s that is, or was certainly my hope I have been. First, I want to say I’ve been grateful that you have taken the reins here at
SSI Live. Over the last ten months, I have been an avid listener in between my own writing and research, and so they’ve been a great series of Brennan Deveraux led podcasts.
So I’ve been grateful for your efforts. Thank you. It’s been really fantastic to hear those. Where SSI live goes from here is really unclear to me. As you mentioned, as our listeners may know, we are undergoing some change here at the US Army War College. And so, it, you know, it may not. I’m not sure what the future holds for
SSI Live.
Frankly, I will say, you know, when I started this podcast for SSI, gosh, over ten years now, I want to say 2013, 2014, somewhere in there, this was the only US Army War College podcast. But as you know very well, now there are 3 or 4 others that have joined in the effort to examine the kind of work that goes on at the War College to get our research out there, to sort of leverage the expertise of our faculty and our students.
And so, you know,
SSI Live kind of exists in a different world now than when it first started. So I would ask listeners to have some patience as we figure out the way ahead. But, you know, speaking of the way ahead, Brennan, I don’t know if listeners have yet heard about your way ahead. You are moving on to, to, I think, bigger and better things after this stint at SSI? Where are you headed next?
Deveraux
Yeah, I would say “different” things. This has been my favorite assignment in the Army so far and I’ve been in for 17 years. So that’s saying something. But yeah, so I was lucky enough to be selected for a fellowship program through the Army called the Goodpastor Fellowship, or ASP3 (Advanced Strategic Planning and Policy Program). I am going to go get my PhD in history from your alma mater, the George Washington University.
So I’m taking off here for a summer course at Fort Leavenworth in a couple of days. Probably by the time this publishes, I’ll be on a plane. And then in the fall, I’m going to start diving into some early Cold War history and see what I can uncover to help us look at modern problems using some historical insights.
Deni
Brennan it sounds fantastic. I can think of no better candidate to take on that challenge. You have really been a great asset for SSI in the US Army War College. I am sad to see you go, but if you’re going to go on anywhere from SSI, it is great to know that you are going to be continuing to build your own knowledge and build the body of knowledge that is the political science and history of the national security enterprise.
So thank you for all your efforts here, and I look forward to seeing your dissertation when published as a book eventually.
Deveraux
Yeah, that one might be a little bit slower than the one you did on your sabbatical. It’s a process, they say, right. Well, John, I’m going to officially hand you back over the reins for
SSI Live. I know you’re going to work through, as you said, the process. But if you’ll allow me, I’ll still close out this episode as my final go.
So, listeners, for more of those podcasts that John just mentioned, as we’ve added a few more channels, check out
Decisive Point,
Conversations on Strategy,
CLSC (China Landpower Studies Center) Dialogues, and
A Better Peace.
Deni
You can now find
SSI Live on TuneIn radio and on popular podcast directories like Stitcher—and at the iTunes Store. If you have any comments on our podcast, thoughts on what you’d like to see addressed, or a response to something you heard here at
SSI Live, please go to our website. That’s SSI.armywarcollege.edu. Find me, John Deni, in the staff directory, and send me an e-mail. I look forward to hearing from you. For the
SSI Live podcast series, I’m John Deni. Thanks for listening.