Joaquin Camarena
©2026 Joaquin Camarena
CLSC Quick Takes offer expert analysis of select sources and provide timely insight in a succinct format rather than as formally cited academic products.
Discovery
In mid-June 2026, China Live News released a video segment about an air defense battalion likely from the 125th Amphibious Combined Arms Brigade (ACAB) that conducted a nighttime live-fire exercise along the coast of southern Fujian to test the unit’s rapid response and precision-strike capabilities. The exercise involved HN-6B MANPADS teams and an HQ-17A surface-to-air missile (SAM) battery setting up ambush sites to intercept target drones at sea and along the coast. Several teams rode Type-05 armored personnel carriers (APCs) into the open sea to set up ambush positions and intercept the drones after receiving flight-path information from other units. Other teams conducted simulated ambushes using HN-6Bs located in concealed positions after receiving warnings about the flight paths. The HQ-17A battery tracked and engaged a target drone that simulated a cruise missile as it entered the designated airspace.
Analysis
The exercise conducted by the 125th ACAB demonstrates how the unit would employ its air defense battalions to protect landing sites and other locations from cruise missiles and other aerial threats. The PLA Army (PLAA) understands that these landing sites (or staging areas) would require layered air defenses of various anti-aircraft systems. The ACAB’s air defense battalions would provide short-range protection while air defense brigades and other units would intercept targets at longer ranges. The PGZ-09 anti-aircraft gun batteries and MANPADS teams would ambush aircraft or drones conducting air strikes or reconnaissance missions against the sites. Additionally, MANPADS teams would be stationed on Type-05 APCs and other Type-05 amphibious vehicles in the waters near these sites to enhance air defense coverage and increase target interception. The HQ-17A batteries would also intercept cruise missiles and other precision-guided munitions (PGMs) launched at the sites. The individual detachments would be able to send and receive information about threats to other units assigned to the air defense network.
Figure 2. A MANPADS team aims an HN-6B missile toward a target during an air defense exercise
(Source: “[
新闻直播间]
陆军 防空导弹实射 提升快反精确打击能力” [Live News, Army Air Defense Missile Live-Fire Exercise Improves Rapid Reaction and Precision-Strike Capabilities], June 11, 2026,
https://tv.cctv.cn/2026/06/11/VIDEZQrFEJq6FUvBtB32Z8Rx260611.shtml.)
Implications
The training of MANPADS teams to target air threats from Type-05 APCs and concealed positions demonstrates that the PLAA still values these skills—even with the development of the HQ-13 and other surface-to-air missile systems that provide anti-air platforms to amphibious units. The ACABs and PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) marine brigades continue to train personnel to launch MANPADS from Type-05 APCs and other Type-05 amphibious vehicles because of the value this capability brings to the units (for example, enhancing the air defense coverage provided to the landing units by the HQ-13 SAM systems). The teams would also serve as a second line of defense if the HQ-13s exhaust their missile supplies while engaging targets, allowing the teams to continue protecting the units as they head toward the beaches. The PLAA and the PLANMC view the ability of the MANPADS teams to employ hunter-killer team tactics to engage aircraft and drones from concealed positions as necessary to increase the threat posed to aircraft and drones when flying at low altitudes, so they would be forced to fly higher and be exposed to more potent air defense systems. Additionally, the hunter-killer teams would enhance the location’s defensive capabilities by protecting the landing sites and staging areas alongside other air defense systems.
Strategic Message
The exercise shows that the PLAA can network its tactical air defense units into an integrated air defense system (IADS) to defend landing sites and amphibious vehicles during beach landings using kinetic and non-kinetic systems capable of intercepting air threats at both short and long ranges. The 125th ACAB’s air defense battalions would fill the short-range and point defense roles within the IADS and work with other systems to defend the sites. For example, the teams operating from Type-05 vehicles would use hunter-killer tactics and information sent by other air defense units to move into positions to intercept aircraft and drones. The ability to move rapidly during and after engagement, however, complicates the planning of strike missions conducted by aircraft, drones, or warships. These teams would also serve as surveillance nodes within the IADS via datalink or radio, relaying information to other air defense units about approaching aircraft and PGMs, thereby increasing the detection and engagement of potential air threats before they can destroy the landing sites.
Analysis Source: “[新闻直播间]陆军 防空导弹实射 提升快反精确打击能力” [Live News, Army Air Defense Missile Live-Fire Exercise Improves Rapid Reaction and Precision-Strike Capabilities], June 11, 2026, https://tv.cctv.cn/2026/06/11/VIDEZQrFEJq6FUvBtB32Z8Rx260611.shtml.
Keywords: CLSC, amphibious, ZSB-05, Type 05, air defense, MANPADS, HN-5B, HQ-13, HQ-17A, ambush, hunter-killer tactics
Joaquin Camarena
Joaquin Camarena is a former United States Marine Corps intelligence analyst who runs Sino Talk, an entity devoted to monitoring the PLA’s developing capabilities. His main focuses are PLAN and PLANMC expeditionary capabilities and PLA modernization efforts.
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