Strategic Competition in the Arctic

Antulio J. Echevarria II and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe

 

Listen to why the Arctic is becoming increasingly important from one who has been there.

Keywords: Arctic, strategic competition, United Kingdom, Russia, China, Svalbard

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Introduction  
Welcome to Conversations on Strategy, the companion podcast to the US Army War College Strategic Competition Center. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests, and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.
           

Antulio J. Echevarria II (Host)
Well, hello listeners. Today, I have a special privilege to have Professor Caroline Kennedy-Pipe from Loughborough University [United Kingdom]. She’s the professor of war studies there, and she is recently back from a trip to the Arctic. And, she’s going to talk to us a little bit about strategic competition in the Arctic. So, Caroline, why don’t you just tell us a little bit about yourself and how you became interested in the Arctic.
           

Caroline Kennedy-Pipe       
So, I’ve always been interested in Russia. Many years ago, of course, it was known as the former Soviet Union. But 15 years ago, in the United Kingdom (UK), we became keenly aware of what we saw as increased Russian militarism in and around Greenland, Iceland, and what we call the Greenland–Iceland–UK Gap (GUIK). The UK is reliant on friends and allies, such as Norway, for our energy supplies, and we became concerned over what we saw as President Putin’s threats towards our security on the northern flank.

This engendered or inspired in me a desire to know more about the Arctic and about security arrangements. So, we started studying the UK’s position in the Arctic. Now we are not—unlike the United States and Canada—an Arctic state, but we regard ourselves by virtue of Scotland, as a near friend and neighbor. And, of course, the north of Scotland is closer to the Arctic than it is to the powers in Westminster.

We are dependent on the Arctic in terms of climate change. And, increasingly, we’re beginning to see, as I sit here today, the Arctic is melting and melting fast. That means that new sea routes are opening up, particularly the Northern Sea Route. And, although no one believes that the Arctic will be ice-free for at least two generations, increasingly ships [and] vessels are beginning to transit the Arctic with increasing ease for some parts of the year.

That means that the riches of the Arctic, the oil, gas reserves, and the rare earth minerals are going to become increasingly accessible. We in the UK, also, as a member of NATO, have been increasingly concerned. It seems with climate change, with great-power ambitions, and the position of the United Kingdom, that the Arctic is no longer a place apart. It is no longer exceptional.

And, let me quickly add, that of course, Siberia—Russian Siberia—has been attacked as part and parcel of the Ukraine war. Indigenous people in the Arctic have been recruited to President Putin’s war in Ukraine, and there has been a general spillover into the Arctic of the demands to meet Russian aggression. Most notably, of course, Finland and Sweden have joined the NATO alliance. So, seven of the eight Arctic states are now in NATO. More latterly, I visit Svalbard every summer. Svalbard is an archipelago just south of the North Pole, which by treaty, a treaty that is now over 100 years old, is governed by Norwegian sovereignty. But, here’s the thing: The Russians have a settlement on Svalbard (formerly used for coal mining) still in some use, and a presence that we believe the Russians are increasing.

This means that the Russians have a foothold in NATO territory, and in territory, an archipelago that sits on the cusp of the Barents Sea, thus, allowing and permitting the Russians a foothold not just on the archipelago, but [on] the transit route for their submarines to cross through into the waters I described. Therefore, this is an extremely interesting place.

I should add, I study the European Arctic. There is, of course, a Pacific Arctic, and so the Arctic is not one place. It is a series of different places, all connected though, across the top of the globe by water. So, we understand the water as a maritime space surrounded by land. And, the intriguing thing is that nobody owns a central Arctic Ocean.

This, therefore, is a place of exploration of oil and gas and increasingly of potential military confrontation. Let me just add, before I stop, it is also, of course, a nuclear space. If there is to be a nuclear confrontation between East and West, it will be most likely in the Arctic, as the Russians have most of their capabilities on the Kola Peninsula. And President Trump has certainly signaled disquiet that Russian missiles might cross Greenland and hit the east coast of America. So, nature, climate change, and militarism all meet in the European Arctic.


Host   
That’s well laid out. Thank you very much. Obviously, the Arctic has some special challenges, climate-wise and otherwise, perhaps. Could you elaborate on those? What makes the Arctic unique as an area of competition due to the extreme temperature potential and so on?


Kennedy-Pipe           
Historically, certainly during the first Cold War, we understood the Arctic as frozen, a place apart. Submarine warfare could take place under the ice. It was possible to hide, and it was possible for East and West to signal, to perform to each other, that the Cold War was there, particularly in the maritime domain. But all was protected by the ice. And for Russia, the melting of the Arctic, and it’s disappearing fast, the ice, made it so Russia felt protected—or the Soviet Union as it was then. Increasingly now, the Russians know, with the Arctic disappearing, with trade routes and vessels entering what is now becoming still a place that is far away but increasingly cluttered, they are more vulnerable.

Add into climate change and (as I said, the glaciers are melting, that is obvious on Svalbard) we have a new array of actors entering the Arctic because it’s now possible [to do so]. So, Russia, the United States, Canada, these are legitimate actors. They are Arctic states. They are on the Arctic Council. But China, Korea, India, Türkiye have all positioned themselves as Arctic friends and allies, or in China’s case, a near-Arctic state.

This might seem a preposterous claim given where China [and] Korea sit, but China sees advantages here. By moving into the Arctic with its soft power, it has not yet militarized its presence. It seeks to create what we call a “polar Silk Road,” as opposed to its Silk Road through Central Asia. It seeks to buy up territories and influence to gain a foothold in these places, which are going to be absolutely crucial to the mining of rare earth minerals.

So, it’s an extraordinary feature of the Arctic that more states than ever are moving in. Now, in the Arctic, the way a state becomes an Arctic player is through science. And so, China, Türkiye, India all claim to be engaged, and they are, with scientific endeavor on places like the Svalbard archipelago. Once in, through science, they have a presence. They have a stake in what happens in the Arctic. And, presence in the Arctic is everything. So, climate change is allowing new actors, not just states, commercial ventures, into the Arctic, to try and exploit its riches.


Host
I’m going to ask you at this point to look into your crystal ball, as it were, and tell us, [in] 10 to 20 years, what developments strategists should be thinking about and watching for strategic competition in the Arctic.


Kennedy-Pipe           
I think it is fair to say that Russia cannot go away. It is the predominant Arctic power because of its northern coastline. President Putin has made it his personal endeavor to try and reinvigorate the Russian Arctic. Bases have been remilitarized, and people have been moved northwards into these extreme conditions to repopulate the Arctic. It is of crucial importance to the future of the Russian economy.

More latterly, the United States, having ignored the Arctic for many years until the first Trump administration, and now more latterly Canada, can see the potential of what will happen if Russia and China take advantage in the Arctic. With the melting of the ice, what we see, therefore, is increased tonnage of shipping. Still, nothing compares to [the] Suez [Canal]. So, the great powers, if I can call them that, are reigniting the competition in the Arctic.

So, with [my] crystal ball blazing away, the Arctic will melt, increasingly, and more states and actors will move in. There’s a question of what happens to the 4 million indigenous people [living there]. And here’s a prediction: As the Arctic melts, it will see urbanization. People are moving into the cities away from traditional habitats because of climate change. The terrain is being shifted.

So, we’ll see a very different Arctic. The glaciers will melt, and we’ll therefore see the top of the world as exposed. I should note that the competition at the top of the world is also mirrored by competition at the south of the world. Polar politics is connected. But what we’re watching is great powers like China moving in, buying up a lot of the turf, and establishing what we might call an Asian presence in the European Arctic. That’s a concern.

What I think we’ll see from the UK, and we have our troubles, as you know, we will increasingly emphasize by the northern flank and our commitment to our friends and allies. And here’s the thing, we will increasingly concentrate not just on the prospect of a nuclear exchange, but on hybrid warfare. Because the thing about the Arctic is, particularly if you look at the United Kingdom and moving further north, undersea cables connect the Arctic. Svalbard has cables which run down to Norway. If they are cut, that remote community cannot communicate. So, we’re looking at hybrid warfare, which I see increasing in the Arctic. So, climate change, communication, riches—it’s a pretty potent brew for some form of conflict.


Host   
Certainly, it is. It’s quite an impressive crystal ball you’ve got there.

So, let me wrap this up by asking you to what extent do you think the Arctic is, in some ways, a model for strategic competition among the great powers? You’ve already laid out quite a bit for us, but I wonder if you could cap it as we close out here.


Kennedy-Pipe           
The interesting feature of the Arctic is how many states are able and willing to fight in those conditions and have the capability and training to do so. This is not the central front in Europe. This is where extreme conditions are. The ice still makes movement, maneuverability, extremely difficult. So, fighting in the Arctic, the Finns know this only too well, is a tough, tough choice.

So, it’s preparation. It’s deterrence. But it’s also looking at the human elements of warfare. Now we think—you know this better than anyone from your writings—we think that we can use technologies like uncrewed systems to somehow gobble up the space, prevent us [from] having to deploy men and women into that terrain. The interesting thing about uncrewed systems is they don’t work very well in the Arctic because of the extreme temperatures.

So, that human to element, that element of sacrifice, I think of the campaigns of the Second World War in the Arctic. I think will always remain with us. So, it’s the durability of the human face of war that I don’t think you can get away from in the Arctic.


Host   
Yes. Well, thank you very much, Caroline, this has been very informative and very enjoyable, and I look forward to our next opportunity to talk. Thank you so much.


Kennedy-Pipe           
Thank you so much. Pleasure.


Conclusion
You can find more resources and information about the Strategic Competition Center at ssi.armywarcollege.edu/Research-Commentary/Strategic-Competition-Center/. For more Army War College podcasts, check out Decisive Point, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.